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1. Introduction 
 
Today, it is widely accepted that competition law constitutes a fundamental instrument for 
competitiveness, economic growth, and consumer welfare. In particular, the main objective of 
competition law and policy is the attainment of competitive markets with the ultimate purpose of 
allocating resources efficiently and, as a consequence, to ensure that consumers will obtain goods and 
services at the lowest possible prices. The growing number of national and regional competition law 
regimes evidences the global acknowledgement of the importance of this branch of public law for 
economic development. A few decades ago, only a bunch of countries had implemented competition law 
provisions, all of them with well developed economies. Currently, this situation has substantially changed 
provided that over a hundred jurisdictions, with different legal traditions and levels of economic 
development, have introduced some kind of competition law provisions in their national legislations1.  
 This proliferation of competition law has been remarkably fast and has taken place in different 
contexts depending on the jurisdictions in question and on the specific characteristics of these (economic, 
social and political). Particularly, the proliferation of competition law entails that the implementation of 
competition law provisions is no longer exclusive for developed countries that have a long tradition of 
free-market economies; on the contrary, the expansion of this branch of law includes the adoption of 
competition law provisions by developing countries with different levels of experience with market 
processes. 
 In great part, the economic context of nations has provoked the establishment of new 
competition law systems. Traditionally, the support for the development of competition law and policy 
has been associated with the levels of economic development, thus, developed countries came first to 
recognize the desirability of competition policy2.  Accordingly, in jurisdictions that have a long tradition 
of free-market economies the implementation of competition law regimes has occurred at an earlier stage 
than in jurisdictions with centrally planned economic systems and with significant control of the 
                                                          
1 Mehta, Pradeep S. & Evenett, Simon J. (2006), ‘Promoting Competition Around the World: A Diversity of Rationales and 
Approaches’. In: Mehta P.S. Competition Regimes in the World: A Civil Society Report. CUTS International. 
2 Edwards, Corwin D. (1974), ‘The Future of Competition Policy: A World View’, 14 California Management Review. 
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government over the economic activity, e.g. in 1950, the United States alone had a robust antitrust 
system, conversely, countries like China that have been characterized for their strong government control 
have implemented competition law policies more recently3. Consequently, economic reforms, political 
liberalization and the increase of the level of development have constituted important drivers for the 
establishment of competition law systems across the world4, provided that the enactment of antitrust 
provisions has been a fundamental component of the legal reforms that developing countries have 
adopted to move from central planning to market processes5. 
 In addition, the expansion of competition law and the subsequent establishment of new 
competition law regimes have occurred, in many cases, due to the encouragement by and pressure from 
Western countries, multinational donors and advisory bodies6. The participation of these in shaping the 
fundamental commands and institutions of new competition law regimes has taken place at different 
instances. For example, Eastern European countries aspiring for EU membership were required to 
implement competition law provisions into their national legislations, in such cases; advisors from the 
United States and the European Union have helped candidate countries in drafting their competition acts7. 
Similarly, the willingness of developing countries to participate in bilateral trade agreements has 
motivated these nations to adopt competition law provisions, for instance, in 2004; Chile was required to 
reform its competition act in order to sign a free trade agreement with the U.S. More recently, in 2011, the 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia and Peru required the parties to ban 
through their national and regional legislation the most harmful anticompetitive practices. At a regional 
level, the countries which are members of multinational organizations have committed themselves to 
adopt competition law provisions in their national legislations in order to provide market operators with a 
reliable competition environment; such is the case of the ASEAN countries or the members of the Andean 
Community. Finally, in some cases, the implementation of competition law regimes in developing 
countries has been promoted by international organizations and donors, such as the United Nations 
Development Program or the World Bank, in exchange for credits and funds.  
 With regard to the overall application of the competition law provisions, the proliferation of this 
branch of law has produced two major issues. On the one hand, the expansion of competition law across 
the world has created a vast spectrum of competition law systems with different types of enforcement. On 
the other hand, even though competition law regimes have flourished over the last decades, this increase 
has not brought along proportional rates of enforcement given that in great part of the adopting countries 
the competition law provisions are rarely and/or erratically applied.  
                                                          
3 Huang, Yong & Jiang, Shan (2010), ‘Thirty Years of PRC Anti-Monopoly Law under ‘State-Market’ Yardstick: From 
Retrospective and Prospective Viewpoints’. In: Zäch, Heiemann, and Kellerhals, The Development of Competition Law: Global 
Perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub. 
4 Palim, Mark R.A. (1998), ‘The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis’. The Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 
1998, vol. XLIII, Nº 1. 
5 Kovacic, William E. (1998A), ‘Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies’, 66 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1997-1998. 
6 Kovacic, William E. (2000), ‘Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy’. St. John’s 
Law Review, Volume 74, Issue 2. 
7 Mastalir, Roger W. (1993), ‘Regulation of Competition in the “New” Free Markets of Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study of 
Antitrust Laws in Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republic, and their Models’, 19 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 
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 The present investigation intends to address these two issues: by analyzing how competition law 
is enforced across jurisdictions; and by trying to identify what characteristics have determined the success 
of certain competition law systems and what others have influenced the under-enforcement of the 
competition law provisions in some jurisdictions, mainly those of developing countries. The ultimate 
purpose of the investigation is to provide the reader with a comprehensive study about the overall 
enforcement of competition law across the world and to identify the main obstacles that new competition 
law regimes have faced in enforcing effectively the substantive commands of competition law.  
 One of the main features of competition law is its possibility to be enforced by a variety of 
persons in different proceedings8. This feature is due to the fact that a single competition law 
infringement can harm a variety of persons in different ways. In this sense, depending on the jurisdiction 
in question, administrative proceedings against undertakings suspected of having infringed the 
competition law provisions may be initiated by the relevant public authority. Moreover, the parties 
affected by the anticompetitive behavior of infringing undertakings may bring civil claims seeking 
damages, injunctive relief, or a declaration. In the most stringent jurisdictions, the individuals involved in 
hard-core cartels may be criminally prosecuted and sentenced to jail if found guilty. Finally, in an 
increasing number, competition law disputes may also be resolved via arbitration9. 
 Additionally, besides the traditional enforcement of competition law, public and private, which is 
intended to accomplish the goals and objectives of competition law and policy and to assure compliance 
with the law, the willingness of undertakings and individuals to abide by the law, or self-enforcement, can 
also help to achieve the objectives of competition law and assure compliance. Provided that the voluntary 
compliance of the antitrust provisions by market participants can play a fundamental role in increasing the 
levels of deterrence and compliance10, the present investigation will also study the case for antitrust 
compliance programs and their interaction with the enforcement of competition law.  
 In relation to the different types of competition law enforcement, the present investigation will 
review a variety of jurisdictions in order to provide the reader a clear picture of the different types of 
competition law enforcement found across the world. To provide a global perspective of how competition 
law is enforced in different jurisdictions, the study will review a variety of competition law regimes. The 
reviewed competition law systems will be chosen by taking into consideration certain conditions that 
make the study of these regimes interesting for illustrating the overall enforcement of competition law. In 
this sense, jurisdictions with strong and successful competition law regimes, mainly those of the U.S. and 
the EU, will serve as a benchmark to compare the rates of competition law enforcement of young 
competition law regimes. Finally, to review a fair sample of competition law regimes, the proposed 
investigation will study jurisdictions with different legal traditions (common law and civil law countries), 
different levels of economic development (developed countries, transition economies, and developing 
countries), and from every continent in the world.  
                                                          
8 WILS, Wouter P,J. (2009), ‘The Relationship between Public Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’, 32 World 
Competition. 
9 NAZZINI, Renato (2004A), ‘Concurrent Proceedings in Competition Law: Procedure, Evidence and Remedies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
10 LEVI, Margaret, TYLER, Tom & SACKS, Audrey (2009), ‘The Reasons for Compliance with the Law’. The United States 
Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, Working paper. 
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 Probably the most important result of the current investigation is that despite the vast expansion 
of competition law and policy in the last decades, this phenomenon does not imply a proportional increase 
on the rates of competition law enforcement. This is the situation in great part of the recently 
implemented competition law regimes; moreover, this current state of under-enforcement is notoriously 
evident in the jurisdictions of developing countries.     
Competition law provisions are not self-enforced; accordingly, the mere existence of a 
competition law system in a determined country does not guarantee on its own the achievement of the 
professed goals and objectives of competition law. In this sense, in order for competition law and policy 
to produce their desired effects on the economy, they have to be effectively implemented. Hence, in 
practice the only way to accomplish the competition law goals and objectives is through the optimal 
enforcement of the competition law provisions; otherwise, if competition law only exists on paper it has 
no important value.  
Overall, the optimal enforcement of competition law is concerned mainly with five aspects. First, 
it requires the establishment of clear provisions that govern the commercial practices of the recipients of 
the law and defines the competition law policies. Second, it also requires the creation of strong 
institutions with effective means responsible for the enforcement of the competition law provisions. 
Third, since competition law is compulsory by nature, every competition law regime shall establish 
appropriate sanctions and remedies in case the substantive commands of competition law are infringed. 
Fourth, competition law should provide private parties that have been injured by the infringement of the 
competition law provisions the possibility to enforce the antitrust provisions to receive compensation in 
cases where the public authorities will not prosecute an alleged violation of the law for priority reasons or 
lack of resources. And fifth, in order to avoid the unlawful and abusive application of the competition law 
provisions by the public authorities responsible for their application, the availability of effective review 
mechanisms is fundamental for the creation of a strong and credible competition law regime.  
 The exercise of reviewing several competition law regimes allows evidencing that most 
jurisdictions, especially those of developing countries, have borrowed heavily from the experienced 
nations in designing the fundamental commands and institutions of their respective competition law 
systems. In many cases, the rules, practices and theories developed in successful competition law regimes 
(mostly in the U.S. and the EU) have been forced down the throat of developing countries, often with the 
aid of international organizations11. This practice has constituted a dangerous trend to indiscriminately 
transpose the provisions and institutions of experienced competition law regimes into the legislation of 
the adopting countries. This one size fits all trend has caused the inability of young competition 
authorities to enforce their respective competition laws efficiently, provided that these foreign provisions 
have failed to address all of the realities of the jurisdictions they are called upon to regulate12. 
Accordingly, in practice, most young competition law regimes have experienced serious difficulties while 
trying to apply their competition statutes, these are mainly concerned with: the lack of economic and 
human resources of young competition agencies to execute complex legal commands; a strong economic 
                                                          
11 Dabbah, Maher M. (2010), International and Comparative Competition Law. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
12 ICN, Lessons to Be Learnt From the Experiences of Young Competition Agencies, 2006. 
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and political opposition, and deficient judicial systems that have little or no experience in the adjudication 
of competition law matters13. 
 From the abovementioned, the objective of the present investigation is to produce a 
comprehensive study that provides the reader an ample description of the different competition law 
regimes, their institutions and types of enforcement, in order to identify the best practices of successful 
regimes. Therefore, the ultimate objective is to provide guidance on how new competition regimes can be 
designed and implemented effectively by learning from the experience of other countries that have 
succeeded in building effective competition law regimes.   
2. Methodology 
 
As evidenced in the previous section, competition law has expanded vigorously over the last couple of 
decades across the world. This phenomenon has caused the establishment of a variety of different 
competition systems worldwide. The diversity of most competition regimes is due to the differences 
found across jurisdictions with regard to the legal, social, political and economic traditions of the 
jurisdictions where the antitrust provisions have been implemented. Moreover, such diversity is also 
reflected by the vast spectrum of objectives that competition law and policy are intended to attain. In our 
globalized economy, great part of the commercial activities has an international dimension; accordingly, 
the anti-competitive effects of the majority of these activities may have a direct impact in several 
jurisdictions. In such cases, a single anti-competitive conduct can be scrutinized by more than just one set 
of competition law provisions; hence, it is important to acknowledge the abovementioned diversity of 
competition law systems in order to set the standards of an effective international application of 
competition law. In this sense, this diversity found in the enforcement of competition law across 
jurisdictions has inspired this investigation.  
According to the preceding, the present is an international comparative study intended to shed 
some light on how the competition law provisions are enforced across the world and to identify the main 
obstacles that new competition law regimes have faced in enforcing effectively the substantive commands 
of competition law. To accomplish such an arduous endeavor several approaches will be utilized.  
Firstly, as mentioned above, many jurisdictions with different backgrounds will be reviewed. An 
effort has been made to cover as many jurisdictions as possible, which represent a fair sample of the 
current state of competition law enforcement across the world. For this purpose the criteria used to 
determine the reviewed jurisdictions was to study the competition regimes of countries with different 
traditions and backgrounds. Thus, numerous jurisdictions from every continent will be reviewed to 
provide a widespread geographic sample. This comparative study will cover countries with different legal 
traditions (common law and civil law countries); different economic systems (capitalism and socialism); 
and even different religious beliefs (Arabic countries and Western countries). This comparison will also 
                                                          
13 Kovacic, William E. (1998B), ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies’. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, vol. XXIII, No 1. 
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cover the competition systems of both jurisdictions with a long tradition of free market economies and 
competition law enforcement, and jurisdictions that have recently moved from central planned economies 
and recently adopted competition law provisions in their national legislations. Moreover, the competition 
regimes of countries with different levels of economic development will be reviewed, i.e. developed 
countries, transition economies, and developing countries, to determine the impact on their economies of 
the implementation of competition law provisions.  
Secondly, to study the competition regimes of the reviewed jurisdictions, the internet constitutes 
a fundamental tool to obtain most of the relevant international materials. For instance, the websites of 
most competition authorities provide insightful information of their competition system. These include 
useful materials, such as: competition acts, publications, enforcement policies, guidelines, annual reports, 
Q&A sections, among others. Moreover, there are specialized websites that offer comparative legal 
information on competition law enforcement14. Similarly, on the websites of international organizations 
there are reports and studies about competition law enforcement that are fundamental for this 
investigation, for example, visit the websites of the: Andean Community of Nations15,  European Union16, 
International Competition Network17, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development18, or the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development19.     
And thirdly, since a lot has been written about the national and international enforcement of the 
competition law provisions in the last few years, the relevant literature on the topic is abundant and 
valuable for the present investigation. Accordingly, the study will include a diversity of materials from 
various authors and on different topics, such as books, journals, conference papers, and reports to 
determine the current state of the theory on the subject matter of the investigation.  
Even though the present investigation tries to cover several jurisdictions to provide a clear 
picture of competition law enforcement globally, the reader is advised that the present study is not an 
exhaustive analysis of every jurisdiction reviewed, provided that some competition regimes have been 
studied more thoroughly than others in virtue of their special characteristics or peculiarities, and also, 
with regard to the availability of information. Moreover, there are of course certain limitations regarding 
the number of jurisdictions chosen for this comparative study. These are mainly concerned with the lack 
of information available about some competition law regimes, language barriers, and with the research 
timeline, given that reviewing every existing competition law regime would take a tremendous amount of 
work and time. At the end, including regional competition law regimes, the proposed study will review 
over ninety different jurisdictions in different extents. The thoroughness of the review will vary 
depending on the information available and on the characteristics of the concerned jurisdictions, for 
instance, is impossible to study antitrust class actions in jurisdiction where this possibility is not available.  
                                                          
14 www.iclg.co.uk/; or www.concurrences.com/   
15 http://www.comunidadandina.org/competencia.htm  
16 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html  
17 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/  
18 http://www.oecd.org/competition/  
19 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/Competition-Law-and-Policy.aspx  
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Due to the pace at which countries are adopting new competition law regimes, or reformulating 
existing regimes, most materials are quickly outdated. In this sense, an updated investigation like the 
present study is always welcomed; therefore, an effort has been made to include the most recent changes 
to existing legislation and the adoption of new competition acts. In this sense, with regard to the research 
timeline, the closing date of the investigation is June 2013. 
The present study is composed of five chapters. Chapter one is an introductory part that 
establishes the aim of the study and introduces the subject that will be further reviewed in the following 
sections of the present investigation along with the basic concepts of competition law enforcement. 
Chapter two is concerned with the public enforcement of competition law, the application of the 
competition law provisions by public authorities. This chapter provides an introduction that deals with the 
fundamental issues of the public enforcement of competition law, such as a definition of public 
enforcement and the objectives and benefits of this type of enforcement. Moreover, this chapter reviews 
the fundamental provisions that govern the public enforcement of competition law, and then analyzes the 
institutions that are responsible for the public application of competition law and how these effectively 
enforce the antitrust provisions by analyzing the powers and attributions granted to these public 
institutions. Finally, this chapter studies the sanctions and remedies available in public procedures for the 
infringement of competition law and the review mechanisms against the decisions of the public 
institutions responsible for the public enforcement of competition law. Chapter three of the study deals 
with the private enforcement of the competition law provisions, the application of the competition law 
provisions by private parties in private proceedings seeking remedies of a private nature. The introductory 
part of this chapter provides a definition of private enforcement of competition law and analyzes the 
objectives and benefits of this type of competition law enforcement. This chapter then analyzes the 
fundamental issues of the private enforcement of competition law, such as the statutory basis for the 
private antitrust enforcement, the main procedural issues of private antitrust litigation, the remedies 
available for private plaintiffs in competition law cases, and the interaction between private and public 
proceedings for the infringement of competition law. In addition, Chapter three also deals with a further 
type of private enforcement, the arbitration of competition law disputes. Chapter four is about the 
voluntary compliance of the antitrust provisions by individuals and undertakings. This part reviews the 
most relevant literature on law compliance and self-enforcement and examines the drivers that encourage 
compliance and non-compliance with the antitrust provisions. Lastly, this chapter elaborates on which are 
the essential features of effective antirust compliance programs and illustrates on the interaction of 
compliance programs and competition law enforcement. Finally, Chapter five presents the conclusions of 
the present comparative study. This chapter provides for some general conclusions to the current state of 
competition law enforcement, and in addition, it provides specific conclusions to the public and private 
enforcement chapters addressing the main obstacles faced by these two types of competition law 
enforcement.  
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3. Origins of Competition Law  
 
Restrictive trade practices by individuals trying to obtain certain advantage through the interference in the 
competition process are as old as trade itself. Accordingly, the origins of competition law can be traced 
back to the ancient Egypt, where papyri related to the existence of private monopolies in wool and cloth 
were found, which are dated from about 3000 B.C.20. Furthermore, the first documented antitrust case has 
appeared in the antique Greece; the case involved a group of grain dealers who infringed the laws by 
regulating the corn trade21. Nevertheless, the first comprehensive legislation against monopolies and 
restrictions to trade was promulgated in Rome. Around 50 B.C., the Lex Julia de Annona established 
sanctions for combinations aimed at raising the prices of corn. Similarly, around A.D. 301, the Edict of 
Diocletian prohibited buying up merchandise, the concealment of foodstuffs, and the artificial creation of 
scarcity. In the same vein, the Constitution of Zeno of A.D. 483, which was aimed at protecting 
consumers from the artificial increase in the price of foodstuffs and other articles of everyday use, 
contained provisions against the joint action of monopolistic organizations and covered all possible types 
of private monopolies, and even monopolies operating under the exclusive grant of the Emperor22.  
Later on, in the Medieval Europe, a law of Athelstane was passed around A.D. 930 in England, 
this law established the offense of foresteel, which consisted in keeping goods from a market with the 
purpose of increasing the price; at that time this offense was punished by the imposition of a fine. 
Subsequently in England, conspiracies to monopolize were amounted to a criminal offense in 1529 by 
Henry VIII’s Star Chamber. In the same period, similar provisions against forestalling and ingrossing 
were enacted in other European countries such as France or Germany. Finally, in 1599 the first recorded 
case related to English common law on monopolies was decided, which declared certain types 
monopolies as illegal23. 
Notwithstanding the preceding, the flourish of competition law and policy as we know it today 
has taken place between the end of the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the Twenty-First 
Century. At the end of the Nineteenth Century the growth and proliferation of trade and commerce in 
determined countries resulted in the adoption of some kinds of competition law systems. More 
specifically, the end of the Civil War in the U.S. produced a revolution in transportation and 
communications, which allowed the expansion of trade within the U.S. territory. The augmentation of 
commerce and trade, at the same time, resulted in the emergence of significantly large enterprises that got 
more powerful as they expanded over the U.S. territory24. The appearance of these large enterprises 
produced negative effects in the economy, such as the displacement of small enterprises trough massive 
price cuts, which imposed a tremendous pressure on the capacity of small local enterprises to compete 
                                                          
20 WILBERFORCE, Richard Orme (1966), ‘The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies’. 2nd Edition. London: Sweet 
and Maxwell. 
21 KOTSIRIS, Lambros E. (1988), ‘An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law’. The International Lawyer, Spring 1988, vol. 22, Nº 1, 
p. 451-458.  
22 WILBERFORCE (1966), p. 21; and MILLER, Frederic P. (2011), ‘History of Competition Law’. Mauritius: Alphascript 
Publishing, p. 2.  
23 Davenant v. Hurdis (1599), in: LETWIN, William L. (1954), ‘The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies’. The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 21, p. 359. 
24 For a brief recapitulation of the expansion of the US economy, the growth of enterprises and the subsequent enactment of the 
Sherman Act, see: MOTTA, Massimo (2004), ‘Competition Policy: Theory and Practice’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 1-5; and STIGLER, George J. (1985), ‘The Origin of the Sherman Act’. 14 Journal of Legal Studies. 
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effectively. Furthermore, as a result of their growth these large enterprises began to acquire a more than 
significant economic power, and eventually this situation led to a reasonable fear that the economic power 
of these enterprises will also produce a form of political power that would eventually enable large 
enterprises to control important parts of the economy, and ultimately, to control the apparatus of the 
government itself. These changes in trade and commerce and the emergence of these large enterprises 
eventually resulted in the adjustment of the legislative framework through the adoption of competition 
law provisions that regulate, inter alia, the actuation of these large enterprises. In this way, it was in 1890 
when the Sherman Act was passed in the U.S., which constitutes probably the most important antitrust 
legislation of the modern era. Eventually, both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, against 
restrictive agreements and monopolization, respectively, have provided the two central principles of 
modern antitrust policy throughout the world25. Finally, provided that the Sherman Act did not address 
mergers and acquisitions, which were likely to create high levels of market power, in 1914 the U.S. 
Congress passed the Clayton Act, which contained the foundations for modern merger control.  
However, on the other hand, some free market economists proclaim a more obscure origin of the 
Sherman Act. Government regulation is not usually enacted to protect the public interest, but rather to 
benefit private interests, thus, ill-conceived antitrust legislation and/or its inadequate practice, do not 
protect the public interest –competitive markets in the case of competition law- as it may be 
anticompetitive because of the objectives pursued by the law. In this sense, opponents to the public-
interest-origins of the Sherman Act argue that the passing of the Act was never intended to protect 
competition, as it was a blatantly protectionist act designed to protect smaller and less efficient businesses 
from their larger and more efficient competitors26. In addition, they provide evidence that the passing and 
enforcement of the Sherman Act have reduced industrial competitiveness, provided that the trusts that the 
Act was intended to eliminate caused output to expand faster than other sectors of the economy, and as a 
result, the prices of the allegedly monopolized industries fell27.  
Irrespective of the original intention of the legislators of the Sherman Act, the adoption of this 
antitrust legislation led to the implementation of competition law regimes across the world throughout the 
Twentieth Century. In the first half of this Century only a few countries had implemented some type of 
competition law system, however, after World War II some competition regimes were formed in 
countries like Japan and the United Kingdom in the late 1940’s. Between 1950 and 1975 the basic 
foundations of competition law appeared in Asia, Europe and Latin America. Over this period of time, 
especially in Europe, the proliferation of competition law systems occurred after the adoption of the 
Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic Community, in the 1950’s. The fact the Treaty of 
Rome contained strong competition law provisions enforceable in all Member States has served as the 
foundation of most of the competition law provisions in the majority of the European countries. 
                                                          
25 RUBINFELD, Daniel L. (2001), ‘Antitrust Policy’. International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 1: 
553-60. 
26 DILORENZO, Thomas J. (1990), ‘The Origins of Antitrust: Rhetoric vs. Reality’. Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 27.  
27 DILORENZO, Thomas J. (1985), ‘The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective’. 5 International Review of Law and 
Economics, p. 87.  
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Furthermore, during this quart of the Century countries like Brazil and Colombia, in Latin America28, or 
South Korea, in Asia, adopted competition law systems. In addition, the dissolution of the former Soviet 
Union brought the implementation of competition regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. With the fall of 
this last bastion, only a few jurisdictions refused to implement free-market processes in their economies 
along with competition law and policy. In the Arab World, the process of privatization and liberalization 
undertaken to develop their economies and catch up with the rest of the world, has included the 
implementation of new laws and policies to further this process, competition law and policy constituted 
an important part of this reform29. This meant that with the beginning of the new Century the proliferation 
of competition law systems has truly became global with the adoption of competition law systems in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
4. Proliferation of Competition Law 
 
As stated above, the end of the Twentieth Century has brought enormous attention to competition law and 
policy across the globe. As the number of countries that adopt free-market principles for their economies 
grows, more jurisdictions are enacting competition law provisions in line with these free-market 
principles. This proliferation has not been seen in any other branch of law, because it has been very vast 
and it happened in a relatively short period of time30. In practice, what this proliferation of competition 
law entails is that the adoption of competition law regimes is no longer exclusive for developed nations 
that have a long tradition of free-market economies; on the contrary, this expansion of competition law 
also includes the implementation of competition law provisions and policy by developing nations with 
different levels of experience with market processes.  
In part this process of proliferation has been possible thanks to the recognition of the favorable 
effects that the adoption of a competition law regime has on economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 
Furthermore, another factor that has widely supported the expansion of competition law and policy is 
related to the economic context of the jurisdictions that have adopted competition law systems in last 
decades. In most jurisdictions that have a long tradition of free-market economies the adoption of 
competition law systems has occurred at an earlier stage than in jurisdictions with centrally planned 
economic systems and with significant control of the government over the economic activity. 
Consequently, as these jurisdictions shed their control over the economic activity, the implementation of 
legislative frameworks and institutions that keep markets competitive became necessary. In this sense, the 
establishment of competition law systems began to spread as the market-based systems gained force 
among these nations. Thus, the most common explanations for the proliferation of competition law 
systems are the economic reforms, the political liberalization and the increase of the level of development 
in the countries implementing competition law provisions in their national legislations31. 
                                                          
28 To read about the emergence process of competition law systems in Latin America, see: DE LEÓN, Ignacio (2001), ‘Latin 
American Competition Law and Policy: A Policy in Search of Identity’. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.  
29 DABBAH, Maher M. (2007), ‘Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East’. Cambridge, New York, et al: Cambridge 
University Press. 
30 DABBAH (2010), p. 1.  
31 PALIM (1998), p. 111.   
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From the global perspective of competition law enforcement, the proliferation of competition 
law regimes across the world has raised two different scenarios. On the one hand, the fact that most 
countries where competition law has been implemented have different social, economic and political 
backgrounds has resulted in that the competition law systems adopted in these countries vary widely from 
one jurisdiction to another. On the other hand, some jurisdictions that have recently adopted competition 
law systems have used as foundations for their national legislations the provisions of countries with a 
longer tradition on competition law enforcement, in such cases, this has caused that the newer 
competition law systems resemble, at least in the principal features, to the competition law systems of 
these other countries. Ultimately, the existence of such vast number of competition law legislations 
entails that the enforcement of competition law varies heavily depending on the jurisdiction. Even though 
this feature is not exclusive of competition law, as other branches of law also vary when applied in 
different jurisdictions, nevertheless, the fact that competition law is turning global due to the globalization 
process of trade and commerce has drawn the attention of academics and practitioners to the enforcement 
of competition law in different jurisdictions.  
5. Goals and Objectives of Competition Law 
 
A fundamental concern of the implementation of a competition law system and the subsequent 
enforcement of its legal commands is that of the goals and objectives that competition law is intended to 
accomplish. In practice, the economic goals of a certain jurisdiction in conjunction with the goals of 
competition law usually determine the role of competition law and policy in the economy. These 
fundamental goals of competition law will ultimately determine the intention of the antitrust provisions; 
how these provisions shall be interpreted; and lastly, how to be enforced. Hence, from the perspective of 
the enforcement of competition law, the substantive provisions and commands of a determined 
competition law regime should be interpreted and enforced in a way that furthers the fulfillment of these 
goals and objectives. Accordingly, in practice, the provisions of competition law cannot be effectively 
enforced until their goals and objectives are clearly determined32.  
 From a global point of view, the fact that over one hundred jurisdictions have implemented some 
kind of competition law provisions in their national legislations has resulted in a multiplicity of 
competition law goals and objectives, which vary from one jurisdiction to the next. Nonetheless, the 
existence of these differences is not surprising given that, as with any other branch of public law, 
competition law is linked to distinctive contexts and circumstances, which are unique in every 
jurisdiction. This means that the implementation and the development of competition law and policy in 
different countries are related to the diverse historical, social, political, economic, and even religious 
backgrounds of the jurisdictions in question. In this sense, such divergence translates in the multiplicity of 
competition law goals and objectives across the world, provided that these different circumstances have 
generated different scenarios for the implementation and evolution of competition law and policy. 
Furthermore, even though most newly established competition systems have borrowed knowledge from 
                                                          
32 BORK, Robert H. (1993), ‘The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself’. New York: The Free Press, p. 50. 
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the most advanced competition regimes when designing their legal commands and competition agencies, 
the objectives of the antitrust provisions and eventually its application will be ultimately determined by 
the specific circumstances of the concerned jurisdictions. For instance, most developing countries face 
different obstacles in order to attain competitive markets when compared to developed economies, thus, 
the antitrust provisions in these developing nations will have to deal with issues such as the government’s 
intervention in the market process or the creation of strong public institutions responsible for the 
enforcement of competition law33.  
 Notwithstanding the abovementioned, despite the fact that the circumstances and backgrounds of 
the countries establishing competition systems differ greatly among each other, there are vast similarities 
with regard to the goals and objectives of competition law among competition regimes. In particular, it is 
considered that competition law is a public interest law, like having private property, enforcement of 
contracts, and suppression of crime34. In this sense, due to the public nature of this branch of law, among 
its fundamental objectives there is the protection of the public interest, as competitive markets may 
constitute a public good. Furthermore, there is wide acceptance across jurisdictions, and an ongoing 
debate, that among the main objectives of competition law there is the enhancement of economic 
efficiency35 and the maximization of consumer welfare36.  
 With respect to the enhancement of economic efficiency, this is mainly concerned with: 
allocative efficiency, which is allocating resources to their most valued use; productive efficiency, which 
is producing goods at the lowest cost; and dynamic efficiency, which is developing better goods and 
services through innovation. In this regard, competition law and policy are aimed at encouraging market 
participants to enhance efficiency by: promoting economic growth; encouraging the creation of new 
products and services by promoting rivalry between competing undertakings; increasing productivity; 
reducing costs; increasing choice; improving product quality; and stimulating innovation to gain the favor 
of consumers37. 
 As to the maximization of consumer welfare, competition law and policy are intended to 
maximize consumer welfare by lowering prices, raising output, increasing consumer choice and the 
quality of goods and services, and driving technological development and innovation38. As a 
consequence, in practice, according to some commentators, the fundamental goal of competition law is 
the protection of consumers from paying higher prices to firms that have unfairly gained or maintained 
market power39. Nevertheless, there is a contested matter on the consumer welfare objective approach 
among jurisdictions, on the one hand, some regimes associate consumer welfare with total welfare – 
                                                          
33 JUNG, Youngjin & HAO Qian (2003), ‘The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition Regime?’. 24 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business.  
34 STIGLER (1985). 
35 POSNER, Richard A. (2001), ‘Antitrust Law’. Second Edition. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 29.  
36 HOVENKAMP, Herbert. (2005), ‘The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution’. Cambridge; London: Harvard University 
Press, p. 1.    
37 BORK, Robert. (1966), ‘Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act’. 7 Journal of Law & Economics. 
38 SCHWARTZ, Louis B. (1979), ‘Justice and other non-economic goals of antitrust’. 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
39 KIRKWOOD, John, & LANDE, Robert (2008), ‘The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing 
Efficiency’. Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 84:1, p. 196. 
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producer and consumer welfare – in such cases, the transfer of wealth from consumers to producers 
resulted from higher prices, lower output, or any other variable affecting demand, are not taking into 
account. On the other hand, other regimes consider that the consumer welfare goal should prioritize the 
welfare and interests of consumers over those of producers. Particularly, the consumer welfare objective 
is more evident in jurisdictions where the competition law provisions also contain consumer protection 
rules. Accordingly, in some of these jurisdictions, the competition authority is also responsible for the 
fulfillment of consumer protection policies; at the end, this is due to the fact that the competitive process 
itself is intended to deliver benefits to consumers.  
 As stated above, there are other competition law goals and objectives among jurisdictions 
besides the previously seen that have an economic dimension. For instance, a further objective of 
competition law in some jurisdictions is concerned with the dispersal of economic power and the 
redistribution of wealth, which focuses on the promotion of economic equity instead of economic 
efficiency. This antitrust objective seeks to prevent the concentration of resources in monopolists, 
multinational corporations and conglomerates, given that such concentration could threaten the very 
notion of democracy, individual freedom of choice and economic opportunity40. In this sense, it has been 
argued that the redistribution objective of competition law, unlike the economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare objectives, has a social dimension41. An additional competition law objective with a social 
dimension is that related to the protection of competitors. In particular, this antitrust goal is intended to 
safeguard the opportunities and interests of small and medium-size enterprises from more powerful 
competitors42. However, there are some who are against this “uncritical sentimentality in favor of the 
small guy”43, and argue that the main objective of competition law should be concerned with economic 
efficiency. Accordingly, competition law should not prevent a dominant firm from eliminating a smaller 
competitor from the market by superior performance, in this sense, the most efficient competitors will 
succeed and the weak and inefficient will be forced out of the market.   
 Additionally, some competition law regimes make reference to other goals and objectives 
pursued by their competition law systems that are not strictly related to consumer welfare, economic 
efficiency, or the competitive process. For instance, in some jurisdictions, competition law and policy are 
intended to promote regional integration by preventing anticompetitive conducts in one country to affect 
the integration of markets by isolating domestics markets, and by encouraging trade between the countries 
through the facilitation of international transactions44.  
 It has been stated that based on their history, culture and context, competition law and policy in 
developing countries tend to protect competitors from competition. Therefore, traditionally in developing 
                                                          
40 WHISH, Richard, BAILEY, David (2012), ‘Competition law’. Seventh Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21. 
41 DABBAH (2010), p. 41-42. The author classifies the goals pursued by the different competition law systems in: economic goals, 
social goals, and broader (political) goals.   
42 For example, Section 1.1 of the Canadian Competition Act provides that the purpose of the Act, inter alia, is to ensure that small 
and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy.   
43 BORK (1993).   
44 This regional integration objective of competition law can be evidenced in the European Union, where competition law seeks to 
accomplish a fundamental objective of the Union, which is single market integration.  
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countries, the protection of small and indigenous undertakings from foreign competitors is included 
among the objectives of competition law and policy45.  
 Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, other subjects have been considered as goals and objectives 
pursued by competition law, these may include: public interest (Indonesia); unemployment (Japan); the 
position of historically disadvantaged people (South Africa); traditional community economies (Bolivia); 
unfair trade (Armenia); unity of economic space (Kazakhstan); the social function of property (Brazil); 
local and foreign investment (Kenya); competiveness of national undertakings in international markets 
(Kenya); creative initiative of enterprises (Korea); harmonization of national competition law provisions 
with regional provisions (Lithuania); freedom of economic activity (Russia); trading order (Taiwan); 
efficient utilization of society’s resources (Norway); or the development of the socialist market economy 
(China); among others. 
 Despite the variety of objectives that may be pursued through the implementation of a 
determined competition law system, the conventional wisdom of antitrust academics and practitioners 
suggest that among the fundamental goals of competition law there is the enhancement of economic 
efficiency and the maximization of consumer welfare. From both perspectives, competition law would 
condemn practices involving economic inefficiencies and the transfer of wealth from consumers to the 
antitrust offenders, respectively. In practice, however, even though there is discrepancy with regard to the 
ultimate objective of competition law, most antitrust infringements are concerned with both economic 
inefficiencies and transfer of wealth from consumers, e.g. horizontal cartels. In this sense, anticompetitive 
practices that involve allocative inefficiencies and transfers of wealth, such as cartels, could be 
condemned by the antitrust provisions despite the ultimate objective of competition law in a certain 
jurisdiction46. Alternatively, other anticompetitive practices that involve economic inefficiencies or 
transfers of wealth could be treated differently depending on the antitrust objectives of the jurisdictions in 
question, thus, ultimately leading to an uneven application of the competition law provisions across 
jurisdictions.  
6. The Legal Framework of Competition Law 
 
The first step in the implementation of a competition law regime is the establishment of a statutory basis 
that governs competition law and policy. Due to their importance for free markets and economic 
development, the enactment of competition law provisions is fundamental for the establishment of 
competitive markets and the attainment of  other social and economic objective, in this sense, in some 
cases the antirust provisions have been awarded near-Constitutional status47. As will be seen in the 
following chapters of this study, there are certain differences and similitudes with regard to the legal 
                                                          
45 FOX, Eleanor M. (2003), ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors’. World Competition, Vol. 12:2, p. 163. 
46 BAXTER, William F. & KESSLER, Daniel P. (1995), ‘Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements’. 47 
Stanford Law Review. 
47 The U.S. Supreme Court has described the antitrust provisions as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the 
preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental 
personal freedoms” (United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). 
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framework of competition law across jurisdictions. These are mainly concerned with the foundations of 
the competition law provisions, the nature of these and the substantive commands of competition law.  
Regarding the nature of the competition law provisions, virtually in all competition law systems, 
the legal framework of competition law is incarnated as public laws. Accordingly, legislators have chosen 
a public approach with regard to competition law and policy; this means the enactment of public laws to 
protect the competitive process. In practice, the adoption of public laws and the intervention of the 
government in the market process have resulted from the inability of markets to control themselves and 
especially from the tendency of market participants to affect or restraint the competitive process in their 
favor.      
As stated above, the legal framework of competition law may vary depending on the jurisdiction. 
In that sense, in some competition regimes, the foundations of the statutory basis of competition law can 
be found on the precepts of the national constitution. In addition, other competition law systems have 
found their legal framework on the provisions of multilateral treaties. However, in most countries where 
competition law systems have been instituted, these regimes have as statutory basis national public laws 
that govern this branch of law. Finally, and in a fewer extend, in some countries the legal basis of 
competition law is contained in ministerial regulations.  
As to the substantial commands of competition law, most competition law systems share similar 
provisions in relation to the practices policed by competition law. In nature, competition law is mainly 
prohibitory, which means that the fundamental provisions of competition law establish certain 
prohibitions that the recipients of the law have to obey. Thus, the substantial commands of competition 
law of all competition law systems prohibit certain practices that are considered to be contrary to the 
goals and objectives of competition law. In practice, most competition law regimes provide for provisions 
that prohibit restrictive agreements and the abusive behavior of dominant undertakings. Furthermore, 
competition law is also regulatory in nature, in this regard; the substantive provisions of competition law 
of some jurisdictions control certain practices that may be contrary to the goals and objectives of 
competition law. Thus, even though in a lesser extent, the substantial provisions of some competition law 
systems provide for control mechanisms aimed at preventing certain transactions that would harm the 
competitive process if these were implemented without the scrutiny of the competition authorities, such is 
the case of mergers and acquisitions that create or reinforce a dominant position.   
Finally, due to the fact that the commercial practices regulated by the competition law provisions 
are in constant evolution, most legislators have drafted extremely broad antitrust provisions in order to be 
applicable to most anticompetitive practices. Accordingly, it has been stated, that in some competition 
systems the principal antitrust legislation may even fit on a single piece of paper48. In this sense, the 
legislators have delegated the application and interpretation of the competition law provisions to the 
enforcers of the law. 
                                                          
48 WALLER, Spencer W. (2003), ‘The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust’. 78 Chicago Kent Law Review, 207, p. 209. 
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7. Practices Subject to the Control of Competition Law 
 
As stated before, one of the main characteristics of competition law is that this public branch of law is 
mainly prohibitory in nature49. Accordingly, part of the fundamental antitrust provisions establishes 
prohibitions against certain conducts or practices that are contrary to the goals and objectives of 
competition law. In practice, this prohibitory nature of competition law results in the control and police 
by the relevant governmental agencies of certain practices or conducts performed by the recipients of the 
law which may raise competition law issues. Thus, the typical provisions of competition law of most 
jurisdictions contain prohibitions against conducts and practices that are harmful to the competitive 
process. In practice, every competition system should prohibit restrictive business practices as these can 
adversely affect international trade, particularly that of developing nations, and the economic 
development of these50.  
 On the one hand, by looking at the provisions of the numerous competition law regimes today, 
one can observe that there is a great deal of diversity in certain aspects across jurisdictions, however, on 
the other hand, there are vast similarities in the anticompetitive practices that fall under the scrutiny of 
competition law. Therefore, virtually every competition law system contains typical provisions 
prohibiting multilateral restrictive or anticompetitive agreements and monopolization or the abuse of a 
dominant position. 
 In addition to the prohibitory nature of competition law, some antitrust provisions may also have 
a regulatory nature. In this regard, some practices that may raise competition law issues are not prohibited 
per se by the provisions of competition law, but are subject to a control by the relevant authority in order 
to determine if such practices are contrary, or not, to the antitrust provisions. Even though, in a lesser 
extent than jurisdictions with prohibitions against restrictive agreements and the abuse of dominance, 
most competition law regimes are concerned with the anticompetitive effects of certain mergers and 
acquisitions, and consequently, have established control mechanism to determine the effects of such 
transactions and their compatibility with the competitive process.   
 Accordingly, in practice, while the language, the procedures and the institutions vary vastly from 
one competition system to the next, nearly every single competition regime contains provisions against 
restrictive agreements and monopolization or abuse of dominance. Additionally, in jurisdictions where 
merger control mechanisms have been introduced, the latter are aimed at preventing undertakings to 
collude and harm competition (restrictive agreements), or to create or enhance market power 
(monopolization/abuse of dominance). Therefore, the fundamental pillars of competition law and policy 
across the world are the prohibitions against restrictive agreements and monopolization or abuse of 
dominance51. 
Finally, the provisions of some competition law regimes additionally govern other conducts 
besides the abovementioned anticompetitive practices. For instance, in some competition regimes, the 
                                                          
49 With the exception of merger control provided that mergers are not prohibited per se, but are subject to governmental review.  
50 UNCTAD, The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition, Geneva, 2000. 
51 STEUER, Richard M. (2012), ‘The Simplicity of Antitrust Law’. U. of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, Vol. 14:2. 
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competition law provisions deal with the control of unfair competition52. Moreover, some jurisdictions 
have included in their competition law provisions consumer protection rules53. Furthermore, other 
competition law legislations have provisions related to state aid54. And finally, in some competition 
regimes, the competition law provisions include the protection of intellectual property rights55.  
7.1. Multilateral Anti-Competitive Agreements 
 
The cornerstone of competition law is the prohibition against restrictive agreements that affect the 
competitive process in a determined market. Provided that the role of competition law is to foster the 
competitive process, agreements between market participants that restrict competition are considered to 
be contrary to the provisions of competition law practically in all jurisdictions. Accordingly, agreements 
that have as their object or effect the harm, restriction or distortion of competition are considered 
anticompetitive and unlawful, and as a consequence, these are prohibited by the competition law 
provisions, however, in some jurisdictions the prohibition is not applicable to agreements that have some 
redeeming virtue like the enhancement of economic efficiency56.  
In general, the anticompetitive agreements prohibitions are applicable to agreements concluded 
by natural or juridical persons, which are involved in commercial activities, and irrespective of whether 
these are created or controlled by private parties or by the State. Nonetheless, traditionally, these 
provisions do not apply to the agreements between undertakings that are under common ownership or 
control57, provided that these are considered to be a single economic entity that acts as one market 
participant58. Hence, given that for antitrust purposes, a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are 
considered as a single entity, the restrictive agreements prohibition cannot be applied due to the 
requirement of an agreement between two or more undertakings59. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the 
anticompetitive agreements prohibitions may not be applicable to agreements or acts concluded by a 
government60, or to acts concerned with the management of public utilities61.  
Overall, there are further restrictions to the application of the anticompetitive agreements across 
jurisdictions. For instance, some competition regimes have provisions that allow competition authorities 
                                                          
52 In Bulgaria, Chapter Seven of the Law on Protection of Competition has prohibitions against unfair competition. In Hungary, 
Chapter II of the Competition Act deals with unfair competition. In Latvia, Chapter V of the Competition Law has prohibitions 
against unfair competition. In Lithuania, Chapter III of the Law on Competition has provisions on unfair competition. In Moldova, 
Article 8 of the Law on Protection of Competition has prohibitions against unfair competition. In Nicaragua, Chapter V of Law on 
the Promotion of Competition has prohibitions against unfair competition. 
53 In Papua New Guinea, Part VII of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act deals with consumer protection. 
In Poland, Title IV, Chapter 1 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection has provisions on the protection of consumers.  
54 In Armenia, Chapter 5-1 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition deals with state aid. In Estonia, Chapter 6 of the 
Competition Act has prohibitions against state aid. In Kazakhstan, Chapter 5 of the Law on Competition has provisions on state aid. 
55 In Peru, Legislative Decree Nº 1033 has provisions on the protection of intellectual property, free competition and consumer; it 
also has prohibitions against unfair competition.  
56 Such is the case in the EU where according to the provisions of Article 101.3 of the TFEU, restrictive agreements that contribute 
to improving the production or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefits, are exempted of the provisions of the Article.  
57 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring for purposes of the 
Sherman Act (Cooperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)). 
58 In Zambia, Section 13 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act establishes that the prohibitions on horizontal and vertical 
restrictive agreements do not apply to agreements between interconnected bodies which form a single economic unit. 
59 O’CONNOR, John T. (1985), ‘Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation: The Death of a Doctrine’. 5 Pace 
Law Review, p. 896. 
60 In Tanzania, according to Section 6(2) of the Fair Competition Act, the State shall not be liable to any fine or penalty under the 
provisions of the Act or be liable to be prosecuted for an offense against the Act.  
61 See Article 9 of the Egyptian Competition Law. See Article 2 of the Algerian Competition Ordinance.  
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to grant individual exemptions from the prohibitions to particular agreements, or to grant block 
exemptions to agreements that fall within a particular category of agreements62. In some jurisdictions, 
certain agreements do not fall within the prohibitions by virtue of their insignificant impact on 
competition63, or because of the low market share of the participants64. Moreover, in some competition 
systems, the agreements related to certain sectors or markets are exempted from the prohibitions65. 
Similarly, in some jurisdictions, the agreements concerned with the exercise of intellectual property rights 
are not prohibited by the competition provisions66. Finally, in some competition regimes, certain 
agreements may not be prohibited when allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits and 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic 
progress67.  
1. Types of Restrictive Agreements 
 
Multilateral restrictive agreements can be basically of two types68. Horizontal agreements, which are 
agreements between two or more competing undertakings operating at the same level in the market and 
engaged in broadly the same activities, i.e. agreements among producers, wholesalers or retailers. Or 
vertical agreements, which are agreements between two or more undertakings at different levels of the 
production or distribution chain in the market, i.e. agreements between manufacturers of components and 
manufacturers of products, between producers and wholesalers, or between producers, wholesalers and 
retailers. The main difference between these two kinds of agreements when enforcing competition law is 
that, traditionally, certain horizontal restrictive agreements have been deemed as being always harmful to 
competition, and consequently, illegal. Conversely, vertical agreements have not been considered always 
anticompetitive, moreover, some vertical agreements have proven to be procompetitive due to the benefits 
they provide to competition and consumers.   
Even though most competition law regimes prohibit both horizontal and vertical anticompetitive 
agreements, there are different approaches with regard to the anticompetitive agreements provisions. In 
the competition regimes with the broadest provisions, a single provision governs both horizontal and 
vertical restrictive agreements69, even more, there are jurisdictions where anticompetitive agreements 
                                                          
62 In the UK, the OFT is empowered to grant both individual and block exemptions pursuant to Sections 4 and 6 of the Competition 
Act.  
63 In the Czech Republic, agreements with insignificant impact on competition shall not be prohibited (Article 3 of the Act on the 
Protection of Competition). 
64 In Armenia, the agreements of economic entities shall not be deemed as anticompetitive if the total share of the participants does 
not exceed 20% of the given product market (Article 5.6 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition).  
65 In Estonia, the anticompetitive agreements prohibitions do not apply to the agreements between agricultural producers which 
concern the production or sale of agricultural products (Section 4(6) of the Competition Act). In Finland, in general, the provisions 
of the Competition Act do not apply to agreements concerned with the labor market, additionally, the anticompetitive agreements 
provisions do not apply to the agriculture sector (Section 2(1) and (2) of the Competition Act). In Israel, agreements related to 
international air or sea transportation are not prohibited by the anticompetitive agreements provisions (Section 3(7) of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices). 
66 In Israel, the agreements involving restraints related to the exercise of intellectual property rights are not deemed to be restrictive 
agreements according to Section 3(2) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law). 
67 In Germany, see Section 2 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition.  
68 In Kazakhstan, according to the provisions of Article 9 of the Law on Competition, anticompetitive agreements can be of two 
types: horizontal or vertical.  
69 For instance, in the US, Section 1 of the Sherman Act may be applied to both horizontal and vertical agreements. Similarly at the 
European Union level, Article 101 of the TFEU is applicable to horizontal and vertical agreements. In Germany, Section 1 of the 
Act Against Restraints of Competition regulates horizontal and vertical agreements. In the UK, Section 2 of the Competition Act is 
applicable to horizontal and vertical agreements. 
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(horizontal and vertical) and abusive practices by dominant undertakings are governed by one single 
provision70. Instead, in other competition law regimes, the legislators have chosen to insert separate 
provisions for horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements71. And finally, there are jurisdictions with 
general provisions on horizontal agreements and specific provisions dealing independently with most 
vertical agreements72.    
A further issue related to the content of the restrictive agreements provisions is the type of 
prohibited practices that are scrutinized by these provisions. In some competition systems, there is a broad 
prohibition that is applicable to most anticompetitive agreements, in those cases, the enforcers of the 
competition provisions are supposed to determine which practices shall be subject to the application of 
these broad prohibitions73. Conversely, other competition systems have opted to provide for a general 
prohibition followed by a non–exhaustive list of prohibited agreements74.  
(a) Horizontal Agreements  
 
The broad definition of horizontal anticompetitive agreements includes any anticompetitive agreement 
between two or more competing undertakings operating at the same level in a determined market. A strict 
interpretation of the preceding definition allows to evidence that horizontal agreements are fundamentally 
concluded by actual competitors; however, there are some jurisdictions that make reference on their 
restrictive agreements provisions to the possibility of applying the restrictive agreements prohibition 
against agreements between potential competitors75. 
In general, horizontal anticompetitive agreements can be divided in two types: hard-core cartels 
and other types of horizontal anticompetitive agreements. Hard-core cartels are agreements between 
competitors that have proven to be always anticompetitive and are usually presumed to be illegal without 
any further enquiry. Conversely, the other types of horizontal agreements have not been considered as 
intrinsically illegal due to the fact that some of these agreements may provide some benefits to 
consumers.  
1. Hard-Core Cartels   
  
The true nature of competition in a market is that competitors should compete with one another for 
customers and profits; accordingly every competition regime should prevent and punish any attempt of 
competitors to cooperate with one another to distort competition in a given market. Generally speaking, 
                                                          
70 In Argentina, Article 1 of Law 25.156 for Defense of Competition prohibits both anticompetitive agreements and the abusive 
behavior of dominant undertakings.  
71 In El Salvador, Chapter I of the Competition Law handles agreements between competitors (horizontal agreements), and Chapter 
II agreements between non-competitors (vertical agreements). In Kenya, Section 21(2) (a) and (b) regulate horizontal and vertical 
agreements. In South Africa, Sections 4 and 5 deal with horizontal and vertical agreements respectively. 
72 In Canada, Section 45 and 90.1 of the Competition Act deal with anticompetitive horizontal agreements. Additionally, Sections 76 
and 77 refer to price maintenance, and exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restriction, respectively.   
73 In the US, Section 1 of the Sherman Act includes a broad prohibition applicable to anticompetitive agreements that restraint trade 
or commerce.  
74 In Seychelles, Section 11(1) of the Fair Competition Act provides for a broad prohibition for anticompetitive agreements, 
additionally, Subsection (2) of the same section provides for a list of anticompetitive practices caught under the prohibition.    
75 In Kazakhstan, see Article 9 of the Law on Competition.  
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hard-core cartels are horizontal anticompetitive agreements between competitors that have as the main 
purpose to fix prices, divide markets, restrict output, or to fix the output of competitive tenders.  
Traditionally, this type of agreements has been deemed so harmful to competition that they have 
been referred to as the “supreme evil of antitrust”76. Furthermore, the provisions governing these kinds of 
agreements have been determined as the “core” of the competition law provisions77. The nature and 
effects of these kinds of agreements have led some competition systems to consider them as being always 
anticompetitive and unlawful without the need of any further inquiry78. As a consequence, in some 
jurisdictions, hard-core cartels have been declared as illegal per se79; have been listed as particularly 
harmful in the competition provisions80; or have been presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on 
competition81. Hence, hard-core cartels are contrary to the antitrust provisions regardless of the market 
power of the cartel participants, their motives, or purported business justifications82.  
Cartels are the main focus of competition law and policy and this type of anticompetitive 
practice are legally condemned by virtually all competition systems around the globe. Accordingly, given 
that hard-core cartels are so harmful for the competitive process and that due to their secretive nature are 
very difficult to detect, this type of behavior is significantly offensive to society and its prevention and 
punishment demand the expenditure of a considerable quantity of resources. These special characteristics 
of hard-core cartels increase the gravity of the offense, in this sense, in order to deter individuals from 
engaging in hard-core cartel activity, the enforcement authorities increase the size of punishment and 
devote additional resources to detect and punish cartel behavior with the ultimate purpose of increasing 
deterrence and compliance with the law83. Accordingly, in practice, the intrinsically unlawful nature of 
hard-core cartels has led some competition regimes to increase the sanctions imposed on cartel 
participants, for instance by including criminal penalties in their sanctioning systems, such as the 
imprisonment of individuals who participated in cartel activity. Moreover, enforcement authorities 
usually devote most part of their resources in the investigation of hard-core cartels. 
1.1. Types of Hard-Core Cartels 
 
As stated before, there are different types of cartels that are subject to the application of the competition 
law prohibitions against anticompetitive practices. In a broad sense, most competition regimes prohibit 
the following types of cartels.  
                                                          
76 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
77 The Canadian Supreme Court described the criminal provisions against cartel behavior of Section 45 as the core of the 
Competition Act (R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society (1992), 43 C.P.R. (3d) at 32). 
78 The United States Supreme Court has determined that these kinds of agreements are almost always anticompetitive and for that 
reason should be declared illegal without any further inquiry (Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 US 1 (1958)).   
79 The per se term has been established in the USA antitrust case law to declare illegal without any further inquiry hard-core cartels. 
There are, however, other jurisdictions that have borrowed this term to also declare illegal hard-core cartels in their respective 
jurisdictions, for instance, Article 6 of the Egyptian Competition Law declares hard-core cartels illegal per se. Additionally, some 
other jurisdictions have established their own terminology that corresponds to the per se concept, for instance, in Costa Rica, hard-
core cartels fall within the category of absolute monopolistic practices, which is similar to the per se category (Article 11 of the 
Costa Rican Law on the Promotion of Competition and Consumer Protection).    
80 In the EU, Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits all agreements that prevent, restrict or distort competition within the internal market, 
and in particular hard-core cartels. Most EU Member States have similar provisions, e.g. Article 5 of the Finnish Competition Act is 
identical to Article 101 TFEU. 
81 In India, according to Section 3 of the Competition Act, hard-core cartels are presumed to have adverse effects on competition. 
82 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
83 STIGLER, George T. (1970), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78, No. 3, p. 528. 
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(i) Cartels to Fix Prices 
 
These are horizontal agreements between competitors to raise, fix or maintain the price of a product or 
service in a determined market. Overall, price fixing cartels are the main target of most competition 
provisions, the harmful effects that these agreements have on competition and their anticompetitive nature 
have led most competition regimes to focus on these practices. In practice, the detection and prosecution 
of price fixing cartels constitutes the bulk of competition law enforcement in most competition regimes84.  
The scope and the wording of the competition provisions against price fixing cartels vary 
depending on the jurisdiction. For example, the competition regimes with the simplest provisions prohibit 
agreements that fix prices85. Alternatively, in other systems these provisions are more elaborated and 
besides the general prohibition to fix prices, these rules contain prohibitions against agreements intended 
to increase or decrease prices86; to control prices87, or to manipulate prices88. Moreover, some of these 
jurisdictions make reference to the types of prices, like purchase prices and selling prices89, or to other 
trading conditions besides prices90. Finally, in some countries, the provisions against price fixing cartels 
prohibit the exchange of information between competitors with the purpose of fixing prices91.  
(ii) Cartels to Share Markets 
 
These are horizontal anticompetitive agreements where competitors divide markets among themselves 
and agree not to compete with each other in those markets. Similar to the rules against price fixing cartels, 
the provisions on cartels to share markets may vary from one country to another. For instance, these 
provisions are different across jurisdictions in relation to how the markets can be shared. For example, in 
some competition regimes the provisions will prohibit the simple allocation of markets between 
competing undertakings. In other jurisdictions, however, the competition provisions may prohibit the 
division of markets in a variety of ways, like dividing the market by: sources of supply92; volume of 
purchases or sales93; types of products94; geographical areas95; customers96; seasons or periods of time97; 
or by any other mean98.  
 
                                                          
84 In Korea, according to the Statistical Yearbook 2010, from the beginnings of the 1980’s to 2010, 71% of the cases where the Fair 
Trade Commission imposed some kind of correction were related to price fixing violations (Statistical Yearbook 2010 of the Fair 
Trade Commission, available at: http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=51&pageId=0303). In the US, more than 
$1.7 billion in fines have been imposed for price fixing cartels in the air transportation industry (Department of Justice Press Release 
of 30 November 2010, available at: www.justice.gov/atr/index.html).  
85 See Article 8 of the Vietnamese Competition Law.  
86 See Article 6 of the Egyptian Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices. 
87 See Section 45 of the Canadian Competition Act.  
88 See Article 9 of the Mexican Federal Law on Economic Competition.  
89 See Section 41 of the Malaysian Competition Act. 
90 See Article 4 of the Albanian Law on Competition Protection.  
91 See Article 9 of the Mexican Federal Law on Economic Competition. 
92 See Article 4 of the Albanian Law on Competition Protection. 
93 See Article 25 of the Salvadoran Competition Law.  
94 Idem. 
95 See Article 6 of the Egyptian Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices. 
96 See Section 45 of the Canadian Competition Act.  
97 See Article 9 of the Mexican Federal Law on Economic Competition. 
98 See Section 4 of Pakistani Act No XIX of 2010.  
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(iii) Cartels to Restrict Output  
 
These are horizontal anticompetitive agreements between competitors to restraint the production or the 
sales of a certain product in a determined market with the sole purpose of raising the prices by artificially 
limiting supply. Depending on the competition regime, output restrictions may include agreements 
between competitors on the restriction of: production99, sales100, markets, supply or demand101, quality or 
types of assets102, transportation and delivery103, distribution104, technical development105, investment106, 
or purchases107, among others.  
(iv) Cartels to Fix the Output of Competitive Tenders 
 
These are horizontal anticompetitive agreements in which competing undertakings making tenders agree 
among themselves to fix or control the result of public tenders. There are some peculiarities related to 
collusive tendering and how such practices are regulated across jurisdictions. For instance, in most 
competition regimes collusive tendering is regulated by the anticompetitive agreements provisions108, 
however, in other competition regimes, these practices are not regulated by these provisions, instead, the 
legislators have devoted separate sections, within the competition provisions, that govern this type of 
anticompetitive practices separately109. Alternatively, in other jurisdictions, there are specialized 
legislations on tendering that regulate these practices110. Finally, in some countries, these kinds of 
agreements are prosecuted more actively111, or punished more severely than other horizontal restrictive 
agreements due to the fact that such agreements affect the public interests by wasting the public 
resources, accordingly, some regimes with no criminal sanctions for other anticompetitive agreements 
punish criminally individuals that take part in these fraudulent practices112.  
(v) Other Cartels   
 
Besides the previously seen anticompetitive agreements, there are other practices that are also treated as 
hard-core cartels in some competition systems. For example, in some jurisdictions, the agreements 
between competing undertakings not to do business with targeted individuals or businesses are prohibited 
                                                          
99 See Section 2 of the UK Competition Act.  
100 See Article 13 of the Chinese Anti-monopoly Law.  
101 See Article 4 of the Turkish Act on the Protection of Competition.  
102 See Section 2 of the Israeli Restrictive Trade Practices Law.  
103 See Article 19 of the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.  
104 See Article 9 of the Mexican Federal Law on Economic Competition. 
105 See Article 5 of the Romanian Competition Law.  
106 See Section 17 of the Jamaican Fair Competition Act.  
107 See Article 5 of the Swiss Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraint on Competition. 
108 In Argentina, Article 2(d) of the Law for Defense of Competition. In Australia, Section 44ZZRA(d) of the Competition and 
Consumer Act. In Kenya, Section 21(3)(c) of the Competition Act. In India, Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act. 
109 In Canada, Section 45 of the Competition Act deals with horizontal restraints to competition, nevertheless, Section 47 of the Act 
separately prohibits bid rigging. In Mauritius, Section 45 of the Competition Act regulates horizontal agreements related to price 
fixing, market sharing, and output restriction; however, bid rigging is regulated separately by Section 42 of the Act.   
110 In China, the Bidding Law prohibits bidders from colluding to set bidding prices, or to exclude other bidders (Article 32 of the 
Bidding Law).   
111 In Japan, during 2010, out of 20 cases by the Japanese Fair Commission, 12 were related to bid rigging (See the JFTC 2010 
Annual Report, available at: http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/about_jftc/annual_reports/index.html).   
112 For instance, in Germany, pursuant to paragraph 298 of the Criminal Code, bid rigging is expressly prohibited. There are no other 
restrictive agreements in Germany that are sanctioned with criminal penalties. Similarly, in Austria, Section 168b of the Criminal 
Code sanctions individuals involved in bid rigging practices with up to three years of imprisonment.  
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under the restrictive agreements prohibitions113, these agreements, usually know as group boycotts, are 
used to coerce the market participant that are not members of the cartel in question. These kind of 
restrictive agreements may be horizontal, i.e. cartel members that agree not to sell or buy from certain 
customers; or vertical, i.e. market participants at different levels of the production or distribution agreeing 
not to deal with a third party.      
2. Other Horizontal Restrictive Agreements    
 
As seen before, most competition regimes have provisions with lists that govern the most traditional and 
harmful anticompetitive agreements (hard-core cartels), nonetheless, these lists are illustrative and non-
exhaustive, thus, these provisions are applicable to other kinds of horizontal agreements that might 
restrict competition, but are not expressly included in those lists.   
The other horizontal restrictive agreements that do not fall inside the category of hard-core 
cartels are those which are not deemed as anticompetitive by their object, like hard-core cartels, but are 
illegal by their negative effects on competition. Contrary to the per se illegality of hard-core cartels, these 
other horizontal agreements are usually examined under the rule of reason114. In practice, unlike hard-
core cartels, where their injurious characteristics make them almost always contrary to competition, these 
other horizontal restrictive agreements will be scrutinized under the rule of reason, provided that these 
may not always be harmful to competition. Accordingly, in the rule of reason approach the 
procompetitive effects of a certain conduct have to be compared with the anticompetitive effects, thus, 
such an approach requires a case-by-case analysis of potential anticompetitive behavior.   
There are certain agreements signed among competing undertakings that can lead to substantial 
economic benefits, especially when these allow the undertakings to share risks, save costs, enhance 
investments, poll know-how, increase product quality and variety, or improve innovation. Nonetheless, 
some of these horizontal agreements may raise competition issues when they allow undertakings to 
maintain, gain or increase market power, and as a consequence, to affect prices, output, product quality 
and quantity, or innovation. For these reasons, the scrutiny of these types of horizontal agreements is 
made on a case by case basis regarding at the specific effects that a particular agreement has on 
competition.  
Accordingly, besides from hard-core cartels, there are certain horizontal agreements that may 
raise competition issues. For instance, joint purchasing or selling agreements intended to fix the price to 
pay, or to purchase, e.g. agreements between purchasers determining with whom they will deal. These 
agreements may fall within the restrictive agreements prohibition if they have a substantial effect on 
                                                          
113 In China, boycott transactions among competing business operator are prohibited by the provisions of Article 13 of the Anti-
monopoly Law. In Germany, undertakings and associations of undertakings cannot request other undertakings or association of 
undertakings to refuse to sell or purchase, with the intention of unfairly harming targeted undertakings (Section 21 of the Against 
Restraints of Competition). 
114 Just like with the term per se, the term rule of reason is a concept forged in the US antirust case law. Accordingly, in 1911, the 
US Supreme Court determined the use of the “rule of reason” under the Sherman Act, whereby “the standard of reason [is]… the 
measure [to be] used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong 
against which the statute provided” (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 61-64 (1911)). However, this standard is 
widely used worldwide in the enforcement of competition law and also among practitioners and academics as a method to examine 
the anticompetitive effects of a certain conduct, where the latter is declared unlawful by its effects on competition and not by its 
object. 
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competition. Likewise, the agreements between sellers to refuse to deal with certain customers may have 
an appreciable effect on competition. 
 Moreover, the agreements between competing undertakings to share and exchange information 
may also raise competition issues. While in some cases exchanging information may lead to pro-
competitive collaboration, it can sometimes increase the possibility of collusion. Accordingly, these kinds 
of agreements may have a substantial effect on competition, and particularly, agreements to exchange 
information on prices, costs, transaction terms and conditions115. 
Similarly, agreements between competitors restricting advertising, whether related to the 
amount, nature or form of advertising may have potential anticompetitive effects. However, agreements 
aimed at curbing misleading advertising, or at ensuring that advertising is legal, truthful and decent are 
improbable to have anticompetitive effects.  
Standardization agreements, which are agreements between competitors concerned with 
technical or design standards may, in some circumstances, lead to an enhancement in production by 
reducing costs or raising quality, or promote economic interpenetration among competitors, and 
encourage the development of new and improved products. These agreements, however, may give rise to 
restrictive effects on competition by creating entry barriers, restricting price competition and restricting or 
controlling productions, markets, innovation or technical development.  
Finally, in some cases, research and development agreements between competing undertakings 
may be pro-competitive and produce significant benefits by combining complementary skills, assets and 
know-how, thus resulting in improved or new products and technologies being developed and marketed 
more rapidly and efficiently. On the contrary, joint research and development agreements can lessen or 
affect competition by reducing or slowing down innovation, leading to fewer or worse products, reducing 
competition between the parties outside the scope of the agreement, increasing prices by making 
anticompetitive coordination between the parties, and restricting the exploitation of products developed 
through the cooperation.  
(b) Vertical Agreements  
 
Vertical agreements are arrangements between undertakings at different levels of the production or 
distribution chain in a certain market. For example, these can be agreements between a producer and its 
distributors, or between a wholesaler and its retailers. Even though not as extensively regulated as 
horizontal agreements, some jurisdictions make specific reference to vertical agreements in their 
competition provisions. 
When applying the restrictive agreement prohibitions to vertical agreements, most jurisdictions 
examine these practices using the rule of reason approach, provided that, unlike hard-core cartels, vertical 
                                                          
115 In some jurisdictions, the exchange of price information is likely to be regarded as giving rise to an anticompetitive price-fixing 
agreement. The European Commission has considered that the exchange of price information between competitors allows them to 
coordinate the setting of prices (Commission decision of 15 October 2008, on appeal Cases T-587/08 etc. Fresh Del Monte Produce 
v Commission). 
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agreements are not always anticompetitive116. In practice, given that not every vertical agreement will 
raise competition issues, competition authorities will not investigative most of these agreements, 
especially since some vertical agreements may create efficiencies and benefits to competition and 
consumers.  
As to the provisions regulating these kinds of agreements, different approaches have been chosen 
across jurisdictions. On the one hand, there are many jurisdictions that have one single general provision 
that is applicable to both horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements117. Additionally, in some 
competition regimes, there is a single general prohibition that is followed by a non-exhaustive list of 
anticompetitive agreements that contains both horizontal and vertical anticompetitive agreements118. On 
the other hand, in some competition regimes, there are independent provisions that regulate horizontal 
agreements and vertical agreements separately. In most of these jurisdictions, there is a provision that 
contains a general prohibition against restrictive agreements among competing undertakings that is 
followed by a similar provision on agreements between undertakings operating at different levels in the 
chain of production or distribution119. Finally, other competition regimes have independent provisions 
that prohibit specific forms of vertical agreements120.  
Irrespective of the way in which vertical restrictive agreements are regulated and how the effects of these 
agreements on competition are assessed, there are certain vertical arrangements that are more prone to 
raise competition issues. Firstly, resale price maintenance agreements are arrangements by the virtue of 
which a supplier specifies the resale price of a determined product, this kind of agreements, like most 
agreements concerned with the fixing of prices, may restrict competition to an appreciable extent. 
Secondly, exclusive dealing agreements, where a buyer agrees to purchase all his requirements from only 
one seller, or a seller agrees to sell its products to only one firm, are likely to restrict competition by 
limiting the undertaking’s choice of buyers or suppliers. Thirdly, exclusive distribution agreements, 
where a supplier agrees to sell its products to only one distributor for resale in a particular territory, may 
restrict competition by reducing intra-band competition and by partitioning markets. Fifthly, tying 
agreements, where the manufacturer makes the purchase of one product (tying product) conditional on the 
purchase of a second product (tied product), may restrict competition by restricting the ability of the 
purchaser to buy the tied product from another manufacturer. 
                                                          
116 In Mexico, Article 9 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition establishes that certain restrictive agreements among 
competing undertakings (price fixing, output restrictions,  market sharing, and bid rigging) are absolute monopolistic practices, and 
that the involved parties shall be sanctioned for infringing the competition law provisions. On the contrary, Article 10 establishes 
that restrictive practices among non-competing undertakings are relative monopolistic practices and subject to the fulfillment of 
certain conditions.  
117 In the US, Section 1 of the Sherman Act is applicable to both horizontal and vertical restraints. Similarly, in Germany, Section 1 
of the Act Against Restraints of Competition regulates horizontal and vertical agreements.  
118 In Armenia, Article 5 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition begins with a general prohibition against restrictive 
agreements that is coupled with a non-exhaustive list of anticompetitive practices and ends explaining that anticompetitive 
agreements can be signed by economic entities on the same product market (horizontal agreements) and economic entities on 
different product markets (vertical agreements).   
119 In China, Section 13 of the Anti-monopoly Law establishes a general prohibition against horizontal agreements, plus a non-
exhaustive list of examples. Furthermore, Section 14 establishes a general prohibition against agreements among business operator 
and their trading parties (vertical agreements), which is coupled with a list that expressly prohibits fixing the price of commodities 
for resale to a third party, or restricting the minimum price of commodities for resale to a third party. 
120 In Canada, there is a general prohibition against restrictive agreements between competitors (Section 45 of the Competition Act), 
additionally, there are specific provisions against: resale price maintenance (Section 76), exclusive dealing, tying, and market 
restriction (Section 77). 
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7.2. Single Firm or Unilateral Anti-Competitive Conduct 
 
Along with the prohibition against restrictive agreements, the provisions against monopolization or abuse 
of dominance constitute the fundamental elements of competition law and policy in practically all the 
jurisdictions in the world that have antitrust provisions. Monopolization or the abuse of dominance occur 
when a dominant undertaking in a market, or a dominant group of undertakings, engages in conduct that 
is intended to eliminate or discipline a competing undertaking or to deter future entry by new competitors, 
with the result that competition is prevented or lessened substantially. Due to the ability of this kind of 
anticompetitive practices to harm competition, most competition law regimes have introduced specific 
provisions in their legislations that prohibit this type of conducts.   
In general, the wording of the monopolization or abuse of dominance provision is quite similar 
in most jurisdictions, with a few exceptions. Thus, the majority of competition regimes have established a 
general prohibition against the abuse of a dominant position which is generally followed by a non-
exhaustive list of anticompetitive practices that amount to the abusive behavior of dominant undertakings.  
Overall, there are two main issues that are treated differently from one jurisdiction to another; 
these are concerned with the determination of dominance and the conducts that are considered to be 
abusive. Thus, on the one hand, the provisions and/or the enforcers of competition law have to determine 
when a certain undertaking or group of undertakings is dominant in the relevant market. And on the other 
hand, there is the establishment of which specific practices amount to the abusive behavior of a dominant 
undertaking or group of undertakings in the relevant market. Accordingly, the main differences found 
across jurisdictions are related to these two subjects. 
As to the determination of dominance, it has been defined as a position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on a 
relevant market, by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of consumers121. Nonetheless, in some jurisdictions, according 
to the relevant case law, it has been determines that the mere possession of a dominant position is not 
considered to be anticompetitive; there must be an element of unacceptable conduct to achieve or 
maintain that position122. Similarly, the acquisition of a dominant position through competition on the 
merits does not constitute a violation of competition law123. 
In practice, competition regimes across the world handle differently the determination of whether 
an undertaking is dominant in the relevant market or not. For instance, in some jurisdictions, a definition 
of dominance has been introduced in the competition law provisions with the purpose of facilitating the 
                                                          
121 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para 65; and Case 85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 38. 
122 The US Supreme Court determined that the Sherman Act does not contain any direct prohibition against monopoly in concrete, 
and that without unlawful conduct, mere size, aggregated capital, power and volume of business are not monopolizing in a legal 
sense (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 114). 
123 In the US, it has been determined that the Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits acquiring or maintaining monopoly power only 
through improper means (Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. Mc Quillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 
570-71 (1966)). 
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enforcers of the antitrust rules the application of the abuse of dominance provisions124. Instead, in other 
jurisdictions that do not have a definition of dominance, given that the antitrust statute is silent on this 
point, the competition law enforcers are responsible for the determination of dominance. In such cases, 
the enforcement authorities will analyze every case and arrive at a conclusion by looking at the available 
case law and assessing several factors125. For instance, when determining if an undertaking has or not a 
dominant position, the enforcement authorities may take into consideration: the market shares; the 
barriers to entry; the potential competition; the economic and financial power of the undertakings; the 
economic dependence of the suppliers and purchasers; the countervailing power of buyers/customers; the 
development of the undertaking’s distribution network, and access to the sources of supply of products; 
and the undertaking’s connections with other undertakings; among others126.    
Despite the preceding, most competition regimes have established certain mechanisms to 
facilitate the determination of dominance. As a way of guidance, some competition regimes have 
introduced in their competition provisions certain factors that the competition authorities have to consider 
in order to determine if an undertaking is dominant or not127. Another approach chosen in some 
competition systems is related to the use of market share thresholds. For instance, in some countries, if a 
certain undertaking does not have a predetermined market share, it will not be regarded as dominant in 
the relevant market and its practices shall not raise competition issues, oppositely, if the undertaking 
possesses a higher market share than the pre-established, then the competition authority will further 
investigate to see if the undertaking is dominant and if its conduct is abusive128. Similarly, in other 
                                                          
124 In Belgium, see Section 1(1°) of the Competition Act. In Bulgaria, see Article 20(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition. In 
China, see Article 17 of the Anti-monopoly Law. In India, see Section 4 of the Competition Act. In Estonia, see Article 13 of the 
Competition Act. In Finland, see Section 4(2) of the Competition Act. In the Netherlands, see Article 1(1) of the Dutch Competition 
Act. In Russia, see Article 5(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition. In Switzerland, see Article 4(2) Cartels and Other 
Restraints of Competition Act. In Zambia, see article 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act. 
125 For instance, in the US, the competition provisions do not include a definition of dominance, as a result, courts in the application 
of the monopolization rules have defined dominance as the power to control market prices or exclude competition (United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). Similarly, at the EU level, Article 102 of the TFEU, which prohibits the 
abuse of a dominant position, does not have a definition of dominant position. Thus, the determination of dominance has been made 
by the institutions in charge of the enforcement of EU competition law. The European Court of Justice established in the Hoffmann-
La Roche case that dominance was a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers (Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission, supra note 121). 
126 See Article 8 of the Albanian Law on Competition Protection.  
127 In Argentina, in order to determine the dominance of a determined undertaking, the following factors have to be considered: (i) 
the level of substitution of the involved product or service; (ii) the entry barrier level in the relevant market; and (iii) the level in 
which the relevant undertaking can unilaterally influence the price determination or restrict market supply and the level in which the 
competitors have to counteract such power (Article 5 of the Law for Defense of Competition). In Australia, an undertaking will 
abuse its dominant position if it uses it with the purpose of: (i) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor; (ii) preventing 
the entry of a person in that or any other market; or (iii) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in 
that or any other market (Section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act). In China, Article 18 of the Chinese Anti-monopoly 
Law states that the dominant market of an undertaking can be determined by taking notice of: (i) the market share of a business 
operator, and the competition situation in the market; (ii) the capacity of an undertaking to control the sales market or the raw 
material market; (iii) the financial and technical conditions of the undertaking; (iv) the degree of dependence of other undertaking; 
(v) the degree of difficulty for other undertakings to enter the relevant market; and (vi) other factors related to determine a dominant 
market position. In Germany, according to Section 19(2) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition an undertaking is dominant 
where, as a supplier or purchaser of certain kinds of goods or commercial services on the relevant market, it (i) does not have any 
competitors; or (ii) has a paramount market position in relation to its competitors.  
128 In Brazil, an undertaking or group of undertakings are presumed to be dominant if these are capable of altering or controlling 
unilaterally or conjunctionally the market conditions, or controlling 20% or more of the relevant market (Article 36(2) of the 
Antitrust Law). In China, according to Article 19 of the Anti-monopoly Law, dominance is presumed if; (i) the market share of an 
undertaking accounts for 1/2 or more of the relevant market; (ii) the joint market share of two or more undertakings accounts for 2/3 
or more of the relevant market; or (iii) the joint market share of three undertakings accounts for 3/4 or more of the relevant market. 
However, if in the cases (ii) and (iii) any undertaking has less than 1/10 of the market share; it will not be considered as dominant. 
Moreover, these dominance presumptions are rebuttable, accordingly, if the undertaking presents evidence to the contrary, it will not 
be considered dominant. In Estonia, pursuant to Section 13(1) of the Competition Act, an undertaking is presumed to be dominant if 
it holds a market share of more than 40% in the relevant market by itself or with other undertakings. In Germany, pursuant to 
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competition regimes with market share thresholds, if the undertaking meets the determined market share 
thresholds, it will constitute prima facie evidence of dominance, and it will be on the undertaking to 
disprove that it has market power, and consequently, that it is not dominant129. Finally, in some 
jurisdictions with no previously determined market share thresholds, the enforcers of the competition 
provisions have established safe harbors based on market share thresholds130. 
Furthermore, in other competition systems, other mechanisms have been established to ease the 
determination of dominance, such as the elaboration of guidelines to assist the competition authorities in 
determining if a certain undertaking is dominant131. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, other factors 
besides market shares are taken into account for the determination of dominance, i.e. in some countries, 
the annual turnover of undertakings is considered to determine if the latter is dominant in the relevant 
market132. 
A further issue related to the determination of dominance is concerned with the number of 
undertakings that can hold a dominant position in a determined market. In this respect, in some 
competition regimes, the notion of dominance refers to a single undertaking having market power in the 
relevant market. Alternatively, in other competition regimes, two or more undertakings acting together 
may have market power and be collectively dominant in the relevant market. Thus, depending on the 
jurisdiction, the competition law provisions will apply to the abusive behavior of a single dominant 
undertaking133, and conversely, in other systems, the abuse of dominance prohibition will apply to the 
anticompetitive practices of a group of undertakings with market power acting together in a determined 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Section 19(3) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, a single undertaking is presumed to be dominant if it has a market share 
of at least one third, while several undertakings are presumed to be dominant if they are three or less reaching a combined market 
share of 50%, or they are five or less reaching a combined market share of two thirds. In Russia, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the 
Federal Law on Protection of Competition, an undertaking is dominant if it has a market share of more than 50% in the relevant 
market. In South Africa, according to Section 7 of the Competition Act, an undertaking is dominant if: it has at least 45% of that 
market; it has at least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or it has less 
than 35% of that market, but has market power.   
129 In China, according to Article 19 of the Anti-monopoly Law, a business operator is presumed to be dominant if it meets certain 
market share thresholds, however, where a business operator who has been presumed to have a dominant position can prove that it 
does not have a dominant position, it shall not be determined as being dominant.  
130 In Denmark, the Competition Council in its Decisions of 20 June 2007 Elsam III, determined that there is a presumption of 
dominance if an undertaking holds a market share between 40 to 50 % in a relevant market. In France, the Autorité de la 
Concurrence established that a market share below 10% does not provides market power (La Française des Jeux, 2001). At the EU 
level, there is rebuttable presumption of dominance for market shares of more than the 50% of the relevant market (Case C-62/86 
AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359). Also, the ECJ held that market shares which are superior to 70% are in 
themselves, evidence of the existence of a dominant position (Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission, supra note 121). In the 
U.S. firms have a dominant position if they hold about two-thirds or more of a relevant market (Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. Mc Quillan, 
supra note 123).  
131 For instance, in Bulgaria the Methodology on Investigation and Definition of the Market Position of undertaking in the Relevant 
Market is an instrument designed to investigate and determine the market position of undertakings in the relevant market in relation 
to the application of the provisions of the Law on the Protection of Competition. According to this methodology, the Commission 
on Protection of Competition presumes that the maintenance of a market share higher than 70% over a sufficiently long period of 
time is sufficient proof the existence of dominance (page 13). At the EU level, the Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Firms determines that dominance is 
unlikely if the market share of a firm is below 40% (Recital 14). 
132 In Korea, according to Article 4 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, an undertaking will be presumed to be market-
dominant if it holds a market share of 50/100 or more, or if the total market share of not less than three undertakings is 75/100 or 
more. However, undertakings with less than 10/100 of market share, or undertakings whose annual sales turnover or purchases in a 
particular market amount to less than KRW 4 billion, shall not be considered as dominant.  
133 In Egypt, Article 8 of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices refers to a person 
holding a dominant position. In South Africa, according to the wording of the abuse of dominance provisions of the Competition 
Act, these apply only to single dominant undertakings. In the US, there is no notion of collective dominance; the provisions of 
abusive dominance apply only to single firm conduct (Section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
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market134. Nevertheless, provided that most of the current jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of 
collective dominance135, in some competition systems where dominance used to refer to an undertaking 
actin on its own, the abuse of dominance prohibition has been amended in order to be applicable to cases 
involving collective dominance136. Moreover, depending on the competition regime, dominance will be 
recognized to groups of buyers or suppliers137, and in some cases, to non-dominant undertakings seeking 
to acquire a dominant position138.  
As to the determination of which practices amount to the abuse of dominance, as previously 
seen, it is important to first notice that the mere possession of a dominant position or a substantial market 
power is not prohibited by the competition provisions, given that such possession do not raises 
competition issues by itself139. Thus, the abuse of dominance prohibition will apply only when the 
dominant undertaking abusively uses its dominant position to distort competition on its favor without any 
advantages to consumers.  
Overall, an undertaking abuses its dominant position in a market when, through the effects of its 
conduct on competition, it adversely affects consumers directly, i.e. though the prices charged; or 
indirectly, i.e. by reducing existing or potential competition. Thus, in general, the abusive conduct of a 
dominant undertaking may be of two kinds. On the one hand, practices that exploit customers and 
suppliers, for example, by charging excessively high prices. And on the other hand, practices that amount 
to exclusionary behavior, by removing or limiting competition in a market, or establishing or 
strengthening entry barriers.   
 
                                                          
134 In Belgium, Section 3 of the Competition Act applies to single undertakings and to two or more undertakings that are collectively 
dominant. In Bulgaria, Article 21 of the Law on Protection of Competition prohibits the abusive practices of single undertakings and 
multiple undertakings which are dominant in the relevant market. In Denmark, Section 11 of the Competition Act prohibits abuses 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position. In France, Article L.4202(1) of the Commercial Code prohibits abuse by an 
undertaking of a group of undertakings of a dominant position. In Greece, according to Article 2 of the Law on the Control of 
Monopolies and Oligopolies and the Protection of Competition prohibits the abuse by a single undertaking or by a group of 
undertakings of their dominant position. In Italy, the provisions of Section 3 of the Competition Act apply to abusive practices of 
single undertakings and to group of undertakings. In Vietnam, Article 11 of the Competition Law applies to enterprises or groups of 
enterprises holding a dominant position.  
135 In the Italian Flat Glass case, the European Court determined the principle of collective dominance: “There is nothing, in 
principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities from being, on a specific market, united by such economic links 
that, by virtue of that fact, together they hold a dominant position vis à vis the other operators on the same market” (Cases T-68/69 
etc Societá Italiano Vetro SpA v Commission [1992] II ECR 1403, [1992] 5 CMLR 302). 
136 For example in India, the abuse of dominance prohibition of the Competition Act was amended in 2007 from “No enterprise 
shall abuse its dominant position” to “No enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position”.    
137 In Australia, the abuse of dominance provisions apply to both buyers and suppliers with substantial power in a market (Section 
46 of the Competition and Consumer Act), for instance, in the following case, a wholesale supplier of bread was successfully 
condemned for the violation of the abuse of dominance rules (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Australian 
Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No. 4) [2008] FCA 21). At the EU level, from the wording of Article 102(a), the abuse of dominance 
prohibitions shall apply to dominant buyers, given that it mentions the imposition of unfair prices in the list of abusive practices. In 
Ireland, the High Court has ruled that the provisions of abuse of dominance can be applied to buyers and suppliers. The Court held 
that a monopsonist undertaking has similar power to control price in purchasing as a monopolist has in selling, and is able to act 
independently from its competitors and customers (Jim Blemings v David Patton Ltd. [2001] 1 IR 385). In the US, the provisions of 
the Sherman Act prohibit monopsonization and also attempts to monopsonize under the same principles that apply to 
monopolization and attempted monopolization.   
138 In Portugal, according to the abuse of economic dependence provisions, it is forbidden, as long as it may affect the functioning of 
the market or the structure of competition, the abusive exploitation by one or more undertakings, of the state of economic 
dependence of any of their suppliers or clients, due to the absence of an equivalent alternative (Article 12 of the Portuguese 
Competition Act). In the US, the provisions of the Sherman Act prohibit attempts to monopolize where the defendant has a 
dangerous probability of gaining monopoly power (Section 2 of the Sherman Act).  
139 According to the OFT Guidelines on the Abuse of a dominant position 2004, the prohibitions of Article 82 (now 102 TFEU) and 
Chapter II of the Competition Act are against the abuse of the dominant position, not the holding of the position.  
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1. Types of Abusive Practices 
 
As mentioned before, most competition systems have included a general prohibition against the abuse of 
dominance which is coupled with non-exhaustive lists of practices considered as abusive. Thus, in 
practice, all the practices that fall within the general prohibition shall be considered as contrary to the 
competition provisions. With respect to the lists of practices provided by most competition provisions, 
these are mere examples introduced by the legislators with the purpose of serving as a guide for enforcers 
and market participants. Despite the preceding, most competition regimes prohibit the majority of the 
following practices for being considered as abusive; predatory pricing; exclusive dealing; resale price 
maintenance; discriminatory pricing; refuse to deal; tying or bundling; among others.  
According with the traditional taxonomy of abusive behavior, abusive practices are distinguished as 
exploitative abuses, including discriminatory abuses, and exclusionary abuses. The difference between 
these categories of abusive behavior is concerned with the way in which these harm social welfare140. 
Accordingly, exploitative and discriminatory abuses are directed towards the customers of a dominant 
undertaking, while exclusionary abuses are directed towards the competitors of a dominant undertaking. 
Thus, in practice, dominant undertakings can abuse their market position in three ways. First, dominant 
undertakings may use their dominant position to harm consumers, for instance, by raising prices 
(exploitative abuse). Second, within the same category, dominant undertakings use their market position 
to harm consumers by charging different prices to different customers (discriminatory abuse). And third, 
dominant undertakings may use their market power to create or maintain a dominant position to suppress 
competition, by  
a) Exploitative Abuse 
 
(i) Excessive pricing 
 
Excessive pricing is a type of exploitative abuse that occurs when prices are set significantly above 
competitive levels as a result of monopoly or market power141. According to the relevant jurisprudence, 
excessive pricing constitutes abusive behavior when the price charged is excessive because it does not 
have a reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied142. With regard to the design of 
the abuse of dominance provisions, there are jurisdictions that have introduced excessive pricing 
provisions in their antitrust act143. Alternatively, in other jurisdictions this type of exploitative abuse falls 
within the general provisions of abusive behavior144. From the enforcement perspective, normally, 
competition authorities are often extremely reluctant to take enforcement action in case of exploitative 
abuses in general and excessive pricing in particular145. 
                                                          
140 NAZZINI, Renato (2011), ‘The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102’. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 51. 
141 OECD, Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law, 1993. 
142 In the EU case law, see: Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental v Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
143 Such is the case of the Competition Act of South Africa.  
144 In the EU excessive pricing is regulated by the provisions of Article 102.  
145 OECD, Excessive Prices, 2011. 
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b) Discriminatory abuse 
 
(i) Discriminatory Pricing  
 
Under certain conditions, discriminatory pricing is also considered as an abusive practice in most 
jurisdictions. Discriminatory pricing occurs when an undertaking sells a product or service at different 
prices, regardless of identical costs of supplying the goods, however, this kind of practice will be 
anticompetitive only when it is intended to unfairly exclude competitors from the market, provided that 
charging lower prices to consumers may be a sign of competition. Accordingly, discriminatory pricing 
will be anticompetitive: if there is no objective commercial justification for it; when the act places an 
undertaking at a competitive disadvantage146; if it is likely to have the effect of substantially preventing or 
lessening competition147; if it creates inequality in competition148; or if it creates diversified conditions of 
competition149; among others.  
c) Exclusionary abuse 
 
(i) Predatory Pricing 
 
One of the most common abusive practices by dominant undertakings is predatory pricing. Predatory 
pricing is an exclusionary practice where a dominant undertaking sells a product or service at a very low 
price with the purpose of driving competitors out of the market, or creating barriers to entry for potential 
new competitors. The main issue related to this exclusionary practice is the determination of when this 
practice occurs. Normally, predatory pricing involves pricing bellow some acceptable measure of costs 
and certain evidence of exclusionary or monopolistic intent. However, in practice, this issue varies widely 
among jurisdictions; nonetheless, some similarities are evidenced by studying the provisions of some 
competition systems. For instance, in some jurisdictions, predatory pricing will occur when a dominant 
undertaking sells its goods at a price that is below cost150. Alternatively, in other regimes, predatory 
pricing will take place when a dominant undertaking sells its goods: below their marginal or variable 
cost151; below their marginal or average variable cost152; at prices lower than the acquisition cost153; at 
extremely low prices154; at prices that drive competitors out of a market or that prevent the entry of new 
competitors155; at glaringly low prices156; or, at unfair prices, including predatory prices157; among others. 
In addition, in some cases, it has been determined that in order for predatory pricing to exist, the predator 
                                                          
146 Article 102 of the TFEU. 
147 Section 9 of the South African Competition Act.  
148 Article 13 of the Vietnamese Competition Law.  
149 Article 09 of the Polish Act on Competition and Consumer Protection.  
150 In China, Section 17 of the Anti-monopoly Law prohibits selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause. In 
Vietnam, Article 13 prohibits dominant undertakings to sell goods at prices lower than the aggregate costs in order to eliminate 
competitors.  
151 In Zambia, see Section 16 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act.  
152 In South Africa, see Section 8 of the Competition Act.  
153 In Canada, see Section 78 of the Competition Act.  
154 In Hungary, Article 21 of the Competition Act determines as abusive behavior, to set extremely low prices which are not based 
on greater efficiency.  
155 See Section 3 of the Pakistani Act No. XIX of 2010. See Article 9 of the Albanian Law on Competition Protection.  
156 In Poland, see Article 9 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection.  
157 In India, see Section 4 of the Competition Act.  
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must be able to recoup its investment in low prices after some or all existing rivals are eliminated158. 
However, in some jurisdictions, the ability to recoup is not an essential element of predatory pricing, in 
such cases, it is sufficient for the predator to price below average variable costs with the ultimate 
intention of eliminating or disciplining a competitor159.  
Nonetheless, despite the preceding, the provisions against undesirably low pricing have to be 
carefully considered, provided that the indiscriminate use of these may deter vigorous, aggressive pricing, 
which is ultimately the type of behavior that competition law is aimed to protect and foster160.   
(ii) Exclusive Dealing 
 
Another anticompetitive practice that is related to the abuse of dominance is exclusive dealing. Exclusive 
dealing is a practice whereby a supplier of a product makes the supply of the product dependent upon the 
acceptance of restrictions on the distribution or manufacture of competing goods161. In these cases, the 
undertaking will have the exclusive right to buy or sell the dominant undertaking’s products. However, in 
exchange of this exclusive right, the supplier requires the buyer to deal only or primarily in products 
supplied by the supplier. In some competition regimes, exclusive dealing is related to restrictions to 
buyers to sell the supplied goods in determined territories only162.  
(iii) Resale price maintenance  
 
Most competition systems have provisions that prohibit manufacturers to enforce or try to enforce vertical 
contractual agreements containing a minimum163 or maximum164 price at which the retailer must resale 
those goods. Resale price maintenance prevents resellers from setting their prices independently, and 
ultimately, lead to increased prices for consumers. In practice, unlike other abuse of dominance practices, 
resale price maintenance has been declared as illegal per se in some jurisdictions165. Moreover, depending 
on the jurisdiction, the suggestion of advertisement of prices by the manufacturer may also be sanctioned 
by the competition provisions166. Finally, in some jurisdictions, resale price maintenance is considered as 
an anticompetitive vertical agreement, and consequently, governed by those provisions167.  
(iv) Refusal to Deal 
 
Most competition systems have provisions that prohibit dominant undertakings to refuse to deal with 
other undertakings with the purpose of excluding competitors or granting a competitive advantage to 
                                                          
158 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209. 1993. 
159 Case C-62/86 AZCO Chemie v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359; and Case C-333/94 P. Tetra Pak International SA v Commission 
[1996] ECR I-5951.  
160 FOX, Eleanor M. (1997), ‘US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison’. In: Graham E.M. & Richardson J.D. (eds) Global 
Competition Policy. Washington: Institute for International Economics, p. 351. 
161 Standard Oil Co of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).  
162 In Canada, see Section 77 of the Competition Act.  
163 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons. Co. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  
164 Albercht v. Herald Co. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
165 The US Supreme Court has determined that minimum resale price maintenance is per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act (Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720, 724 (1988)). 
166 In Canada, see Section 76 of the Competition Act.  
167 In South Africa, Section 5(2) of the Competition Act, titled “Restrictive vertical practices prohibited” prohibits minimum resale 
price maintenance.  
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another undertaking. Provided that in most jurisdictions undertakings should be allowed to contract with 
whosoever they wish, unless it is not justified, the decision of an undertaking to refuse to deal with 
another undertaking will not always raise competition issues168. In some competition regimes, refusal to 
deal is also concerned with the refusal to allow another undertaking to access a network, infrastructure or 
facility of a dominant undertaking, provided that there is an adequate remuneration by the other 
undertaking and that without such access the other undertaking is unable to operate as a competitor of the 
dominant undertaking169. Similarly, in some competition regimes, refusal to deal is related to refusing to 
supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is economically feasible170. Moreover, 
in some competition systems, the refusal to deal provisions is not related to the abusive behavior of a 
dominant undertaking, but applies to any undertaking171, or is regulated as a vertical anticompetitive 
agreement172. 
(v) Tying or Bundling  
 
A further abusive conduct by dominant undertakings is the practice of tying or bundling. Tying is the 
practice of a suppliers of one product (the tying product) requiring a buyer also to buy a second product 
(the tied product)173. Bundling is a practice where two products are sold as a single package at a single 
price. Accordingly, in practice, most competition regimes have provisions that prohibit dominant 
undertaking to carry out these anticompetitive practices174.    
(vi) Other Abusive Practices 
 
Finally, there are other practices that amount to an abuse by dominant undertakings that are prohibited by 
the competition provisions of certain competition regimes. These include: margin squeezing175; buying a 
scarce supply of goods or resources required by a competitor176; undertaking an act that leads to the non-
manufacturing, or non-production, or the non-distribution of a product for a certain period of time177; 
reducing or increasing the quantity of the assets or the scope of the services offered by a dominant 
undertaking178; abusing an intellectual property right179; or unreasonably impeding the participation of 
new competitors180; among others.  
 
                                                          
168 In Hungary, see Article 21 of the Competition Act.  
169 In Albania, see Article 9(e) of the Law on Competition Protection. In South Africa, see Section 9 of the Competition Act.  
170 In South Africa, see Section 9 of the Competition Act.  
171 In Canada, see Section 75 of the Competition Act.  
172 In India, refusal to deal is a prohibit agreement between enterprises at different stages of the production chain (Section 3(4)(d) of 
the Competition Act.   
173 (Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, supra note 78). 
174 Armenia, Article 7 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 10 of the Competition 
Act; Canada, Section 77 of the Competition Act; Egypt, Article 8 of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition 
of Monopolistic Practices; Jamaica, Section 20 of the Fair Competition Act; Seychelles, Section 7 of the Fair Competition Act.  
175 In Canada, see Section 78 of the Competition Act.  
176 In Malaysia, see Section 10 of the Competition Act.  
177 In Egypt, see Article 8 of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices.  
178 In Israel, see Section 29A of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law.  
179 In Kenya, see Section 24 of the Competition Act.  
180 In Korea, see Article 3-2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. In Vietnam, see Article 13 of the Competition Law.  
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8. Merger Control 
 
Other practices that normally fall under the control of the competition law provisions are mergers and 
acquisitions that create or reinforce a dominant position. Even though, the prohibitions of restrictive 
agreements and the abuse of dominance, plus the control of mergers and acquisitions that raise 
competition law issues are the typical provisions of most competition law regimes, there are jurisdictions, 
especially those of new competition law regimes, that have not included provisions that control these 
types of transactions. Nevertheless, in some of these competition law systems, mergers and acquisitions 
that raise competition law issues can be challenged by the abuse of dominance provisions.    
In practice, M&A’s can take different forms: through the amalgamation of two or more undertakings 
that merge to become a single entity; through the acquisition of the control of an undertaking; or through 
the creation of a full-function joint venture. In most competition law regimes with merger control 
mechanisms, the competition authority is enabled to investigate mergers between undertakings that could 
be harmful to the competitive process. Accordingly, it is fundamental to determine which transactions are 
subject to the control by the competition authority provided that not all transactions are contrary to the 
competition law objectives. For instance, some undertakings might choose to merge with the purpose of 
becoming more efficient, in such cases; the proposed transaction will result beneficial for the economy 
and consumers. On the contrary, other transactions may cause anticompetitive effects, provided that these 
may be intended to reduce or lessen competition in a determined market, and as a consequence, create or 
strengthen a dominant position. In such cases the scrutiny of competition law is necessary in order to 
prevent competition from being harm or restricted.  
As with the other anticompetitive practices that fall under the control of the competition law 
provisions, there are some differences with regard to the control of mergers and acquisitions across 
competition law regimes. These are mainly concerned with the obligation of the undertakings to notify 
the transaction, the notification process, the procedures undertaken by the authorities responsible for the 
control of the notified transactions and the remedies available in the different competition law regimes.   
9. Other Practices Controlled by Competition Law 
 
In addition to the typical anticompetitive practices controlled by most competition law systems across 
jurisdictions, there are other conducts that fall under the provisions of some competition law regimes.  For 
instance, in a number of competition law systems there are provisions dealing with state aid, in these 
jurisdictions the state aid provisions are intended to limit the ability of governments to grant subsidies or 
benefits to domestic undertakings, in order to prevent that these aids distort the competitive process 
between the recipients of the subsidies and the undertakings that do not receive subsidies. In this regard, 
the objective of the state aid control is to ensure that undertakings are not kept artificially in markets 
through state aid, provided that these subsidized undertakings will create a distortion on competition by 
affecting the incentives of other competitors in the market and the interest of new entrants. Moreover, in 
other competition law systems there are provisions that control other possible restrictions or distortions of 
the competitive process by the intervention of the State. For example, some competition law regimes may 
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have provisions against the collusion or abuse of dominance by public undertakings or in regard to sectors 
of the economy that have general interest, alternatively, in some competition law systems, the actuation of 
public entities or the administration of public utilities by the State are exempted from the scope of the 
competition law provisions. Finally, in some competition law systems other additional subjects may fall 
under the scope of competition law, such as consumer protection, intellectual property protections, unfair 
competition, price regulation or trade regulation.  
8. Institutional Design of Competition Law 
 
A further fundamental issue concerned with the study of competition law enforcement is related with the 
design of the competition law institutions responsible for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions. All 
competition law enforcement systems are grounded on two essential components: the legal instruments, 
which deal with the fundamental commands of the law, the procedure and the attributions of the public 
enforcers; and the institutional structures and procedures through which the legal instruments are 
implemented. In practice, the efficient interaction of these two components is fundamental for the success 
of the enforcement system as a whole, provided that well drafted legal commands are useless if these are 
not effectively enforced and, conversely, strong public agencies cannot apply deficient legal commands in 
an effective fashion181. 
The establishment of new competition systems and the reformulation of older ones present an 
opportunity to consider the optimal design of antitrust institutions, provided that a body of competition 
laws is only as good as the institutions responsible for their implementation182. Moreover, the optimal 
design and efficiency of public institutions, such as the antitrust agencies, is considered as an important 
driver for accomplishing compliance with the law, provided individuals that have a positive judgment of 
the government’s institutions, usually, consider that the latter ought to be obeyed183.  
 As with other issues of competition law and policy, the subject of the design of the competition 
law institutions varies greatly from one jurisdiction to another. There is a great deal of diversity with 
regard to the composition, the structure and the responsibilities of the competition law institutions across 
the world, however, most differences are found in relation to the structure and the enforcement functions 
of the antitrust agencies.  
 In relation to the structure of the antitrust institutions there is variety of arrangements found 
across jurisdictions. In most competition law regimes the main feature considered in the establishment 
and design of an antitrust institution is the independence of the latter with regard to other public 
institutions and the government itself184. The main purpose of creating independent competition law 
institutions is to safeguard the interpretation and application of the competition law provisions from being 
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182 KOVACIC, William E., EVERSLEY, DeCourcey (2007), ‘An Assessment of Institutional Machinery: Methods Used in 
Competition Agencies and What Worked for Them’. International Competition Network, Competition Policy Implementation 
Working Group, Subgroup 2 on Experiences of Younger Agencies.  
183 LEVI, et al. (2009), pp. 21-22. 
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influenced by political considerations. Hence, by delegating the enforcement functions of competition law 
to independent institutions, the interpretation and application of the antitrust provisions are performed 
taking into account only economic and legal arguments, thus, relieving competition law institutions from 
political pressure. As with other features of competition law, the level of independence of the antitrust 
institutions varies from country to country depending on the administrative structure of the jurisdiction in 
question185. Despite these differences on the level of independence, competition law institutions can be 
classified by their degree of independence in: competition law institutions that are completely 
independent from the government; competition law institutions that are affiliated to a public institution, 
e.g. a certain ministry; and competition law institutions that even though are not affiliated to a public 
institution are somehow responsible to the government, e.g. by being required to provide the government 
with annual reports on their activities.   
In addition to the independence feature, the structure and design of competition law institutions 
also varies with regard to the number of institutions responsible for the enforcement of competition law, 
provided that in some competition law regimes there are multiple enforcers of the competition law 
provisions. Competition law systems can be group in four models in relation to the number of their 
competition law institutions186. First, there are competition law regimes that have multiple specialized 
antitrust institutions which are vertically related. In those jurisdictions, there is one main institution, 
usually named as Tribunal, which reviews the decisions of an antitrust enforcement authority. Second, in 
some competition law systems with multiple institutions, there is a horizontal distribution of the 
enforcement functions, in these jurisdictions, there is a distribution of authority to multiple institutions by 
category of regulated activity, i.e. the distribution of the enforcement functions is made with relation to 
the anticompetitive practices policed by the competition law provisions. Third, in some competition law 
regimes, there are multiple institutions that also share enforcement functions, however, in these 
jurisdictions, in order to avoid the overlap of functions, the authority of the institutions has been divided 
along industry or sectoral lines, i.e. all multiple antitrust institutions have authority to enforce competition 
law irrespectively of the anticompetitive practice in question, however, the competences of these multiple 
institutions are divided in relation to the specialization of the institutions in certain industries or sectors of 
the economy. And fourth, there are competition law systems that concentrate the enforcement functions 
of competition law in a single agency, in such jurisdictions; there is a single competition law institution 
that is responsible for the entire enforcement of competition law, i.e. a single competition law institution 
is in charge of the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of all competition law cases.  
As stated before, the design of the competition law institutions also depends on the enforcement 
functions vested on these antitrust institutions. Hence, provided that one of the most important functions 
of competition law institutions is law enforcement, which is concerned with bringing cases against 
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anticompetitive practices, having a good institutional design is critical for good competition policy and 
competition law enforcement187.   
 In a broad sense, in relation to the design of competition law institutions and their law 
enforcement functions, some competition law regimes have chosen the administrative approach. In such 
jurisdictions, the competition law provisions are enforced via administrative proceedings, in this sense, 
the institution responsible for the enforcement of competition law is an administrative authority which has 
different competences that vary from one country to another when applying competition law. In 
jurisdictions where the competition authority has broad powers to apply competition law, the latter will be 
empowered to carry out an investigation for the alleged infringement of competition law, and at the end 
of which, the competition authority will also have authority to reach a final decision on the case. The 
decision of the competition authority will declare if an infringement of competition law has been 
committed, order the termination of such infringement and impose any sanction or remedy necessary. 
Nonetheless, in other to safeguard the defendant’s procedural rights of defense, the decisions of the 
competition authority can be reviewed and appealed before the competent appellate body. 
Alternatively, in other competition law regimes, the competition authority lacks competence to 
decide on competition law cases, in such instances, a judicial approach has been chosen. In these 
jurisdictions, the power to issue competition law decisions has been vested on courts that handle actions 
brought by the competition authority, governmental institutions, or private parties against undertakings 
suspected of having breached the competition law provisions. In such actions the relevant court will, at 
the petition of the plaintiff, order the termination of the infringement, grant injunctive relief, and award 
damages to the injured parties. Similarly to the administrative approach, the decisions of these general 
courts are subject to appeal before the competent appellate body.  
In addition, in some competition law regimes, tribunals specialized in competition law matters 
have been established. These specialist tribunals are usually responsible for the judicial review of the 
decisions adopted by the competition authority. However, in some competition law systems, these may 
also be empowered to decide on civil claims by injured parties for the recovery of damages.   
In some competition law systems, the application of the competition law provisions is 
decentralized. Thus, in jurisdictions that have a federal political division, the enforcement of the antitrust 
provisions is split between the state and federal enforcers. Similarly, at regional levels, the decentralized 
enforcement of competition law entails the application of the antitrust provisions by the regional 
competition authority and the competition authorities of the member states188.   
Finally, in some competition law systems other institutions are also responsible for the 
enforcement of the competition law provisions in different extents. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the 
competition law provisions may be applied by the relevant ministry, this occurs in jurisdictions where the 
competition authority is subordinated to a certain ministry, or alternatively, in jurisdictions where the 
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competition authority shares the enforcement function of competition law with a determined ministry. 
Moreover, in other competition law regimes, the competition law provisions can be applied by sector 
regulators in competition law cases that are related to their specific sector. However, the ability of sector 
regulators to enforce the competition law provisions and their faculties when doing so, vary greatly from 
one jurisdiction to another.  
9. The Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
An important part of having an effective competition law system, besides the adoption of a sound legal 
framework or the creation of strong competition law institutions, is the effective enforcement of the 
competition law provisions. Accordingly, it is not enough to merely have a competition law statutory 
basis and a competition authority, but it is also fundamental to have effective enforcement mechanisms 
that ensure a reasonable degree of compliance of the competition law provisions189. On the contrary, 
without enforcement, the competition law provisions would be reduced to ink on paper190. 
In a broad sense, the enforcement of competition law is the application or implementation of the 
substantive commands of the competition law provisions by the competition law enforcers – competition 
authorities, judicial authorities or private parties - to specific cases with the ultimate goals of discovering 
competition law infringements, restoring the competitive process, compensating those injured by the 
antitrust infringement, punishing those responsible for the antitrust violations and deterring future 
competition law infringements.  
In practice, the enforcement of the competition law provisions is intended to fulfill determined 
objectives sought by competition law and policy. However, these enforcement objectives of competition 
law are not to be confused with the objectives of competition law itself, even though the fulfillment of the 
latter are strictly related to the accomplishment of the former. The objectives of the enforcement of 
competition law can be classified as three191. The first one is to prevent competition law infringements 
from happening, or alternatively, once the competition law provisions have been breached, to bring the 
infringement to an end. In particular, the accomplishment of this objective through the enforcement of the 
competition law provisions is fulfilled thanks to the deterrence effect of competition law enforcement; 
this means that the effective application of the competition law provisions by the competition law 
enforcers deters market participants from engaging in future anticompetitive practices. Moreover, if the 
antitrust infringement has already taken place, the competition law enforcers, through the application of 
the competition law provisions, may bring the infringement to an end, via a decision of the competition 
authority or the competent court. The second objective of competition law enforcement is to restore the 
competitive process and to compensate the victims of the competition law infringement once the antitrust 
violation has occurred. In such cases, the enforcers of the competition law provisions seek to remedy the 
injury caused by the competition law infringement by restoring competition and compensating the 
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persons who suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct of the antitrust offender. In these cases, 
competition law enforcement can restore the competitive process thanks to the ability of competition law 
enforcers to order the antitrust offenders to restore the competitive process via orders and injunctions. In 
addition, the possibility of private plaintiffs to enforce the competition law provisions and file claims in 
order to recover the damages suffered as a consequence of the infringement of the competition law 
provisions, allows the accomplishment of the compensatory objective of competition law enforcement. 
Finally, the third objective of competition law enforcement is the punishment of the person responsible 
for the infringement of the competition law provisions through the application of the sanctions established 
in the competition law provisions.  
Due to the fact that a single infringement of competition law can affect different market 
participants in a variety of ways, the competition law provisions can be enforced in different proceedings, 
by a number of persons, seeking different sanctions and remedies. Overall, in practice, the competition 
law provisions can be enforced either publicly or privately. In the first case, competition law will be 
enforced in public proceedings by public authorities and with the imposition of sanctions on the 
competition law offenders that have a public nature. In the second case, the provision of competition law 
will be applied by private parties in private proceedings seeking the imposition of remedies of a private 
nature.  
This possibility to enforce the competition law provisions in different ways is further 
exacerbated by the fact that several countries with different legal systems and traditions have 
implemented competition law regimes. As a consequence of this diversity of jurisdictions and 
competition law regimes, the enforcement of competition law varies greatly from on jurisdiction to the 
next. In practice, most differences are found with regard to the nature of the proceedings for the 
infringement of competition law; the persons given standing to initiate a competition law action; the 
procedural issues involved in these procedures; and the outcome of these competition law proceedings.   
10. Types of Competition Law Enforcement 
 
As stated before, one of the main characteristics of competition law in most jurisdictions is the 
multiplicity of proceedings that a single anticompetitive conduct may instigate. For instance, in most 
competition law regimes, administrative proceedings may be brought against undertakings suspected of 
having infringed the substantial provisions of competition law by competition authorities; judicial 
authorities; and other public institutions, such as Ministries or sector regulators; regional competition law 
institutions; and even foreign competition law authorities, depending on the competition law regime. 
Additionally, in a variety of competition law systems, any party affected by, or involved in, a competition 
law infringement may bring civil proceedings before the competent court seeking civil remedies, such as, 
the recovery of damages, injunctive relief, or a declaration. Finally, in some competition law systems, 
where hard-core cartels are considered as criminal offenses, the participation in a hard-core cartel may 
instigate the criminal prosecution against the individuals involved in such anticompetitive practices.  
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A broad categorization can classify the abovementioned types of application of the competition 
law provisions in two kinds, which are: public and private enforcement of competition law. Accordingly, 
all the cases that are handled by public institutions in public proceedings will fall under the category of 
public enforcement of competition law. This category includes the administrative cases handled by the 
competition authority, irrespective of the way in which these have been instigated, i.e. under the initiative 
of the competition authority itself, at the request of a public institution, a regional competition law 
institution or a foreign competition authority, or after the complaint of a private party. In addition, other 
competition law cases can also be resolved via administrative proceedings, such as, the adjudication of 
competition law cases by Ministries or sector regulators, where available. Moreover, the public 
enforcement of competition law also comprehends the judicial application of the antitrust provisions by 
general courts in jurisdictions where the competition authority lacks competence to adjudicate 
competition law cases. And finally, the criminal prosecutions of hard-core cartel participants correspond 
to the public enforcement of competition law due to the public nature of criminal proceedings.  
In relation to the private enforcement of competition law, this type of enforcement includes the 
antitrust cases brought by private parties that seek the award of private remedies, like the recovery of 
damages, the award of injunctive relief, or a declaration. The nature of these civil proceedings is private 
due to the parties involved, the proceedings, and the outcome of the latter.  
(a) Public Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
As happens with other branches of public law, the public application of the competition law provisions is 
the primary source of enforcement in the majority of competition law regimes, with the exception of one 
jurisdiction where the number of competition law cases adjudicated in private proceedings is superior to 
the number of competition law cases handled publicly192. This public approach of the government to 
protect competition through public laws reflects the determination of states to safeguard the competitive 
process by intervening in the economic activities of market participants. Moreover, the intervention of the 
states in the competitive process is ultimately intended to accomplish the previously seen goals and 
objectives of competition law, i.e. maximization of consumer welfare, enhancement of economic 
efficiency, and others, depending on the jurisdiction. 
As stated in the introduction of this Chapter, there are several differences with regard to the 
implementation of competition law systems across jurisdictions. Some of these differences are concerned 
with the enforcement of competition law. Chapter II of the study addresses the main differences found in 
relation to the public application of the competition law provisions in more detail.  
 In a broad sense, and irrespective of the institutional arrangement of the jurisdictions that have 
implemented competition law systems, the public enforcement of competition law is the public 
application of the antitrust provisions by the relevant public authorities, which may be: an administrative 
institution (competition authority, sector regulator or Ministry) or a judicial authority (courts of general 
jurisdiction or specialized courts). Moreover, while applying these provisions, these public institutions 
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address their decisions in regard to the infringement of the competition law provisions to private persons, 
which may be natural or legal. In addition, the public enforcers of competition law have been granted 
authority to impose sanctions and penalties upon the antitrust offenders, nevertheless, these sanctions, as 
other features of competition law, vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. In that sense, there is a 
wide spectrum of sanctions that can be imposed for the breach of competition law, which ranges from the 
imposition of an administrative fine, to the imprisonment of the individuals involved in certain 
anticompetitive practices, in the most stringent jurisdictions. One of the main characteristic of this type of 
enforcement is the verticality of the dispute between the State and the private persons. This verticality 
provides the public enforcers of competition law with wide powers of investigation in order to detect 
possible antitrust infringements, and eventually, the possibility to impose any sanction or penalty 
available upon the antitrust offenders. However, the decisions of these public authorities are normally 
subject to judicial review.  
 Another main feature of the public enforcement of competition law is that related to objectives 
sought by the public application of the competition law provisions. Due to its public nature, this branch of 
law is aimed at protecting the public interests of the State and the private individuals that form part of the 
latter. Thus, unlike the private enforcement of competition law, in which private parties seek to satisfy 
their personal interests, the public application of competition law is intended to protect the well-being of 
the entire population. Generally speaking, the enforcement of competition law can be presumed of 
fulfilling three main objectives. The first one is intended to prevent competition law infringements from 
happening, or alternatively, to put an end to the antitrust infringements if these have already taken place. 
The second objective is aimed at restoring the competitive process and to compensate the victims of the 
anticompetitive practice, in cases where the antitrust infringement has already been committed. And the 
third objective of the enforcement of competition law is to punish those responsible for the breach of the 
competition law provisions.  
 With regard to the accomplishment of the abovementioned objectives of the enforcement of 
competition law, public enforcement is capable of fulfilling these objectives in different extents. For 
instance, in relation with the first objective the public application of competition law may prevent antirust 
infringements from happening thanks to its deterrent effect. The successful application of competition law 
by public enforcers can deter future infringements by presenting to the market participants the possibility 
of being caught and sanctioned for engaging in anticompetitive practices. In addition, most public 
enforcers have authority to order the end of an anticompetitive conduct once this has been detected 
through the public application of competition law. In this sense, the public application will stop antitrust 
infringements that have already occurred. Furthermore, in relation to the restorative and compensatory 
objectives of competition law enforcement, the public application of competition law may restore the 
competitive process by ordering the infringing undertakings to stop the anticompetitive practices, and if 
possible to restore the competitive process. With regard to the compensatory objective, the public 
enforcement of competition law is not well suited to accomplish this objective, due to the fact that most 
public proceedings are not aimed at compensating the victims of the antitrust infringements. Thus, in 
these cases, the private enforcement of competition law is better suited to obtain the compensation of the 
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victims, provided that these types of proceedings are intended to seek the recovery of damages of the 
victims of the antitrust infringements. Notwithstanding, there are few jurisdictions where the competition 
authority may order the infringing undertakings to compensate those who suffered for the breach of the 
competition law provisions in public proceedings, however, these are exceptions because in most 
jurisdictions private remedies such as the award of damages cannot be awarded in public proceedings. 
Finally, as to the punishment objective, the fact that public enforcers are empowered to impose a variety 
of sanctions and penalties upon the infringers of the competition law provisions reflects the readiness of 
public enforcement to accomplish this enforcement objective. 
  There are also some differences in relation to how these public proceedings for the infringement 
of competition law are initiated. Overall, the initiation of public proceedings against anticompetitive 
practices can be instigated by different events, which vary from country to country. For instance, in most 
competition law systems, public proceedings against anticompetitive practices may be initiated by the 
competition authority under its own discretion. Moreover, in most cases, the initiation of public 
proceedings by the competition authority can also be instigated by the request of a public authority, such 
as the head of state, Ministers, or sector regulators, among others. Alternatively, the initiation of public 
proceedings may also be instigated by the complaint filed by private persons, however, despite the 
participation of private parties in these types of proceedings, these shall not be considered as private due 
to the public nature of the proceedings and the sanctions and remedies available in these proceedings. In 
this sense, this kind of actions have been named as “privately triggered public enforcement”193 due to the 
participation of private parties in the initiation of these public proceedings. 
 A further difference found across jurisdictions in relation to the public enforcement of 
competition law is that concerned with the powers of investigation that the public enforcers have while 
applying the antitrust provisions. Due to the secretive nature of most anticompetitive practices, the role of 
the competition authorities in detecting antitrust infringements requires special powers of investigation in 
order to detect antitrust breaches. In this regard, most legislators have vested the competition authorities 
with wide powers of investigation in an attempt to ease the public enforcement of competition law. 
Despite the differences that exist from legislation to legislation, most competition law systems allow their 
competition authorities the possibility to request all relevant information concerned with a possible 
infringement of competition law, to carry out interviews with individuals to receive testimonies, to enter 
and search premises where relevant information may be stored, or to perform intrusive surveillance and 
property interference, in the most permissive jurisdictions.  
 The sanctions and remedies available in the public enforcement of competition law also vary 
from one country to another. Due to the compulsory and remedial nature of competition law, most 
competition regimes have implemented sanctions and remedies for the infringement of the competition 
law rules. Thus, the establishment of sanctions and remedies are intended to serve as mechanisms for the 
accomplishment of the competition law goals and objectives, and also for the fulfillment of the 
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enforcement objectives. In this regard, most competition law regimes have established sanctions for the 
infringement of the substantial commands of competition law, i.e. sanctions against anticompetitive 
agreements, the abuse of a dominant position, and mergers that create or reinforce a dominant position. In 
addition, the sanctioning systems have also included penalties for procedural violations, i.e. refusal to 
supply information, the production of false, incorrect or misleading information, and the failure to comply 
with orders and decisions by the enforcers of competition law. Overall, most competition law regimes 
allow public enforcers the possibility to impose sanctions such as, financial penalties, confiscation of 
illegal gains, blacklisting of infringing undertakings, and director disqualification, among others. In 
addition, in the most stringent jurisdictions the individuals who have engaged in certain anticompetitive 
practices – hard-core cartels – are sanctioned with imprisonment. In these jurisdictions, the participation 
in hard-core cartels is considered a criminal offense, in such cases; the imposition of imprisonment is 
decided by a criminal court in criminal proceedings.  In relation to the remedies, unlike sanctions, these 
do not have a punitive nature. The objective of remedies is to maintain and/or restore the competitive 
process. Most competition law regimes allow competition enforcers the possibility to grant interim 
measures, accept commitments, order the divestiture of undertakings, and order the restitution of injured 
parties, among others. 
 Lastly, several variations can be found across jurisdictions with regard to the review mechanisms 
of the competition law decisions. Most competition law systems have established review mechanisms for 
the revision of the competition law decisions given that some of these tend to restrict the rights and 
freedoms of the subjects of these decisions. The purpose of allowing the addressees of competition law 
decisions to request the revision of these decisions is to prevent flawed decisions that harm the interests of 
the addressees, third parties and the general public. In addition, the possibility to request the revision of 
competition law decisions is intended to safeguard due process and to challenge the unlawful or abusive 
acts of the administration. Overall, most competition law decisions are subject to be appealed before the 
competent appellate body (decisions imposing interim measures, accepting commitments, ordering the 
inspection of premises, opening a case, imposing sanctions and penalties, ordering divestiture, blocking a 
merger, etc.).  However, the review mechanisms established vary from country to country. Accordingly, 
depending on the competition law regime in question, the review of the competition law decision will be 
handled by: the competition authority itself, by general administrative courts, by specialized 
administrative courts, by judicial courts, by Ministries, or by the Supreme Court.  
(b) Private Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
In several competition law regimes, the competition law provisions are not exclusively enforced publicly 
by administrative or judicial authorities in public proceedings and with the imposition of sanctions and 
remedies of a public nature. Instead, in many competition regimes, the antitrust provisions may also be 
applied privately, this means, enforced by private parties, in private proceedings, and seeking the award 
of private remedies. However, even though most competition systems rely on a model based primarily on 
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governmental competition law enforcement (public enforcement), in many jurisdictions several measures 
have been established to strengthen the role of private parties in the application of competition law194. 
In a broad sense, the private enforcement of competition law is the application of the antitrust 
provisions by private parties for the infringement of competition law. In this regard, the initiation of the 
competition law procedures has to be made by private parties, however, this private instigation of the 
antitrust procedures does not include the cases where the concerned parties file complaints to the public 
authority requiring the application of the competition law provisions (privately triggered public 
enforcement), provided that such procedures ultimately have a public nature. Accordingly, this type of 
competition law enforcement requires that the private parties who promoted the initiation of the 
procedure form part of the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, the private enforcement of competition 
law involves the imposition of remedies of a private nature (award of damages, injunctive relief, or a 
declaration), which are awarded by a judicial authority in a court procedure. In summary, private antitrust 
enforcement entails the initiation of civil proceedings by private parties for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions seeking the award of civil law remedies.  
As mentioned above, in private antitrust enforcement the plaintiff can ask the court the 
imposition of different remedies: injunctive relief, a declaration or the award of damages. In practice 
however, the bulk of private antitrust enforcement is constituted by damages claims. Even if the plaintiff 
initially requests injunctive relief from further violations, the initial petition is normally followed by an 
award of damages or settlements pay by the defendant195.   
 In respect to the accomplishment of the enforcement objectives of competition law – prevent and 
terminate antitrust infringements, restore the competitive process and compensate victims, and punish 
antitrust offenders -, it has been noted that state of the art private enforcement of competition law may 
fulfill these objectives. Hence, antitrust infringements may be deterred from happening or terminated via 
cease and desist orders and negative or positive injunctions ordered by civil courts in private proceedings. 
Moreover, the persons harmed by the challenged anticompetitive practices of the defendant can be 
compensated by the award of civil damages. And finally, antitrust offenders can be punished for their 
unlawful behavior with the imposition of punitive damages196.    
 Notwithstanding the abovementioned, and despite the professed benefits of private enforcement 
of competition law, most competition law regimes that allow the possibility to apply the competition law 
provisions in private proceedings have not achieved a decent level of private enforcement. In this regard, 
there have been some initiatives to foster the proliferation of private antitrust litigation. The intention 
behind these initiatives is to promote private antitrust enforcement given that the latter can serve as a 
complement to public enforcement in cases where the public authorities will not prosecute certain 
anticompetitive practices for priority reasons or lack of information and resources, in such cases, private 
antitrust enforcement provides for an alternative given in some cases private parties may be better suited 
                                                          
194 FOER, Albert A. & SCHULTZ, Evan P. (2011), ‘Will Two Roads Still Diverge? Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law is 
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to prove the infringement of the competition law provisions. Moreover, the compensation objective of 
antitrust enforcement requires the participation of private parties, provided that this fundamental objective 
cannot be accomplished through public enforcement as awarding compensation is outside the field of 
competence of competition authorities197.   
 In practice, just as with the public enforcement of competition law, the private application of the 
competition law provisions varies widely from one jurisdiction to another. Chapter III of the present 
comparative study deals with the most important features of private enforcement of competition law and 
describes the main differences found across jurisdictions in the private application of the competition law 
provisions.  
  A first differentiation found across competition law regimes is the statutory basis for bringing a 
private claim for the infringement of the competition law provisions. In this regard, there are competition 
law systems that have included specific competition law provisions establishing the right of antitrust 
victims to bring private actions against the anticompetitive practices of the defendants. Alternatively, in 
other competition law regimes, there are not specific competition law rules allowing private parties to 
bring private claims, instead, in these jurisdictions private claims for the infringement of competition law 
are grounded on the general provisions of civil law or commercial law.  Nevertheless, even jurisdictions 
that have specific competition law rules allowing the possibility to bring private claims refer, at least in 
some degree, to general provisions for procedural issues.  
 Additionally, there are also differences with regard to the legal standing to bring a private claim 
for the infringement of competition law. There are different approaches chosen with regard to the legal 
standing, for instance, in jurisdictions with broad provisions, any person or entity harmed by the 
anticompetitive conduct of the defendant will be allowed to bring a private claim before the competent 
court. Conversely, in other competition law regimes the spectrum of persons who can bring a private 
action has been narrowed, in such cases, this possibility has been limited to: undertakings, competitors, 
parties to a contractual agreement, specific bodies, legal associations, or certain public entities.  
 Moreover, there are different approaches with regard to the possibility to file collective claims 
for the infringement of the antitrust provisions. The availability of collective redress mechanisms allows 
injured parties to exercise their rights collectively. There are different types of collective redress 
mechanisms for private parties across jurisdictions, overall, these include: public interest litigation, class 
actions, collective claims, representative action, joint actions and the assignment of claims.  
 A further differentiation concerned with the private application of the competition law provisions 
is that related to the legal forum for the adjudication of private antitrust claims. Even though there are 
some different approaches in relation to the legal forum for competition law civil claims, most 
jurisdictions have granted jurisdiction to decide on civil antitrust claims to general courts. Alternatively, 
                                                          
197 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
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in some competition law systems, specialist tribunals have been created, which hold jurisdiction to handle 
private claims for the infringement of competition law.    
 Probably the majority of differences that can be found in the private application of competition 
law across jurisdictions are concerned with procedural issues. These procedural differences are related to: 
the burden and standard of proof; the forms of admissible evidence; the process for the disclosure of 
evidence; the fault requirement; the level of causation; the grounds of justification; the limitation periods; 
and the recovery of legal expenses.       
 Finally, there is a variety of remedies that can be granted to the plaintiffs in civil claims for the 
infringement of competition law. Thus, in most competition law systems, private plaintiffs may request, 
the award of damages, which may be actual damages or punitive damages, depending on the jurisdiction; 
the declaration of nullity of anticompetitive agreements; the award of injunctive relief; the award of 
declaratory relief; and the recovery of interests.       
(c) International Enforcement of Competition Law  
 
With the globalization of trade and commerce, anticompetitive practices have also gained an international 
dimension. In line with this globalization of the anticompetitive practices, the enforcement of competition 
law has acquired an international scope. The international enforcement of competition law can take 
different forms depending on the jurisdiction. First, there is the unilateral application of competition law 
by a determined country outside its national borders, this type of application is referred to as the 
extraterritorial enforcement of competition law, by virtue of this type of application a country may apply 
its national competition law provisions to acts that have been committed beyond the borders of its 
territory. Second, in some competition law systems the competition law provisions can be enforced by 
virtue of bilateral cooperation agreements signed between nations. In such cases, the competition law 
provisions are enforced against anticompetitive practices that produce their harmful effects in the territory 
of one of the signing parties. Third, another approach related to the international enforcement of 
competition law is the adoption of multilateral agreements on competition law matters. These are 
multilateral initiatives aimed at developing common competition law policy and practice. Finally, there is 
the regional application of the competition law provisions, which is intended to develop competition law 
and policy at a regional level.  
In this international context of competition law, the doctrine of extraterritoriality plays a 
fundamental and controversial role in the international enforcement of competition law. In a broad sense, 
the doctrine of extraterritoriality allows countries to assert jurisdiction over situations outside their 
territory to ensure that proper protection is afforded to their citizens, interests, and national security. 
Notwithstanding, the assertion of jurisdiction outside the territory of a state is highly controversial given 
that it conflicts with the fundamental principle of sovereignty of states. According to the latter, a country 
is able to enact and enforce laws within its national borders. Consequently, the assertion of jurisdiction 
outside the territory of a determined state is most of the times questionable. However, according to the 
principles of public international law, the jurisdiction of the states can be extended beyond their borders 
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in certain circumstances; for example, the jurisdiction of a country can be extended when certain acts 
committed beyond its national borders produce an effect within its national territory (Effects Doctrine). In 
the case of the extraterritorial enforcement of competition law, according to the Effects Doctrine, national 
competition law provisions are applicable to foreign undertakings, and national undertakings located 
outside the country’s territory, when their behavior or transactions produce an effect within the national 
territory198.  
 As with other features of competition law, the basis for the extraterritorial application of the 
competition law provisions varies from one jurisdiction to the next. For example, in some systems the 
basis for the extraterritorial application of the antitrust rules is established in specific legislation199. In 
addition, some competition law provisions also include specific provisions on the extraterritorial 
application of competition law. In such cases, the statutory basis of competition law establishes, in 
different extents, the possibility to apply the antitrust provisions outside the national borders200. 
Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the competition authorities have published guidance referring to the 
possibility to apply the competition law provisions extraterritorially201. Alternatively, in other regimes, 
the competition law provisions do not include the possibility to apply their provisions in an extraterritorial 
way; however, the existing case law confirms the availability of this possibility202.  
 Furthermore, the extraterritorial application of the competition law provisions in private cases is 
also possible depending on the jurisdiction in question. This extraterritorial enforcement of the 
competition law provisions by private parties occurs when private plaintiffs file damages claims for the 
damages caused by undertakings established in another country. In most jurisdictions where this 
possibility is available, this alternative is governed by the principles of private international law. 
Consequently, in most jurisdictions that allow private parties to file damages claims against 
anticompetitive practices committed outside their national territory, a direct relationship with the 
defendant has to be proven in order to successfully recover damages. Alternatively, in some competition 
law regimes, this possibility to claim damages does not exist.  
 In addition to the preceding type of international enforcement of competition law, in some 
countries, bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms have been adopted with the purpose of 
coordinating the activities of the cooperating states when enforcing competition law. Some countries have 
signed formal cooperation agreements in competition law matters. These cooperation agreements can be 
mainly of two kinds, on the one hand, there are cooperation agreements with negative comity, which 
                                                          
198 In the Empagran case, the US Supreme Court determined that the provisions of the Sherman Act do not apply to the effects of 
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require that the signing parties take into consideration the important interests of the other party and notify 
the latter when its enforcement activities may affect these interests. The main purpose of this kind of 
agreements is to prevent jurisdictional conflicts by requiring that the investigation is carried out by the 
party with the superior or more reasonable right to assert jurisdiction203. On the other hand, there are 
cooperation agreements with positive comity in which one party to the agreement may request the other 
party to inquire about certain anticompetitive practices within its national territory that produce negative 
effects on the territory of the requesting party204. Finally, bilateral cooperation for the enforcement of 
competition law may also be accomplished via de facto cooperation. In such cases, even though the 
cooperating states have not signed a formal cooperation agreement, these may still coordinate their 
enforcement activities. For instance, one country may require, in an informal way, the competition 
authority of another country to investigate certain anticompetitive behavior that negatively affects its 
interest. 
 The international enforcement of competition law has also a multilateral approach. In this regard, 
some countries and international organizations have been interested in developing common competition 
law policy and practice. In practice, some of these multilateral agreements include binding obligations on 
the signing states. In such cases, these multilateral initiatives may entail the creation of supranational 
competition law provisions and international institutions capable of enforcing these provisions205. 
Alternatively, other multilateral options do not include binding obligations for the parties, in such cases; 
these multilateral approaches entail the formulation of guidelines, best practices and recommendations on 
competition law matters206.  
 Finally, the regional approach usually follows supranational initiatives for integration and 
economic cooperation. In this regard, some regional cooperation efforts have included competition law 
matters in their agenda. Overall, the aim of regional integration and cooperation is to attain higher 
objectives, such as the liberalization of trade across a determined region, nevertheless, given that 
competition law can play a fundamental role for the accomplishment of these higher objectives, some of 
these regional initiatives have sought the development of a supranational competition law regime, which 
controls anticompetitive behavior at a regional level207.  
11. Interaction of Competition Law Proceedings 
 
As stated before, one of the most peculiar characteristics of competition law is the possibility to enforce 
its provisions in more than one proceeding and by different persons. This possibility is given to the fact 
that a single competition law infringement may harm a variety of person in different ways. Accordingly, 
                                                          
203 For example, the Agreement Between the US and Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business 
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204 Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the Application of 
Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws (1998).  
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206 These multilateral initiatives are supported by international organizations such as: the International Competition Network (ICN), 
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due to this characteristic, there is the possibility of concurrent proceedings being instituted against the 
same anticompetitive behavior. Thus, in order to avoid concurrent proceedings to interfere with each 
other in some competition law systems there have been established certain mechanisms that regulate this 
concurrency. Overall, the different procedures that may be instituted for the infringement of competition 
law may interact with each other at different levels. 
 In competition law regimes where the antitrust provisions may be applied both publicly and 
privately, these two types of independent proceedings may interact with each other manly in two respects. 
On the one hand, these competition law proceedings converge in relation to the decisions issued by the 
competent authorities. Hence, in some jurisdictions, the decisions of the competition authority declaring 
the infringement of the competition law provisions are a prerequisite for private plaintiffs wanting to 
bring civil claims for damages. In such jurisdictions, only follow-on actions are allowed, provided that a 
prior decision by the competition authority declaring the infringement of competition law is required. 
However, since this requirement can be considered as an obstacle for private enforcement, most 
jurisdictions do not request the existence of a prior decision to bring actions for damages. On the other 
hand, public and private proceedings may interact when the competition law provisions are applied both 
publicly and privately at the same time against the same anticompetitive conduct. In such cases, some 
competition law regimes have established stay mechanisms to avoid the overlaping of procedures. Hence, 
depending on the jurisdiction in question certain procedures may be stayed awaiting the resolution of the 
other. As general rule, ordinary courts are not under the obligation of staying their proceedings if the 
competition authority has initiated procedures on its own based on the same legal or factual issues. 
However, most courts may decide to do so and wait for the decision of the competition authority, 
provided that the latter is a specialized institution and has specific powers to uncover anticompetitive 
practices. By staying their proceedings, ordinary courts will be relieved from having to determine if the 
competition law provisions have been breached and will focus on the award of damages or other civil 
remedies requested by the plaintiff. Alternatively, in some competition law regimes ordinary courts are 
statutorily obliged to stay their proceedings whenever the competition authority has initiated public 
proceedings based on the same legal or factual issues. With regard to the competition authority, most 
regimes do not require their authorities to stay their proceedings if an ordinary court has initiated civil 
proceeding on the same matter. Nevertheless, some competition authorities may decide to stay their 
proceedings if they feel that private litigation is better suited for the resolution of the case, or for 
prioritization purposes.  
 Furthermore, public and private proceedings for the infringement of competition law also 
interact with each other in relation to the evidenced gathered in such proceedings. In respect to the 
evidenced gathered by the competition authority in public proceedings, this may have a high value for 
private plaintiffs in civil claims given that the competition authority has broad powers to acquire relevant 
information concerned with the infringement. Accordingly, private plaintiffs are always willing to get 
access to the files of the competition authority; however, the accessibility of such files varies depending 
on the jurisdiction. There are different arrangements in relation to the accessibility to the competition 
authority’s files across jurisdictions, hence, in some countries, these files will be available for interested 
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parties, and alternatively, in other regimes the files of the competition authority will not be disclosed to 
parties outside the proceeding. Nevertheless, irrespective of the different arrangements found across 
jurisdictions, the information shared by the competition authority is always restricted to non-confidential 
documents that do not contain sensitive information about the parties in the proceedings. In addition, 
competition authorities are usually reluctant to share information acquired via leniency applications with 
private parties seeking the recovery of damages, this is mainly because, it will reduce the attractiveness of 
leniency programs and would put the leniency applicant in a disadvantaged positions in respect to the 
other cartel members in case a private action for damages is filed. Leniency programs are also related to 
private actions for damages in some jurisdictions where the leniency applicants have to compensate 
antitrust victims in order to receive lenient treatment, or have to cooperate with the victims so these can 
successfully recover damages from the other cartel members.  
 Public and private proceedings also interact in relation to the evidential value of the decisions 
issued in each proceeding. For instance, the decisions of the competition authorities declaring the 
infringement of the competition law provisions have different evidential value depending on the 
jurisdiction. Thus, such decisions may constitute; a rebuttable presumption; prima facie evidence; 
admissible evidence; reversal of the burden of proof; or have binding effects on ordinary courts. With 
regard to the decisions of ordinary courts handling competition law cases and its incidence on public 
competition law cases, normally, competition authorities are not bound by the findings of ordinary courts, 
however, in some jurisdictions, the competition authority may take into account when imposing a penalty 
for the infringement of competition law the fact that the defendant has compensated the antitrust victims 
that have brought damages claims.  
 In addition to the most obvious interaction of competition law proceedings (public/private), there 
may be other concurrent proceedings when enforcing the competition law provisions. For instance, in 
jurisdictions with criminal provisions for the infringement of competition law, this kind of proceedings 
may concur with others, such as private actions for damages or public cases initiated by the competition 
authority. However, as a general rule both civil and administrative proceedings will normally be stayed 
until the criminal proceedings are concluded.  
Moreover, in some jurisdictions the interaction of competition law proceedings is regulated in 
other ways. For instance, in countries where regional competition law systems have been established the 
overlap of proceedings between national and regional competition law institutions is addressed with 
regard to the scope of the anticompetitive practice in question. Accordingly, if the anticompetitive 
behavior has a national dimension, then the national competition authority will have the right to assert 
jurisdiction over the matter, conversely, if the case has a regional scope, then the regional competition law 
institution will be entitled to adjudicate the case. In respect to regionally enforced competition law cases 
and national civil claims for damages, the initiation of a case by the regional competition law institution 
does not deprive national courts from its right to initiate civil proceedings, however, normally; the latter 
will wait for the decisions of the former. Similarly, in countries with a federal structure that have a federal 
competition authority plus regional competition law institutions, the competence of the relevant 
institution will be declared in relation to the scope of the competition law infringement. In addition, in 
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countries that have more than one institution responsible for the enforcement of competition law, the 
jurisdiction of these authorities will be determined by the specific arrangements of each country, thus, in 
some countries, the jurisdiction of the competition institutions will be determined in relation to the type of 
anticompetitive practice, while in other countries the jurisdiction will be determined in relation to the 
industry or sector affected by the competition law infringement. Finally, in competition law regimes 
where the competition law provisions can be enforced both by the competition authority and sector 
regulators, the competence of the relevant institution will be determined by the sector or industry affected 
by the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant.  
12. The Law and Economics of Antitrust Enforcement 
 
The mere enactment of a law does not, on its own, guarantee the attainment of the purposes and 
objectives of the law in question. Hence, in order to fulfill the objectives of a determined law, its legal 
commands have to be effectively enforced. In a broad sense, the main objective of law enforcement is to 
assure a certain degree of compliance with the law by apprehending, prosecuting and punishing offenders. 
However, complete enforcement of the law cannot be achieved, mainly because, law enforcement is 
costly208. The costs of enforcement usually include the expenditure on detecting the violations, punishing 
the offenders, and compensating the victims. On the other hand, despite the costs involved in law 
enforcement, the application of the law has certain socially desirable benefits, like the reduction of crimes 
or the deterrent effect to prevent future infringements. In practice, the extent of law enforcement is strictly 
related to the amount of resources devoted to the application of the law. Nevertheless, as happens with 
other public activities the states have only limited resources to assign to the enforcement of the law. 
Consequently, the states need to balance the costs of law enforcement against its benefits, in this regard; 
policy makers should allocate the state’s limited resources to achieve the goals of law enforcement 
efficiently209.  
1. The rationale for competition law enforcement 
 
In light of the preceding, provided that the application of the law is expensive for the state and ultimately 
for the tax payer, it is worth considering if the enforcement of the law –in our case of competition law- is 
socially desirable in the first place. 
Among the main objectives of competition law there is the enhancement of economic efficiency 
and the maximization of consumer welfare, hence, from the perspective of the government, these 
objectives constitute a fundamental part for the development of the nation and the welfare of its 
inhabitants. Competition law and policy have a public nature given that antitrust violations can harm the 
general public, thus, provided that competition can be considered as a public good, it must be worthy of 
governmental protection.  
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Even though apprehending and convicting competition law offenders is expensive for the 
government, some law & economics-scholars note that the estimated direct gains to consumers from 
antitrust policies alone tend to be well in excess of the costs incurred by the competition law enforcers 
applying the antitrust legal commands210. Moreover, it is expected that the benefits of competition law 
enforcement to the general public would be far larger than the expenses of the government on antitrust 
enforcement and of undertakings on antitrust compliance211.  
It is well know that competition law infringements can be particularly harmful for the economy 
and the general public. In practice, competition law enforcement can stop the noxious effects of most 
antitrust violations and, additionally, prevent future infringements from happening in the first place. At 
first instance, through the application of competition law, the enforcement authorities can detect and 
punish most competition law infringements, in such cases, if it was not for antitrust enforcement most 
infringements could cause a substantial harm to competition and society. Additionally, the effective 
enforcement of the competition law commands can create a deterrent effect that prevents future 
infringements from taking place. In this sense, competition law enforcement benefits society substantially 
by remedying past violations and preventing future losses.  
Moreover, in favor of competition law enforcement, there is empirical evidence in some 
jurisdictions that undertakings have behaved differently before the competition act was enacted and 
during periods in which competition law enforcement was absent or lax. Furthermore, there has been a 
proliferation of competition law in the last couple of decades around the world; nonetheless, the 
enforcement of the antitrust rules has been uneven across jurisdictions. Therefore, provided that in 
countries with a robust competition policy the levels of development and welfare are higher, cross-
national comparisons between jurisdictions with strong competition regimes and countries where antitrust 
enforcement is less serious provide further evidence on the efficacy of antitrust and the value of 
protecting competition212.  
2. Modalities of Antitrust Enforcement 
 
Traditionally, the states have implemented public laws to control unwanted behavior from happening. To 
enforce effectively such rules of public law the states delegate to public authorities the detection of 
violators of the legal rules and the imposition of sanctions upon offenders. Additionally, in some branches 
of public law, these public provisions can also be enforced by the private parties affected by a determined 
infringement of the law, as will be seen in the following chapters; such is the case of competition law in a 
number of jurisdictions across the world213.  
Most competition law enforcement systems are basically grounded on two enforcement types: 
public enforcement and private enforcement. In practice, the coexistence of public and private antitrust 
enforcement raises questions about the appropriate role of these types of enforcement, the appropriate 
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division of enforcement responsibilities between private and public enforcers, and the type of dual 
enforcement system (mix) that is preferable on efficiency grounds.  
Viewed from the perspective of the optimal enforcement of competition law, both public and 
private antitrust enforcement are costly, however, these two enforcement systems also have their 
respective objectives and benefits. In consequence, an effective dual competition law regime should find 
an appropriate balance between the costs that these types of enforcement represent and the benefits that 
these report. 
a) Public Antitrust Enforcement 
 
Public antitrust enforcement is the use of public authorities for the detection and punishment of 
competition law violations. In order to be able to apply the law effectively, public enforcers have specific 
powers and procedures to investigate possible violations. Moreover, the enforcement authorities are 
usually empowered to impose sanctions for the infringement of the competition law provisions upon 
offenders. Finally, the decisions of the public enforcers are subject to an appeal process.  
 With regard to the objectives of public antitrust enforcement, it is considered that this type of 
enforcement is mainly intended to achieve deterrence, and in this way, compliance with the law214. From 
an economic point of view an individual decides rationally whether to commit an infringement of the law 
if he can perceive a utility from engaging in an illegal activity. In order for an individual to break the law, 
he will compare rationally the benefits and costs of engaging in illegal activities. Accordingly, people will 
only infringe the law if the benefits obtained from their illegal conduct outweigh the costs of the 
probability of apprehension, conviction, and punishment215. In practice, the costs of apprehension, 
conviction, and punishment can reduce the benefits of engaging in illegal activities. Hence, if it was not 
for the public enforcement of the law, people would be more prone to violate the law, given that the cost 
of crime would be eliminated and its benefits increased.  
 According to the preceding, it is fundamental to determine an optimal level of public law 
enforcement that effectively deters individuals from violating the law. As seen above, if the costs of 
breaking the law are higher than the utilities expected from it, then rational individuals would be deterred 
from engaging in illegal activities. Therefore, in order to prevent individuals from committing illegal acts, 
law enforcers could raise the probabilities of apprehension and the punishment for conviction to deter 
individuals from breaking the law. The probabilities of apprehension can be increased by hiring more 
public officers, policemen and judges, and the levels of punishment can be increased by raising the 
amount of the fines and the terms of imprisonment. However, since these approaches can be expensive 
for the government, especially hiring more officials and increasing the terms of imprisonment, it is 
considered that optimal levels of deterrence can be achieved by the imposition of financial penalties made 
by public enforcers216. Accordingly, in the case of antitrust enforcement, in most competition regimes the 
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imposition of financial penalties by the competition authority is the main sanction imposed for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions.  
b) Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
In a number of competition regimes, the antitrust provisions are not solely enforced by public authorities, 
because these can also be applied by private parties. Private antitrust enforcement is the application of 
competition law by private parties, before a court, and seeking the imposition of private remedies (award 
of damages, injunctive relief, or a declaration). Private antitrust enforcement can take place as a stand-
alone action (without a prior decision declaring the infringement of the law), or as a follow-on action 
(after a decision by the competition authority declaring the infringement of the law). Private parties in 
antitrust proceedings do not have special powers of investigation like public enforcers in public 
proceedings; therefore, they have to rely on the rights conferred to them by the procedural rules of civil 
proceedings. 
 With regard to the objectives of private antitrust enforcement, it is considered that its main 
purpose is to seek compensation for the harm caused by the infringement of the competition law 
provisions217, provided that awarding compensation for the damages suffered as a consequence of an 
antitrust violation is outside the field of competence of competition authorities218, and as a consequence, 
of public antitrust enforcement. From an economic perspective, a party who has suffered a loss will sue 
only when the costs of suit are less than the expected benefits from suit219. However, provided that the 
incentives of private parties diverge from those of the general public, it is necessary to determine the 
optimal level of private enforcement. In this regard, it has been noted that the amount of private 
enforcement would be optimal if the successful private enforcers were paid the amount caused by the 
infringement, excluding their enforcement costs, divided by the probability that they are successful220. 
3. An Economic Approach to Public vs Private Antitrust Enforcement  
 
As previously seen, the two possible modes of law enforcement, public and private, have both costs and 
benefits for society. Therefore, it is necessary to determine which type of enforcement is preferable on 
efficiency grounds, or alternatively, to determine an effective dual enforcement system. For instance, in 
the specific case of competition law, it is recognized that the public and private application of competition 
law complement each other in accomplishing the enforcement objectives of competition law221, thus, in 
this case it is necessary to determine the appropriate role of each type of enforcement.   
 Particularly, the optimal private enforcement of public laws, such as competition law, has always 
been a disputed matter among academics. There are different positions with regard to this debate which 
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have been reflected in the most relevant law and economics literature; nevertheless, it has been 
established that both public and private enforcement of the law can achieve optimal deterrence.  
Chronologically speaking, first it has been suggested, regarding criminal law, that deterrence can 
be achieved through private enforcement as effectively and efficiently as with public enforcement if 
private individuals compete for the high damages that would follow from demonstrating that a defendant 
was liable. Moreover, private enforcement was considered as a solution to governmental failure, i.e. 
malfeasance or inaction of public authorities. In this sense, it would be better to reward private enforcers 
with a bounty than having to pay a salary to public enforcers. However, it was recognized that private 
enforcement could have adverse effects such as actions against innocent defendants and different private 
enforcers competing creating a double jeopardy222. 
  Straightaway, challenging the abovementioned arguments that private enforcement could be as 
efficient and effective as public enforcement, it was replied that the use of private enforcers to apply the 
law could lead to over-enforcement and over-deterrence. Given that in order to deter individuals from 
breaking the law it is required the imposition of high financial penalties or damages, this situation would 
attract higher than optimal numbers of private enforcers trying to collect these fines or damages by 
allocating their own private resources to detection and prosecution. Instead, due to the fact that public 
enforcers are not compelled by profit maximization, unlike private enforcers motivated by collecting fines 
or damages, they would be able to make optimal decisions regarding the amount of resources to be spent 
on prosecution. However, over-enforcement by private actors can be controlled if the rewards offered to 
private enforcers are restricted, so that these do not devote more private resources than the socially 
optimal223. 
 Subsequently, this over-deterrence proposition of private enforcement was challenged by arguing 
that private enforcers would only pursue a violation of the law if the reward collected is greater than the 
costs of enforcement. Furthermore, in cases where the violation in question does not generate a sufficient 
return for the private enforcer in order to cover the costs of enforcement, it would not be rational for 
private actors to pursue such violations. In this regard, private enforcement would be suitable for cases 
where the rewards offered are higher than the costs of enforcement and, on the other hand, public 
enforcement would be more appropriate for cases where the rewards available for pursuing an 
infringement of the law are significantly less than the cost of enforcement224.  
 As a conclusion, developing on the study of the reviewed literature, it is evident that the private 
enforcement of the law provides benefits and disadvantages. For instance, the availability of a private 
enforcement regime can encourage private parties to pursue cases in which public enforcers would not 
act. In such cases, private enforcement of the law delivers more information about the violation and offers 
additional resources to the overall enforcement of the law. In this regard, private enforcement can 
increase the levels of deterrence. Despite the preceding, the private enforcement of the law may cause 
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negative effects as well, such as the expenditure of additional enforcement costs and the strategic 
enforcement of the law. 
In this sense, it is fundamental to determine the appropriate role of public and private 
enforcement to reach an optimal dual enforcement system by quantifying the costs and benefits expected 
from each type of enforcement.  
4. Benefits of Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
The validation for a private antitrust enforcement system is founded on the benefits that this system can 
deliver to the overall enforcement of the competition law provisions. In this regard, given that private 
antitrust enforcement serves as a complement of public enforcement225, it is fundamental to review the 
ways in which private antitrust enforcement can interact efficiently with public enforcement in order to 
determine the optimal role of private enforcers in the application of competition law.  
 Initially, private enforcement can act as a check on the monopoly power of enforcement that 
public authorities would otherwise hold226. The public monopoly of enforcement allows public authorities 
to decide which infringements are worthy of being prosecuted. In practice, however, the existence of a 
private enforcement system means that all the violations that return a positive utility will be prosecuted 
despite of the inaction of the public authorities227. In this sense, private parties can palliate the inaction of 
the government by bringing their own actions for the infringement of competition law, and as a 
consequence, adding private resources for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions. The addition of 
private resources to the overall enforcement of competition law is especially important in jurisdictions 
where the competition authorities have tight financial budgets and in times of fiscal constraints. Finally, 
private enforcement can be an effective mechanism to challenge the decisions not to prosecute of public 
authorities by determining in court proceedings if a certain violation of the law has been committed or 
not.  
Furthermore, private antitrust enforcement can strengthen deterrence and compliance by acting 
in cases that have not been pursued by public enforcers due to the lack of information and/or resources, or 
for priority reasons. In such cases, private enforcers that are aware of the infringement and have 
information about it are in a better position than the public authorities to pursue the infringement of 
competition law given that the enforcement costs of the public authorities can be comparatively higher. 
Similarly, in cases where for prioritization reasons the public authorities chose not to pursue a determined 
infringement to allocate their limited resources in an efficient manner228, private enforcers can act in such 
cases pursuing the infringement of competition law. 
Great part of the benefits that private antitrust enforcement provides to the overall enforcement 
of the law is closely related to the condition of the private parties as victims of the law infringement. 
Compared to public enforcement, in a private enforcement system, private enforcers are supposed to have 
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greater incentives to pursue a violation, better information about the infringement, and sufficient 
resources to take on violations than public enforcers, due to their condition of being directly connected 
with the violation229. 
Private enforcement can be superior to public enforcement due to the fact that private enforcers 
are usually the ones directly affected by infringement in question230, in such cases, private actors have 
greater incentives to take enforcement actions than public authorities, and as a consequence, this type of 
actions might lead to additional benefits for society through additional deterrence231. Law enforcement is 
more effective in violations with victims given that these have an incentive to apprehend the violators and 
particularly if they are compensated232. Moreover, compensation can achieve corrective justice when the 
party that wrongfully committed the infringement compensates those parties who innocently suffered the 
consequences of the infringement233. In this regard, private antitrust enforcement is better suited than 
public enforcement when it comes to compensating the parties affected by the infringement of the 
competition law provisions234.   
As noted before, private enforcers may have an initial information possession advantage due to 
their connection with the violation. In practice, this means that regarding the enforcement costs, the costs 
of public information acquisition can be higher than those of private parties for three reasons. First, the 
public sector is less efficient than private parties, mainly because it is not motivated by the profit 
incentive. Second, funding public enforcement with taxes imposes a deadweight costs on economic 
activity. And third, private actors have superior initial information about the infringement due to their 
proximity with the violation235. Therefore, in certain cases, it is evident that private parties have superior 
information about violations and the subsequent harm caused upon them. This condition of private parties 
serves as a justification for allowing private enforcers to sue for a determined infringement of the law 
which inflicts harm upon them236. Likewise, the possibility of private parties to sue for damages arising 
from the infringement of the competition law provisions is grounded on the same reasoning. For instance, 
it may be easier for private parties to detect competition law violations that directly affect their interests 
than for public enforcers concerned with large sectors of the economy. In addition, in some instances, due 
to the expertise of private parties in certain industries, they often have better information about the 
industry practices than public enforcers. Furthermore, in certain cases, the standing to sue for antitrust 
damages has not been recognized to those who have suffered the most damage but to those who have 
superior information about the infringement237.  
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Law enforcers are usually constrained by their human and economic resources. With regard to 
the performance of public authorities, the enforcement activities of the competition authorities are limited 
by their financial budget. Thus, the public application of competition law can be compromised if 
competition authorities do not have enough human and financial resources to carry out their enforcement 
activities effectively. On the other hand, as that private enforcement is motivated by the private incentives 
of the enforcers, then, private actors will spend in investigation and litigation as many resources as 
necessary to secure prosecution as long as the resources devoted are less than the benefits expected238. 
However, in the case of small companies, the fact that these have tight budgets to devote to the 
prosecution of an antitrust violation can affect the case for private enforcement. Overall, the introduction 
of private resources in the enforcement of competition law can raise the levels of antitrust litigation and 
help to further develop on the general standards of competition law by setting precedents and creating 
jurisprudence, evidently, this is only true for stand-alone actions as follow-on actions do not add much to 
the preceding decision by the public enforcement authority239. In this sense, private antitrust enforcement 
can achieve a fundamental objective of competition law enforcement, which is to clarify the ambiguous 
substantive commands of competition law by setting precedents, hence, adding legal certainty and 
clarifying the legal standards of antitrust litigation240.  
5. Drawbacks of Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
Despite the preceding, there are certain aspects about the application of the law by public authorities that 
can be regarded as efficiency advantages of public enforcement over private enforcement. These aspects 
are mainly concerned with the comparative advantages that public enforcers have over private enforcers 
and the divergence between private and public interests. Accordingly, public enforcement should not be 
abandoned for a system that relies exclusively on private suits; on the contrary, these two types of 
enforcement must complement each other in light of the benefits that both of them provide for the 
increase of social welfare241. These important factors in favor of the public enforcement of competition 
law will be discussed below.   
With regard to the advantages that public enforcers have over private enforcers, these are mainly 
related with the characteristic features of public enforcement. For instance, there are substantial 
economies of scale in some areas of public law enforcement. Some types of investigation require the 
coordination on large scales of high technologies and experts, in such cases, public agencies are better 
positioned than private enforcers to investigate the infringement of the law242. In the case of competition 
law, generally, the competition authorities have exclusive powers of investigation, privileged information, 
and expert economists and lawyers available to determine if a violation of the law has been committed. 
On the contrary, due to their costs, private enforcers may not have all these means available to prove their 
case. Hence, as the costs of running these investigation systems can be considerably high, these 
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enforcement systems can constitute natural monopolies. In this sense, and in favor of public enforcement, 
provided that the duplication of enforcement activities by public and private enforcers is wasteful, public 
monopolistic enforcement is more desirable243, especially if one bears in mind that public monopolies are 
preferable than private ones244.  
Additionally, another factor in favor of the superiority of public enforcement is that related with 
the powers of investigation vested on public authorities245. In this regard, since public enforcers rely on 
the power of the state, they are in a better position than private enforcers to investigate the alleged 
infringement of the law because of their extensive investigative powers246. Consequently, in the specific 
case of competition law enforcement, competition authorities are better positioned than private parties to 
discover and prosecute the infringement of the antitrust provisions thanks to their superior investigative 
tools247. Moreover, other mechanisms, such as leniency programs, allow competition authorities to have 
privileged information about the anti-competitive conduct in question. In addition, the case for public 
antitrust enforcement is further supported by the limited discovery procedures of civil litigation found in 
most jurisdictions, given that these govern the acquisition of evidence in private antitrust enforcement248. 
Finally, an additional advantage of public enforcement over private enforcement is that in certain cases 
the use of force, or the threat of it, may be needed to acquire information about the violation. Under these 
circumstances, public enforcers would be better suited to investigate the violation in question, as private 
enforcers cannot use force to demand disclosure.  
In the same line, the sanctions available in public antitrust enforcement proceedings make this 
type of enforcement inherently superior to private antitrust enforcement. On the one hand, compared with 
private enforcement, public enforcers have a variety of sanctions that can be imposed depending on the 
violation in question; this possibility provides public enforcers with an ample room for discretion at 
setting the optimal level of the sanctions. In private proceedings, however, the remedies available for 
successful plaintiffs are restricted to the award of injunctive relief, damages or a declaration. Conversely, 
public enforcers have an array of sanction to choose from, these vary from financial penalties to 
imprisonment depending on the case and jurisdiction in question. On the other hand, public enforcers 
have the ability to set the level of the penalties; this allows them to set the optimal amount of the sanction. 
On the contrary, in private proceedings, the amount of damages is calculated in relation with the losses 
that the plaintiffs can prove to have suffered, and as a consequence, not considering the defendant’s gain 
or the social loss.  
One of the main concerns regarding the implementation of a private enforcement system is that 
related with potential over-deterrence249. The establishment of a private enforcement regime could lead to 
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excessive enforcement, especially if there are involved generous rewards for successful plaintiffs. In such 
cases, since private actors are driven by profit motives, the availability of large rewards would incentive 
them to invest more than the socially desired amount in law enforcement, and as a consequence, creating 
private over-enforcement250. Hence, the risk of over-deterrence occurs when the rewards of private 
enforcers are superior to the costs of enforcement and where there are multiple potential plaintiffs in a 
single case. In the context of competition law enforcement, private over-enforcement may harm the 
antitrust enforcement policies by causing undertakings to refrain from implementing socially desirable 
agreements for the fear of large financial penalties and compensation payments. A further issue of private 
antitrust enforcement and over-deterrence is that since the level of the penalty is not strictly related with 
the anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question but with the loss proved by the plaintiff, then the 
awards of damages could incentive the infringement of the law (if too small) or deter efficient conduct (if 
too large)251.  
Another problem with private enforcement is the divergence between the private and the general 
interest. Since private enforcers are driven by their private motives, they are not normally concerned with 
the optimal level of enforcement. This difference between the interests of private and public enforcement 
may lead to inadequate investment on enforcement when private parties will refrain from detecting and 
litigating cases that even though are meritorious for the overall enforcement of competition law, do not 
report sufficient rewards for them252. 
Moreover, this divergence may also cause unmeritorious claims by competitor plaintiffs against 
their rivals. As mentioned before, private enforcers have greater incentives than public authorities to 
enforce the law due to their connection with the infringement. However, private enforcers also have 
greater incentives to use the competition law provisions strategically. For instance, companies can use 
competition law to prevent large potential competitors from entering the market. Companies can also use 
competition law strategically to prevent rivals from competing vigorously, extort funds, improve 
contractual conditions, enforce tacit collusive agreements, respond to existing suits, and prevent hostile 
takeovers253.  
Similarly, since private enforcers are driven by private incentives, these incentives can persuade 
them to settle the case. Thus, the availability of a private antitrust enforcement regime can encourage 
nuisance suits to extort large monetary settlements254. For example, in cases where the enforcer is a 
lawyer hired by the victim, the former can be induced to settle the case in exchange for generous attorney 
fees. In the same way, a competitor plaintiff might have an incentive to enter into a collusive settlement 
with its rival that will harm competition255.  
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Finally, private antitrust enforcement can create free-ridding problems. Private plaintiffs 
frequently free-ride on public antitrust enforcement efforts by suing for damages after the competition 
authority has declared the infringement of the antitrust provisions. In such cases, private enforcement 
does not add any resources to antitrust enforcement. Similarly, the free-riding problems is not restricted to 
private enforcers taking advantage of successful public prosecution, as potential private plaintiffs can 
free-ride on the enforcement efforts of successful private enforcers. 
6. Optimality of Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
A fundamental finding of the previous sections dealing with the benefits and drawbacks of private 
antitrust enforcement is that a combination of public and private enforcement is likely to enhance the 
benefits of the overall application of competition law. In practice, the optimal application of the 
competition law provisions by private parties or by public authorities very much depends on which of 
these enforcement systems accomplishes the enforcement objectives of competition law in a more 
economic fashion, i.e. detection of the violation, sanction of the offenders, and compensation of the 
victims.  
According to the preceding, the competition law provisions can be efficiently enforced either by 
private parties or public authorities depending on different factors, such as the type of action brought256, 
the information available about the infringement, or the types of anti-competitive behavior257. 
 The costs and benefits of public and private enforcement may vary depending on the type of 
action brought for the violation of the antitrust rules. For instance, in case of victims seeking 
compensation for the harm suffered as a consequence of the infringement of the competition law 
provisions, private intervention seems to be socially desirable for a few reasons. Normally, the victims of 
antitrust violations possess information about the identity of the offenders, in such cases, the detection of 
the infringement and the identification of the violators by private enforcers that already have such 
information would be beneficial for society, instead of having to spend extra resources on public 
enforcement to detect the infringement of competition law. However, in order to encourage victims to 
report the infringement and provide information about it, these must be given an incentive, such as the 
recovery of damages. In practice, this is the rationale for granting antitrust victims standing to sue for the 
damages suffered as a consequence of the infringement of the competition law provisions. A possible 
problem with offering private parties a monetary gain for reporting a violation is that these may sue for 
losses that did not indeed suffer. Nonetheless, in private antitrust litigation courts handle this situation by 
requiring private plaintiffs to provide sufficient evidence of the loss being claimed. Moreover, since the 
main objective of private antitrust damages claims is to achieve corrective justice by providing 
compensation to the victims, the recovery of a monetary sanction by successful plaintiffs appears to be 
more appropriate than the collection of fines by public authorities or the imprisonment of the individuals 
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involved in anti-competitive behavior. In this sense, private actions for damages seem to be superior to 
public antitrust enforcement to achieve corrective justice through compensation.   
Similarly, in private antitrust litigation, the private parties who have suffered injury resulting 
from an infringement of the competition law provisions, or are threatened with injury, have the right to 
sue for and have injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is an equitable civil remedy in which a court orders a 
party to do or refrain from doing specific acts. From the competition law perspective, injunctions are 
mainly used by private plaintiffs in cases related with the abuse of a dominant position by the defendant 
and, in a lesser extent, in cartels, vertical restraints and mergers. The rationale for allowing private parties 
to sue for injunctive relief, instead of relying on public enforcers to secure the rights of the plaintiffs, is 
that usually the private plaintiffs, due to their connection with the infringement, can detect and recognize 
unlawful behavior that has affected or could affect their interests more easily. For instance, in a case 
where the defendant is a dominant undertaking involved in abusive behavior by offering discriminating 
conditions or an unfair price, the plaintiff could request the court to order the defendant to either stop the 
discrimination or to grant him access to the products or input to non-discriminatory conditions. Thus, the 
adequacy of allowing private parties to sue for injunctive relief in competition law litigation is related 
with the proximity of the plaintiffs with the violation and with the expertise of the plaintiffs about the 
commercial practices in a determined industry. In this regard, since in private antitrust litigation the 
plaintiffs can easily detect and recognize violations of the antitrust rules that affect them, society benefits 
from allowing private antitrust plaintiffs to sue for injunction in order to stop or prevent harm, given that 
it would be wasteful to rely on the public authorities to detect antitrust violations that can be quickly 
detected by private parties.    
Moreover, for competition law infringements arising from contractual relationships, private 
antitrust enforcement can play a leading role. In practice, the competition law provisions are regularly 
invoked in contractual disputes when the parties claim specific performance of the contract, allege the 
breach of the contract, or request the nullity of the contract. As seen before, in cases where the private 
plaintiff has a direct connection with the antitrust infringement, i.e. a contractual relationship, this 
possesses an information advantage in comparison with public enforcers. In addition, since the private 
plaintiffs are also parties to the contract, these know the identity of the defendant, and can easily observe 
any anti-competitive term included in the contract. Accordingly, the rationale for relying on private 
plaintiffs for contractual disputes that give raise to competition law infringements is that society benefits 
from the information provided by private parties about the infringement and in retribution these are 
allowed to collect, to obtain specific performance from the defendant, or to declare the contract null and 
void. On the contrary, to assign the scrutiny and control of contractual relationships to public authorities 
would be inefficient, as private plaintiffs provide for a readily alternative.  
Alternatively, for competition law infringements where the identification or apprehension of the 
violators is difficult and requires effort, the public application of the competition law provisions by public 
agents may be desirable on efficiency grounds. If unlike the previous situations where private plaintiffs 
have an information advantage because of their proximity with the antitrust infringement, then public 
antitrust enforcement activities may be required to identify and apprehend the offenders. Moreover, under 
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some situations, even if the private party knows the identity of the offender but does not have sufficient 
information nor the means to acquire it and secure prosecution, in such cases public intervention may be 
required.  
In practice, in cases where private parties do not have initial information about the infringement 
of the competition law provisions, public antitrust enforcers are better suited to discover and prove the 
antitrust infringement, because they have wider powers of investigation and stronger sanctions. 
Accordingly, in cases where it is difficult for private enforcers to detect and prosecute an antitrust 
violation, public proceedings for the infringement of the competition law provisions will be instituted. 
Even in jurisdiction where private parties in antitrust proceedings benefit from broad discovery rules; 
public enforcement is superior in acquiring relevant information about the violation. For example, in 
cases related with hard-core cartels, cartel members take efforts in concealing any possible piece of 
information that can relate them with the violation in question, in such cases, most private parties would 
not be even aware of the existence of the cartel nor would be able to gather the necessary information for 
prosecution, however, as public authorities are vested with special powers to detect most anti-competitive 
conducts, these are superior to private parties when it comes to uncover concealed anti-competitive 
behavior.  
Depending on the on the competition regime in question, these public proceedings will be 
resolved by specifically entrusted authorities or national courts. Moreover, in relation with the challenged 
anti-competitive conduct, public proceedings can be handled in administrative procedures, or in the most 
stringent jurisdictions, in criminal proceedings. The use of public enforcement in these cases is concerned 
with the seriousness of some anti-competitive practices, and the special powers of investigation and 
sanctions available in this type proceeding.  
In the same vein, even though the remedies available in private antitrust litigation may satisfy 
private plaintiffs in their claims, from a deterrence perspective, the sanctions imposed in public 
proceedings seem to be more adequate to reach the desired levels of deterrence, since private antitrust 
enforcement is primarily driven by private profit motives. In order to accomplish the deterrence objective 
of competition law enforcement, public antitrust enforcement provides enforcers with a substantial 
spectrum of sanctions, which range from the imposition of financial penalties, to directors 
disqualifications, to imprisonment. The setting of these sanctions can be controlled by public agencies in 
order to assure optimal levels of deterrence. Additionally, public enforcers can attain effective deterrence 
by using a combination of sanctions, like the imposition of financial penalties on undertakings and the 
imprisonment of managers responsible for the infringement of the competition law provisions.  
Finally, as abovementioned, the optimal use of public and private antitrust enforcement can be 
related to a certain type of anti-competitive, i.e. horizontal agreements, vertical agreements and abuses of 
a dominant position. As will be showed below, the costs and benefits of each type of enforcement system 
(public and private) may vary with regard to the anti-competitive conduct being challenged by the 
competition law enforcers.  
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In the case of horizontal agreements -price-fixing agreements, limitation of output or partitioning 
of markets- public enforcement of competition law may be more effective than private enforcement. Due 
to the noxious effects of these types of anti-competitive behavior, these are considered as illegal without 
further inquiry, are vigorously prosecuted, and severely sanctioned. Accordingly, the persons involved in 
this kind of unlawful behavior resort to highly sophisticated measures to ensure that no incriminatory 
evidence is left behind. Because of this secretive nature of hard-core cartels, public and private enforcers 
need to spend a considerable amount of resources to detect this kind of infringements. Unlike other types 
of antitrust violations, in horizontal restrictive agreements, both public authorities and private plaintiffs do 
not have an initial information advantage. In this regard, since public authorities possess special powers 
of investigation and mechanism, like leniency programs, which help in the detection of this type of 
agreements, it can be argued that the intervention of public authorities to uncover such anti-competitive 
practices is required. Some of the specific mechanisms of public enforcement of competition law, such as 
leniency programs and settlement procedures aid to save valuable resources in prosecution. On the other 
hand, in private proceedings the acquisition of evidence is grounded on the rules of discovery, which are 
usually very restrictive and require the expenditure of resources from the parties and the court. Even 
though public antitrust enforcement seems preferable to tackle horizontal restrictive agreements due to its 
superior investigative and sanctioning powers, it can be complemented by private enforcement actions in 
order to accomplish with the compensatory objectives of competition law enforcement, as well as 
increasing deterrence. Hence, the possibility of private plaintiffs to bring follow-actions that benefit from 
the findings of public enforcement constitutes a valuable mechanism to ensure compensation and 
deterrence.   
Vertical agreements –resale price maintenance or rebate schemes- may be intended to exclude 
competitors and foreclose markets but can also entail efficiency gains. This means that these agreements 
are not always anti-competitive, like hard-core cartels, but require further scrutiny to determine if these 
have negative effects on competition. Nevertheless, from the enforcement perspective, this inquiry about 
the effects of the agreements on competition can increase the costs of enforcement as the agencies and 
courts will have to devote more resources in the investigation of these practices. Since this type of anti-
competitive agreements are not among the most harmful for competition and the general welfare, public 
authorities may chose not to investigate them due to priority reasons, agencies usually save their limited 
resources to prosecute the cases that are more harmful for society. On the other hand, however, when 
private parties are directly connected with the infringement they normally have insightful information 
about the violation and some expertise about the commercial practices of a certain industry. In cases 
where the parties are business partners, private parties may be prevented from pursuing an infringement if 
they fear retaliations from the defendant. With regard to the sanctions available against these anti-
competitive practices, in public proceedings, the public authorities can impose financial penalties and 
behavioral remedies, on the other hand, private plaintiffs may require the payment of damages, injunctive 
relief, or the nullity of the agreement. In practice, injunction and nullity declarations are the most 
economical choices, given that they do not require a monetary quantification. Overall, for anti-
competitive vertical agreements, it appears that private antitrust enforcement is more adequate as it is 
more efficient that the enforcers who have an information advantage pursue the infringement.  
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Abuses of dominance are conducts by dominant undertakings intended to maintain or increase 
their dominant position in an anti-competitive way. Like vertical agreements, the unlawfulness of abusive 
behavior cannot be easily identified, thus, enforcement actions by public or private parties require the 
expenditure of considerable amounts of resources in the detection of these anti-competitive practices. As 
with vertical agreements, private parties normally have some expertise about the industry, in addition, in 
cases where the private plaintiffs are directly connected with the infringement –business partners- these 
may have an information advantage in comparison with public authorities. However, since this type of 
anti-competitive behavior require high degree of expertise to delineate the market and determine the 
dominance of the defendant, public authorities may be better suited to investigate cases related with the 
abuse of  a dominant position. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the most peculiar characteristics of competition law enforcement is the possibility to apply the 
competition law provisions by multiple enforcers and in a variety of procedures. The present chapter is 
related to the public enforcement of competition law, which is the primary enforcement mechanism of 
competition law in most jurisdictions. This part of the study addresses the most relevant features of the 
public enforcement of competition law in a variety of jurisdictions; nonetheless, the chapter is not aimed 
to be a definitive analysis of each competition regime studied. Instead, the purpose of this part of the 
study is to be a practical guide for practitioners and academics on how the competition law provisions are 
publicly applied in some jurisdictions with a long tradition of competition law enforcement and in certain 
jurisdictions that have recently adopted competition law provisions. 
 In a broad sense, the present chapter deals with issues such as, what are the substantial 
provisions of competition law that can be publicly applied; who is empowered to apply these substantial 
provisions; how these competition law provisions are applied; what is the outcome of the public 
application of the competition law provision; and how the public application of the substantial provisions 
of competition law is reviewed.  
2. Public Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
The adoption and implementation of competition law and competition policy are governmental initiatives 
aimed at safeguarding the process of competition in a determined territory with the ultimate purpose of 
achieving certain goals and objectives, such as the protection of consumer welfare, the economic 
progress, or the public interest. In order to achieve these objectives, most jurisdictions have opted for a 
public choice approach, i.e. the protection of competition by using public laws. This intervention of the 
State in the competitive process has derived from the inability of private forces to sustain competition and 
to prevent anticompetitive practices from happening. Accordingly, in practice, in the majority of 
jurisdictions where competition law provisions have been implemented, these are mainly applied by the 
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public authorities responsible for the enforcement of competition law; this application is usually referred 
to as the public enforcement of competition law. 
The public enforcement of competition law is undertaken by specialized administrative or 
judicial authorities, depending on the jurisdiction, which apply the competition law provisions in their 
capacity as public enforcers. In doing so, these authorities address their decisions in respect to the 
infringement of competition law to private persons, which may be natural or legal, and have the authority 
to impose upon the latter sanctions that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for the breach of the antitrust 
rules. The main feature of the public enforcement of competition law is the verticality of the dispute 
between the State and the private persons and the eventual ability of the former to sanction the latter for 
the infringement of the competition law provisions.   
3. Objectives of the Public Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
The enforcement of the competition law provisions intends to fulfill certain goals or objectives. Generally 
speaking and without making reference to any competition regime in concrete, the objectives pursued by 
the enforcement of competition law are usually three1. The first objective of the enforcement of 
competition law is to prevent the antitrust infringement from happening, or alternatively when this has 
already occurred, to bring the infringement to an end. The second objective of competition law 
enforcement is restorative or compensatory; this second goal takes place once the antitrust infringement 
has occurred. In those cases, the enforcement of competition law intends to remedy the injury caused by 
the anticompetitive conduct by compensating the persons who suffered the consequences of the violation. 
As to the third objective of competition law enforcement, the latter is intended to punish the person or 
persons responsible for the competition law infringement.   
With regard to the accomplishment of the abovementioned objectives through the public 
enforcement of competition law, the latter may be better suited, than other types of enforcement, to 
achieve some of the competition law enforcement goals. For instance, in respect to the first objective, 
when the public application of the competition law provisions is effective, it can have strong deterrence 
effects on market participants, accordingly, it may prevent competition law infringements from 
happening. In addition, in cases where the competition law infringement has already taken place, the 
public enforcers of competition law may have among their powers the ability to order the competition law 
offenders to bring the antitrust infringement to an end. As a consequence, it could be argued, that the first 
objective of the competition law enforcement may be accomplished through the public application of the 
competition law provisions2. Furthermore, with regard to the compensatory objective of competition law 
                                                          
1 According to Komninos, the enforcement objectives of competition law are: the injunctive objective, to bring the infringement to 
an end; the compensatory or restorative objective, to remedy the injury caused by the antitrust infringement; and the punitive 
objective, to punish the competition law offenders (KOMNINOS, Assimakis, P. (2008), ‘EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts’. Oxford [etc.]: Hart Publishing, p. 7). Moreover, according 
to Wils, the tasks of antitrust enforcement are: to clarify and development the antitrust prohibitions; to prevent violations of the 
antitrust prohibitions through deterrence and punishment; and to provide compensation to achieve corrective justice (WILS, Wouter 
P.J. (2009), ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’. World Competition. 
Volume 32, No. 1, p. 5-15). 
2 According to Wils, public antitrust enforcement is a superior instrument, compared to private actions for damages, for deterring 
future competition law infringements (WILS (2009), p. 15). 
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enforcement, it has been argued that the public enforcement of competition law cannot accomplish this 
goal provided that most public enforcers are not allowed to order the competition law offender to 
compensate the victims of the anticompetitive conduct3. In this sense, other types of enforcement, more 
precisely the private enforcement by private parties bringing damages claims before competent courts, 
may better suited to accomplish this enforcement objective4. Finally, in relation to the punitive objective 
of competition law enforcement, the fact that public enforcers of competition law are empowered to 
impose a variety of sanctions on the perpetrators of the antitrust infringement reflects the readiness of 
public enforcement to fulfill this objective5.     
4. Benefits of the Public Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
In addition to the capacity of the public enforcement of competition law to accomplish, in different 
extents, the objectives of competition law enforcement, there are situations where public enforcement is 
superior to other enforcement mechanisms, primordially private enforcement. For instance, the 
availability of a competition authority that is specialized in competition law matters enhances the 
efficiency of the public enforcement of competition law in respect to other types of enforcement6. 
Moreover, this specialized authority in charge of the public enforcement of competition law is usually 
vested with wide investigative powers that allow the authority to be better at discovering and proving 
competition law infringements more effectively7. In the same line, the fact that the competition authority 
has been empowered to impose a variety of sanctions for the infringement of competition law permits the 
authority to punish the competition law offenders more effectively and at lower costs than other types of 
enforcement8. Finally, it has been argued that private enforcement is driven by private profit motives, in 
that respect, the public enforcement of competition law is superior to private actions for damages 
provided that public enforcers apply the competition law provisions for the protection of the public 
interest9.  
 Accordingly, in every competition law regime, the role of public authorities publicly enforcing 
the provisions of competition law is of critical importance for detecting competition law infringements 
                                                          
3 There are, however, some jurisdictions where the public enforcers of competition law can order or accord the compensation of the 
victims of the anticompetitive conduct. For instance, in Indonesia, the competition authority can order the competition law offender 
to compensate the victims. In addition, in South Africa, the Competition Commission can agree with the competition law offender 
to end the investigation for the alleged infringement of competition law in exchange, inter alia, of compensating the complainant 
that has requested the investigation.  
4 Both Komninos and Wils agree that private enforcement of competition law is better suited to obtain compensation for the victims 
of the competition law infringement (KOMNINOS (2008), p. 8; and WILS (2009), p. 15).   
5 According to Prichard and Trebilcock, the fines imposed trough public enforcement mechanisms are the ideal form of correction. 
See PRICHARD, J. Robert, S. & TREBILCOCK, Michael, J. (1978), ‘Class Action and Private Law Enforcement’. University of 
New Brunswick Law Journal. Volume 27, June 1978, p. 10.  
6 The level of specialization of the competition authority enhances the efficiency of the public enforcement over the private 
enforcement (PRICHARD & TREBILCOCK (1978), p. 10).  
7 The fact that the competition authority has wide powers of investigation allows the latter to effectively scrutinize for possible 
anticompetitive behaviors (PRICHARD & TREBILCOCK (1978), p. 10). The availability of these investigative powers makes that 
the competition authority can discover and prove competition law infringements more easily than private parties can (WILS, 
Wouter, P. J. (2005B), ‘Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement’. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 118).  
8 WILS (2005B), p. 118.  
9 Idem. In Addition, according to Posner, public enforcement of competition law is more desirable and needed in situations where 
private parties refuse to enforce the antitrust rules in cases where the amount of the antitrust damage is difficult to calculate and in 
cases where the harm suffered by independent victims is too small to turn its individual claim cost efficient. In those scenarios, the 
public application of the competition law provisions is necessary provided that private individuals will lack incentives to file a 
claim. (POSNER, Richard A. (2001), ‘Antitrust Law’. Second Edition. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 274-
275). 
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using their special powers of investigation, and to punish those responsible by imposing sanction or 
remedies for the infringement of competition law 
II. INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF 
COMPETITION LAW 
 
Overall, the establishment of competition law provisions has been coupled with the creation of 
specialized institutions for the enforcement of the competition law provisions and the performance of 
other tasks in the competition policy area. In most countries, the design of the competition provisions and 
the competition authorities responds to the political, economic and social environment of that particular 
country. Accordingly, provided that these environments differ greatly from one jurisdiction to another, 
the design of the competition provisions and competition institutions is also different depending on the 
jurisdiction in question. In general, most of the differences related to the competition authorities are 
concerned with the position of the latter in the administrative structure of the state, the powers and 
functions of the competition authority, and the relation of the competition authority with other public 
authorities. 
In a broad sense, in most jurisdictions, the enforcement of the competition provisions is done by 
a specialized, non-judicial public entity, which is the primary responsible institution for the enforcement 
of the competition law provisions and other activities in the competition policy area, regardless of its 
actual denomination. In the majority of competition regimes, this institution is usually referred to as 
competition authority, thus, for the purposes of this part of the study, the term competition authority will 
be used to make reference to the main institution in charge of the enforcement of the competition law 
provisions and other tasks related to the competition policy in a determined regime.   
1. Legal Basis for the Establishment of the Competition Authority 
 
With respect to the legal basis for the establishment of the competition authority, the approach chosen by 
the legislators varies from one country to another. Most competition regimes resort to a law as the main 
legal basis for the establishment of the competition authority, usually the competition law. Alternatively, 
in other competition systems, the legal basis for the establishment of the competition authority is an 
ancillary law to the competition act10. Ultimately, in other jurisdictions, the competition authority has as 
its legal basis the constitution11, and in other regimes, it is established by specific ministerial 
regulations12.  
 
                                                          
10 For instance, in Seychelles, the Fair Trading Commission finds its legal basis on the provisions of the Fair Trading Commission 
Act, which is ancillary to the Fair Competition Act 2009. 
11 In some countries, the legal basis for the establishment of the competition authority derives from constitutional principles (In 
Brazil, Article 170 of the Federal Constitution; in Bulgaria, Article 19 of the Constitution; in Lithuania, Article 46 of the 
Constitution; in Russia, Articles 8 and 34 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation).  
12 In China, the Ministry of Commerce has created the Anti-monopoly Bureau to control mergers and acquisitions.  
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2. Position of the Competition Authority in the Administrative Structure 
 
The creation of a specialized institution for the public enforcement of competition law presumes the will 
of the government to delegate the functions related to the application and interpretation of the competition 
law provisions to such institutions. The main idea is that the enforcement of the competition law 
provisions should not be influenced by political considerations of any kind. This approach requires a 
certain degree of independence from the government’s interference and their institutions. Thus, a 
fundamental feature of any efficient competition agency should be its independence from the government, 
given that traditionally, the antirust legislations have been usually subject to political manipulation13. 
Accordingly, in practice, by delegating the enforcement of competition law to independent institutions, 
legislators try to guarantee that the application of the antitrust provisions is carried out taking into account 
economic and legal arguments alone, and it is not influenced by political pressure.  
In the design of competition institutions, the degree of independence of the competition authority 
is a main issue to the creation of strong institutions14. Across jurisdictions, the level of independence of 
competition authorities reflects the countries’ administrative structures and traditions, thus, the degree of 
independence of competition authorities will vary depending on the jurisdiction and on its administrative 
structure. Overall, the status of competition authorities in the public administration can be classified in: 
competition authorities that are completely independent from the government15; competition authorities 
that are affiliated to a public institution, i.e. a certain ministry16; and competition authorities that even 
though are not affiliated to any public institution, are somehow responsible to the government17. 
3. Composition of the Competition Authority 
 
The composition of the competition authority, including its chairman, the number of members, the 
background of the members, and the way in which they are appointed also varies from one competition 
system to another. Additionally, the qualifications required to be appointed as a member of the 
competition authority also varies depending on the jurisdiction. Finally, the tenure of office of the 
chairman and the members of the competition authority and the possibility of reappointment is different 
across jurisdictions.    
                                                          
13 DILORENZO, Thomas J. (1990), ‘The Origins of Antitrust: Rhetoric vs. Reality’. Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 27. 
14 See the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition: Substantive Possible Elements for a Competition Law, Commentaries and 
Alternative Approaches in Existing Legislation, 2010, para 160.  
15 Most strong competition authorities considered themselves as independent from their governments. However, it has been argued 
that even these competition authorities can be influenced by the government under certain conditions and in determined 
circumstances (VAN DE GRONDEN, Johan W. & DE VRIES, Sybe A. (2006), ‘Independent competition authorities in the EU’. 
Ultrecht Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 1.)   
16 In Estonia, the Competition Authority is a governmental authority within the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications. In Costa Rica, the Commission for the Promotion of Competition operates under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce. In Qatar, the Competition Protection & Prevention of Monopoly 
Practices Committee is affiliated to the Ministry of Economy and Commerce.  
17 For instance, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is an independent statutory agency, however, pursuant to 
Section 29(1) of the Competition Act, the Minister (Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs) 
may give directions concerned with the performance of several of its functions. In Croatia, the Agency for Protection of Market 
Competition is an independent and autonomous institution responsible to the Croatian Parliament. In Serbia, the Commission for 
Protection of Competition is an independent and autonomous organization, however, it is accountable for its work to the National 
Assembly, to which it submits an Annual Report on its activities by the end of February of the current year for the preceding year 
(Article 20 of the Law on Protection of Competition). 
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3.1. Appointment of the Chairman of the Competition Authority 
 
With regard to the appointment of the chairman of the competition authority, in many jurisdictions, the 
Head of State is somehow involved in this process. For instance, in some competition regimes, the 
chairman of the competition authority is appointed by the Head of State at its own discretion18. In other 
regimes, the chairman of the competition authority is also appointed by the Head of State, but with the 
interaction of other institutions. For example, in some jurisdictions the Head of State will appoint the 
chairman of the competition authority after consultation with the members of the competition authority19, 
additionally, in other countries,  the chairman will appointed by the Head of State from a list of 
candidates nominated by other authorities20. Alternatively, in other competition regimes where the Head 
of Stated is not involved, the chairman of the competition authority may be appointed by; the 
Government21, a Minister22, the Parliament23, or other public authorities24. Ultimately, in some 
competition systems, the chairman of the competition authority is appointed by the competition authority 
itself25.    
3.2. Number of Members of the Competition Authority 
 
The number of the members of the competition authority also varies depending on the competition regime 
in question. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the number of the members of the competition authority 
is clearly established in the competition act26. Alternatively, in other competition regimes, this number is 
                                                          
18 In Egypt, the Executive Director of the Authority for the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices 
is appointed by the Prime Minister (Article 15 of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices).  In El Salvador, the Superintendent, head of the Superintendence of Competition, is appointed by the President of the 
Republic (Article 6 of the Competition Law).  
19 In Botswana, according to Section 6 of the Competition Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the Competition Authority is 
appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with the Competition Commission, which is body corporate formed by 7 
members chosen by the Minister.  
20 In Chile, the chairman of the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia is appointed by the President from a list of five 
candidates nominated by the Supreme Court (Article 6 of Antitrust Act). In Hungary, the President of the Competition Authority is 
nominated by the Prime Minister and is appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 35 of the Competition Act). In 
Mauritius, the chairperson of the commission has to be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister given after 
consultation with the Leader of the Opposition (Section 7 of the Competition Act). 
21 In India, the Chairperson of the Competition Commission is appointed by the Central Government (Section 8 of the Competition 
Act). 
22 In Ireland, the Chairperson of the Competition Authority is appointed by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
(Section 35 of the Competition Act).  
23 In Italy, the President of the Competition Authority proposed and appointed jointly by the Presidents of the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate (Section 10(2) of the Competition Act). 
24 In Canada, the Competition Commissioner is appointed by the Governor Council (Section 7 of the Competition Act).  
25 In Barbados, according to Section 6 of the Fair Trading Commission Act, the Commission shall, with the approval of the Minister 
responsible for Consumer Affairs, appoint a Chief Executive Officer. In Kenya, the Director-General of the Competition Authority 
is appointed by the Authority with the approval of the Parliament (Section 12 of the Competition Act).  
26 In Bulgaria, according to Article 4 of the Competition Act, the Commission on Protection of Competition shall consist of seven 
members: a chairman, two deputy chairpersons and four members. Similarly, in Japan, according to Article 29 of the Antimonopoly 
Act, the Fair Trade Commission is constituted by five members: a chairman and four commissioners. In Tanzania, Section 62 of the 
Fair Competition Act establishes that the Fair Competition Commission shall be constituted by five members: a chairman, three 
non-executive members appointed by the Minister and the Director-General.  
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not fixed and may vary within a minimum and a maximum number27. Ultimately, in some competition 
systems, the number of members of the competition authority is determined by the relevant authority28.  
3.3. Background of the Members of the Competition Authority 
 
As to the background of the members of the competition authority, most competition regimes foster the 
diversity of the origins of the members of the competition authority with the purpose of attracting the 
expertise of other fields that are related to the competition process. Traditionally, similar to other public 
institutions, the majority of the members of the competition authority were officials from the public 
administration. At present, there are competition regimes that have introduced specific provisions that 
limit the number of public officials that can be appointed as members of the competition authority with 
the purpose of allowing representatives from other sectors to be appointed as members of the authority29. 
Similarly, there are competition regimes that have included provisions that limit the number of members 
that have a diploma in a certain field30. Accordingly, in order to include representatives from other fields, 
some competition regimes have included certain provisions that make reference to the background of the 
members of the competition authority. Some of these provisions make reference to: members from 
universities or certified research institutes31; members from the public sector32; members from the private 
sector33; former judges34; members with experience in consumer affairs35; or members from the fields of 
science or health36; among others.  
3.4. Qualifications to be appointed as Member of the Competition Authority 
 
In many competition systems, the competition provisions establish the qualifications required to be 
appointed as a member of the competition authority. Thus, there is a variety of personal and professional 
requirements that have been established in most competition regimes that have to be fulfilled in order to 
be appointed as a member of the competition authority.  
                                                          
27 In India, pursuant to Section 8 of the Competition Act, the Competition Commission shall consist of a chairperson and not less 
than two and not more than six other members. Likewise, in Ireland, according to Section 35 of the Competition Act, the 
Competition Authority shall consist of a chairperson and such number of other whole-time members, not being less than two or 
more than four. In Fiji, according to Section 8 of the Commerce Commission Decree, the Commerce Commission consists of not 
less than four or more than six members. 
28 In Australia, according to Sections 6A and 8 of the Competition and Consumer Act, the Governor-General has competence to 
appoint and to determine the number of members of the Competition and Consumer Commission. In Belgium, pursuant to Article 
12 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition the King may increase the number of councilors of the Competition 
Council.  
29 In Pakistan, according to Section 14 of Act Nº XIX of 2010, not more than two members of the Competition Commission shall be 
employees of the Federal Government. 
30 In Belgium, no more than three-quarters of the councilors Competition Council shall have a diploma in the same subject (Article 
15 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition).  
31 In Korea, see Article 36-2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
32 In Seychelles, the commissioners from the Fair Trade Commission can be from the public or private sector (Section 5 of the Fair 
Trading Commission Act). 
33 In Mauritius, see Section 7 of the Competition Act. 
34 In Romania, the members of the Competition Council have to be selected among former judges of the High Court of Rescission 
and Justice, the Litigation Division or the Commercial Division, among university professors of economics or law, or well know 
managers in business, or high-raking public servants (Article 18 of the Competition Law). 
35 In Fiji, the members of the Commerce Commission must have knowledge or experience, inter alia, in industry, commerce, or 
consumer affairs, (Section 8 of the Commerce Commission Decree). 
36 In Sri Lanka, the members of the Consumer Affair Authority shall be persons that have distinguished themselves in the fields of 
industry, commerce, administration, accountancy, science or health (Section 3 of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act).  
73 
 
For instance, most competition regimes require that the members of the competition authority 
have the nationality of the country in question; moreover, some even require that the members have not 
acquired any other foreign nationality37. Additionally, most competition regimes require certain personal 
qualifications in order to be appointed as a member of the competition authority, i.e. honorability, civic 
probity, ability, integrity, impartiality, having the sense of protecting socialist legality, some jurisdiction 
even require certain religious believes, such as believing in “The Almighty God”38   
A further qualification required to the members of the competition authority in most competition 
regimes is related to the level of education. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, the members of the 
competition authority will be required to hold a bachelor degree39, a master’s degree40 or even a doctoral 
degree41. With regard to the field of expertise of the members of the competition authority the majority of 
jurisdictions require the members to hold a degree in law or economy; however, other degrees are 
required to a lesser extent42. As a particularity, some jurisdictions explicitly require that the head of the 
competition authority should hold a degree in law43.   
In some competition regimes, the members of the competition authority have to be of a certain 
age in order to be appointed. Most jurisdictions have provisions establishing a minimum age to be 
appointed member of the competition authority44, however, some competition regimes, have established 
both a minimum and a maximum age for being appointed as member of the competition authority45.  
Finally, there are other qualifications required to be appointed as member of the competition 
authority across jurisdictions, such as: years of professional experience46, languages spoken47, criminal 
                                                          
37 In Mexico, the members of the Federal Competition Commission have to be Mexican by birth and have not acquired other 
nationality (Article 26 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition).   
38 In Indonesia, according to Article 32(c) of Law 5/1999 concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business 
Competition, the members of the Business Competition Supervisory Commission are required to, inter alia, believe in and be 
devoted to “The Almighty God”.   
39 In Lithuania, the members of the Competition Council are required to have a university degree in law or economics (Article 20 of 
the Law on Competition).  
40 In Belgium, all members of the Competition Council must hold a master’s degree (Article 14 of the Act on the Protection of 
Economic Competition). 
41 In Croatia, individuals from the economics field have to hold a doctor’s degree in order to be appointed as members of the 
Competition Council (Article 28 of the Competition Act).  
42 In El Salvador and Honduras, the members of the competition authority can hold a degree in business administration (Honduras, 
Article 26 of the Law for the Defense and Protection of Competition; El Salvador, Article 9 of the Competition Law). In Vietnam, 
the members of the Competition Council shall hold a bachelor degree in law, economics or finance (Article 55 of the Competition 
Law).  
43 In Bulgaria, according to Article 4 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, the chairperson of the Commission has to be 
lawyer with at least 10 years of experience. In Cyprus, according to Section 9 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, the 
chairman of the Commission for the Protection of Competition shall be a lawyer of high standing and probity.  
44 In El Salvador, according to Article 9 of the Competition Law, the Superintendent and the members of the Superintendence have 
to be at least 30 years old.  
45 In Mexico, the commissioners of the Federal Competition Commission must be over 35 years old but under 75 (Article 26 of the 
Federal Law of Economic Competition).  
46 In Albania, members of the Competition Commission must have a working professional experience of not less than 15 years 
(Article 20 of the Law on Competition Protection).   
47 In Belgium, the President and Vice-president of the Competition Council must be fluent in Dutch and French and must have a 
working knowledge of English. Additionally, half of the councilors shall hold a French language diploma and the other half must 
hold a Dutch language diploma, and at least one councilor shall have a working knowledge of German (Articles 13 and 15 of the 
Act on the Protection of Economic Competition). 
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records48, financial record49, credentials50, kinship51, professional merits or background52, place of 
residence53, among others.  
3.5. Tenure in Office of the Members of the Competition Authority 
 
Regarding the tenure in office of the chairman and the members of the competition authority, this varies 
from country to country. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, the tenure in office of the chairman and the 
members of the competition authority may range from three to ten years54. Alternatively, in some 
competition regimes, the term in office of the members of the competition authority is not predetermined 
by the law, thus, is those cases, the period of the appointment of the members will be determined by the 
authority responsible for such appointment55.  
In some competition systems, the mandate of the chairman of the competition authority is 
different than the period of the appointment of the other members of the authority. For instance, in some 
countries, the chairman is appointed for a fixed period; alternatively, the tenure in office of the other 
members of the competition authority is not fixed and may vary56. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the 
period of appointment of the chairman of the competition authority is superior to the period of the other 
members57. 
As a general rule, the chairman and the members of the competition authority can be reappointed 
in most competition regimes, nonetheless, in some jurisdictions the members of the authority cannot be 
                                                          
48 In Armenia, a person cannot be appointed as commissioner of the State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition 
if he has been convicted for committing an intentional crime by a valid court decision (Article 20 of the Law on Protection of 
Economic Competition). 
49 In Mauritius, according to Section 10 of the Competition Act, no person shall be appointed commissioner of the Competition 
Commission if he has been declared insolvent or bankrupt.  
50 In Croatia, the members of the Competition Council that hold a law degree must have passed the Bar Exam (Article 28 of the 
Competition Act).  
51 In Panama, according to Article 90 of the Law on the Protection of Consumer and Defense of Competition, the chairman of the 
Authority for Protection of Consumer and Defense of Competition cannot be related to the President or the Vice-president of the 
Republic. 
52 In Italy, the President of the Competition authority has to have already held a high office with broadly-based institutional 
responsibilities. Additionally, the other members of the Authority shall be chosen among serving judges on the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the Court of Auditors, the Court of Cassation, full professors of Economics or Law or respected business 
executives of particularly high professional repute (Section 10(2) of the Competition and Fair Trading Act).  
53 In Nicaragua, the directors of PROCOMPETENCIA must have resided in Nicaragua for at least four years before being appointed 
(Article 9 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition). In Papua New Guinea, at least one of the persons appointed as an Associate 
Commissioner of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission shall have international experience and shall not be a 
resident of Papua New Guinea (Section 11 of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act).    
54 For instance, in Albania, five years (Article 21 of the Law on Competition Protection); in Armenia, five years (Article 20 of the 
Law on Protection of Economic Competition); in Barbados, five years (Section 6 of the Fair Trading Commission Act); in Belgium, 
6 years (Article 13 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition); in Chile, six years (Article 7 of the Antitrust Act); in 
Croatia, five years (Article 28 of the Competition Act); in Honduras, seven years (Article 24 of the Law for the Defense and 
Promotion of Competition); in India, five years (Section 10 of the Competition Act); in Jamaica, seven years (Section 15 of the Fair 
Competition Act); in Japan, five years (Article 30 of the Antimonopoly Law); in Latvia, five years (Section 5 of the Competition 
Law); in Lithuania, six years (Article 20 of the Law on Competition); in Macedonia, five years (Article 27 of the Law on the 
Protection of Competition); in Mauritius, five years (Section 8 of the Competition Act); in Mexico, ten years (Article 27 of the 
Federal Law on Economic Competition); in Romania, five years (Article 18 of the Competition Law); In Serbia, five years (Article 
20 of the Law on Protection of Competition); In Seychelles, three years (Section 6 of the Fair Trading Commission Act); in South 
Africa, five years (Section 22 of the Competition Act); in Sri Lanka, three years (Section 4 of the Consumer Affairs Authority); in 
Vietnam, five 5 years (Article 55 of the Competition Law);  
55 In the Fiji Islands, the members of the Commerce Commission hold office for such a term, not exceeding five years, as the 
Minister specifies in the member’s instrument of appointment (Section 8 of the Commerce Commission Decree).  
56 In Botswana, the chairman of the competition authority holds office for five years, however, the other members of the authority 
can be appointed for a period that cannot exceed five years (Sections 5 and 11 of the Competition Act).  
57 In Bulgaria, the chairperson of the Commission on Protection of Competition is appointed for six years, while the other members 
of the Commission are appointed for only five years (Article 4 of the Law on Protection of Competition).  
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reappointed58. In Practice, there are some differences across jurisdictions regarding the reappointment of 
the members of the authority. For instance, in some regimes, the members of the competition authority 
can be reappointed only once59; in other regimes, the members can be reappointed twice60; and finally, in 
some competition regimes there are no restrictions on the number of times that the members of the 
competition authority can be reappointed61. Additionally, in some competition regimes, the period of the 
reappointment is different than the first period of appointment62.  
3.6. Removal of the Members of the Competition Authority 
 
As to the removal of the members of the competition authority, there are some differences between 
jurisdictions regarding this matter. On the one hand, the authority empowered to dismiss the chairman and 
the members of the competition authority may vary depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, in some 
competition regimes, the members of the competition authority will be removed by President63 or the 
King64 at its sole discretion. Alternatively, in other jurisdictions, the members of the authority can be 
removed by the Head of State at the recommendation of the relevant authority65. Furthermore, in some 
jurisdictions, the members of the authority can be removed from office by the relevant Minister66, and in 
some cases, by the advice of the relevant Minister67. In most competition regimes, the members of the 
competition authority are removed by the legislature acting on its own68, or at the request of the relevant 
authority69. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the Supreme Court will be empowered to remove from 
                                                          
58 In Mexico, the commissioners of the Federal Competition Commission cannot be reappointed (Article 27 of the Federal Law on 
Economic Competition).  
59 In Tanzania, the members of the Competition Commission shall be eligible for reappointment for one further consecutive term but 
shall not be eligible for reappointment thereafter (section 63 of the Fair Competition Act).  
60 In Albania, the members of the Competition Commission can be reappointed no more than twice consecutively (Article 21 of the 
Law on Competition Protection). 
61 In India, the members of the Competition Commission can be reappointed as many times until they turn sixty-five years old 
(Section 10 of the Competition Act). Similarly in Japan, however, the members of the Fair Trade Commission cannot be older than 
seventy (Article 30 of the Antimonopoly Law).  
62 In Jamaica, the Executive Director of the Fair Trading Commission is appointed for a period of seven years, however, if 
reappointed, it will be for a period not exceeding five years at a time (Section 15 of the Fair Competition Act). In Fiji, the members 
of the Commerce Commission are appointed for a maximum period of five years, however, they can only be reappointed for a 
period of three years (Section 8 of the Commerce Commission Decree).  
63 In Armenia, the commissioners of the State Commission for Protection of Economic Competition are removed by the President of 
the Republic of Armenia (Article 21 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition). In Seychelles, the President can remove 
the commissioners from the Fair Trade Commission (Section 8 of the Fair Trading Commission Act).  
64 In Belgium, the councilors of the Competition Council can be removed from office by the King (Article 18). 
65 In Mauritius, the President can remove the members of the Competition Commission acting on the advice of the Prime Minister 
(Section 11 of the Competition Act).  
66 In Kenya, the Minister in charge of Finance may remove the members of the Competition Authority, (Section 2 of the Kenyan 
Competition Act Schedule).   
67 In Vietnam, the head of the Competition-managing Agency shall be removed by the Prime Minister at the proposal of the Trade 
Minister (Article 50 of the Competition Law).  
68 In Albania, the members of the Competition Commission can be removed from office by a decision of the majority, in the 
presence of more than half of all the members of the National Assembly (Article 22 of the Law on Competition Protection).  
69 In Kosovo, the members of the Commission for Protection of Competition can be dismissed by a decision of the Assembly of 
Republic of Kosovo on the proposal of the Government (Article 27 of the Law on Protection of Competition). In Macedonia, the 
members of the Commission for Protection of Competition shall be dismissed by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia on the 
proposal by the Commission for appointment and dismissal matters of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Article 27 of 
the Law on the Protection of Competition). In Serbia, the members of the Commission for Protection of Competition are removed 
by the National Assembly on the proposition of the Council of the Commission or the National Assembly Committee (Article 24 
Article 20 of the Law on Protection of Competition).  
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office the members of the competition authority70. Ultimately, in some regimes, the members of the 
competition authority are removed by the competition authority itself71, or on the advice of the latter72.  
On the other hand, with regard to the reasons for being removed from the competition authority, 
these also vary from one jurisdiction to another. Accordingly, depending on the competition regime, the 
members of the competition authority will be removed in case of: resignation73; being absent from duty74; 
serious misconduct75; cessation of citizenship76; irresponsible, negligent or poor job performance77; 
violation of the competition provisions78; being adjudged as insolvent79; discrediting the name of the 
chairman or the members of the competition authority80; engaging in any paid employment during the 
term of office81; exercising an elected public mandate82; becoming physically or psychologically 
incapable of discharging his duties as member of the competition authority83; being convicted of an 
offense involving moral turpitude84; being convicted of a criminal offense by a valid court decision85; 
losing permanently his abilities to perform his duties86; abusing his position as member of the competition 
authority87; or being sentenced to death88. 
 
                                                          
70 In Panama, the Administrator, who is the head of the Authority for Protection of Consumer and Defense of Competition, can be 
removed from office by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court (Article 93 of Law Nº 45 of 31 of October 2007). 
71 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the members of the Council of Competition are removed by Council of Competition itself (Article 23 
of the Competition Act).  
72 In Botswana, the Executive Secretary of the Competition Authority can be removed from office by the Minister at the 
recommendation of the Competition Commission (Section 7 of the Competition Act). Other members of the Competition Authority 
can be removed by the Minister too (Section 15).  
73 In Bulgaria, the members of the Commission on Protection of Competition can be removed at their own request (Article 5 of the 
Law on Protection of Competition). 
74 In Pakistan, a member of the Competition Commission can be removed from the latter if he absents himself from three 
consecutive meetings (Section 14 of Act N° XIX of 2010).  
75 In South Africa, the commissioners of the Competition Commission can be removed for serious misconduct (Section 22 of the 
Competition Act). 
76 In Moldova, the Director and the deputies of the National Agency for Protection of Competition can be removed in case of 
cessation of citizenship of the Republic of Moldova (Section 16 of the Regulation of the National Agency for the Protection of 
Competition).  
77 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the members of the Competition Council can be removed from office in case of irresponsible, 
negligent or poor job performance (Article 23 of the Competition Act). 
78 In Japan, the chairman or a commissioner of the Fair Trade Commission can be removed if he has been punished for a violation of 
the provisions of the Antimonopoly Act (Article 33 of the Antimonopoly Act). 
79 In Kenya, the members of the Competition Authority can be removed in case of being declared bankrupt or insolvent (Section 2 of 
the Competition Act Schedule).  
80 In Lithuania, the members of the Competition Council shall be removed from office where, by their acts, they discredit the name 
of the Chairperson or member of the Competition Council (Article 20 of the Law on Competition).  
81 In India, provided that the members of the Competition Commission are whole-time members (Section 8 of the Competition Act), 
if a member has engaged in any paid employment, during his term of office, he can be removed from the Competition Commission 
on this basis (Section 11 of the Act). 
82 In Belgium, the King can remove a councilor from the Competition Council if he exercises an elected public mandate (Article 18 
of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition).  
83 In Korea, the commissioners of the Fair Trade Commission can be removed from office in case of incapacity to perform duties 
due to prolonged physical or mental illness (Article 40 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act). 
84 In Pakistan, a member of the Competition Commission can be removed if he has been convicted of an offense involving moral 
turpitude (Section 14 of Act N° XIX of 2010). 
85 In Armenia, the commissioners of the State Commission for Protection of Economic Competition can be removed in case of being 
convicted for a criminal offense by a valid court decision (Article 20 and 21 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition). 
86 In Croatia, the members of the Competition Council can be removed from office in case of losing permanently the ability to 
perform their duties (Article 29 of the Competition Act). 
87 In India, a member of the Competition Commission can be removed if he has abused his position as member (Section 11 of the 
Competition Act). 
88 In Papua New Guinea, the members of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission can be removed from office in 
case of being sentenced to death or imprisonment, or has been previously sentenced to death or a term of imprisonment (Section 12 
of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act).  
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4. Structural Design or Model of the Competition Authority 
 
The design of the competition authorities respond to the cultural, political and historical context of each 
country. The fact that these contexts vary from country to country translate in different models of 
competition authorities across the globe. Nonetheless, many young competition regimes have been 
inspired by the models of the competition authorities of jurisdictions that have a longer experience with 
the enforcement of competition law. Thus, departing from the idea that the design of the majority of 
competition authorities is based on different models, generally speaking, most competition regimes share 
some similarities with regard to their enforcement structure. 
4.1. Models Based on the Number of Agencies Enforcing Competition Law  
 
A first issue related with the design of competition agencies has to do with the number of institutions that 
deal with competition law matters in a determined jurisdiction. With regard to this issue, the enforcement 
of competition law can be performed by multiple agencies or single agencies. 
(a) Multiple Institutions 
 
The multiple agency model has been adopted in jurisdictions where the power to enforce the competition 
law provisions has been distributed in multiple institutions. One of the characteristics of this kind of 
enforcement structure is that these multiple institutions, which share authority to enforce the competition 
law rules, are independent from each other. This means that these authorities are not vertically related as 
they are in other systems where one institution investigates, another adjudicates and a final one reviews 
the decisions of the latter.  
In practice, the distribution of the enforcement functions within multiple institutions may serve 
different purposes depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, in some competition regimes that have 
multiple agencies, this separation of the enforcement duties is based on the nature and form of 
anticompetitive conduct. Thus, in these regimes, separate agencies enforce laws aimed at specific forms 
of anticompetitive conduct89. On the contrary, in other competition systems with multiple institutions, 
these share concurrent jurisdiction over the same anticompetitive practices, in those cases, in order to 
avoid the overlap of competences, the agencies have opted to divide the cases by industries or sectors90. 
Additionally, the role of the multiple institutions may be assigned in relation to the type of proceedings in 
which the competition law provisions are applied, thus, each institution will be competent to enforce the 
competition law provisions in a determined kind of procedure, i.e. civil proceedings, administrative 
                                                          
89 In China, there are three independent institutions responsible for the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. The State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce, which controls anticompetitive practices related to non-prices cartels and the abuse of 
dominance; the National Development and Reform Commission, which oversees price-related cartels and abuse of dominance; and 
the ministry of Commerce, which is in charge of the merger control. 
90 In the US, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have authority to investigate the 
same anticompetitive practices. In order to avoid overlaps, these agencies have divided the anticompetitive practices by industries.  
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proceedings, or criminal proceedings91. Similarly, in some competition regimes with multiple institutions, 
these will be assigned different enforcement functions92. Moreover, in countries where the competition 
agency shares jurisdiction over the application of competition law with other non-specialized institutions, 
the former is usually in charge of the enforcement of the more complex and aggressive anticompetitive 
conducts, while the latter will be allowed to handle small competition law violations93.  
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, a dual antitrust enforcement system has been established. This 
system of public enforcement is characterized by the existence of one main competition agency and other 
additional agencies that regulate the competitive process94. The most evident example of jurisdictions 
with dual enforcement systems are federal states where both the federal and the states governments share 
jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust provisions95. In such cases, due to the political division of federal 
states, there are many federal statutes, such as the competition law provisions, that authorize enforcement 
by a federal and states institutions (antitrust federalism). In practice, the multiplicity of enforcers in 
antitrust federalism results in that the federal and states institutions assume different functions in the 
enforcement of competition law, which in turn, are also complementary96. This multiplicity present in 
dual antitrust enforcement systems is further exacerbated by the fact that in some cases besides the states 
agencies, the federal agencies have regional offices that perform the investigatory and other functions of 
the federal authority, within their geographic area of responsibility97, furthermore, in addition to the 
federal antitrust statutes, in some jurisdictions, the states may also have their own competition acts, 
however, these largely resemble the provisions of the federal antitrust law; accordingly, most of these 
have established that they are supposed to be interpreted consistently with federal precedent98, 
additionally, in other dual enforcement systems, the regional agencies have to apply their antitrust laws 
and the general antitrust statutes when the infringement in question affects other territories outside their 
own99.  
In favor of antitrust federalism, it has been noted that dual enforcement systems that allow state 
enforcement of federal competition law, provides a competitive alternative to the monopoly of antitrust 
                                                          
91 In the US, both the Antitrust division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have authority to bring civil 
suits before ordinary courts, however, the Antitrust Department holds sole jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust provisions in criminal 
proceedings. Similarly, the FTC has authority to apply the antitrust provisions in administrative proceedings.  
92 In the UK, the main institution in charge of the enforcement of competition law is the Office of Fair Trading, which withholds 
both the investigative and adjudicative function in administrative cases. Nevertheless, both the Serious Fraud Office – in criminal 
cartel cases; and the Competition Commission - in mergers and market investigations, have only investigative functions. In 
Vietnam, the Competition-Managing Agency is responsible for the investigation, while the Competition Case-Handling Council is 
the decision-making body.  
93 In France, the Autorité de la Concurrence is the main institution in charge of the enforcement of the competition provisions. 
However, the latter shares jurisdiction over the application of the antitrust rules with the Minister of Economy who has residual 
jurisdiction over the anticompetitive practices of small and medium companies which affect only local markets – micro-
anticompetitive practices (Article L. 464-9 of the French Code of Commerce). 
94 Except for the US where there are two antitrust agencies at the federal level: the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the DoJ.  
95 In the US, in addition to the federal authorities (the Antitrust Division of the Department of justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission) the state attorneys general can initiate proceedings for the infringement of the federal or state antitrust provisions 
before federal or state courts. 
96 HAWK, Barry E. & LAUDATI, Laraine L. (1996), ‘Antitrust Federalism in the United States and Decentralization of 
Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison’. Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 20, Issue 1, p. 18. 
97 In the US, both the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DoJ have several regional offices across the US to enforce the antitrust 
provisions more efficiently in matters of regional concern.  
98 Such is the case of the US where almost every state has an antitrust statute or constitutional provision of general application.  
99 In the EU, even though is not a federal jurisdiction, by the provisions of Regulation 1/2003, when the national competition 
authorities are investigating an anticompetitive conduct which may affect trade between the EU Member States under national 
competition law, they must also apply the EU antitrust provisions in parallel to or instead of national law.  
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enforcement by the central government by adding additional enforcers100. Conversely, the establishment 
of a dual enforcement system may translate in differences between the authorities responsible for the 
enforcement at the state and federal levels provided that states enforcement promote the interest of the 
state and its residents, while federal enforcement is intended to promote the broader national interest. 
Furthermore, antitrust federalism empowers additional institutions responsible for the enforcement of 
competition law, which may result into differences in enforcement outputs101. For instance, states 
governments may be more concerned than the federal government with the protection of small businesses 
that represent the states102. 
Additionally, dual enforcement systems have been established in other jurisdictions besides 
federal countries. The establishment of a dual enforcement system in those jurisdictions may not be 
strictly concerned with the political division, but may respond to other motives, such as the 
decentralization of antitrust enforcement. For instance, in countries where the territorial organization is 
divided in autonomous regions that do not constitute a federation per se, the antitrust enforcement 
structure is organized in one central competition agency and one regional agency per autonomous 
region103. Similarly, the decentralization of competition law enforcement can take place in multinational 
organizations that have antitrust provisions that are applicable in the territories of the member states. In 
such organizations, there is a decentralized application of competition law, as the enforcement structure is 
composed by one supranational antitrust agency and several national authorities104. The main advantage 
of decentralizing the enforcement of competition law is the reduction of the workload of the central 
competition agency and the addition of enforcement forces for the detection and prosecution of 
anticompetitive practices. However, there are certain disadvantages, like the biased application of the 
antitrust provisions by the decentralized enforcers105.  
The main issue with both antitrust federalism and decentralized enforcement of competition law 
is related with the efficient interaction of the multiple competition agencies in order to achieve affective 
coordination and cooperation between the multiple institutions and to avoid overlapping responsibilities 
and duplicate work. In this sense, in order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, in most competition regimes 
where a dual enforcement system has been adopted, the main mechanism to avoid overlapping 
responsibilities is to restrict the competence of the regional enforcers. Both in antitrust federalism and 
decentralized enforcement, the regional antitrust institutions prosecute infringements, the effects of which 
are limited to the specific territory of the state/region in question. Alternatively, if a determined 
anticompetitive practice has broader effects and affects more territories within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                          
100 POSNER, Richard A. (2004), ‘Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General’. The Georgetown 
Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 2:5, p. 12.  
101 LEMOS, Margaret H. (2011), ‘State Enforcement of Federal Law’. New York University Law Review, Vol. 86:698, p. 717. 
102 HAWK, Barry E. & VELTROP, James D. (1993), ‘Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: Positive or Negative 
Lessons for the European Community’. In: Slot & McDonnell (ed), Procedure and Enforcement in E.C. and U.S. Competition Law. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 28-29. 
103 In Spain, ten of its autonomous communities have created regional competition authorities: Andalucía, Aragón, Castilla y León, 
Catalunya, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Islas Canarias, País Vasco, and Región de Murcia.  
104 In the EU, since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the enforcement of competition law has been decentralized by increasing the 
involvement of national courts and national competition authorities.  
105 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2004), ‘The Reform of Competition Law Enforcement: Will it Work?’. In: Cahill (ed), The Modernisation of 
EU Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union-FIDE 2004 National Reports. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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central antitrust authority, then the latter has sole jurisdiction to apply the competition law provisions106. 
In addition, there are other restrictions/attributions that are design to avoid overlapping competences 
between multiple enforcers. For instance, to ensure coherent application of the competition provisions, 
the central competition authority may retain jurisdiction in the prosecution of severe infringements or 
landmark cases107. On the contrary, in some jurisdictions, the states governments may be empowered to 
bring suits on behalf of the residents of their states for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions108. 
As to the coordination and cooperation of multiple antitrust institutions in dual enforcement 
systems, there are different approaches across jurisdictions regarding the coordination and cooperation 
networks between competition authorities. On the one hand, in more formalistic jurisdictions, the 
competition authorities’ network works through formal predetermined management mechanisms and 
respect a hierarchical structure where the central competition authority has a managerial position and 
differentiated authority. On the other hand, in other less formal jurisdictions, the competition network is 
established on empirical learning and functions through informal and flexible cooperation mechanism, 
where all the institutions are in a same level and have broad discretion to cooperate or not with other 
institutions within the network109.   
(b) Single Institutions 
 
In some competition regimes the enforcement duties of competition law have been vested in a single 
institution. Unlike the multiple agency systems, in these jurisdictions, there is a single competition agency 
that holds sole jurisdictions to enforce the competition law provisions. Accordingly, the main differences 
found between jurisdictions with regard to single competition agencies, is the functions and powers that 
these agencies have when applying the competition law provisions.  
 Traditionally, in this type of institutions there is conglomeration of the prosecuting and 
adjudication functions. Even though this system provides for greater economy and broader enforcement, 
in cases where the proceedings before the administrative authority are strictly judicial in nature, and the 
remedy imposed in one usually granted by courts, there can be no effective protection of private rights 
unless there is a complete separation of the prosecuting functions from the functions of decision110.  
In some competition regimes where the competition authority has been granted wide powers to 
enforce the competition provisions, the latter is empowered to carry out investigations for the discovery 
of anticompetitive practices, to issue orders requiring the stop of the anticompetitive conduct, to issue 
                                                          
106 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt is the main institution responsible for the enforcement of the competition law provisions. 
However, at the regional level, State Cartel Offices (Landeskartellbehörden) have jurisdiction over infringements with regional 
effects. 
107 In the EU, according to the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (2004), the 
Commission will concentrate on severe infringements and landmark cases.  
108 In the US, states can bring parens patriae suits on behalf of their resident acceding to the provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act.  
109 Talking about the European Competition Network in the EU and the US competition network, see: CENGIZ, Firat (2012), 
‘Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US’. London and New York: Routledge.  
110 The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, ‘Legal Services and Procedure’, 
1955. 
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final decisions declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions, and to impose the 
determined sanctions for the infringement in question. Traditionally, in most competition systems that 
have a single agency responsible for the enforcement of competition law, the enforcement functions are 
distributed between different offices or departments within the same authority. Thus, in those cases, the 
handling of the investigation of an alleged infringement of competition law will be performed by a 
determined office or department within the authority111. Alternatively, in some competition regimes, the 
investigative function is vested in a determined employee of the authority who will be in charge of the 
investigation112. With regard to the adoption of a decision declaring the infringement of the competition 
law provisions, in some jurisdictions, this function may be awarded to the head of the competition 
authority who will decide based on the findings of the investigation113. In other competition systems, the 
adoption of a decision will be made by a collegiate body that is part of the competition authority. In those 
cases, the decision will be adopted in relation to the votes of the members of the collegiate body114. 
Additionally, in most of these competition regimes, the single authority is empowered to impose the 
established sanctions to the infringers of the competition law provisions. Finally, in jurisdictions where 
the competition authorities have been awarded vast powers to enforce the competition law provisions, 
these authorities may even have authority to review their own decisions, at least in first instance115.    
In other competition regimes with a single agency responsible for the enforcement of the 
competition law provisions, the enforcement functions vested on this authority are more limited than in 
the previously seen systems. For instance, in most of these competition regimes, the competition authority 
is empowered to investigate the alleged infringement of the competition provisions, but cannot issue a 
decision declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions nor impose any sanctions for the 
anticompetitive conduct of the perpetrators116.  
                                                          
111 In Albania, there is a single institution that is responsible for the enforcement of competition law, the Competition Authority, this 
is compound of the Competition secretariat, which is the office in responsible for the investigative process and the Competition 
Commission, which is the decision-making body (Articles 18 to 29 of the Law on Competition Protection). In Belgium, the 
investigation is carried out by the College of Prosecutors that is part of the Competition Council. In Denmark, the Competition 
Council is the institution responsible for the enforcement of the competition provisions. However, there is another institution, the 
Competition Authority, which is subordinated to the Council and is responsible for the investigation process.  
112 In Mexico, the investigation is carried out by the Executive Secretary of the Federal Competition Commission (Article 30 of the 
Federal Law on Economic Competition).  
113 In Nicaragua, the President of PROCOMPETENCIA (Nicaraguan competition authority) is empowered to decide on the 
investigated cases and to impose the relevant sanctions (Article 14 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition).  
114 In Belgium, the decisions are issued by the General assembly of the Competition Council, which is a corporate body composed 
by the President, the Vice-president and the councilors of the Competition Council. The decisions are adopted by the vote of the 
simple majority of the members of the Assembly (Article 22 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition). In Croatia, the 
Competition Agency is responsible for the enforcement of competition law. The Competition Council is the managing body of the 
Agency; it is composed of five members. The Council can investigate and decide on a determined case; in order to issue a decision, 
it has to be adopted by the vote of the majority of the members of the Council. 
115 In Mexico, the decisions of the Federal Competition Commission can be reviewed, in first instance, by the Commission itself. 
The Commission can revoke, modify or confirm its decision, however, against this decision there is a further appeal before the 
District Courts and the Tribunals specialized in competition matters. In El Salvador, the decisions of the Superintendence of 
Competition are reviewed by the Directive Council, which is the highest authority of the Superintendence. In Pakistan, an order 
made by any authorized member of the Competition Commission can be appealed before the Appellate Bench of the Commission, 
which is a corporate body, comprised at least two members of the commission. The decision of the Bench shall be made 
unanimously or by a majority of votes if the Bench comprises more than two members. In the case of a split decision, the original 
order appealed will be hold and have the effect as the final order of the commission.  
116 In Finland, the Competition Authority is allowed to carry out investigations for the alleged infringement of competition law. 
However, the Authority lacks competence to issue decisions or to impose sanctions to the infringing undertakings. Thus, in order to 
declare the infringement of the competition rules and to impose penalties to the perpetrators, the Authority will propose the 
initiation of proceedings before the Market Court. In Moldova, the National Agency for the Protection of Competition is allowed to 
conduct investigations and to issue some orders to stop the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant. However, if the Agency 
considers necessary the imposition of a penalty, the latter will have to bring an action before the relevant court.  
82 
 
4.2. Models Based on the Distribution of the Enforcement Functions 
 
Additionally, the design of the enforcement structure can vary from one country to another depending on 
the enforcement responsibilities and functions vested on the competition authorities and other additional 
institutions. Overall, the enforcement structure of the competition authority and the allocation of decision-
making functions within the administrative and judicial systems generally fall into one of three structural 
models. First, the bifurcated judicial model, where the competition authority is allowed to conduct the 
investigation, but has to bring enforcement actions before general courts in order to declare the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, appeals against the court decision can be made before 
general appellate courts. Second, the bifurcated agency model, where the competition authority is allowed 
to conduct the investigation, but has to bring enforcement actions before specialized competition 
adjudicative institutions in order to declare the infringement of the competition law provisions, appeals 
against these decisions can be made before specialized appellate bodies or general appellate courts. And 
third, the integrated agency model, where the competition authority is allowed to conduct the 
investigation and also to issue a decision declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions, 
appeals against these decisions can be made before specialized appellate bodies or general appellate 
courts117.  
(a) Bifurcated Judicial Model  
 
In competition regimes where the bifurcated judicial model has been adopted, the different enforcement 
functions have been awarded to different institutions, i.e. competition authorities and courts of general 
jurisdiction. The main characteristic of this kind enforcement structure is the strict separation of the 
enforcement functions, additionally; the fact that the decision-making body is a general court 
differentiates this structure model from others where the decisions are issued by a specialized competition 
adjudicative authority. Thus, in practice, in the competition systems where this model has been fully 
implemented, the investigative, enforcement or prosecutorial and adjudicative functions have been 
delegated to separate authorities, i.e. the competition authority is the investigative and prosecutorial body 
and a court of general jurisdiction is the decision-making body118. Finally, due to the strict separation of 
the enforcement functions in this kind of model, the decisions issued by the general courts are appealable 
before independent general appellate courts.  
                                                          
117 This categorization has been borrowed from: TREBILCOCK M. & IACOBUCCI E.M. (2010), ‘Designing competition law 
institutions: values, structure and mandate’. 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 455. 
118 In Australia, even though the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has extensive powers to carry out 
investigations and to grant immunities to certain cartel conducts and to proposed mergers, the Federal Court has sole jurisdiction to 
declare the infringement of the antitrust provisions and to impose penalties and fines. In New Zealand, the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission enforces the antitrust provisions, however, the latter only investigates the alleged infringements and when it believes 
there has been a breach of competition law, it then brings proceedings before the High Court seeking orders imposing pecuniary 
penalties, injunctions, orders preventing individuals from participating in the management of any undertaking for up to five years, 
and the amendment of any relevant contractual provisions. In Panama, the Authority for Protection of Consumer and Defense of 
Competition is allowed to carry out investigations for the infringement of the competition law provisions. After an investigation, the 
head of the authority shall decide whether or not to institute a proceeding before the relevant court. In the USA, in civil and criminal 
cases, the competition authorities are entrusted only with the investigation and prosecution of antitrust infringements, thus, ordinary 
courts hold sole jurisdiction in the US to decide on civil or criminal competition law cases. 
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With regard to the enforcement or prosecutorial function, it has been argued that this function 
can only be differenced from the investigatory function in jurisdictions where there is a strict separation 
of the enforcement functions (Bifurcated Judicial Model), because in systems where a single authority 
investigates, prosecutes and adjudicates (Integrated Agency Model), the prosecutorial function cannot be 
differentiated from the investigatory function119. Consequently, this enforcement function can be better 
evidenced in jurisdictions where the decision is adopted in court proceedings, given that in those cases; 
the competition authority will act as a prosecutor before the court. Nevertheless, the prosecutorial 
function may not always be held by the competition authority, in some regimes, whenever the application 
of competition law may affect the public interest, the prosecutorial function may be assigned to an 
institution subordinated to the government120. Similarly, in some jurisdictions with criminal competition 
law provisions, the prosecution may be performed by public prosecutors121. 
Moreover, in some competition regimes where the bifurcated judicial model has been adopted 
the powers of the competition authority are not restricted to the conduction of the investigation, 
accordingly, even though the competition authority is not allowed to issue a decision declaring the 
infringement of the competition law provisions nor is allowed to impose any sanctions or penalties to the 
perpetrators of the anticompetitive conduct, the authority may be empowered to issue certain orders while 
enforcing the competition law provisions. For instance, in some jurisdictions, despite the fact that the 
competition authority is not an adjudicative body, the latter has certain prerogatives, such as: to order the 
infringing undertakings to stop the contested anticompetitive conduct122; to issue an order requiring an 
undertaking to supply123; to declare that certain anticompetitive agreements are not prohibited if they 
comply with certain conditions124; to grant immunity to previously notified restrictive agreements125; to 
accept commitments from investigated undertakings to put an end to the anticompetitive effects of their 
                                                          
119 WILS, Wouter, P.J. (2004A), ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in 
EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’. World Competition. Volume 27, No. 2, pp. 201-224.   
120 In Austria, the Federal Cartel Prosecutor (Bundeskartellanwalt), which is incorporated to the Austrian Minister of justice, is 
responsible of representing public interests in the field of competition law in cases before the Cartel Court. 
121 In Ireland, the Competition Authority investigates suspected infringements of competition law, following its investigation, and if 
the Authority considers that a breach has occurred, it can file summary proceedings in the District Court. For competition law 
breaches that have criminal sanctions, the Competition Authority shall submit its file to the Director of Public Prosecution who may 
initiate criminal proceedings before the Central Criminal Court. In Estonia, pre-trial investigation in cartel cases is carried out by the 
Estonian Competition Board (Competition Authority), in these cases, the prosecution is made by the Prosecutor’s Office and the 
final decision is adopted by a criminal court.  
122 In Moldova, the National Agency for the Protection of Competition is allowed to investigate and request information related to 
the alleged infringement of the competition rules. The Agency is also allowed to issue an order requiring the stop of an action 
violating the competition provisions. In case this order is not complied, the Agency can bring an action before court in order to 
declare it to be non-binding or to impose the restoration of the situation. In case of a contract that is in contravention with the 
competition provisions, the Agency can bring an action before a court to modify or dissolve the contract. This orders issued by the 
Agency can be appealed before a court. Finally, whenever the Agency considers that the imposition of financial penalties is suitable 
for the anticompetitive conduct of a certain undertaking, it can then bring an action before the competent court for the imposition of 
the financial penalty.  
123 In Finland, the Competition Authority may order the termination of anticompetitive conducts; oblige undertakings to supply, and 
accept commitments from infringing undertaking. However, the latter cannot impose any fines for the breach of the competition 
rules; instead, the Competition Authority can only recommend the imposition of fines to the Market Court, which is the decision-
making body for competition law matters. 
124 In Ireland, even though the Competition Authority is not an adjudicative body, the latter can declare that certain agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices are not prohibited if they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or 
provision of services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.  
125 In Australia, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is empowered to decide on immunity applications and 
proposed mergers, but it lacks authority to declare the infringement of the competition law provisions or to impose fines or 
penalties. 
84 
 
contested practices126; or to grant clearance to notified mergers that do not strengthen or create market 
position127. 
Additionally, in some of these competition regimes where the competition authorities are not 
decision-making bodies and cannot impose penalties or sanctions for the infringement of the competition 
law provisions, the competition authorities may be allowed to suggest the infringing undertaking the 
payment of settlement fines for its anticompetitive conduct, however, this is a mere suggestion given that 
the competition authorities lack competence to impose or order the payment of financial penalties. In 
those cases, if the infringement undertaking agrees to pay the settlement fine, the competition authority 
will end the proceedings, on the contrary, if the undertaking refuses to accept the payment of the 
settlement fine, then competition authority can bring formal enforcement actions before the relevant court 
for the imposition of financial penalties128. Similarly, in other competition regimes where the competition 
authority lacks jurisdiction to impose financial penalties for the infringement of competition law on its 
own, the competition authority will bring enforcement actions before the competent court with the 
purpose of obtaining a declaration of the infringement of the competition provisions, once the antitrust 
infringement has been declared by the relevant court, then the competition authority is allowed to impose 
a financial penalty for the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant129.  
With regard to the right of appeal, due to the strict separation of enforcement powers in this type 
of enforcement structure, the decisions issued by the general courts are appealable before appellate courts 
of general jurisdiction130. Moreover, as previously seen, in some competition regimes with the bifurcated 
judicial model, the competition authorities are allowed to issue some orders while enforcing the 
competition law provisions. With respect to these decisions by the competition authority, the review of 
such orders or decisions can vary from one jurisdiction to another, for example, in some competition 
regimes, the judicial review of the decisions by the competition authority will be made before appellate 
courts of general jurisdiction131, alternatively, in other competition regimes, the review of the competition 
authority decisions will be made by the competition authority itself132.  
                                                          
126 In Ireland, the Competition Authority may agree not to bring an action before courts in exchange for commitments to bring to an 
anticompetitive action to an end. 
127 In the US, both the FTC and Antitrust Division are allowed to grant clearance to proposed mergers, nonetheless, if these 
authorities oppose to a proposed transaction, they have to resort to a court of general jurisdiction in order to block the merger in 
question.    
128 In Sweden, the Competition Authority may only order the termination of the anticompetitive conduct and suggest the payment of 
a settlement fine. Only national courts have jurisdiction to impose fines on competition law infringers. 
129 In Panama, the Authority for Protection of Consumer and Defense of Competition is empowered to conduct the investigation for 
the infringement of competition law. It is also allowed to bring enforcement actions before the relevant courts for the declaration of 
the antitrust infringement, at the end of which, the competition authority can impose financial penalties to the perpetrators of the 
antitrust violation.   
130 In Ireland, the decisions of the Circuit Court on the cases brought by the Competition Authority can be appealed before the High 
Court; further appeal against the decisions of the High Court can be brought before the Supreme Court. In the US, the decisions of 
federal courts on the cases brought by the FTC and the Antitrust Division for the infringement of competition law are appealable 
before the Supreme Court.  
131 In Australia, appeals against the decisions of the ACCC in the course of the investigation can be made before the Federal Court 
of Australia. In Ireland, even though the Competition Authority is not empowered to issue a decision in respect to the breach of 
competition law, the latter can issue certain orders or issue certain decisions, hence, the parties affected by such orders or decisions 
can resort to the High Court for judicial review.  
132 In the US, in civil cases both the FTC and the Antitrust Division are empowered to issue Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) 
requiring the submission of written answers and/or oral testimony. In the case of a CID issued by the FTC, the recipient can request 
the FTC to limit or quash the CID. On the other hand, the recipient of a CID by the Antitrust Division can request an order 
modifying or setting aside the CID directly from a federal district court.   
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Lastly, this kind of enforcement structure model provides for some advantages and some 
drawbacks with regard to the other two models. The fact that the decisions adopted by general courts are 
appealable before independent courts of appeal provides for significant accountability. Moreover, because 
the decisions are finally adopted by a different authority the levels of detachment, transparency and due 
process are higher compared with other models. Nevertheless, there are also some drawbacks related to 
this kind of enforcement structure, for instance, the level of expertise of general courts in relation to 
competition law matters is usually low, additionally, the timeliness are longer and the process costs are 
higher than would be in administrative proceedings. 
(b) Bifurcated Agency Model 
 
In competition regimes where the bifurcated agency model has been instituted there is also a separation of 
the enforcement functions. Nonetheless, in this type of model, unlike with the bifurcated judicial model 
where the decisions are issued by courts of general jurisdiction, the competition authority, which is vested 
with investigative and enforcement functions, has to bring enforcement actions before specialized 
competition adjudicative authorities. In addition, the decisions issued by the specialized adjudicative 
authorities can be appealed before specialized appellate bodies or before general appellate courts, 
contrary to the bifurcated judicial model where the appeal is made before general appellate courts.  
Depending on the competition regime, some differences can be evidenced with regard to this 
model of enforcement structure. The main differences that can be found from one jurisdiction to another 
are related to the type of specialized authority that holds the adjudicative functions. For instance, in some 
of these competition regimes, the decision-making functions have been awarded to specific tribunals that 
are specialized in competition law matters, which are usually comprised of a mix of judges and lay 
members133. Moreover, in some competition regimes, certain courts of general jurisdiction sit as 
specialized courts for competition matters and have jurisdiction to decide on the cases brought by the 
competition authority134. Alternatively, in other competition regimes, the adjudicative functions are 
withhold by executive bodies specialized in competition law which are independent from the authority 
responsible for the investigation of the antitrust infringement135.  
Irrespective of the specific arrangement of a determined competition regime, the decision-
making functions of these specialized competition adjudicative authorities are limited in certain respects. 
For instance, none of these specialized adjudicative authorities can impose criminal sanctions for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, accordingly, in jurisdictions where criminal sanctions can 
be imposed for the violation of competition law, these sanctions can only be imposed by criminal courts, 
this has the purpose of safeguarding the rights of the defendants due to the seriousness of the sanctions 
                                                          
133 In Chile, the investigative authority is the Fiscalía Nacional Económica, while the adjudicative authority is the Tribunal de 
Defensa de la Libre Competencia, which is specialized tribunal in competition law matters. In South Africa, the Competition 
Commission is responsible for the investigation of competition law violations, once the Commission has concluded its investigation; 
it can then file a case before the Competition Tribunal – which is a specialized court in charge of competition matters, for the 
imposition of administrative sanctions.  
134 In Austria, the Higher Regional Court of Vienna sitting as the Cartel Court (Kartellgericht) is the adjudicative body that decides 
on competition matters upon the application of the Federal Competition Authority.  
135 In Croatia, the authority responsible for the investigative and enforcement functions is the Competition Agency. On the other 
hand, the adjudicative function is vested on the Competition Council which is corporate body composed by five members.   
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involved in criminal proceedings136. Similarly, the specialized adjudicative authorities in this kind of 
model are not competent to award civil remedies, such as the award of damages to individuals affected by 
the anticompetitive conduct of the competition law offender, accordingly, whenever an affected party 
wishes to recover the amount of damage suffered as a consequence of the unlawful conduct of the 
competition law offender, the former will have to bring a civil action before the relevant court of general 
jurisdiction137.  
Finally, in respect to the appeals against the decisions issued by the specialized adjudicative 
authorities, the legal forum for the appeal may be different depending on the competition regime. Hence, 
in some jurisdictions, the appeals against the decisions of the specialized adjudicative authorities will be 
made before appellate courts of general jurisdiction138. Oppositely, in other competition regimes such 
appeals will be presented before specialized appellate courts139.  
When adopted, this type of institutional system for competition law enforcement involves certain 
trade-offs. For instance, this model provides a high level of independence in the decision-making process 
provided that the investigative and the adjudicative functions are performed by different institutions. 
Moreover, the fact that the appeals are handled by independent appellate courts entails some degree of 
accountability. Due to the fact that the decision-making body is specialized in competition law matters, 
the degree of expertise in this kind of system is higher compared to other systems. The main inconvenient 
with this type of enforcement structure are the costs involved in the creation of these specialized 
adjudicative institutions, especially given that courts of general jurisdiction provide for a ready 
alternative.  
(c) Integrated Agency Model 
 
Finally, in the integrated agency model there is not a separation of the enforcement functions, on the 
contrary, in this model a specialized agency in competition law matters consolidates the investigative, 
enforcement and adjudicative functions140. The main virtue of this type of enforcement structure is its 
efficiency and the degree of expertise of the decision-making body in competition law matters. 
Nevertheless, this kind of enforcement structure presents some drawbacks as well, for instance, the 
concentration of the enforcement powers in a single competition agency raises issues of transparency, 
independence and due process, this due to the fact that a single agency is responsible for the investigation 
and adjudication of the case.   
                                                          
136 In Israel, the Antitrust Authority cannot impose any sanction for the breach of the competition rules; instead, it has to file a suit 
before the District Court of Jerusalem, when seeking criminal sanctions, or, to the Antitrust Tribunal for other kind of remedies. 
137 For instance, the Australian Competition Tribunal, which is a specialist tribunal that is, inter alia, responsible for the judicial 
review of the decisions of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, has no authority to award civil remedies. 
Similarly, in Peru, the Tribunal for the Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property cannot award damages for the infringement 
of the competition rules. 
138 In Austria, the decisions of the Cartel Court will be appealed before the Supreme Court sitting as the Higher Cartel Court.  
139 In South Africa, the appeals against the decision of the Competition Tribunal can be made before the Competition Appeal Court. 
Further appeal can be made before the Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court.  
140 The most representative competition authority that combines the investigative and adjudicative functions in the world is the DG 
Competition within the European Commission, which is responsible for the enforcement of the competition provisions at the EU 
level.  
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The most common arrangement in this type of system is to delegate each enforcement function 
to a separate office or subdivision of the competition authority. Hence, depending on the internal 
organization of the competition authority in question, the enforcement functions will be fulfilled by 
separate bodies within the same authority. For example, a certain office of the competition authority will 
be in charge of conducting the investigation, while another will be responsible for the final adoption of a 
decision in the case141.  
With regard to the adoption of a decision by the competition authority, there are different 
approaches depending on the competition regime on this matter, for example, in some competition 
systems the adoption of the final decision will be issued by the head of the competition authority142. 
Alternatively, in other competition systems the adoption of the said decision will be made by a collegiate 
body formed by the conjunction of the members of the competition authority. In these jurisdictions, the 
adoption of the decision will be implemented by taking into account the votes of the members of the 
collegiate body143. 
Irrespective of the fact that the competition authorities are decision-making bodies in the 
competition regimes where the integrated agency model has been instituted, the decisions issued by these 
authorities are limited in some respects. The main restriction is evidenced in regimes that have criminal 
antitrust provisions. In these regimes, despite the fact that the competition authority has competence to 
issue an infringement decision, make orders and impose fines and penalties, the latter will not be allowed 
to impose any criminal sanction when applying competition law144. Similarly, normally competition 
                                                          
141 In Albania, the Albanian Competition Authority is subdivided in: the Competition Commission, which is the decision-making 
body; and the Secretariat, which is a technical and investigative body. In Belgium, the College of Competition Prosecutors and the 
Directorate General for Competition (Service de la concurrence/Dienst voor de Mededinging) is the investigative body, and the 
Competition Council is the Adjudicative body. In Cyprus, the Service of the Commission for the Protection of Competition is the 
investigative body, and the Committee of the Commission for the Protection of Competition is the decision-making body. In 
Denmark, the Competition Authority investigates and the Competition Council is the decision-making body. In Greece, the Hellenic 
Competition Commission is a two-tier institution, where the Directorate General is in charge of the investigation, and the 
Commission is de decision-making body. In Italy, the Investigation Directorate – incorporated to the Competition Authority, 
investigates suspected antitrust violations, following the investigation, a decision on the case is made by the five members of the 
Competition Authority sitting as a college. In Spain, the National Competition Commission is composed of a Council – which is the 
decision-making body and a Directorate for Investigation – which is the investigative body.  
142 In Nicaragua, the President of PROCOMPETENCIA (Nicaraguan competition authority) is empowered to decide on the 
investigated cases and to impose the relevant sanctions (Article 14 of the Law on the Promotion of Competition).  
143 In Albania, the Competition Authority composed by the Secretariat, in charge of the investigation, and the Commission, this is a 
collegiate decisions-making body, formed by five members (Article 24 of the Competition Act). In Armenia, the State Commission 
for the Protection of Economic Competition of the Republic of Armenia adopts its decisions in a session by the votes of the majority 
of the members participating in the session. In Belgium, the decisions are issued by the General assembly of the Competition 
Council, which is a corporate body composed by the President, the Vice-president and the councilors of the Competition Council. 
The decisions are adopted by the vote of the simple majority of the members of the Assembly (Article 22 of the Act on the 
Protection of Economic Competition). In El Salvador, the Council of Directors of the Competition Superintendence is a collegiate 
decision making body, which adopts a decision on a case by simple decision of its members.  
144 In Canada, the Commissioner of Competition, which is the head of the Competition Bureau of Canada, has authority to directly 
enforce the non-criminal provision of the Competition Act, however, if after an investigation it finds that the criminal provisions of 
the Act have been breached, it can recommend the opening of criminal proceedings to the Director of Public Prosecution. In 
Estonia, the Competition Authority, which is government authority incorporated within the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications, has jurisdiction to conduct only administrative proceedings. In case of conducts that are criminally prosecuted, the 
Prosecutor’s Office is competent to enforce the competition provisions before criminal courts. In Japan, the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission has authority to investigate, prosecute and decide on administrative proceedings for the breach of competition law. 
However, for the imposition of criminal sanctions, the JFTC has to file a criminal accusation to the Public Prosecutors’ Office; the 
latter will then begin the criminal procedure. In Korea, the Korean Fair Trade Commission has jurisdiction to enforce the provisions 
of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in administrative procedures –investigates, prosecutes and decides on the case. For 
criminal sanctions, it has to file a criminal complaint to the Public Prosecutors’ Office. In Mexico, the Federal Competition 
Commission applies the competition provisions in administrative cases, while the Federal Prosecutor is in charge of the prosecution 
criminal offenses before criminal courts. In Slovenia, the Competition Protection Office is empowered to investigate and impose 
administrative sanctions for the infringement of competition law; however, criminal proceedings are initiated by state prosecutors 
and are adjudicated by ordinary criminal courts.  
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authorities are not allowed to grant civil remedies such as the award of damages to the parties affected by 
the unlawful conduct of the perpetrator. This is due, mainly because, as a general rule, the impositions of 
criminal sanctions and the award of civil remedies are powers exclusively reserved for criminal and civil 
courts, respectively. Nevertheless, there a few exceptions where the competition authority is empowered 
to award damages for the infringement of the competition law provisions. For instance, in jurisdictions 
where courts of general jurisdictions are not empowered to handle competition law matters, the 
competition authority is competent to order the competition law offender to pay compensation to the 
victims of the competition law infringement145.  
Finally, the right to appeal the decisions issued by the competition authorities in this kind of 
enforcement structure varies from one competition regime to another. Accordingly, in some competition 
systems, the right to appeal the decisions of the competition authority will be exercised before general 
appellate courts146. Alternatively, in other competition regimes where the integrated agency model has 
been established, the decisions of the competition authority will be appealable before appellate courts 
which are specialized in competition law matters147. In a few competition regimes, the decisions of the 
competition authority can be reviewed by a determined Ministry148. And finally, in some competition 
regimes the decisions of the competition authority will be reviewed by the competition authority itself, 
depending on the jurisdiction this revision will constitute the first level of the appeal process149, or will 
exhaust the administrative procedure150.   
5. Enforcement of Competition Law by Sector Regulators 
 
The fact that the interests of various stakeholders interact with each other in most economies has resulted 
in the creation of regulatory frameworks by the governments. In this sense, most jurisdictions have 
adopted both competition law provisions and sector regulations with the purpose of promoting 
                                                          
145 In Indonesia, the Commission for Supervision of Business Competition (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, or KPPU) has 
authority to order the competition law offender to compensate the parties injured by its anticompetitive conduct. Similarly in 
Tanzania, according to Section 59 of the Fair Competition Act, any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of an 
infringement of the provisions of the Act can apply to the Fair Competition Commission for a compensatory order requiring the 
competition law offender to pay a determined amount of money for the loss or damages caused to the requesting party.  
146 In Belgium, the decisions of the Competition Council can be appealed before the Court of Appeal; further appeals can be made 
before the Court of Cassation. In the EU, the appeals against the decisions of the European Commission are presented before the 
General Court. Further rights of appeal can be exercised before the Court of Justice.   
147 In India, appeals against the decisions of the Competition Commission can be brought before the Competition Appellate 
Tribunal, with further rights of appeal before the Supreme Court. In Malaysia, the Competition Appeal Tribunal is responsible for 
the judicial review of the decisions of the Competition Commission. In the UK, the decisions of the OFT can be appealed to the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, decisions of the CAT, may be subject to further appeal, in certain circumstances, before the Court of 
Appeal or the Court of Session in Scotland.  In Tanzania, the Fair Competition Tribunal reviews the decisions of the Fair 
Competition Commission, the decisions of the Tribunal are final.  
148 In Norway, the decisions of the Competition Authority can be appealed before the Ministry of Government Administration, 
Reform and Church Affairs.  
149 In Barbados, the decisions issued by the Fair Trading Commission can be review by the Commission itself upon the request or an 
interested party or at its own motion. Further appeals can be made before the High Court. In Korea, an affected party by the decision 
of the KFTC may file an objection to the KFTC within 30 days from the date of receiving the notice. If the objection is not accepted 
by the KFTC, the party that submitted the objection will be allowed to file an administrative lawsuit before the appellate court 
(Seoul High Court). In Mexico, the decisions of the Federal Competition Commission are reviewable before the Commission itself 
in first instance; further appeal can be made before the competent courts of general jurisdictions (District Courts and tribunals 
specialized in competition matters). In El Salvador, the decisions of the Superintendence of Competition are appealable, in first 
instance, before the Directive Council, which is the highest authority within the Superintendence.   
150 In Nicaragua, the decisions of the PROCOMPETENCIA (Nicaraguan Competition Authority) can be reviewed in first instance 
by the president of the Authority. The decision of the president of PROCOMPETENCIA can be appealed before the Directive 
Council which is a collective body and the highest authority within the competition authority. These two levels of review exhaust 
the administrative procedure.  
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competition in markets and preserving consumer welfare, nevertheless, in certain ways; these separate 
frameworks can be sometimes a source of friction between their objectives and also their enforcement 
institutions, i.e. sector regulators and competition authorities.  
The institution of these regulatory frameworks and of their enforcement bodies can create 
conflicts and discrepancies between the goals of the regulatory frameworks and the actuation of the 
enforcement institutions. Given that certain types of regulation may have a bearing on competition law, it 
is fundamental for the success of the economic policies to consider the relationship between the 
regulation of specific sectors or industries and competition law.  
Normally, most governments have paid special attention to certain specific sectors or industries, 
such as: energy, water, telecommunications and transport. The interest in these sectors or industries is due 
to their importance for the correct functioning of the economy in every country, provided that their 
performance is directly related to the development of the economy and the state of welfare of society. 
These sectors or industries are fundamental for the economic development, mainly because, they provide 
essential inputs for all other sectors of activity, and as a consequence, they are considered by the 
government to be of general interest. Hence, the essential nature of these sectors has caused the 
intervention of the governments through regulation with the purpose of guaranteeing the timely and non-
discriminatory access to these services to all citizens, even more; in some countries is the State that 
provides these services through State-owned enterprises.   
In practice, the State regulation of these specific sectors or industries is usually concerned with 
guaranteeing universal access to these services at affordable prices. In order to fulfill these objectives, the 
actuation of the government through sector regulation interacts with competition law policy in certain 
ways.  
On the one hand, sector regulation can have beneficial effects on competition. For instance, one 
of the principal characteristics of these regulated industries is that their activities can be performed only 
by a few operators at the national level. Accordingly, usually in these regulated sectors, natural 
monopolies have been established due to the fact that it is more efficient that a single operator provides 
the service in question to society. The main impact that the presence of natural monopolies has on 
competition law policy is the lack of competition that the operators of these services face in their relevant 
markets. In this regard, the intervention of the government through sector regulation consists in 
mimicking competition in these regulated sectors. In these cases, sector regulation will control prices with 
the purpose of preventing the operators to charge monopolistic prices for the services provided, as a 
consequence, in these cases sector regulation will alleviate some of the market imperfections that are 
proper of these regulated sectors and restore competition to these industries.  
On the other hand, sector regulation can also have negative effects on competition law policy 
when the intervention of the State in these sectors raises competition law issues. The main way in which 
sector regulation can affect the competitive process is through the creation of regulatory barriers to 
competition. Thus, the acts of the government or governmental authorities with regard to sector regulation 
may affect competition by: creating administrative barriers to entry, like, complex and lengthy 
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authorization procedures for the entry of new market participants; requiring compliance with unusual 
norms and standards that impede the entry of new market participants; preventing foreign enterprises 
from competing in national markets; or favoring certain national enterprises, i.e. national champions. 
Ideally, State intervention should not affect competition through regulation that restraints the 
independence of enterprises, or creates discriminatory or favorable conditions for the activity of particular 
enterprises, however, some jurisdictions have established express provisions addressing this problems 
with the purpose of preventing State regulation from affecting competition negatively. 
One of the solutions that some jurisdictions have adopted in order to impede that State regulation 
affects competition negatively is to grant the competition authority the power to review, in advance, 
sector regulations that are related to the specific sectors or industries discussed above. In these cases, the 
competition authority will advise the government on the effects of the sector regulation over competition. 
This function is attributed to competition authorities in virtue of their expertise in competition matters and 
their advocacy role151.    
Furthermore, with regard to the regulatory barriers on competition established by sector 
regulation, some jurisdictions have introduced specific regulations to address this issue. For instance, 
some competition regimes have provisions that prohibit administrative organs to eliminate or restrict 
competition by: setting discriminatory measures; imposing different technical requirements and 
standards; setting up barriers to entry; preventing business operators from participating in tendering and 
bidding activities or impeding business operators from investing or setting up local branches by imposing 
unequal treatment; or to force business operators to engage in monopolistic practices152. 
With regard to the enforcement of the competition law provisions in regulated sectors, there are 
different approaches depending on the jurisdiction. The main differences with regard to this matter are 
associated to the regulatory functions that sector regulators and competition authorities have. As a general 
rule, there are four regulatory tasks: i) competition protection, which is controlling anticompetitive 
practices and mergers; ii) access regulation, which is ensuring non-discriminatory access to necessary 
inputs; iii) economic regulation, which is adopting measures to control monopoly pricing; and iv) 
technical regulation, which is setting and monitoring standards153.  
Depending on the jurisdiction and on the regulatory tasks vested on sector regulators and 
competition authorities, five different approaches can be found in relation to the coordination between 
competition authorities and sector regulators when enforcing their respective frameworks, however, more 
than one of these approaches can be implemented within a single jurisdiction154: i) there are jurisdictions 
                                                          
151 In Ireland, the Competition Authority has among its advocacy functions: to advice the Government and Ministers concerning the 
implications for competition in markets for goods and services of proposals for legislation; to advice public authorities generally on 
issues concerning competition which may arise in the performance of their functions; and to identify and comment on constraints 
imposed by any enactment or administrative practices on the operation of competition in the economy (Section 30 of the 
Competition Act).  
152 In China, Articles 33, 34, 35 and 36 of the Anti-monopoly Law that prohibit any administrative organ or organization empowered 
by a law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs to abuse their administrative power to eliminate or restrict 
competition in the aforementioned ways. 
153 UNCTAD, Best Practices for defining respective competences and settling of cases, which involve joint action of competition 
authorities and regulatory bodies, Geneva. 19 August 2004.    
154 Idem.  
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that combine technical and economic regulation in a sector regulator and leave competition enforcement 
exclusively in the hands of the competition authority155; ii) other jurisdictions combine technical and 
economic regulation in a sector regulator and award the latter some or all competition law enforcement 
functions156; iii) some jurisdictions combine technical and economic regulation in a sector regulator and 
award the latter competition law enforcement functions which are to be performed in coordination with 
the competition authority157; iv) other jurisdictions organize technical regulation as a stand-alone function 
for sector regulator and include economic regulation within the competition authority158; and v) in some 
jurisdictions the competition authority has sole jurisdiction to enforce the competition law provisions159.  
The enforcement of the competition law provisions also vary from country to country depending 
on the ability of the sector regulators to enforce the competition law provisions on their own, or, in 
conjunction with the competition authority. Consequently, in some jurisdictions the sector regulators will 
be required to enforce the competition provisions in conjunction with the competition authority. 
Alternatively, in other jurisdictions the sector regulators will be empowered to apply directly the 
competition law provisions.   
In competition law systems where the sector regulators enforce the competition law provisions in 
conjunction with the relevant competition authority, the former may perform different functions and their 
participation varies from one jurisdiction to another. For instance, in some of these competition regimes, 
the sector regulators may be simply invited by the competition authority to submit their opinions with 
regard to a certain case that is concerned with their respective fields. Furthermore, in other competition 
regimes, such participation may be mandatory, accordingly, whenever a competition authority has begun 
an investigation in a field that is controlled by a determined sector regulator; the competition authority 
may be under the obligation to communicate the initiation of such investigation with the purpose of 
giving the sector regulator a fair chance to state its opinion with regard to the case in question160. 
Conversely, in some competition regimes, the sector regulators are obliged to notify any anticompetitive 
practice they have become aware of in their respective sectors to the competition authority while 
performing the functions that have been vested on them161. Finally, in order to make the collaboration 
between competition authorities and sector regulators smoother, in some competition systems, the 
competition authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the sector regulators that address the 
issues related to the enforcement of competition law in cases concerned with the regulated sector162. 
                                                          
155 Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Tanzania, US, Zimbabwe.  
156 Canada, France, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, US, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
157 Canada, France, Indonesia, Portugal, Korea, South Africa, Namibia, UK. 
158 Australia, Korea. 
159 Australia, New Zealand. 
160 In Algeria, pursuant to Article 39 of the Competition Ordinance (Algerian Competition Act), the Competition Council is obliged 
to provide the respective sectorial regulator with a copy of its file whenever the Council has initiated an investigation that is 
concerned with the field of a determined sectorial regulator. Accordingly, the relevant regulator is allowed to submit its opinion to 
the Council in cases related to its sector.  
161 In Brazil, the Electric Energy National Agency, which is responsible for the prevention of economic concentration and the 
stimulation of competition in the electric energy field, is under the obligation of notifying any anticompetitive practice it has 
become aware of to the Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE). 
162 For instance, in El Salvador, the Competition Superintendence (Salvadoran Competition Authority) has signed cooperation 
agreements with the Telecommunications and Electricity Authority for the enforcement of the competition provisions in those 
sectors. 
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On the other hand, there are jurisdictions where the sector regulators can apply competition law 
directly, in most of these cases; the sector regulations have included competition law rules in their 
provisions163. In these jurisdictions, the role of the sector regulators in the enforcement of competition law 
depends on the attributions granted to them by these specific provisions. In practice, the attributions of 
these sector regulators when enforcing competition law provisions may range from the power to initiate 
investigations for the alleged infringement of competition law, to the issue of orders and the impositions 
of fines to undertakings responsible for the breach of competition law164. Furthermore, besides the powers 
vested on sector regulators to enforce the competition law provisions, some of these sector regulators can 
additionally request the competition authority to submit its opinion whenever they are investigating a 
possible infringement of competition law165.  
Finally, irrespective of the fact that some sector regulators can enforce the competition law 
provisions directly166, in some cases, such application will be made under the surveillance of the 
competition authority167. Even more, in some competition regimes, the decisions issued by sector 
regulators when applying the competition law provisions may be reviewed by the relevant competition 
authority168. 
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
1. Initiation of the Investigation 
 
Generally speaking the public enforcement of competition law can be triggered in two ways. On the one 
hand, the authority in charge of enforcing the competition law provisions will be empowered to initiate an 
investigation at its own discretion, and, on the other hand, the actuation of the relevant authority will be 
instigated by a complaint filed by a natural or legal person, or at the request of the government or some of 
its institutions. Despite the preceding, irrespective of the way in which the public enforcement of the 
competition provisions has been instigated, the actuation of the relevant authority will lead to the opening 
                                                          
163 In Brazil, the National Telecommunication Agency is responsible for the control of anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunication sector according to its Norm No.7/99, approved by Resolution No. 195, 7 December 1999. In China, the State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission has to prevent unfair competition practices and collusion between undertakings in the electricity 
sector pursuant to the Measures for the Supervision of Electric Power Market. In Croatia, the Banking Law and the Decision 
Regulating Market Competition in the Banking Sector, contain provisions regulating competition in the banking sector. 
164 In Austria, the Telekom-Control Kommission is an independent institution in charge of the review of the decisions issued by the 
Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications. Besides its reviewing functions, the Kommission is also 
empowered to determine if an undertaking has significant market power on a market related to the telecommunication or 
broadcasting sectors, and to impose remedies for the abusive use of such market power. In Brazil, the National Telecommunication 
Agency has authority to initiate investigations and administrative proceedings whenever it finds anticompetitive practices in its 
sector. In China, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission may impose corrections order and fine for non-compliance to 
undertakings in the electricity sector, additionally; the Insurance Regulatory Committee may order an insurance undertaking to 
change its insurance terms and premium rates if it finds that the undertaking is involved in monopoly practices.  
165 In Croatia, the National Bank has authority to request the Agency for Protection of Market Competition (Croatian Competition 
Authority) to submit its opinion on a case being investigated by the National Bank. 
166 In Croatia, the National Bank, which is responsible for the control of the banking sector, has plenty powers to apply the 
competition provisions of the Law on Protection of Market Competition (Croatian Competition Act) along with the banking sector 
provisions containing competition rules. 
167 In Brazil, the powers vested on the National Telecommunication Agency have to be exercised under the vigilance of the CADE.  
168 In Belgium, the Competition Council, which is the primary decision-making institution responsible for the enforcement of 
competition law, has authority to hear on appeal the decisions issued by the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and 
Telecommunications and the Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation - both sectorial regulators on the fields of 
telecommunications and post, and gas and electricity (Article 79 of the Competition Act). 
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of an investigation with the purpose of establishing if a certain practice is contrary to the competition law 
provisions. 
(a) Investigations Initiated by the Competition Authority 
 
Provided that one of the main purposes of the competition provisions is to eradicate most of the 
anticompetitive practices, in this sense, the legislators have provided the authorities in charge of the 
application of the competition rules with wide powers to conduct inquires and investigations under their 
own discretion. Accordingly, in most competition regimes the authority in charge of the enforcement of 
the competition provisions is entitled to open an investigation for the alleged violation of competition law 
on its behalf169. In some of these regimes, however, the ability of the competition authority to initiate an 
investigation may be conditioned to certain circumstances170.  
In practice, frequently enough, the relevant authority will become aware of potential 
anticompetitive practices while exercising its functions. As a consequence, the initiation of an 
investigation by the competition authority on its behalf will vary from one jurisdiction to another 
depending on the powers and functions that have been entrusted to such authority. Despite the differences 
that may exist, most authorities will initiate enforcement proceedings while: investigating markets; 
reviewing the behavior of market participants; evaluating information gathered from the press and other 
means of information; or evaluating information obtained from the government or from foreign 
competition authorities, among others.  
In some competition regimes, the competition authority will initiate an investigation after 
receiving information about a certain practice that raises or may raise competition law issues, in these 
cases, the information is provided by the parties involved in such practice. This scenario occurs in 
jurisdictions where leniency programs have been implemented with the purpose of gaining insightful 
information about a cartel from the disaffected members of the latter, in those cases, the information 
contained in the leniency application, if sufficient, will trigger the actuation of the competition authority 
on that specific matter. Similarly, in countries where prior notification or clearance mechanisms have 
been established in order to determine, in advance, if a certain practice, if implemented, will eventually 
affect competition, such approach to the competition authority may instigate an inquire by the 
competition authority. For instance, in countries where merger notifications are mandatory, such 
                                                          
169 For instance, at the EU level, the Commission can act on its own initiative pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Council Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
[2003] OJ L1/1 (Regulation 1/2003). Similarly, in Germany, Section 54(1) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, the cartel 
authority may institute proceedings acting on its own initiative or upon request. In India, according to Section 19(1) of the 
Competition Act, the Competition Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act on its own 
motion. In Lithuania, according to Article 24(2) of the Law on Competition, the Competition Council is empowered to start an 
investigation on its own initiative by taking a justified decision. In Mexico, Article 30 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition 
states that the investigation will be initiated by a party request or by the sole decision of the Federal Competition Commission. In 
Taiwan, according to Article 11 of the Fair Trade Act, the Fair Trade Commission may investigate and handle any violation of the 
competition provisions, upon complaint or ex officio.  
170 In the UK, according to Section 25 of the Competition Act, the OFT will be allowed to open an investigation on its own behalf if 
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an agreement falls within Article 81 and/or the Chapter I prohibition, and/or that 
there has been an infringement of Article 82 and/or the Chapter II prohibition. 
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notifications will inevitably lead to the actuation of the relevant authority171. Likewise, in countries where 
the parties to an agreement that may raise competition issues are allowed to approach the competition 
authority in order to get a prior approval for the agreement in question, such approach may instigate the 
actuation of the competition authority172.  
(b) Investigations Initiated by Complaints or Requests to the Competition Authority 
 
Apart from the investigations initiated by the competition authorities on their own behalf, in most 
regimes, the intervention of the authority can be instigated by certain events outside the sphere of the 
competition authorities. Generally speaking this possibility to initiate an investigation by the competition 
authority can be caused bay: a complaint lodged by a natural or legal person; or a request made by the 
government, certain national public institutions, and even by foreign institutions and competition 
authorities.  
With regard to the initiation of an investigation following the filing of a complaint, given that the 
initiation of the public proceeding in those cases is instigated by a private party, this possibility has been 
named “privately triggered public enforcement” of competition law173. In practice, there are some 
differences among jurisdictions related to the lodge of such a complaint. For instance, with regard to who 
is allowed to file the compliant, depending on which jurisdiction, the standing to file a claim will be 
granted to: any natural or legal person174; interested parties only175; persons whose rights have been 
                                                          
171 In Bulgaria, pursuant to Article 38(1)(6) the Commission will initiate proceedings upon a notification of a concentration between 
undertakings. In Croatia, according to Article 38(2) of the Competition Act, the proceedings related to the assessment of a 
concentration will be initiated by the notification of the parties to the concentration. Alternatively, of the parties fail to notify, the 
Competition Agency, acting on its own initiative, will initiate any relevant proceedings. In Hungary, pursuant to Article 68(1)(a) of 
the Competition Act, an application for the commencement of proceedings may be submitted by persons obliged to obtain 
authorization for a concentration. 
172 At the EU level the prior approval mechanism was first established in the EU Article 2 of the EEC Regulation No 17: First 
Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, which allowed undertakings and association of undertakings to get 
negative clearance from the Commission. However, this mechanism was abolish by Regulation 1/2003 (Recital 3 and Article 34(1)) 
because it prevented the Commission from concentrating on the most serious infringements. Accordingly, most EU competition 
regimes that have similar mechanisms have repealed them and encourage undertakings to self-assess the effects of their conducts on 
competition. Outside the EU there are jurisdictions that have prior approval procedures, for instance: in Korea an interested party 
may request the Korean Fair Trade Commission to review a transaction and to determine in advance if the latter infringes the 
provisions of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act; in Singapore, according to Section 43 of the Competition Act (for 
restrictive agreements) and Section 50 (for abuse of dominance), a party to an agreement may notify the agreement to the 
Commission in order to see of the agreement is likely to infringe competition law; in Switzerland, the parties to an agreement may 
file a notification to the Competition Commission in order to get clearance from the Commission; in the US, parties may apply to 
the Federal Trade Commission for a formal advisory opinion if the case involves substantial or novel issues of fact or law, or if the 
publication of the Commission’s opinion would be of significant interest, in such cases, the Commission will not pursue the 
transaction if the information provided by the parties was correct.      
173 JACOBS, Francis G. & DEISENHOFER, Thomas. (2003), ‘Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC 
Competition Rules: A Community Perspective’. In: Ehlermann and Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: 
Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, p. 197. 
174 In China, the AMEA will investigate suspected monopolistic conduct under its own motion or after a complaint by an entity or 
individual (Article 38 of the Anti-Monopoly Law). At the EU level, pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation 1/2003, a complaint to 
the Commission may be lodged by: natural or legal persons and Member States. As a curiosity, in Canada, an investigation will be 
initiated by the application in proper form by six Canadian residents (Section 9 of the Competition Act).  
In China, according to Article 38 of the Anti-monopoly Law, any entity or person may report a suspicious monopolistic conduct. In 
Egypt, According to Article 19 of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices, any 
person may report to the Authority for the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices any breach of the 
provision of the Law. In Hungary, any person may submit a complaint to the Competition Authority (Article 43/G(1) of the 
Competition Act). In India, according to Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, any person shall submit a complaint to the 
Competition Commission. In Ireland, the Competition Authority may carry out an investigation in response to a complaint made to 
it by any person (Section 30(1)(b) of the Competition Act). In South Africa, according to Section 49B (2)(a)of the competition act, 
any person may submit information concerning an alleged prohibit practice to the competition commission, in any manner or form. 
In Kenya, any person may submit a complaint to the Competition Authority (Section 31(1) of the Competition Act). In Zambia, the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission may initiate an investigation upon a complaint made by any person if it has 
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affected or endangered176; associations177; and consumers178. Moreover, with regard to the form of the 
complaint, the majority of jurisdictions provide for many forms in which the complaint can be presented, 
these include: written complaints, oral complaints, complaints made by telephone, by fax, by e-mail or 
other electronic means, delivered by post, by hand, or submitted online. Other important issue concerned 
with the presentation of a complaint is the content of the latter. Across jurisdictions, the main difference 
regarding this subject is related to the level of proof required from the complainant179. Finally, the 
response of the authority to the complaint also varies from one country to another, hence, in some regimes 
the authority will be under the obligation to respond to any complaint, and if rejected, the competition 
authority will have to notify the complainant this decision and the reasons for rejecting the complaint180. 
In addition, in most jurisdictions, the decision rejecting a complaint by the competition authority will be 
subject to an appeal181. Alternatively, in other competition regimes, the authority will be allowed to reject 
the complaint without providing any reason to the complainant182.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
reasonable grounds to believe that there is, or is likely to be, a contravention of the provisions of the Act (Section 55 of the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act). 
175 In Albania only interested parties may submit a complaint to the Authority requesting the initiation of an investigation (Article 42 
of the Law on Protection of Competition). In Belgium, pursuant to Article 44 of the Competition Act, a claim may be filed by 
persons showing direct and immediate interest. In Lithuania, according to Article 24(1)(1) of the Law on Competition, undertakings 
whose interests have been violated are allowed to request the start of an investigation. In Spain, according to the Annex I of the 
Spanish Competition Act Implementing Regulation (Royal Decree 261/2008 of 22 February 2008), only parities with legitimate 
interest may lodge a complaint. 
176 In Barbados, every person who is aggrieved by an act done by a service providers or business enterprise which is contrary to the 
law, may make a compliant to the Commission (Section 23 of the Fair Trade Commission Act). In Bulgaria, pursuant to the 
provisions of the Law on Protection of Competition, a complaint can be lodged by a person whose rights have been affected or 
endangered by a violation of the Law (Article 38(1)(3)). 
177 In Croatia, according to Article 37 of the Competition Act, the initiative for the initiation of the proceedings may be done by at 
the request of, inter alia, professional association or economic interest group or association of undertakings, or consumer 
associations. In Lithuania, according to Article 24(1)(3) of the Law on Competition, associations representing the interests of 
undertakings may request the initiation of an investigation. 
178 In India, pursuant to Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, a complaint may be filed by consumers or consumers associations. 
In Italy, According to Section 12(1) of the Competition Act, the Competition Authority shall conduct an investigation to ascertain an 
infringement of the provision of the Act by assessing the information submitted by, inter alia, bodies representing consumers. In 
Lithuania, pursuant to Article 24(1)(3), consumers associations may request the opening of an investigation.  
179 In Argentina, the complaint must be made in written and contain: the name and address of the complainant, description of the 
anticompetitive practice, and the facts and legal grounds that support its claim (Section 28 of the Law for Defense of Competition). 
In Brazil, the Economic Law Secretariat of the Ministry of justice Regulation 04/06 provides for the requirements of a complaint: 
identification of the parties; description of the facts to be investigated; relevant documentation; any other relevant elements. The 
complaint can be made anonymously and the forms can be downloaded from the website. In Canada, Section 9(2)(1) of the 
Competition Act established that a complaint should be contain: the names and addresses of the applicants; the nature of the 
contravention, grounds for making an order, the offense; the names of the persons concerned; a concise statement of the evidence 
supporting their opinion. In Egypt, according to Article 32 of the Executive Regulations provides the content of the complaint: 
name, address, and interest; name, address of the subject of the complaint and the nature of its activity; the kind of breach; 
supporting evidence, if available; an indication of the damage incurred by the complainant, if available. In Spain, Annex I of the 
Spanish Competition Act Implementing Regulation (Royal Decree 261/2008 of 22 February 2008) establishes the content of a 
complaint: identification of the parts; object of the complaint; relative information of the market; legitimate interest; proof; measures 
adopted; other information. At the EU level the content of the complaint is regulated by the Commission Notice on the handling of 
complaints by the Commission under Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] C101/5. 
180 In Belgium, pursuant to Article 45(2) of the Competition Act establishes that when the College of Competition Prosecutors 
believes that the complaint is inadmissible or ungrounded it is under the obligation to reject the complaint by a reasoned decision 
which has to be notified by registered letter to the complainant. In Canada, pursuant to Section 22 of the Competition Act, the 
Commissioner may discontinue an investigation by a decision that has to be notified to the applicants. In Hungary, according to 
Article 43/H(10) of the Competition Act, the Authority issue a decision declaring that the conditions to pursue a complaint are not 
fulfilled, and the complainants shall be informed of such a decision. In Kenya, of the Competition Authority decides not pursue a 
complaint; the latter has to inform its decision in writing of the reasons for its decision (Section 31(2) of the Competition Act). In 
Zambia, the commission may decide not to investigate if it determines that a request is frivolous or vexatious, it will inform in 
writing this decision (Section 56(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act).  
181 In Belgium, according to Section 45(3) of the Competition Act, a complainant may appeal to the Competition Council a decision 
from the College of Competition Prosecutors rejecting its complaint. In Canada, a decision not to pursue a complaint by the 
Commissioner can be appealed to the Minister (Section 22(3) of the Competition Act). At the EU level, the decision of the 
Commission rejecting a complaint may be appealed before the General Court.  
182 In Croatia, according to Article 38(7) of the Competition Act, the Agency is not obliged to provide assessment or give 
explanation in respect to every received complaint. Moreover, a decision of the Agency to reject a complaint is not appealable; 
nevertheless, the complainant may take action at the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia (Article 38(6) of the 
Competition Act). In Estonia, according to Section 63(2) of the Competition Act, an application will be rejected without review, if: 
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As stated before, in some competition law regimes, there is also the possibility to instigate the 
actuation of the competition authority through a request made by the government or certain national or 
foreign institutions. Accordingly, in the competition law regimes where this faculty has been granted, a 
variety of institutions will be entitled to request the competition authority to initiate an investigation for 
the alleged infringement of the competition law provisions, thus, in practice, the following institutions 
may be entitled to request the actuation of the competition authority in a determined matter: the central 
government183, local governments184, ministers185, public prosecutors186, courts187, and even foreign 
institutions and competition authorities188.   
2. Case selection and prioritization 
 
As happens with other branches of public law, the resources devoted to antitrust enforcement are limited. 
A common characteristic shared by competition authorities, irrespective of their size and experience, is 
the limitation of resources. The competition authorities inevitably have only limited human and financial 
resources to allocate to the application of the competition law provisions in relation to the many cases of 
potential competition law infringements that could be investigated. Thus, it is essential for competition 
agencies around the world to allocate their resources efficiently, given that these are mainly funded by tax 
payers’ money. From the perspective of efficient antitrust enforcement this means that the authorities 
have to spend their limited resources according to the likelihood of finding a serious violation that can be 
remedied or punished189. In this regard, competition authorities have the prerogative to determine which 
cases to investigate, and which of those to prioritize, accordingly, complainants cannot compel the 
competition authorities to carry out an investigation or to take a decisions as to the existence or non-
existence of an alleged infringement of the antitrust provisions190. Competition authorities should be 
allowed to set their priorities based on the expected direct and indirect effects of their action, allowing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
it is unjustified; an action concerning the same matter has been filed to the European Commission or there is a decision by the latter 
on the same matter; similarly with actions filed to a competition authority of another Member State; if it does not have the contact 
information of the complainant.  
183 In India, the Competition Commission will begin proceedings after receiving a reference by the Central Government or a State 
Government or a statutory authority (Section 19(1)(b) of the Competition Act). 
184 In Russia, the antimonopoly body will initiate a case after receiving information indicating signs of violation of the antimonopoly 
legislation from state bodies or bodies or local self-government (Article 39(2)(1) of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on 
Protection of Competition).   
185 In Belgium, an investigation can be opened at the request of the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Middle Classes or 
other public bodies referred to in Article 44(1)2 of the Competition Act (Article 44 of the Belgium Competition Act). In Canada, 
proceedings may be initiated by a directive from the Ministry of Industry (Section 10(1)(c) of the Competition Act). In Italy, the 
Competition Authority will begin an investigation at the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry, or the Minister of State 
Shareholdings (Section 12(2) of the Competition Act). In Kenya, the Competition Authority can, upon receiving information or a 
complaint from a Government Agency or Ministry, carry out an investigation into any conduct that may constitute an infringement 
of competition law (Section 31(1) of the Competition Act). 
186 In Bulgaria, proceedings may initiated by a request from a prosecutor (Article 38(1)(2) of the Law on Protection of Competition). 
187 In Belgium, an investigation by the college of Competition Prosecutors may be instigated by the request of the Brussels 
Commercial Court (Article 44 §1(5) of the Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition). 
188 At the EU level, in accordance with Article 20 to 22 of Regulation 1/2003, most Member States have provisions allowing the 
European Commission and competition authorities from other Member States to request the nation competition authority to initiate 
an investigation for the infringement of the EU competition law provisions. For instance, Section 14 of the Belgian Competition Act 
determines that the Competition Council may open an investigation upon a referral from the European Commission or other 
competition authorities of the European Union. Similarly, in Bulgaria, according to Article 38(1)(7) of the Competition Act, the 
Commission will initiated proceedings upon a request of a national competition authority of a Member State of the EU or of the 
European Commission. Also, in the UK, according to Section 61 to 65 of the Competition Act the OFT is entitled to conduct an 
investigation on behalf of the European Commission or at the request of a national competition authority of another Member State 
of the EU.  
189 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2008B), ‘The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles’. World 
Competition, Vol. 31, No. 3. 
190 Case T-24/90 Automec v Commission [1992] ECR II-2250, paragraphs 75 and 76.  
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them to concentrate their resources on the potentially most harmful anticompetitive practices and on 
emblematic cases that will set precedent191. Hence, and appropriate case section and prioritization criteria 
can help competition authorities to ensure the best outcome for consumers and businesses and to achieve 
maximum efficiency. In brief, prioritization can be understood as the process of deciding what to do and, 
equally important, what not to do192.  
 From the perspective of the optimal enforcement of the law, the discretionary non-enforcement 
of the law is related to the public application of the law by a single public enforcer (public monopoly of 
enforcement). In the case of competition law, the enforcement authority may nullify particular laws, or 
particular applications of law, by declining to prosecute offenders. The fact that the antitrust provisions 
normally contain broad and general rules enables these to be overinclusive, this means, that the legal 
provisions of competition law may sometimes prohibit conduct that the legislators did not want to 
prohibit. In this regard, if a strict application of the legal mandates of an overinclusive law would be 
mandatory, such application would not be socially desirable given that, in practice, the enforcers could 
convict an innocent in order to reduce the probability of acquitting a guilty. Thus, the costs associated 
with convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty can be reduced by allowing the enforcement 
authorities to decide which cases are worthy of being prosecuted193.  
There are basically two enforcement models in relation to how competition law investigations 
are initiated. On the one hand, there is the complaint/request-driven model, by the virtue of which 
competition authorities open an investigation based on the complaints filed to the authority and the 
requests made by the government. On the other hand, the competition authorities can also initiate 
investigations on their own behalf by conducting market studies and performing periodic collection and 
assessment of information.  
With regard to the complaints filed by third parties, there are different approaches in relation to 
the ability of competition authorities to select which cases will be further investigated. For instance, in 
some competition law systems, the competition authority has wide discretion to determine which 
complaints are worthy of being investigated194. On the other hand, in other jurisdictions, the competition 
authority is under the obligation to conduct at least a preliminary investigation into all complaints 
received195.  
In relation to the studies and inquiries conducted by the competition authorities on their own 
behalf, the authorities exercise their discretion to allocate resources to the investigation and resolution of 
cases that provide the greatest overall benefit for consumers and businesses. Normally, in determining 
which cases to investigate and prioritize, the competition authorities take into consideration different 
                                                          
191 LOWE, Philip  (2008), ‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century: The experience of the European 
Commission and DG Competition’. Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, p. 2. 
192 ICN, Report on the Agency Effectiveness Project, Zurich, 2009. 
193 LANDES, William M. & POSNER, Richard A. (1975), ‘The Private Enforcement of the Law’. 4 The Journal of Legal Studies, 1, 
p. 38.  
194 In Denmark, according to Section 14(1) of the Competition Act, the Competition Council may decide whether there are sufficient 
grounds to open an investigation or to adopt a decision in a case, including the determination of whether a case should be suspended 
or discontinued. 
195 In South Africa, in terms of Section 49B(3) of the Competition Act, the Competition Commission has the duty to initiate an 
investigation upon receiving a complaint or information from a third party about a prohibited practice.  
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factors, including whether the conduct is of significant public interest or concern, results in significant 
consumer detriment, is a blatant disregard for the law, involves national or international issues and 
involves a significant new or emerging market. Additionally, competition authorities may consider 
whether action is likely to have a worthwhile educative or deterrent effect and whether there is a history 
of previous infringements. Finally, competition authorities may also decide to pursue matters that test or 
clarify the competition law provisions.  
The success of a competition authority depends heavily upon its ability to select priorities and 
design strategy for applying its authority196. Thus, in order to clarify the priorities of competition 
authorities in the enforcement of the antitrust provisions, some regimes have introduced different 
instruments to shed light on the enforcement policies of their competition agencies. Depending on the 
competition regime in question, the enforcement priorities may be set by law, or by formal or informal 
processes.  
As stated before, in some competition regimes, the enforcement priorities of the competition 
authority are set by the law197. Moreover, in other jurisdictions, the enforcement priorities are formally set 
through strategic planning, such as the issue of prioritization principles or guidelines198. Alternatively, in 
some regimes, the enforcement priorities are informally agreed and then communicated within the 
competition authority199. Finally, enforcement priorities are usually set by the leadership of the 
competition agency. This process may include, or not, the participation of the staff, and normally is not 
defined by one person.  
In practice, the exercise of competition authorities to set enforcement priorities with regard to 
which cases should be investigated and which cases should be discarded can produce both benefits and 
drawbacks for the overall enforcement of competition law.  
 In favor of prioritization, due to the fact that the competition law provisions are broad enough to 
include most practices that may be anticompetitive, the discretion of competition authorities to decide 
which cases they pursue is fundamental to avoid enforcing the antitrust prohibitions in cases that could be 
brought under the prohibitions but do not fit under the rationale of the prohibitions. Moreover, 
prioritization of antitrust enforcement allows competition authorities not to investigate cases where the 
costs of the investigation exceed the benefits of doing so. As mentioned above, another reason in favor of 
antitrust enforcement prioritization is that competition authorities have limited resources to spend. 
Additionally, given that most complaints are brought by competitors affected by exclusionary practices, if 
competition authorities would be required to pursue all the filed complaints, this would result in 
competition authorities only investigating this type of practices, given that all the resources would be 
spent on pursuing these complaints, thus, leaving insufficient resources to pursue other types of 
infringements. Another justification for enforcement prioritization is that it may be possible to achieve the 
                                                          
196 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project, Kyoto, Japan, 2008.  
197 For example in Turkey.  
198 In Ireland, see the Irish Competition Authority Project Selection and Prioritization Principles, 2011 
(http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/Prioritisation%20booklet.pdf); and in the UK, see the OFT Competition 
Prioritisation Framework, 2006 (http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/press_release_attachments/compcriteria.pdf). 
199 Such is the case of Spain.  
99 
 
same level of deterrence that the one obtained by pursuing all potential infringements at a lower cost by 
pursuing fewer infringements but punishing these more severely. Finally, prioritization may also be 
desirable in cases where other enforcers are better placed to handle the case.  
 On the other hand, however, there are also risks in relation to the enforcement prioritization of 
the competition law provisions. For example, there is the risk that competition authorities abuse their 
discretion and pursue cases on the basis of criteria unrelated to either optimal antitrust enforcement or 
efficient resource allocation. Furthermore, prioritization may cause competition authorities to focus on 
big cases in big markets, thus, leaving behind smaller cases that may be equally or more important. 
Announced prioritization on specific sectors or anticompetitive practices may allow the infringers in the 
sectors concerned to prepare themselves and conceal the evidence related to the infringement. 
Additionally, market participants in other sectors may take advantage of the fact that the authority is 
focused on other sectors. Finally, the prioritization process itself may consume substantial resources, and 
as a consequence, diminish the enforcement capacity of competition authorities200.    
3. Investigation Process 
 
Irrespective of the way in which the actuation of the competition authority has been initiated, once the 
latter has become aware of a potential infringement of competition law, it will usually open an 
investigation with the purpose of determining if a certain practice is contrary to the competition 
provisions. In most jurisdictions, the investigation process has been divided in two phases, hence, in the 
first one; the competition authority will conduct a preliminary investigation in order to determine if 
according to the information collected so far there are good reasons to believe that the competition 
provisions have been infringed. In the second phase, the competition authority will open an in-depth 
investigation, which unlike the preceding; it is normally a formal proceeding. The opening of the in-depth 
investigation is usually done through the issuing of a resolution which will be notified to the concerned 
undertakings201, or by publishing the resolution in an official way202. The purpose of notifying the 
decision of the competition authority to open a formal investigation is to allow the concerned parties the 
opportunity to intervene in the proceedings and to try to convince the competition authority that the 
challenged practices are not contrary to competition law203. 
One fundamental issue about the opening of an investigation is the ability of competition 
authorities to decline the prosecution of a determined potential infringement. This ability is concerned 
with the economization of the resources of the competition authorities. Given that all competition 
authorities have limited resources to prosecute every potential infringement of the competition law 
                                                          
200 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2011), ‘Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in particular EU antitrust 
enforcement’, World Competition, Volume 34, No. 3. 
201 In Italy, according to Section 14 of the Competition Act, the Authority has to notify the undertakings concerned of the opening of 
an investigation. In Zambia, the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission will notify the concerned undertaking the 
opening of an investigation (Section 55(3) of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act).  
202 In Mexico, according to Article 30 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the Executive Secretary of the Federal 
Competition Commission will open the investigation by issuing a resolution (Acuerdo de Inicio) which will be published in the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación.   
203 In Argentina, the competition authority grants the concerned parties a 10-day-period to submit their explanations regarding the 
conduct in question. 
100 
 
provisions, they are obliged to select the cases to be investigated. In this line, some competition 
authorities have issued prioritization guidelines which explain the principles that the competition 
authorities take into account when selecting a case for investigation204. 
4. Powers of Investigation 
 
The competition law provisions are not self-enforced; accordingly, competition agencies must be given 
more than just a mandate to enforce the law efficiently205. Thus, the enforcement authorities normally 
require specific powers and attributions to apply the antitrust mandates with vigor and efficiency. The 
public enforcement of the competition provisions is a hard endeavor most of the times. The secretive 
nature and harmful characteristics of most anticompetitive practices increase the difficulties that 
competition authorities face when pursuing possible breaches of competition law. The fact that the 
individuals involved in anticompetitive practices resort to highly sophisticated measures to ensure that no 
evidence is left behind to be discovered by the competition authorities makes the enforcement of the 
competition rules more challenging. Thus, in practice, the participants in anticompetitive conducts take 
elaborate measures to try to conceal their unlawful activities, such as: to prepare false bids with the 
purpose of leaving an impression of genuine competition; to use codes for company names; to use codes 
to cover the identity of individuals; or to use secured emails and SMS messages and encrypt telephone 
communications, among others206. As a way to ease the effective enforcement of the antitrust rules, most 
legislators have vested competition authorities with specific powers of investigation in order to assist 
them to effectively detect and punish as many anticompetitive practices as possible, given that insufficient 
investigative powers for the enforcement authorities may frustrate enforcement207.  
Depending on the legal system and on the sanctions imposed for the violation of the competition 
law provisions, these investigation powers may be more or less intrusive, for instance, in jurisdictions 
where criminal provisions and sanctions have been established for the breach of the competition rules, the 
legislators have granted the competition authorities more intrusive powers of investigation, e.g. intrusive 
surveillance or property interference. Despite the nature of the powers of investigation, the main purpose 
of these is to allow the competition authorities to retrieve all necessary information to be able to 
determine that a competition law infringement has occurred and to impose a sanction for such 
infringement in order to effectively comply with the enforcement objectives of competition law. In 
practice, however, the battle between perpetrators and enforcers is continuous, provided that the more 
intrusive the powers of investigation become, the perpetrators turn to more extreme measures to try to 
conceal any incriminating information that can be used by the competition authority to prosecute them for 
the infringement of the antitrust provisions.  
 From a global perspective, the powers conferred to competition authorities vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction; however, there are vast similarities between most competition systems. 
Nonetheless, despite the differences and similarities, all competition regimes should try to provide 
                                                          
204 In the UK, see the OFT Prioritisation Principles, 2008. 
205 STIGLER (1970), p. 531. 
206 See, the Commission Decision of 24 January 2007 (Case COMP/F/38.899), at paras 170 – 176.  
207 CHADWELL, John T. (1955), ‘Antitrust Administration and Enforcement’. 53 Michigan Law Review, p. 1133.  
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competition agencies with effective investigative techniques, provided that these are essential for the 
success of any competition law procedure208. Accordingly, in practice, when conducting investigations 
related to the infringement of competition law, most competition regimes allow competition authorities 
to: request relevant information; carry out interviews with individuals to receive testimony; enter and 
search certain premises; among others. 
4.1. Power to Request Information 
 
The most common power of investigation that has been vested on competition authorities around the 
world is the ability to request certain information which may contain relevant documentation or facts 
concerned with an investigation for the alleged infringement of the competition provisions. The main 
objective of this power of investigation is to acquire any kind of information which has a bearing on the 
investigation in course. Depending on the jurisdiction, the exercise of this power of investigation varies 
with regard to the form on which the competition authorities require the information in question; the 
individuals subject to being requested; and the type of information that can be required.  
 As to the form of the request for information, most jurisdictions have established the obligation 
of the competition authorities to make such a request in writing209. However, depending on the 
jurisdiction, there are other forms on which the competition authorities may require certain information in 
the course of an investigation. For instance, in some competition regimes, the competition authorities will 
be empowered to require the desired information through a simple request210, or alternatively, through a 
formal decision issued by the relevant competition authority211. Similarly in other regimes, the 
competition authorities will be entitled to make voluntary requests for information, in such cases the 
requested parties are not obliged to provide the requested information212, however, in the same 
jurisdictions, when the competition authorities deem that a voluntary request is not adequate for the case, 
the latter will be empowered to compel the production of the requested information and documents 
through other means213.    
With regard to the spectrum of individuals that can be requested by the competition authorities, 
this power of investigation can be exercised against a variety of individuals and even institutions. For 
                                                          
208
 LOWE (2008), p. 8.  
209 In Sri Lanka, pursuant to Section 57(1) of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act, a requirement for documentation made in the 
course of an investigation shall be made by notice in writing.   
210 In the EU, according to Article 18(2) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission is entitled to send a simple request for information 
to an undertaking or association of undertakings.   
211 In the EU, the Commission, pursuant to Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003, is empowered to require undertakings and 
associations of undertakings to supply information by a decision issued for this cause. The difference between a simple request and 
a request by decision is that failure to comply by a request by decision or supplying incorrect, incomplete or misleading information 
can subject the company concerned to a fine, plus the imposition of a periodic penalty on the company in order to compel the 
company to comply with the request, while the failure to comply with a simple request is sanctioned just with the imposition of a 
fine (Article 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003).   
212 In the US, both the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice are entitled to make 
voluntary requests for information and documents to the potential subjects of an investigation, other companies in the industry, 
customers, trade associations, and other sources. The advantage of this kind of request is the informality of such petition, the 
avoidance of the adversarial tone of the use of compulsory process, and the speedy collection of information.   
213 In the US, both the FTC and the Antitrust Division are empowered, in civil procedures, to require certain information or 
documentation through the issue of Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs). In case of failure to comply with the request, the 
competition authority will be allowed to obtain a court order to compel the recipient to comply (Section 5 of the Antitrust Civil 
Process Act).   
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instance, in most countries where this possibility is available, such a request can be made to any natural or 
legal person214. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, the scope of this attribution has been narrowed and 
may include: only natural or legal persons concerned with the investigation, i.e. complainants and 
concerned undertakings215; third parties216; representatives and employees217; consumers associations218; 
undertakings and associations of undertakings219; undertakings with market power220; state agencies221; 
local governments222; non-governmental organizations223; and public institutions224, such as: national 
statistical institute225.  
In relation to the kind of information which may be required, again, some regimes have broad 
provisions allowing the authority to obtain all relevant information to the investigation226. Alternatively, 
some jurisdictions have empowered the relevant authority to require only specific documents or 
information227. Despite the aforementioned, according to the competition provisions of some 
jurisdictions, the competition authorities may be allowed to request, inter alia: any information228 
(digital229, material230, oral231, written232, economic233, business234); data235; personal data236; electronic 
                                                          
214 In Argentina, see Article 24(a) of the Law for Defense of Competition. In Australia, see Section 155 of the Competition and 
Consumer Act. In Bulgaria, see Article 46 of the Law on Protection of Competition. In Canada, see Section 11(1)(b) of the 
Competition Act. In Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. In Denmark, see Section 17 of the Competition Act. In 
Estonia, see Section 57(1) of the Competition Act. In India, see Section 36(4) of the Competition Act. In Latvia, see Section 9(5)(1) 
of the Competition Law. In Russia, see Article 25 of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition. In Singapore, see Section 63(1) 
of the Competition Act. In the UK, see Section 26 of the Competition Act, and Section 193 of the Enterprise Act. 
215 In Albania, see Article 33 of the Competition Act. In Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. In Kenya, see Section 
31(3)(b) of the Competition Act. In Latvia, see Section 9(5)(2) of the Competition Law. In Mexico, see Article 31 of the Federal 
Law on Economic Competition. In Switzerland, see Article 40 of the Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition Act. In Taiwan, 
see Article 27 of the Competition Act. 
216 In Albania, see Article 33 of the Competition Act.  In Switzerland, see Article 42 of the Cartels and Other Restraints of 
Competition Act. 
217 In Korea, see Article 50(1)(3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
218 In Argentina, see Article 24(a) of the Law for Defense of Competition. In Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. 
219 In Belgium, see Article 44 §2 of the Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition. In Bulgaria, see Article 46 of the 
Law on Protection of Competition. In Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. In the EU, see Article 18 of Regulation 
1/2003. In Finland, see Section 33(1) of the Competition Act. In Germany, see Section 59(1)(1) of the Act Against Restraints of 
Competition. In Korea, see Article 50(1)(3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. In Taiwan, see Article 27 of the 
Competition Act. 
220 In Switzerland, see Article 40 of the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition. 
221 In Bulgaria, see Article 46 of the Law on Protection of Competition. In Estonia, see Section 57(1) of the Competition Act. In 
Russia, see Article 25 of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition. In Taiwan, see Article 27 of the Competition Act. 
222 In Argentina, see Article 24(a) of the Law for Defense of Competition. In Bulgaria, see Article 46 of the Law on Protection of 
Competition. In Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. In Estonia, see Section 57(1) of the Competition Act. In 
Russia, see Article 25 of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition.  
223 In Bulgaria, see Article 46 of the Law on Protection of Competition. 
224 In Argentina, see Article 24(a) of the Law for Defense of Competition. In Albania, see Article 34 of the Competition Act. In 
Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. 
225 In Bulgaria, see Article 46 of the Law on Protection of Competition. 
226 In Bulgaria, Article 45(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition allows the Competition Commission to request all relevant 
information. In Croatia, see Article 41(1)(1) of the Competition Act. In Denmark, according to Section 17 of the Competition Act, 
the Competition Council may require all relevant information. In Egypt, according to Article 11(3) of the Law on the Protection of 
Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices, the Authority for the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices is allowed to require all data, papers, or documents necessary for the exercise of its competences. In Estonia, 
see Section 57(1) of the Competition Act. In Finland, see Section 33(1) of the Competition Act. In Germany, pursuant to Section 
57(1) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, the cartel authority may collect any evidence required. In Hungary, see Article 
65 of the Competition Act. In India, see Section 36(4) of the Competition Act. In Italy, see Section 14(2) of the Competition and 
Fair Trading Act. In Kenya, see Section 31(3)(a) of the Competition Act. 
227 In Singapore, see Section 63(1) of the Competition Act. in the UK see Section 26 of the Competition Act. 
228 In Australia, see Section 155 of the Competition and Consumer Act. 
229 In Bulgaria, see Article 45(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition. In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on 
Protection of Competition.  
230 In Bulgaria, see Article 45(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition. 
231 In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition.  
232 In Bulgaria, see Article 45(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition. In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on 
Protection of Competition.  
233 In Germany, see Section 59(1)(1) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. In Macedonia, see Article 40(1) of the Law on 
the Protection of Competition. 
234 In Macedonia, see Article 40(1) of the Law on the Protection of Competition. 
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data237; accounting acts238; records239; certified copies of records240; documents241; evidence242; 
contracts243; financial statements244; books245; papers246; articles247; items248; and business 
correspondence249.   
Moreover, in some competition regimes, whenever a person is required by the competition 
authority to produce a determined document which is not under his custody, the latter will be under the 
obligation to state to the best of his knowledge and belief where the document may be found, also, to 
identify to the best of his knowledge and belief the last person who had custody of the document and to 
state where that person may be found250. 
There are some restrictions, however, with regard to the information provided at the request of 
the competition authorities. These are mainly concerned with the treatment of confidential information, 
such as: privileged information and trade secrets. In the case of privileged information, this refers to the 
communications between legal counselors and its clients which are protected by the professional secrecy 
privilege; accordingly, such information will be protected from disclosure when it contains confidential 
information supplied by a client to its legal counselor or legal advice supplied by the latter to its clients. 
As to the trade secrets, these constitute information which is not generally known or reasonably 
ascertainable, by the virtue of which an undertaking may obtain an economic advantage over its 
competitors, similarly to privileged information, the disclosure of trade secrets is protected to certain 
extents. 
In practice, most competition regimes have provisions that allow competition authorities to 
require confidential information from the concerned parties in an investigation for the infringement of 
competition law. Despite the aforementioned, such information has a special treatment regarding to its 
production and its handling. As a general rule, most jurisdictions have provisions that protect confidential 
or sensitive information from being disclosed. For instance, when the competition authority has acquired 
confidential or sensitive information through leniency applications, merger notifications, prior 
notifications of potentially anticompetitive agreements, or complaints, it is reluctant to share such 
information with other interested parties in the procedure, provided that the sharing of confidential or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
235 In Egypt, see Article 11(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices. 
236 In Hungary, see Article 65(2) of the Competition Act. 
237 In Bulgaria, see Article 45(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition. In Denmark, see Section 17 of the Competition Act. In 
Hungary, see Article 65 of the Competition Act. In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition.  
238 In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition.  
239 In Canada, see Section 11(1)(b) of the Competition Law. 
240 In Canada, see Section 11(1)(b) of the Competition Law. 
241 In Argentina, see Article 24(a) of the Law for Defense of Competition. In Australia, see Section 155 of the Competition and 
Consumer Act. In Egypt, see Article 11(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices. 
In Germany, see Section 59(1)(1) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. In India, see Section 36(4) of the Competition Act. 
In Kenya, see Section 31(3)(b) of the Competition Act. In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of 
Competition.  
242 In Australia, see Section 155 of the Competition and Consumer Act. 
243 In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition.  
244 In Denmark, see Section 17 of the Competition Act. 
245 In Denmark, see Section 17 of the Competition Act. In India, see Section 36(4) of the Competition Act. 
246 In Egypt, see Article 11(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices. 
247 In Kenya, see Section 31(3)(b) of the Competition Act. 
248 In Korea, see Article 50(1)(3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade. 
249 In Russia, see Article 25(1) of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition.  
250 In Malaysia, see Section 18(2) of the Competition Act.  
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sensitive information may harm the interests of the person who provided the information to the 
competition authority.  
With regard to the production of privileged information and trade secrets at the request of the 
relevant competition authority while carrying out an investigation concerned with the possible 
infringement of the competition law provisions, the production and handling of that information can be 
different in some competition law regimes.  
In the case of privileged information, the main purpose of this legal principle is the protection of 
the confidentiality of the communications between a legal counselor and its client in order to provide the 
latter a fair access to the judicial system and to protect him from the disclosure of any sensitive 
information that may harm his interests. Accordingly, as a general rule, most competition authorities are 
not empowered to request privileged information from the concerned parties in an investigation251. 
Nevertheless, there are some procedures that have to be fulfilled in order to declare that certain 
information shall be protected by the professional secrecy privilege. For instance, in some competition 
regimes, the requested party has to make an application before the relevant court with the purpose of 
obtaining a declaration establishing that such information contains legal advice between the requested 
party and its legal counselor, and consequently, should not be acquired by the competition authority252. 
Finally, there are other types of privileged information, like the confidential communications between a 
bank and its clients, in some countries, such communications are also exempted from disclosure at the 
request of the competition authority253. 
With regard to trade secrets, the production and treatment of such information vary from one 
jurisdiction to another. In principle, the disclosure of trade secrets is protected in order to preserve the 
interests of the requested party. However, unlike with privileged information, in some jurisdictions, the 
competition authority may be empowered to request information that contains trade secrets when 
conducting an investigation for the infringement of competition law254. Alternatively, in other competition 
regimes, the production of such information is protected, and consequently, the requested party cannot be 
                                                          
251 In Canada, pursuant to Section 19(7) of the Competition Act, a person cannot examine, copy, or seize any record without 
affording the concerned person a reasonable opportunity to file a claim of solicitor-client privilege. In Croatia, according to Article 
45 of the Competition Act, any letters, notices and other communications between the undertaking and its lawyers shall be excluded 
from surprise inspections to the extent they constitute confidential or privileged information. In Finland, according to Section 38(3) 
of the Competition Act, an undertaking is not obliged to deliver to the Finnish Competition Authority documents which contain 
confidential correspondence between an outside legal consultant and the client. In Singapore, pursuant to Section 66(3) of the 
Competition Act, a professional legal adviser is not under the obligation of disclosing privileged communications between him and 
his clients. In Malaysia, according to Section 22 of the Competition Act, no person shall be required to produce or disclose any 
communication between a professional legal adviser and his client. In Mauritius, Section 54 of the Competition Act establishes that 
no person shall be required to disclose or produce information or a document that the person would in an action in a court be entitled 
to refuse to disclose or produce on the grounds of legal professional privilege. In the UK, according to Section 196 of the Enterprise 
Act, a person may not be required to disclose any information or produce any document which he would be entitled to refuse to 
disclose or produce on grounds of legal professional privilege, similarly, Section 30 of the Competition Act establishes that a person 
cannot be required to produce or disclose a privileged communication.   
252 In Canada, whenever a person is requested to submit certain information that may contain confidential communications between 
a legal counselor and its client, the requested person shall place such information in a sealed package referred to an officer of a 
superior or county court, or of the Federal Court; a sheriff; or some person agreed between the Commissioner and the person who 
makes the claim of privilege. Once the documents have been received by the competent judge, the latter shall determine if the 
information contains confidential communications between the requested person and its legal counselor or not (Section 19 of the 
Canadian Competition Act).  
253 In the UK, according to Section 196 of the Enterprise Act, a person cannot be required to disclose any information or produce 
any document in respect of which he owes an obligation of confidence by virtue of carrying on any banking business. 
254 In Russia, according to Article 25 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Protection of Competition, a person who has 
been requested to submit information relevant to subject matter of an investigation carried out by the antimonopoly body is required 
to provide any legally protected secrets. 
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obliged to submit it under the petition of the competition authority255. Just like with privileged 
information, there are some procedures concerned with the declaration of the confidentiality of 
documents that contain trade secrets. For instance, in some jurisdictions, whenever a person is required by 
the competition authority to submit information that according to him contains trade secrets, the latter has 
to file an application to obtain a declaration of the confidentiality of such information provided that it 
contains sensitive information that may harm his competitiveness. Depending on which jurisdiction, the 
application for the declaration of confidentiality will have to be filed to the competition authority256, or 
alternatively, before the competent court257. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, besides the application for 
the declaration of confidentiality, the requested parties may be under the obligation of submitting to the 
competition authority a copy of the documents which does not contain trade secrets, the failure to provide 
this copy will lead to the assumption that the document submitted does not contain any trade secrets258. 
Finally, with regard to the treatment of confidential information that contains trade secrets; most 
competition regimes have provisions that establish the obligation of competition authorities and their 
officials to keep and not to disclose any confidential information irrespective of the way in which it has 
been acquired by the competition authority259, nevertheless, in some competition regimes, the competition 
authority may be empowered to disclose confidential information under some circumstances260. 
Another issue with the power of the competition authority to require information while 
conducting an investigation for the infringement of competition law is the one related to the production of 
self-incriminatory information. Self-incrimination is accusing oneself of an unlawful conduct for which a 
person can then be prosecuted; such act can be done by producing information of a self-incriminatory 
nature or by making statements or answering questions while testifying. In practice, most competition 
regimes that have provisions on this matter have restricted its scope of application to testimonies261. 
Accordingly, the privilege against self-incrimination will protect the requested party from making 
statements or answering questions that might incriminate him. Oppositely, such privilege will not excuse 
                                                          
255 In Hungary, according to Article 47(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition, when the Competition Commission has 
requested information from a person, this may not refer to any production, trade or other secret protected by law. 
256 In Mexico, pursuant to Article 31 bis of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, whenever a person is required to submit to 
the Federal Competition Commission documents that contain confidential information, such as trade secrets, the requested person 
shall file a petition for the declaration of confidentiality to the Commission, the latter will examine the information submitted and 
will determine if it contains sensitive information that if disclosed may harm the competitiveness of the requested party. 
257 In South Africa, according to Section 44 of the Competition Act, a person requested to submit to the Competition Commission or 
the Competition Tribunal may identify certain information as confidential (pursuant to Section 1(1)(v) of the Act, confidential 
information means trade, business or industrial information that belongs to a firm, has a particular economic value, and is not 
generally available to or know by others). The Competition Commission is bound by such a claim of confidentiality; however, the 
Commission may challenge the claim before the Competition Tribunal. 
258 In Croatia, according to Article 44 of the Competition Act, when the Competition Agency has requested information which 
contains business secrets, the requested person can state in the writing presented with the documentation that certain information 
should be considered confidential and provide the necessary argumentation. Moreover, the requested person is under the obligation 
to provide for a copy of the documentation submitted to the Agency that does not contain business secrets, the failure to do so will 
lead to the assumption that the documents do not contain confidential information. In Kosovo, according to Article 38(6) if a party 
required to provide information which contains trade secrets to the Competition Authority does not provide the Authority a copy 
which does not contain trade secrets, it will be assumed that the information submitted does not contain trade secrets.  
259 In China, see Article 41 of the Anti-monopoly Law. In Croatia, see Article 53 of the Competition Act. In Kenya, see Section 20 
of the Competition Act. In Mexico, see Article 31 bis of the Federal Law on Economic Competition.   
260 In Russia, pursuant to Article 25 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Protection of Competition, the antimonopoly 
body shall not disclose legally protected secrets except in cases established in the Federal Laws. 
261 At the EU level, the ECJ has determined the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination in EU competition law proceedings 
in the Orkem v. Commission case. In this case, the ECJ determined that the privilege against self-incrimination shall be restricted to 
the possibility of a person to refuse to answer questions that might constitute an admission of an infringement of the EU competition 
provisions. In that sense, a person shall not be allowed to refuse to produce documents that may evidence the existence of an 
infringement on the grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination (Case 374/87 Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 3283). 
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a requested party from producing any information that might have an incriminating nature when 
requested by the competition authority262.    
4.2. Power to Take Statements or Testimonies 
 
Another power of investigation vested on most competition authorities is the faculty to summon certain 
individuals to submit a declaration over certain facts or evidence concerned with an investigation for the 
infringement of the competition provisions. The main objective of this power of investigation is to 
acquire any relevant information concerned with the investigation in course, by requiring certain persons 
related to the alleged infringement of the competition provisions to appear before the competition 
authority and give a declaration concerning any fact, document or information which is related to the 
subject matter of the investigation.  
In practice, there are certain differences between jurisdictions which are concerned with the 
exercise of this power of investigation, these are mainly related to: the variety of individuals who may be 
required to appear before the competition authorities; the subject matter of the declaration; and the form 
in which the declarations will be taken.  
With regard to the spectrum of individuals who can be required to appear before the competition 
authorities in the course of an investigation to testify, this varies from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, in 
the competition regimes with the broadest provisions the competition authority will be entitled to call any 
person who it believes has relevant information concerned with the investigation263. Alternatively, in 
other competition regimes, this possibility has been narrowed, accordingly, in most of these regimes, the 
competition authorities will be allowed to summon: the persons related to the investigation264; the 
complainants and the allegedly responsible for the antitrust infringement265; the managers or any other 
members of the investigated undertakings266; interested third parties267; experts268; witnesses269; the 
officials of public agencies270; or the officials of local governments271.  
The subject matter of the testimonies requested by the competition authority while conducting an 
investigation for the infringement of the competition provisions may differ depending on the jurisdiction 
                                                          
262 In the Fiji Islands, Section 119 of the Commerce Commission Decree establishes that a person shall not be entitled to refuse or 
fail to furnish information or records or a copy thereof on the ground only that the information, or records or copy thereof would 
tend to incriminate him. In Hungary, pursuant to Article 65 of the Competition Act, a party shall not be obliged to make statements 
admitting as infringement of the Act; however, he may not refuse to supply incriminating evidence. In Singapore, according to 
Section 66(1) of the Competition Act, a person is not excused from providing any information required by the Competition 
Commission on the ground that the disclosure of such information might tend to incriminate him. 
263 In Pakistan, according to Section 33 the Commission is allowed to summon and enforcing the attendance of any witness. In 
South Africa, the Commissioner may summon any person believed to be able to furnish any information on the subject of the 
investigation (Section 49A(1) of the Competition Act). In the US, the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Antitrust  Division are entitled to issue a Civil Investigative Demand requiring any person who may have any information 
related to a civil antitrust investigation, to give oral testimony concerning documentary materials or information (Antitrust Civil 
Process Act 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a)). 
264 In El Salvador, see Article 44 of the Competition Law.  
265 In Panama, see Article 99 of Law N° 45 on the Protection of Consumers and Defense of Competition. 
266 In Chile, see Article 39 of the Antitrust Act. 
267 In Korea, see Article 50 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.  
268 Idem 
269 In Jamaica, see Section 52 of the Competition Act. In Sri Lanka, see Section 35(2) of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act.  
270 In Moldova, see Article 14 of the Law on the Protection of Competition.  
271 In Estonia, see Section 58 of the Competition Act.  
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in question. In Practice, however, most competition regimes have established broad provisions in order to 
allow the competition authorities to interrogate the required individuals about any fact, document, 
information or agreement that is somehow related to the investigation in course272.   
In addition, another feature related this power of investigation that varies from one country to 
another is the one related to the form of the declarations submitted to the competition authorities while 
investigating an alleged infringement of the competition provisions. Traditionally, in most competition 
regimes, the declarations submitted to the competition authorities are made through oral testimonies 
concerned with certain facts, documents or information which are relevant for the investigation in course. 
Alternatively, in other jurisdictions, the declaration presented by the requested parties to the competition 
authorities in the course of an investigation will be either made by answering written interrogatories, or 
by giving oral testimonies273. Finally, in most competition regimes where this power of investigation is 
available, the testimonies submitted by the requested parties will be given under oath274.   
Finally, regarding the faculty of competition authorities to obtain a declaration from the 
individuals related to the alleged infringement of the competition provisions, some competition regimes 
have established a restriction to this investigative power. As stated before, in some jurisdictions the power 
to require relevant information in an investigation by the competition authority does not entail the 
production of self-incriminatory evidence. In practice, in the majority of jurisdictions where this 
restriction has been established, such limitation is only applicable to oral testimonies. Thus, in most of 
these jurisdictions whenever a party is requested to provide the competition authority with certain 
documents, the former will not be excused from doing so on the grounds that the requested documents 
may tend to incriminate him. Conversely, whenever a requested party is required to give oral testimony 
on certain facts or documents related to the investigation, the testifying party will be allowed to refuse to 
make any statement that will incriminate him275. Nevertheless, in some competition regimes whenever a 
party is requested to testify or produce certain evidence, the latter cannot refuse to answer any question or 
provide any document by arguing that such a testimony or evidence may have an incriminatory nature, 
nonetheless, in such jurisdictions, the testimony given by an individual at the request of the competition 
authority cannot be used against that individual in any criminal proceedings instituted against him276. 
                                                          
272 For instance, in Mauritius according to Section 52 of the Competition Act, the Executive Director may order any person to 
attend, at a specified time and place, for the purpose of being examined orally in relation to any matter. 
273 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Article 35 of the Competition Act, the parties to the proceedings and other legal and 
natural persons are obliged upon the request of the Council of Competition or official person: to provide all necessary information in 
the form of written submissions or oral statements. In Chile, the Fiscalía Nacional Económica may call to declare or to submit 
written declaration any representative, manager, and staff member of any natural or legal person who may have relevant information 
for the investigation (Article 39(j) of the Antitrust Act). In the US, the persons conducting a civil investigation are allowed to 
require the concerned individuals to answer written interrogatories and to give oral testimonies (15 U.S.C. § 1312(a)). 
274 In Jamaica, the Fair Trading Commission is empowered to summon and examine witnesses, and to administer oaths (Section 7 of 
the Fair Competition Act). In Pakistan, according to Section 33 of Act No. XIX of 2010, when the Competition Commission is 
examining a witness in the course of an investigation, the former shall do so under oath. In Sri Lanka, pursuant to Section 36(2) of 
the Consumer Affairs Authority Act, the Authority is empowered to administer oaths when taking the testimony of a requested 
party.  
275 In the US, a person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony may refuse to answer any question on grounds of the 
privilege against self-incrimination (15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(A)).  
276 In Canada, according to Section 11(3) of the Competition Act, no person shall be excused from complying with an order to 
appear before the Commissioner to be examined or to produce any record on the ground that the testimony or record required may 
tend to criminate the person or subject him to any proceedings or penalty. However, no testimony given shall be used against the 
individual in any criminal proceedings other than a prosecution under section 132 (Perjury) or 136 (Giving contradictory evidence) 
of the Criminal Code.  
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4.3. Power to Enter and Search Premises 
 
Another power of investigation that most competition authorities have is the possibility to enter and 
search certain premises while conducting an investigation for the infringement of competition law. This is 
one the most intrusive powers that competition authorities have, however, given to the secretive nature of 
most anticompetitive practices, especially hard-core cartels, competition authorities require such powers 
in order to acquire the necessary information for the detection and punishment of the most harmful 
anticompetitive conducts. In that sense, some competition regimes have restricted the ability of 
competition authorities to enter and search certain premises to cases involving the investigation of hard-
core cartels277. The investigative power to enter and search premises consists in a visit by the authorized 
officials of the competition authority, or other individuals properly authorized, to the business premises, 
means of transportation, or residential premises, of an investigated undertaking or its directors, managers 
and other staff, with the purpose of gathering all relevant documentation and information concerned with 
the alleged infringement of the competition law provisions. In practice, this power of investigation is 
carried out by the authorized officials of the competition authorities278, however, depending on the 
jurisdiction, it can be also be performed by: police officers279, officials of other institutions280, or any 
other person appointed by the relevant authority281.  
The characteristics of this power make it especially suitable for retrieving relevant 
documentation and information that is concealed in the business premises of an investigated undertaking 
or the private dwellings of the directors, managers or other staff members of the undertaking in question, 
which could not have been acquired by other means such as the formal request by the competition 
authority. One of the virtues or advantages that this investigative power has over the others granted to 
competition authorities is the element of surprise that the officers of competition authorities have when 
inspecting and searching the concerned premises with the purpose of retrieving relevant information. The 
fact that the inspection may be carried out without a previous notice allows the officers conducting the 
inspection to have access to any relevant information without giving the owners, directors, 
representatives, or any other employee of the investigated undertaking the chance to conceal, modify or 
destroy any incriminating information or documentation. 
The exercise of this power of investigation varies depending on which jurisdiction. The main 
differences that can be evidenced when conducting an investigation are concerned with the: authorization 
                                                          
277 In Chile, according to Article 39(n) of the Antitrust Act, the ability to enter and search certain premises in the course of an 
investigation is restricted to cases related to hard-core cartels.  
278 In the EU, according to Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003, the officials of the Commission and other accompanying persons are 
authorized to enter and search the concerned premises. In the UK, any officer of the Director General of Fair Trading is authorized 
to perform an inspection (Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act).  
279 In Poland, according to Article 91 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, the inspection of residential and any 
other premises has to be carried out by the Police. In South Africa, pursuant to Section 46 of the Competition Act, the inspection can 
be performed by an inspector or a police officer.  
280 In the US, search warrants during an investigation for the infringement of the antitrust provisions are executed by agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) according to the Antitrust Division Grand Jury Practice Manual (III-186). 
281 In Canada, according to Section 15 of the Competition Act, the judge issuing a search warrant may authorize the Commissioner 
of any other person to execute the search warrant. In Germany, pursuant to Section 59 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, 
any person entrusted by the Bundeskartellamt may enter and search the concerned premises.  
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required to perform an inspection; the types of premises that are subject to an inspection; and the powers 
that the officials of the competition authority have during the course of an inspection.  
1. Authorization to Perform an Inspection 
 
The first issue related to the conduction of an on-site inspection is concerned with the authorization 
required to conduct such an inspection. Given the intrusive nature of this power, most competition 
regimes require some formalities prior to its performance. The most important and first requirement to 
conduct an on-site inspection is the prior attainment of a proper authorization from the competent 
authority, in most cases courts. Thus, in practice, depending on the jurisdiction, the competition authority 
will first have to file an application to the competent court with the purpose of obtaining a judicial 
warrant allowing its officials to enter and search certain premises related to the investigation. 
Alternatively, in other competition regimes, the competition authority may be empowered to authorize its 
officials to conduct the inspection without a judicial order, in such cases; the authority will perform the 
inspection under its own discretion. Finally, in some jurisdictions, the competition authority will be 
allowed to enter and search certain premises if it is authorized to do so by the occupants of the premises 
in question.  
(a) Inspections Carried Out with a Judicial Warrant  
 
There are jurisdictions where the competition authority is not empowered to conduct an inspection under 
its own discretion. In those cases, the competition authority will be required to apply for a judicial warrant 
to the competent judge with the purpose of obtaining permission to carry out an inspection in the course 
of an investigation for the infringement of the completion law provisions. This requirement is mostly 
concerned with the protection of the fundamental rights of privacy and the inviolability of homes and 
documents. In that sense, the restriction of those fundamentals rights will have to be determined by an 
independent judge which is not related to the investigation of the alleged violation of competition law, 
who will determine the admissibility of the application by evaluating factors such as: if the measure is not 
arbitrary nor excessive; the gravity of the suspected infringement; the importance of the evidence sought 
for the resolution of the case; the involvement of the person who is subject to the inspection; or the 
likelihood of finding the searched evidence in the premises related to the inspection282.  
This requirement is not absolute in all competition regimes; therefore, there are some shades in 
the application of this requisite. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the search warrant will be required 
every time the competition authority is planning on conducting an inspection, irrespective of the types of 
premises planned to be inspected, the powers the officials of the competition authority have during the 
inspection, or any other factor. Oppositely, in other regimes, a judicial warrant will be required only when 
the competition authority is planning the on-site inspection of residential premises, such as the private 
dwellings of individuals related to the investigated undertakings. Similarly, in other regimes, the search 
warrant will be mandatory depending on the type of actions that the officials of the competition authority 
                                                          
282 See, Section 65(5) of the Estonian Competition Act. See, Section 35 of the Finnish Competition Act.  
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are allowed to perform in the course of the on-site inspection. Finally, in some competition regimes, the 
competition authorities will be obliged to apply for a judicial warrant to carry out an inspection in the 
course of an investigation related to a criminal proceeding for the breach of competition law.  
As stated before, in some competition regimes, a search warrant is always necessary to conduct 
an inspection during an investigation by the competition authority despite of the type of premises 
inspected or the powers of the officials conducting the inspection. In some jurisdictions, the absoluteness 
of this requirement may be concerned with the strong protection of fundamental rights of persons283. 
However, in other competition regimes, such a requirement is established by virtue of the fact that the 
competition authority is not a decision-making body. Thus, in those countries, where there is a strict 
separation of the enforcement functions, given that the competition authority is merely an investigative 
body; the latter will have to require prior authorization to perform an on-site inspection from the 
competent court284. 
(i) Warrant Depending on the Premises to be searched  
 
The requisite of a prior judicial warrant to conduct an inspection during an investigation for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions may be concerned with the types of premises that the 
competition authority is planning to inspect. Accordingly, in some competition regimes, the competition 
authority will be allowed to enter and search business premises under its own discretion and without a 
previous judicial warrant allowing it to do so. On the contrary, in those same regimes, whenever the 
competition authority is planning on inspecting other premises, like residential buildings, the latter will be 
obliged to obtain a judicial warrant prior to performing the said inspection. This requirement is related to 
the private nature of residential premises, by requiring the authorization of an independent party, like a 
judge who is not related in any way to the investigation, the fundamental rights of individuals are 
protected from any abuse285.  
                                                          
283 In Hungary, pursuant to Article 65/A of the Competition Act, the investigators of the Competition Authority are allowed to enter 
and search business and residential premises only upon the attainment in advance of a judicial authorization from the Municipal 
Court of Budapest. In Lithuania, the Competition Council is allowed to enter and search both business and residential premises, but 
only with the attainment in advance of a judicial warrant (Article 26(2) of the Law on Competition). In Norway, according to 
Section 25 of the Competition Act, the Competition Authority may demand access to any business premises, means of 
transportation, and homes, only when it has obtained a court authorization in advance.   
284 For instance in Ireland, where there is a strict separation of the enforcement functions; the Competition Authority is just an 
investigatory body that lacks competence to issue decisions while conducting an investigation. In that sense, Section 45 of the 
Competition Act establishes the obligation of the Competition Authority to obtain a judicial warrant prior to the performance of an 
inspection. In the US, the Antitrust Division of the Justice of Department, which is an investigative body is required to acquire a 
search warrant from the relevant court with the purpose of inspecting the concerned premises (Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure). 
285 In the EU, the Commission is allowed to enter and search, upon a decision issued under its own discretion, any business premises 
(Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003), moreover, the Commission is also empowered to enter and search residential premises, however, 
in order to do so, it will have to obtain a judicial warrant from the national court of the Member State on which it plans on 
conducting the inspection (Article 21 of Regulation 1/2003).In Finland, the Competition Authority is allowed to enter and search 
business premises, storage facilities, land, and means of transport under its own discretion (Section 35 of the Competition Act), 
however, the latter will have to obtain a judicial warrant from the Market Court to enter other premises, such as residential premises 
(Section 36 of the Act). In the EU, the Commission is allowed to enter and search, upon a decision issued under its own discretion, 
any business premises (Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003), moreover, the Commission is also empowered to enter and search 
residential premises, however, in order to do so, it will have to obtain a judicial warrant from the national court of the Member State 
on which it plans on conducting the inspection (Article 21 of Regulation 1/2003). In Israel, the Competition Authority is allowed to 
enter and search any business premises under its own discretion (Section 45 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law), moreover, it is 
also allowed to enter and search residential premises upon a judicial warrant issued on advance by the competent judge (Section 
45(a)(1) of the Law). 
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(ii) Warrant Depending on the Actions to be carried by the Officials of the Authority  
 
In the same line, the requirement of a search warrant to perform an inspection by the competition 
authority can be associated with the types of actions that the officials of the competition authority are 
allowed to carry out during the inspection of the concerned premises. In those cases, the officials of the 
competition authority may perform certain actions while conducting an inspection without a judicial 
warrant, and conversely, when the competition authority has previously obtained a judicial warrant its 
officials will be empowered to perform more intrusive actions in the course of the on-site inspection. For 
instance, in some jurisdictions, when the competition authority conducts an inspection without a judicial 
warrant, the latter may only be allowed to make copies relevant documents, however, when the authority 
performs an inspection with a judicial warrant it may also be empowered to seize and seal any relevant 
document286. Similarly, in other competition regimes, when the competition authority conducts an 
investigation without a judicial warrant, it may not be allowed to search the persons occupying the 
inspected premises, conversely, when the inspection is carried out under the attainment of a judicial 
warrant, the authority will be entitled to search the occupants of the inspected premises to see if they have 
any relevant documents under their possession287. Moreover, in some jurisdictions where the competition 
authorities are allowed to perform inspections on business premises at their own discretion, those 
authorities will be empowered to request documents or explanations and to seize objects, however, upon 
the attainment of a judicial warrant, the competition authority will be permitted to conduct forcible 
searches, in those cases, the competition authorities will be empowered with more intrusive faculties, 
such as: prohibit person from moving without permission or from conversing with other individuals until 
the end of the inspection; obtain confidential information; or seize objects288. Finally, despite 
aforementioned, in some competition regimes, when acting without a judicial warrant, the competition 
authorities are expressly empowered to exercise the same investigation powers that are vested on them 
when performing an inspection upon a judicial warrant289.  
(iii) Warrant Depending on the Nature of the Proceedings 
 
In some jurisdictions where criminal provisions and sanctions for the infringement of competition law 
have been established, the competition authorities may be required to apply for a judicial warrant 
allowing the officials of the authority to conduct an inspection which is related to a criminal proceeding. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the competition authority may only be require to request a judicial warrant 
for inspections concerned with criminal proceedings, conversely, the competition authority may be free to 
order an inspection under its own behalf in proceedings that do not have a criminal nature nor seek the 
imposition of criminal sanctions290. This different treatment of the same power of investigation is due to 
                                                          
286 In Luxembourg, see Articles 15 and 16 of the Competition Act. 
287 In Singapore, see Sections 64 and 65 of the Competition Act.  
288 In Latvia, see Section 9 of the Competition Law. 
289 In Malaysia, according to Section 26 of the Competition Act, when conducting an inspection without a judicial warrant, the 
Commission officer in charge of the inspection will be allowed to enter the premises and exercise all the powers as if he were 
authorized to do so by a judicial warrant.  
290 In the UK, in proceedings under the provisions of the Competition Act which seek the imposition of administrative penalties for 
the breach of competition law, the OFT is allowed to conduct inspections both under its own behalf and with the prior approval of 
the relevant court (Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act). However, in criminal proceedings under the provisions of the 
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the more serious nature of criminal proceedings and sanctions. In that sense, the exercise of this 
investigative power in criminal procedures is subject to strict safeguards aimed at protecting the rights of 
the investigated individuals.  
(iv) Exceptions to the Request of a Judicial Warrant 
 
Finally, in some competition regimes where a search warrant is required to conduct an inspection during 
an investigation for the violation of the competition provisions, such requisite can be waived if certain 
circumstances are met. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the competition authority may carry out an 
inspection without a judicial warrant, even if the attainment of which is mandatory, if the competition 
authority believes that there is imminent danger291, or when there are circumstances in which the delay 
necessary to obtain a judicial warrant would result in the loss or destruction of evidence292.        
(b) Inspections carried out at the discretion of the authority  
 
Despite the above, there are some competition regimes where the competition authority is empowered to 
carry out an on-site inspection without obtaining a prior judicial warrant from court. In these jurisdictions, 
the competition authorities have been granted significant powers of investigation, provided that they can 
act independently from any other institutions while conducting an investigation for the infringement of 
competition law. This degree of independence allows competition authorities to order and conduct an 
inspection on its own behalf. Nevertheless, in some of these competition regimes, the competition 
authorities can be required to conduct an inspection at the request of superior authorities293.  
The exercise of the investigative power to enter and search certain premises at their own 
discretion is intended to provide the competition authorities with the necessary investigation powers 
required to discover and punish most anticompetitive practices in an effective way. On the one hand, the 
fact that the competition authorities are not required to obtain in advance a judicial warrant from a 
determined court saves the authority time and resources that would have been spent on the acquisition of 
the said warrant. By relieving the authorities of this requirement, the latter will be allowed to act more 
effectively in detecting and punishing any possible infringements of competition law. However, on the 
other hand, the availability of such intrusive powers may restrict certain fundamental rights of the persons 
being inspected whenever those powers are exercised abusively, arbitrarily or excessively.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Enterprise Act, the OFT is allowed only to conduct inspections with the prior attainment of a judicial warrant (Section 194 of the 
Enterprise Act).   
291 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt is obliged to obtain a judicial warrant prior to conduct an inspection (Section 59(4) of the Act 
Against Restraints of Competition), nevertheless, by virtue of the same Section, the Bundeskartellamt is empowered to perform the 
said inspection without a search warrant if it believes there is imminent danger. 
292 In Canada, according to Section 15(7) and (8) of the Competition Act, an inspection can be performed without a judicial warrant 
if by exigent circumstances it would not be practical to obtain a warrant. In Malaysia, Section 26 of the Competition Act empowers 
the persons in charge of an inspection to enter and search the concerned premises without a search warrant if by reason of delay in 
obtaining the warrant the investigation would be adversely affected or evidence of the commission of an infringement is likely to be 
tampered with, removed, damaged or destroyed. 
293 For instance, in Russia, the antimonopoly body is required  to carry out an inspection under the instruction of the President of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation (Article 25(1)(4)(4) of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation 
on Protection of Competition). 
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Depending on the jurisdiction, the types of premises that can be inspected by competition 
authorities at their own discretion may vary. For instance, in the most permissive jurisdictions, the 
competition authorities are empowered to carry out on-site inspections in both business and residential 
premises at their own discretion294. In jurisdictions where the power to enter and search premises is 
strictly limited to business premises, the ability of the competition authorities to carry out inspections on 
their own behalf will also be limited to business premises295. Additionally, in countries where this 
possibility is not limited to business premises, but the competition authorities lack competence to carry 
out an inspection in residential premises on their own behalf, the latter will necessarily be under the 
obligation to apply for a judicial warrant296.  
(c) Inspections carried out with the authorization of the occupants of the premises 
 
Finally, in some countries the officials of the competition authority may be allowed to enter and search 
the concerned premises if they are authorized to do so by the occupants of those premises297. Usually, in 
those jurisdictions, the competition authorities are not empowered to conduct inspections at their own 
discretion; and consequently, the attainment of a previous judicial warrant is mandatory to enter and 
search the premises in question. Nevertheless, in the case that the officials of the competition authority 
are denied access by the occupants of the concerned premises, the competition authority will have the 
possibility to file a request to the competent court requesting a judicial warrant to carry out the desired 
inspection. If after the competition authority has obtained a judicial warrant the occupants still refuse to 
allow the officials of the competition authority to access and search the concerned premises, the authority 
may be assisted by police officers, who will be allowed to use the necessary force to permit the officials 
of the competition authority to enter and search the premises298.  
                                                          
294 In Mexico, see Article 30 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition.  
295 In Kenya, only business premises are subject to be inspected, this inspection can be done at the discretion of the competition 
authority, without any judicial warrant (Section 32 of the Competition Act). In Korea, the Fair Trade Commission is allowed to 
enter and search, under its own discretion, only the business premises of the concerned undertakings (Article 50 of the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act). In Macedonia, the officials of the Competition Commission are allowed by a procedural order 
issued by the Commission to enter and search only the business premises, lands, or means of transportation of investigated 
undertakings (Article 41 of the Law on the Protection of Competition). In Russia, upon an order of the head of the antimonopoly 
body, the officers of the latter can carry out inspections in territories or premises of the undertakings investigated, the examination 
of the private dwellings of the inspected person are exempted from being examined (Article 25(3) of the Federal Law on the Russian 
Federation on Protection of Competition). 
296 In the EU, the Commission is allowed to enter and search, upon a decision issued under its own discretion, any business premises 
(Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003), moreover, the Commission is also empowered to enter and search residential premises, however, 
in order to do so, it will have to obtain a judicial warrant from the national court of the Member State on which it plans on 
conducting the inspection (Article 21 of Regulation 1/2003). In Israel, the Competition Authority is allowed to enter and search any 
business premises under its own discretion (Section 45 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law), moreover, it is also allowed to enter 
and search residential premises upon a judicial warrant issued on advance by the competent judge (Section 45(a)(1) of the Law). In 
South Africa, according to Section 47 of the Competition Act, the inspectors not authorized by a warrant may enter and search 
premises other than a private dwelling. 
297 In Argentina, according to Article 24 of the Law for Defense of Competition, the Competition Tribunal may enter the premises 
with the consent of the occupants or with a judicial order. Similarly, in Spain, pursuant to Article 40 of the Law on the Defense of 
Competition, the officials of the National Commission of Competition are allowed to inspect business and residential premises with 
the authorization of their occupants or with a judicial warrant. In South Africa, whenever an inspector is planning to enter and 
search the business premises of an undertaking without a judicial warrant, such inspector will have to get the permission of the 
occupants of the premises (Section 47(2)(a) of the Competition Act). 
298 In Singapore, if upon a written notice, the officials of the Competition Commission are denied access to the premises subject to 
an inspection by their occupants (Section 64 of the Competition Act); the Commission may then apply for a judicial warrant in order 
to gain access to the said premises, such order allows officials to enter the premises using such force as is reasonably necessary 
(Section 65 of the Competition Act). Similarly, in the UK, see Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act.  
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2. Premises Subject to an Inspection 
 
The second issue related to the performance of an inspection by the competition authority when 
investigating an alleged infringement of competition law is concerned with the types of premises that can 
be subject to an inspection. The kind of premises that can be inspected by the officials of the competition 
authorities during an investigation can be grouped in two categories: in the first one, there are the 
business premises, which are any buildings or premises which are concerned with the commercial 
activities of the investigated undertakings; and in the second one, there are the residential premises, which 
are the private dwellings of the persons employed by or related to the investigated undertakings.  
(a) Business Premises 
 
Traditionally, the main aim of an inspection in the course of an investigation for the infringement of 
competition law has been the business premises of the investigated undertakings given that the 
commercial activities that are related to the anticompetitive practices of the undertakings usually take 
place in such premises. Thus, as a general rule, most competition regimes have provisions that allow 
competition authorities to enter and search the business premises of the concerned undertakings while 
investigating the alleged infringement of the competition provisions.  
Looking at the provisions that govern this investigative power, some first differences are 
evidenced across jurisdictions with regard to the places that shall be considered as business premises, and 
consequently, that shall be subject to the inspection. For instance, in the competition regimes with the 
broadest provisions the competition authorities are permitted to carry out inspections at any business 
premises299, means of transportation300, or even at any other location301, as long as these places are used 
by the undertakings in connection with their commercial activities. In these cases, it will be up to the 
enforcers of the competition rules to determine which places should be considered as business premises 
according to the meaning of the law. Alternatively, other competition regimes have refined the scope of 
the competition provisions regulating this power of investigation by introducing non exhaustive lists of 
the places that should be considered by the competition law enforcers as business premises. Across 
jurisdictions, the most commonly used terms which make reference to the business premises are the 
following: land302; office303; building304; structure305; mean of transportation306 (vehicles, ships, boats, 
                                                          
299 In Denmark, see Section 18(1) of the Competition Act. In the EU, see Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003. In Germany, see Section 
59 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. In Israel, see Article 45 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law. In Kenya, see 
Section 32 of the Competition Act. In Lithuania, see Article 26 of the Law on Competition. In Macedonia, see Article 41 of the Law 
on the Protection of Competition. 
300 In Denmark, see Section 18(1) of the Competition Act. In the EU, see Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003. In Lithuania, see Article 
26 of the Law on Competition. In Macedonia, see Article 41 of the Law on the Protection of Competition.  
301 In Bulgaria, see Article 50(2)(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition. 
302 In Croatia, see Article 42 of the Competition Act. In South Africa, see Section (1)(1)(xix) of the Competition Act. 
303 In Belgium, see Article 44 §3(2°) of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition. 
304 In South Africa, see Section (1)(1)(xix) of the Competition Act. 
305 In South Africa, see Section (1)(1)(xix) of the Competition Act. 
306 In Belgium, see Article 44 §3(2°) of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition. In Bulgaria, see Article 50(2)(1) of the 
Law on Protection of Competition. In Croatia, see Article 42 of the Competition Act. 
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vessels, aircrafts)307; container308; storage facility309; site310; closed premise311; immovable and movable 
object312; territory313; or place of business314; among others. 
Another difference that exists between jurisdictions with regard to the inspection of business 
premises in the course of an investigation by the competition authority is related to the extent of this 
power with regard to the business premises of undertakings that are not being investigated for the breach 
of the competition provisions. In competition regimes that have granted wide investigative powers to the 
competition authority, the latter will be empowered to inspect the business premises of any undertaking, 
irrespective of the fact that the undertaking in question is not a party in the proceedings and is not being 
investigated for the alleged infringement of the competition provisions315. Alternatively, in other 
competition regimes, the competition authorities are empowered to enter and search only the business 
premises of the undertakings that are concerned with the investigation316, the business premises where a 
prohibited practice has taken place317, or the business premises where relevant information related to the 
investigation is being kept318.  
(b) Residential Premises 
 
Provided that not all relevant information concerned with an investigation conducted by the competition 
authority is always stored in the business premises of the investigated undertakings, some legislators have 
granted their competition authorities the faculty to carry out inspections in the residential premises of 
individuals that are related with the commercial activities of the undertakings under investigation. The 
term residential premise comprehends the homes or private dwellings of individuals connected with an 
investigation for the infringement of competition law, however, depending on the jurisdiction; it may also 
comprehend the private means of transportation used by these individuals319.  
 In most countries, the constitutional right of inviolability of the home protects the private 
dwellings of the citizens from abusive inspections320. In that sense, most competition regimes that allow 
competition authorities to enter and search the residential premises of individuals connected with the 
investigation require that the exercise of this investigative power shall be subject to the prior attainment 
of a judicial warrant. Thus, in the competition regimes where the competition authorities have been 
granted the faculty to inspect the residential premises of certain individuals, the fundamental right of 
                                                          
307 In South Africa, see Section (1)(1)(xix) of the Competition Act. 
308 In South Africa, see Section (1)(1)(xix) of the Competition Act. 
309 In Finland, see Section 35 of the Competition Act. 
310 In Hungary, see Article 65/A of the Competition Act. 
311 In Hungary, see Article 65/A of the Competition Act. 
312 In Latvia, see Section 9(4) of the Competition Law. 
313 In Russia, see Article 25(3) of the Federal Law on the Russian Federation on Protection of Competition. 
314 In Korea, see Article 50 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
315 In the EU, see Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003. In Latvia, see Section 9 of the Competition Law. In Poland, see Article 91 of the 
Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. 
316 In Lithuania, see Article 26 of the Law on Competition.  
317 In South Africa, see Section 46 of the Competition Act.  
318 In Kenya, see Section 32 of the Competition Act. In Macedonia, see Article 41 of the Law on the Protection of Competition. In 
Norway, see Section 25 of the Competition Act. In the UK, see Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act. In Zambia, see Section 7 
of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act. 
319 In Hungary, see Article 65/A of the Competition Act. In Singapore, see Section 2 of the Competition Act.  
320 In Germany, Article 13 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany recognizes the inviolability of the home. 
Similarly, in the US, the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution establishes the right of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
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inviolability of the home is restricted to the extent of the investigation321.  Besides the requirement of a 
judicial warrant allowing the competition authority to conduct the inspection of residential premises, 
some competition regimes require that certain circumstances are met before allowing the competition 
authority to enter and search any private dwellings. For instance, in some countries, the inspection of 
residential premises in the course of an investigation by the competition authority will be permitted if 
there are reasonable grounds or suspicions that relevant evidence concerned with the investigation is 
being kept in the residential premises of the concerned individuals322. Similarly, in other competition 
regimes, the inspection of residential premises will be permitted if there are reasonable grounds for 
believing: that evidence that may prove a serious violation of the competition provisions are held in those 
premises323; that relevant information is stored in those premises and that such storage may affect the 
findings that are material to pending proceedings324; that there are documents that have not been produced 
upon the previous request of the competition authority in those premises325; that a prohibited practice has 
taken place, is taking place, or is likely to take place within those premises326; or that anything connected 
with an investigation is in the possession or control of an occupant of those premises327. 
With relation to the precise residential premises that competition authorities are permitted to 
enter and search, these also vary from one jurisdiction to another. In competition regimes that have opted 
for a broad approach, the competition authorities will be empowered to enter and search the residential 
premises of any individual irrespective of the fact that this has a direct relationship with an investigated 
undertaking328. Alternatively, in jurisdictions with provisions of a narrower scope, the competition 
authorities will be allowed to enter and search the residential premises of certain individuals, such as: 
directors, managers or any member of staff, which are related to the undertakings that are concerned with 
an investigation for the infringement of the competition provisions329; individuals connected to 
undertakings that are involved in commercial activities330; or individuals that used to have a relationship 
with the concerned undertakings, such as, former executives, or former employees331. 
 
                                                          
321 In Germany, Section 59 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, establishes that when searches made with a judicial 
warrant for the location of relevant documents, the fundamental right to the inviolability of the home (Article 13 of the Basic Law) 
is restricted to this extent. Similarly, in the USA, the Antitrust Division Grand Jury Practice Manual (III-178) establishes the legal 
standards that have to be met with relation to the requirements of the 4th Amendment of the US Constitution, before a valid search 
warrant can be issued. 
322 In Croatia, see Article 44 of Competition Act. In Lithuania, see Section 26 of the Competition Act. 
323 In Lithuania, see Section 26 of the Competition Act. 
324 In Poland, see Article 91 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. 
325 In Singapore, see Section 65 of the Competition Act.  
326 In South Africa, see Section 46 of the Competition Act. 
327 Idem 
328 In South Africa, according to Section 46 of the Competition Act, the Authority is permitted to enter any premises as long as there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a prohibited practice is taking, has taken or is likely to take place on those premises or if 
anything in connection with an investigation is being held in those premises.   
329 In the EU, Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003 allows the inspection of the business premises of any undertaking or association of 
undertakings; however, Article 21 of the Regulation only allows inspecting the residential premises of individuals related to 
undertakings or associations of undertakings that are concerned with the investigation.  
330 In Ireland, according to Section 45 of the Competition Act, the authorized officials of the Competition authority are allowed to 
enter and search the residential premises of individuals related to undertakings in connection with the business of supplying or 
distributing goods or providing a service, or in connection with the organization or assistance of persons engaged in any such 
business.  
331 In Hungary, according to Section 65/A of the Competition Act, the homes of former executive officials, employees or agents are 
subject to inspections during an investigation for the infringement of competition law. 
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(c) Other Places Subject to an Inspection 
 
Besides business and residential premises, in some competition regimes, other places may be subject to an 
on-site inspection during an investigation conducted by the competition authorities. For instance, in some 
jurisdictions, whenever the information of an investigated undertaking is stored or processed by an 
external data processor, the competition authority will be entitled to enter and search the premises of 
those external data processors with the purpose of gaining access to any relevant information which is 
connected to the investigation332, similarly, in other regimes, the officials of the competition authority will 
be entitled to inspect the premises of external natural or legal persons entrusted with commercial, 
accounting, administrative, fiscal or financial management responsibilities333. Moreover, in other 
jurisdictions, the competition authorities will be empowered to search any person who is on the premises 
subject to the inspections; provided that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person has 
under its personal possession any article, equipment or document concerned with the subject matter of the 
inspection334, additionally, in some jurisdictions, there are provisions that require that the subject to that 
inspection shall only be searched by an official of the same sex335.  Finally, in other competition regimes, 
the competition authorities will be entitled to inspect the premises of public entities to see if the inspected 
institutions are complying with the competition law provisions when exercising their economic 
activities336. 
3. Timing of the Inspections 
 
As to the timing to perform an on-site inspection in the course of an investigation for the infringement of 
the competition law provisions, the time period during which the officials of the competition authority 
can enter and search the concerned premises varies from one jurisdiction to another. Accordingly, in some 
competition regimes, the inspections will be allowed to be performed at any reasonable time337. 
Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, the time period to conduct an inspection is restricted, in those cases, 
the officials of the competition authorities will be permitted to inspect the relevant premises either during 
the daytime, or during business hours338. Irrespective of whether the said inspection is carried out during 
                                                          
332 In Denmark, see Section 18(2) of the Competition Act. 
333 In Belgium, see 44 §3(1°) of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition.  
334 In Singapore, see Section 65(2)(ii) of the Competition Act. In South Africa, see Section 48(1)(c) of the Competition Act. In the 
US, see Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Zambia, see Section 7(4)(b) of the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Act.  
335 In Malaysia, see Section 25 of the Competition Act. In South Africa, see Section 49(2) of the Competition Act. In Zambia, see 
Section 7(4)(b) of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act. 
336 In Moldova, according to Article 13 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, the National Agency for the Protection of 
Competition has the right to access the premises and territory of public administration authorities and economic entities. In Russia, 
pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Protection of Competition, an antimonopoly body to 
control compliance with the antimonopoly legislation is empowered to inspect, inter alia, federal executive bodies, the authorities of 
the constituent territories of the Russian Federation, local self-government bodies, and other agencies and organizations exercising 
the functions of the above bodies. 
337 In Malaysia, according to Section 25 of the Competition Act, the Commission officers may conduct an inspection at any 
reasonable time by day or night. Similarly in Zambia, see Section 7 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act.  
338 In Barbados, the inspection can be made between the hours of 5 o’clock in the morning and 8 o’clock in the night (Section 27(2) 
of the Fair Trading Commission Act). In Belgium, according to Article 44 §3(1°) of the Act on the Protection of Economic 
Competition, the inspections can be performed between 8:00 and 18:00. In Canada, Section 15(3) of the Competition Act allows to 
execute a search warrant between six o’clock in the forenoon and nine o’clock in the afternoon. In Germany, Section 59 of the Act 
Against Restraints of Competition establishes that inspection shall be performed during normal business hours. In Mexico, pursuant 
to Article 31(II) of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, an inspection shall be performed in business days and during 
business hours. In South Africa, according to Section 46(4) of the Competition Act, a warrant to enter and search premises shall be 
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the daytime or business hours, the purpose of such a requirement is to assure that the owners, their 
representatives, or the occupants of the premises subject to the inspection are present during the search339. 
Despite the preceding, in some competition regimes, the inspection can be carried out without the 
presence of the concerned persons340. Irrespective of the fact that some competition regimes have 
established certain time periods during which the officials of the competition authorities will be allowed 
to perform an inspection, in some of these jurisdictions, such time periods can be altered by the authority 
empowered to grant authorization to perform the inspection341.   
Additionally, in relation to the timing for performing an inspection in the course of an 
investigation, as a general rule, most of these inspections are surprise and do not require a prior 
notification to the concerned party342. This characteristic makes surprise on-site inspection an effective 
means for gathering incriminating evidence concerned with an alleged infringement of the competition 
law provisions. Moreover, the performance of surprise inspections reduces the opportunity for document 
destruction and concealment, prevents the failure to produce responsive documents either deliberately or 
through inadvertence343. Nevertheless, there are some jurisdictions where the inspection of the concerned 
premises can be done with a prior notification to the owners or occupants of those premises344. Finally, in 
some competition regimes, the inspection can be scheduled or planned in advance, in those cases, the 
competition authorities will perform regular inspections every certain period of time in order to determine 
if the persons subject to those inspections are complying with the competition law provisions in the 
course of their economic activities345.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
executed only during the day. In the USA, an inspection shall be carried out during the daytime, which according to Rule 
41(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is between 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
339 In Bulgaria, Article 52(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition requires that the inspections shall be conducted in the 
presence of representatives of the undertaking, any of its employees or any other person having the right to be present at the 
premises or found to be there at the time of the inspection. 
340 In Singapore, according to Section 65(10) of the Competition Act, the officials of the Competition Commission can enter the 
concerned premises even if there is no one at the time of the inspection, however, first they will have to take such steps as are 
reasonable to inform the occupier of the intended entry; and if the occupier is informed, afford him or his representative a reasonable 
opportunity to be present when the warrant is executed. In South Africa, if no one is at the premises which are subject to an 
inspection, the person executing the warrant is required to affix a copy of the warrant in a prominent and visible place (Section 46(6) 
of the Competition Act). In the UK, according to Section 29 of the Competition Act, if there is no one at the premises, the person in 
charge of the inspection has to take the reasonable steps to inform the occupier of the intended entry, and if informed, to afford him 
an opportunity to be present during the inspection, however if the officer cannot inform the occupier, a copy of the warrant shall be 
left in a prominent place on the premises. Additionally, according to Section 28(2)(4) of the Act, if the premises subject to an 
inspection are not occupied, the officers conducting the inspection are under the obligation to leave the premises as effectively 
secured as they found them.  
341 In Canada, pursuant to Section 15(3) of the Competition Act, the judge who issues a search warrant allowing the performance of 
the inspection can determine that the execution of the warrant shall be carried out at any time. In Mexico, according to Article 31(II) 
of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the Federal Competition Commission is empowered to order that an inspection which 
has been initiated in business days and during business hours shall be continued during any other days or hours. In South Africa, 
according to Section 46(4) of the Competition Act, a warrant to enter and search will be executed during the night if the judge or 
magistrate who has issued the warrant believes that there are reasonable circumstances to conduct the inspection at night. In the US, 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can seek permission to conduct an inspection during nighttime if it shows a good 
cause pursuant Rule 41(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
342 In Honduras, Article 47 of the Law for the Defense and Promotion of Competition estates the fact that on-site inspections are 
conducted without a previous notification.  
343 Antitrust Division Manual, Fourth Edition, III-96.  
344 In the UK, an investigator officer may enter any premises in connection with an investigation if it has given the occupier of the 
premises at least two working days’ notice of the intended entry (Section 27 of the Competition Act). 
345 In Russia, in order to control compliance with the antimonopoly legislation, an antimonopoly body can perform schedule 
inspections in certain premises as often as every three years (Article 25(1) of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on 
Protection of Competition).  
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4. Powers of the Competition Authority in the Course of the Inspection 
 
Whenever the officials of the competition authority are conducting an inspection in the premises of an 
investigated undertaking, or elsewhere, these will have certain powers to gather all relevant evidence they 
can find in the course of the said inspection. These powers have been vested on the individuals 
responsible for carrying out the inspections of premises with the purpose of allowing them to effectively 
acquire any information or documentation which may be relevant for proving an infringement of the 
competition law provision. Given the fact that the individuals involved in anticompetitive practices 
usually make sure to take all the necessary measures to try to conceal any trace of evidence which may be 
later used to incriminate them for the infringement of competition law, the officials of the competition 
authorities require proper investigative powers to match those elusive measures in order to be able to 
detect and sanction as many as possible anticompetitive practices.     
Just like with other powers of investigation previously studied, the faculties that the officials of 
competition authorities have in the course of an inspection vary from one jurisdiction to another. 
Nevertheless, in the course of an inspection concerned with an investigation for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions, most competition regimes allow competition authority officials to: enter and 
search the premises; examine and copy relevant documents irrespective of the medium on which they are 
stored; seize documents and objects relevant to the investigation; seal documents or premises; and require 
explanations from the occupants or their representatives.  
(a) Power to Enter the Premises  
 
Chronologically speaking, the first power of investigation that the competition authority officials or any 
other authorized individuals conducting an inspection have is the right to enter the concerned premises. In 
most jurisdictions the right to enter the premises is subject to the previous acquirement of a judicial 
warrant issued by a judge, or an authorization issued by the competition authority. Accordingly, in those 
cases, the officials or individuals in charge of the inspection will be required to show the owners, their 
representatives or the occupants of the premises, the judicial search warrant346, or alternatively, the 
authorization issued by the competition authority347, which empowers them to get access to those 
premises. In addition to the presentation of the relevant authorization, the individuals conducting the 
inspection will be required to present identification348. Moreover, while exercising this faculty, the 
persons in charge of conducting the inspection are allowed to use the necessary force to enter the 
premises subject to an inspection349. For this purpose, those persons are usually assisted by officials of the 
public forces of the state, consequently, whenever the owners, their representatives or the occupants of 
                                                          
346 In Kosovo, according to Article 39(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition, prior to performing an unannounced inspection, 
the authorized members of the Competition Commission are obliged to display their official legitimation and authorization of the 
competent district court to conduct the inspection.   
347 In Mexico, the public servants in charge of an inspection are required to identify themselves and to exhibit the authorization for 
the inspection (Article 31(II) of the Federal Law on Economic Competition).  
348 In China, when carrying out an inspection, there shall be at least two law enforcers, and they shall show their law enforcement 
certificates (Article 40 of the Antimonopoly Law).  
349 In the UK, according to Section 28 of the Competition Act, an authorized officer of the Director General of Fair Trading is 
allowed to enter the premises specified in the warrant, using such force as is reasonably necessary for the purpose.  
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the concerned premises refuse to allow the persons performing the inspection to get access to the 
premises subject to the inspection, or whenever the premises subject to an inspection are not occupied, the 
officials of the public forces will be empowered to use all the necessary force with the purpose of 
allowing the persons performing the inspection to enter the said premises350. Nevertheless, in some 
jurisdictions, if the entry is carried out using force, some obligations may arise for the persons conducting 
the inspection, for instance, in some competition regimes, if the premises subject to an inspection are not 
occupied at the time of the execution of the search, and consequently, the persons conducting the 
inspection are obliged to use the force to enter the premises, the competition authority will then be 
obliged to compensate anyone who suffers a damage because of the forced entry351, moreover, in other 
jurisdictions, if the persons in charge of the inspection have to use the force to enter due to the fact that 
the concerned premises are not occupied, the latter will then have the obligation to leave the inspected 
premises as effectively secured as these were found352.  
(b) Power to Search the Premises 
 
Another fundamental power vested on the individuals conducting an inspection in the course of an 
investigation for the infringement of the competition law provisions is the right to search the premises 
related to the investigation. This power of investigation allows the persons conducting an inspection to 
search the premises for valuable information that is relevant for the case. The range of premises that can 
be searched varies from one country to another and depending on the faculties granted by the judicial 
warrant or the order issued by the competition authority. In practice, this power of investigation can be 
exercised in conjunction with other powers that the persons conducting the inspection may have. For 
instance, while searching for a certain document, the persons conducting the inspection may ask the 
occupants where those documents may be found, or require explanations regarding the content of those 
documents.  
(c) Power to Search Persons  
 
In some competition regimes, the persons in charge on an inspection are allowed to search certain persons 
in the course of the inspection. The purpose of this investigation power is to gather any documents, 
articles, objects or any other thing that may be under the possession of a determined person. In most 
jurisdictions where this faculty has been granted to the individuals in charge of the inspection, this power 
of investigation will only be exercised if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the searched 
person has personal possession of any document, equipment or article which has a bearing on the 
investigation353. Moreover, the scope of this power of investigation is limited to certain individuals, 
accordingly, in most competition regimes, this faculty will be exercised against the individuals who are 
                                                          
350 In Canada, according to Section 15(6) of the Competition Act, a judge issuing a warrant may order a peace officer to take such 
steps as the judge considers necessary to give the Commissioner or other person access to any premises, record or other thing.  
351 In South Africa, see Section 48(9) of the Competition Act.  
352 In Singapore, see Section 65(12) of the Competition Act. In the UK, see Section 28(5) of the Competition Act.  
353 In Singapore, see Section 65(2)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act. In South Africa, see Section 48(1)(c) of the Competition Act. In 
Zambia, see Section 7(4)(b) of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act.  
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present in the inspected premises at time of the inspection354. Finally, given to the intrusive nature of this 
kind of searches, in some jurisdictions where the competition authority is allowed to conduct an on-site 
inspection under its own discretion or upon a judicial warrant, the power to search individuals who are 
present at the time of the inspection will only be exercised in searches performed with a judicial 
warrant355.  
(d) Power to Request the Production of Documents  
 
As with previously seen investigation powers, the faculty to require the production of documents in the 
course of an inspection has the purpose of gathering any piece of information that has a bearing on the 
investigation. The availability of this investigation power serves as a complement to other powers vested 
on the competition authority such as the ability to enter and search premises given that once the 
individuals in charge of the inspection have entered and searched the concerned premises, the latter will 
then be empowered to require the occupants of the inspected premises to produce any documents which 
may be stored in those places. In practice, depending on the jurisdiction, the exercise of this investigation 
power may be restricted in its scope. For instance, the fact that most competition regimes require that the 
authorization for the performance of an inspection shall be inspired on the assumption that certain 
documents concerned with the case are being kept in the inspected premises, suggest that the officials in 
charge of the inspection will be allowed to request only the production of the specific documents that 
motivated the inspection in the first place356. Despite the preceding, in jurisdictions with broader powers 
of investigation, the competition authorities will be allowed to require the production of any document 
related to the activities of the investigated undertakings357, or any document considered related to any 
matter relevant to the investigation358. Finally, depending on the jurisdiction, the failure to comply with a 
request by the officials of the competition authority conducting the inspection can be sanctioned with the 
imposition of fines359 or even imprisonment360. 
(e)  Power to Examine Documents 
 
A further power of investigation that the officials in charge of an inspection have in the course of the 
search is the ability to examine the documents found in the inspected premises. This faculty is 
                                                          
354 In Malaysia, pursuant to Section 25 of the Competition Act, a Commission officer conducting an inspection may, for the purpose 
of investigating into the infringement or offence, search any person who is in or on the premises.  
355 In Singapore, the Competition Commission is allowed to inspect any premises upon the attainment of a judicial warrant or at the 
sole discretion of the Commission, however, with regard to the right to search persons who are presumed to have under their 
possession relevant information related to the investigation, this power will only be exercised in inspections carried out with a 
judicial warrant (Sections 64 and 65 of the Competition Act). 
356 For instance, in Germany, according to the wording of Section 59(4) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, searches will 
only be made under an order of the competent court, moreover, such order will be granted if it is assumed that documents are 
located in the relevant premises, and the surrender of which may be requested by the Bundeskartellamt. Consequently, the power to 
require the production of documents will be restricted to the documents that motivated the issue of the judicial order.   
357 In Ireland, according to Section 45(3)(d) of the Competition Act, the Competition Authority is allowed to require the production 
of any books, documents or records relating to the activities of the undertaking  which are in under the control of the required 
person.  
358 In The UK, Section 27(5)(b)(i) of the Competition Act, allows investigating officers to require any person on the premises to 
produce any document considered related to any matter relevant to the investigation.  
359 In Germany the failure to comply with the production of requested documents is sanctioned with administrative fines (Section 81 
of the Act Against Restraints of Competition). 
360 In Ireland, the failure to comply with a request for documents in an inspection is punished with a fine not exceeding €3,000 or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or both such fine and such imprisonment (Section 45(10) of the Competition Act).  
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complementary to the abovementioned powers, provided that once the competition authority has entered 
the concerned premises and has acquired certain documents, then it has the ability to examine the said 
documents in order to determine if these contain any incriminating evidence which may be useful for the 
investigation. Depending on the jurisdiction, the scope of this investigation power varies when executed, 
thus, in some competition regimes; the persons conducting the inspection will be allowed to examine any 
document concerned with the commercial activities of the inspected person361. Conversely, in other 
competition regimes, the scope of this power will be limited to the examination of documents which are 
strictly related to the investigation362, or to documents that are relevant for the determination of an 
infringement of competition law363.  As to the type of documents that can be examined, most countries 
have adopted wide provisions that allow competition authorities to examine a variety of documents with 
the purpose of obtaining as much information as possible. Accordingly, the wording of the provisions that 
regulate this investigative power may include: any documents, irrespective of the medium on which they 
are stored; records; agreements; account books; business correspondence; electronic data; books; 
accounts; maps; plans; drawings; diagrams; pictorial or graphic work; microform; accounting records; 
object; discs; tapes; video tapes; devices in which visual images are embodied, photographs; or sound-
tracks; among others.  
(f) Power to Make Copies of Documents 
 
In relation to the aforementioned powers of investigation, the individuals conducting an inspection in the 
course of an investigation by the competition authority are empowered to make copies of certain 
documents found on the inspected premises. The main purpose of this investigative power is to acquire a 
copy of certain evidence found on the inspected premises, and in this way, to allow competition 
authorities the possibility to further examine the copied evidence and/or to safeguard such evidence from 
being destroyed, altered or concealed. In this sense, as a general practice, any relevant evidence which is 
produced in the course of the inspection shall be copied by the persons conducting the inspection; 
however, there are some cases in which by virtue of the characteristics of the concerned evidence the 
latter cannot be copied at the inspected premises. In those cases, some competition rules expressly 
provide that whenever certain evidence cannot be copied on the spot, the competition authority will be 
empowered to seize such evidence for further examination and copying364. As to the form of the copies 
taken, provided that a certain amount of the relevant evidence may be stored in electronic means, most 
competition regimes, allow the persons in charge of the inspection to take copies in any form and from 
documents stored in any medium365. Additionally, in order to preserve the content of the copied materials 
some jurisdictions have established certain requirements to be met when making copies of evidence 
gathered in the course of an inspection. Regarding the copies taken from electronic materials, given to the 
                                                          
361 In Bulgaria, see Article 50(2)(1)of the Law on Protection of Competition. In the EU, see Article 20(2)(b) of Regulation 1/2003. 
362 In South Africa, see Section 48 of the Competition Act.  
363 In Finland, see Section 37 of the Competition Act. In Macedonia, see Article 41 of the Law on the Protection of Competition.  
364 In Bulgaria, the individuals conducting the inspection are empowered to make paper copies, digital copies or in any other 
electronic medium, where it is impossible to copy the materials, the original can be seized (Article 50(2)(3) of the Law on Protection 
of Competition). In Canada, according to Section 15(1)(d) of the Competition Act, the Commissioner or any other person authorized 
by the warrant may search the premises for any record or other thing and copy it or size it for examination or copying. 
365 In Croatia, pursuant to Article 42(4)(3) of the Competition Act, the persons conducting the inspection may take or obtain any 
form of copies from the concerned documents irrespective of the medium on which they are stored. In The EU, Article 20(2)(c) of 
Regulation 1/2003, allows to take or obtain in any form copies of or extracts from books and records.  
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special characteristics of these, some jurisdictions have established certain requirements to be fulfilled 
when copying electronic materials, such as: to seal the electronic copies in the premises subject to the 
inspection; to allow the presence of a representative of the owner of the materials electronically copied 
when the seal is broken and during the review of those materials by the competition authority; and to 
deliver a copy of the electronically copied materials to the party who is the target of the investigation366. 
Moreover, in relation to paper based copies, some competition regimes have established the obligation of 
certifying such copies; the certification shall be done by the persons conducting the inspection and by the 
representatives of the undertakings whose premises are being inspected367. Finally, with regard to the 
materials that can be copied in the course of an inspection, this issue varies from one country to another, 
thus, depending on the jurisdiction, the officials in charge of the inspection will be entitled to copy: any 
materials relevant to the investigation368, or to the determination of the infringement of competition 
law369; the materials that inspired the issue of the authorization to conduct the inspection; or even 
materials which are not in any way related to the investigation in course, but which are related to another 
possible infringement of the competition provisions370.  
(g)  Power to Seize Elements 
 
Another power of investigation that the individuals conducting an inspection have is the ability to seize 
certain elements from the premises subject to the inspection. The faculty to seize elements during an 
inspection concerned with the infringement of competition law allows competition authorities to 
confiscate and remove from the premises certain elements which may be relevant for the investigation. 
There are mainly three justifications related to the exercise of this investigation power when enforcing the 
competition law provisions. Firstly, most competition regimes permit the individuals in charge of an 
inspection to seize certain elements with the purpose of protecting such evidence from being destroyed, 
concealed or manipulated. Accordingly, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that any relevant 
elements may be destroyed, concealed or manipulated, and as a consequence the investigation will be 
hampered, the individuals conducting the inspection will be allowed to seize those elements in order to 
protect their evidential value371. Secondly, in some competition regimes, the ability to seize certain 
elements will be exercised with the purpose of obtaining a copy of a determined piece of evidence which 
for technical reasons cannot be copied on the premises subject to the inspection. In those cases, the 
persons conducting the inspection will be entitled to seize the concerned elements and remove them from 
the inspected premises to be able to copy the concerned elements elsewhere372. And thirdly, in some 
competition regimes, the persons conducting the inspection will be empowered to seize certain elements 
                                                          
366 In Denmark, see Section 18(4) of the Competition Act.  
367 In Bulgaria, see Article 52(2) of the Law on Protection of Competition.  
368 In South Africa, see Section 48(1)(f) of the Competition Act.  
369 In Macedonia, see Article 41(3) of the Law on the Protection of Competition. 
370 In Hungary, see Article 65/A(9) of the Competition Act.  
371 In Croatia, according to Article 42 of the Competition Act, the Competition Agency is entitled to seize the objects found on the 
inspected premises, particularly if it can be reasonably assumed that if left on the premises, the evidence might be destroyed or 
concealed. In Singapore, Section 65 of the Competition Act, allows to seize certain documents for preserving them or preventing 
interference with them, and also for taking copies of them if it not reasonably practicable to take copies on the premises. 
372 In Macedonia, Article 41 of the Law on the Protection of Competition permits to seize certain elements when the originals cannot 
be copied on the premises inspected. In the UK, according to Section 28 of the Competition Act, certain documents may be seized 
for preservation and for preventing their manipulation, additionally; certain documents may be removed from the inspected premises 
if those cannot be copied on the spot.  
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with the purpose of further examination. Thus, in cases where the competition authority will not be 
allowed to fully examine certain evidence for technical or any other reasons, some jurisdictions will 
permit the latter to seize such elements to submit them to a full examination373.  
There are some differences among jurisdictions in relation to the scope of this power of 
investigation. On the one hand, with regard to the type of materials that can be removed from the 
inspected premises, most competition regimes have adopted broad provisions allowing competition 
authorities to seize, inter alia: any element374; thing375; equipment376; object377; book378; or document, 
irrespective of the medium on which it is stored379. Additionally, in some competition regimes, when 
inspecting the individuals occupying the concerned premises, the competition authorities are entitled to 
seize anything, other than the necessary clothing, found under the personal possession of these 
individuals380. On the other hand, in relation to the elements that can be removed and their relation with 
the investigation, depending on the jurisdictions, the officials in charge of the inspection will be allowed 
to seize: only the elements which are related to the investigation in course381; only the materials that 
motivated the award of the authorization to conduct the inspection382; or any materials that are related to a 
possible infringement of competition law, even if such infringement is not the subject matter of the 
investigation in question383.    
Due to the ability of this investigative power to restrict certain fundamental rights, i.e. private 
property, the possibility to remove materials from the premises inspected is expressly forbidden in some 
competition regimes384. In addition, in jurisdictions where this faculty has been granted to competition 
authorities, the exercise of this power is regulated in different ways. For instance, in most competition 
regimes, the exercise of this seizure power is restricted by time, which means that an object that has been 
seized from an inspected premise will have to be returned to its proprietary in a certain period of time385. 
                                                          
373 In South Africa, according to Section 49 of the Competition Act, anything which is important for the investigation can be 
removed from the inspected premises for further examination and for safekeeping. 
374 In Belgium, Article 44 §3(2°) of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition allows the competition prosecutors to seize 
elements relative to their investigation. 
375 In Canada, according to Section 15 of the Competition Act, the Commissioner or any other person named in the warrant may 
seize any record or thing as long as it is established in the warrant. In Kenya, Section 32(3)(d) of the Competition Act allows to 
remove anything that has a bearing o the investigation from the inspected premises, upon the issue of a receipt for the items 
removed.   
376 In Singapore, according to Section 65 of the Competition Act, any equipment or article which relates to any matter to the 
investigation may be removed from the premises for examination purposes.  
377 In Croatia, Article 42 of the Competition Act allows to seize objects and documents found on the premises inspected. In 
Germany, the Bundeskartellamt is empowered to seize objects which may be of importance as evidence in the investigation (Section 
58 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition).  
378 In Ireland, according to Section 45 of the Competition Act allows the persons authorized by the Authority to seize any books, 
documents or records related to the activities of the undertakings.  
379 In Bulgaria, pursuant to Article 50 of the Law on Protection of Competition, the Competition Commission is empowered to seize 
all documents and records, related to the activities of the undertakings or associations of undertakings, irrespective of the medium 
on which they are stored.  
380 In Malaysia, see Section 25 of the Competition Act. 
381 In Kenya, Section 32(3)(d) of the Competition Act allows to remove anything that has a bearing on the investigation from the 
inspected premises. In Poland, Article 90 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection allows the seizure of objects which 
are relevant evidence for the investigation.  
382 In the UK, according to Section 28 of the Competition Act, the officers of the Director General of Fair Trading are allowed to 
take possession of any document which motivated the issue of the warrant for the inspection.  
383 In Bulgaria, Article 50(4) of the Law on Protection of Competition allows to seize any document or evidence found if they 
contain data raising well-founded doubts of other infringements of the competition provisions. 
384 In Mexico, according to Article 31(V) of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the seizure of materials in the course of an 
inspection is strictly forbidden.   
385 In Bulgaria, according Article 50(4) and (5) of the Law on Protection of Competition, the seized materials shall be returned after 
the Competition Commission’s decision has entered into force, unless the proprietary of the seized item makes a request for the 
materials to be returned before. In Canada, any record or thing that has been seized shall be returned to its owner no later than sixty 
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Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the persons conducting the inspection will be under the obligation to 
issue a receipt to the proprietary identifying the seized items386. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the 
competition authorities are under the obligation of submitting the seized materials before the competent 
court in order to obtain a court order allowing them to retain the seized elements387.  
The proprietaries of the seized materials have some prerogatives over the removed materials. 
Thus, in some jurisdictions, the proprietaries of equipment or articles which are susceptible of being 
seized due to their evidential value may request the persons conducting the inspection to allow them to 
retain those elements in the premises under certain conditions388. Similarly, in other jurisdictions, the 
owners of the seized materials are entitled at all reasonable times to inspect any of the seized materials 
and to make copies of them389. Finally, in some jurisdictions, when the seize objects are of a perishable 
nature, the competition authority is entitled to sell them, and later on, if the owner of those objects is 
convicted for the infringement of the competition provisions the authority is allowed to keep the amount 
made from that sale, oppositely, if the owner of the seized materials is discharged for the alleged 
infringement of competition law, then he has the right to recover the amount obtained through the sale390.  
(h)  Power to Seal or Mark Elements  
 
A further power of investigation vested on the individuals conducting an inspection in the curse of an 
investigation by the competition authority is the ability to seal or mark certain elements or premises. The 
main purpose of this investigation power is to protect certain elements that have a bearing on the 
investigation from being destroyed, concealed or manipulated, by securing them through the imposition 
of a seal that guaranties that the evidence has not been altered during the absence of the persons 
conducting the inspection. Moreover, in some competition regimes, the seal of a determined material may 
occur due to the inability of the competition authority to seize such material, provided that by reason of its 
nature, size or amount, it is not practicable to remove it from the premises391. Consequently, unlike with 
the faculty of competition authorities to seize or remove certain materials from the inspected premises, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
days from the seizure (Section 18(4) of the Competition Act.  In Croatia, Article 42(4)(4) of the Competition Act, allows the 
Competition Agency to retain seized materials as long as it takes to make photocopies of them, however, these cannot be retained 
after the day on which the Agency closes the proceedings in the case concerned. In Ireland, according to Section 45(6) any 
document or record seized may be kept for a period no longer than six months. In Macedonia, according to Article 41(1)(4) of the 
Law on the Protection of Competition, the seized materials can be retained for the period necessary to make copies of them, if such 
copies cannot be made on the spot. In South Africa, pursuant to Section 49 of the Competition Act, any seized materials shall be 
returned to their proprietary as soon as possible. In the UK, according to Section 28 of the Competition Act, any seized materials 
cannot be retained for a period of more than three months.  
386 In Kenya, Section 32(3)(d) of the Competition Act allows to remove anything that has a bearing on the investigation from the 
inspected premises, upon the issue of a receipt for the items removed. In the US, the official conducting the inspection has to give a 
receipt for the property taken to the owner according to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
387 In Canada, Section 17 of the Competition Act, the judge who issued the warrant will have to determine if the seized materials can 
be retained by the Commissioner, provided that those materials are required for an inquiry or any proceeding under the provisions of 
the Act.    
388 In Singapore, according to Section 65 of the Competition Act, the officer in charge of the inspection may allow any equipment or 
article which has a bearing on an investigation and which may be seized from the inspected premises to be retained on those 
premises subject to such conditions as the named officer may require.   
389 In Barbados, see Section 27(7) of the Fair Trading Commission Act. In Malaysia, according to Section 19 of the Competition 
Act, the owner of a document which is being retained by the Competition Commission is entitled to be supplied, as soon as 
practicable, with a copy certified by the Commission to be a true copy of the document.  
390 In Sri Lanka, see Section 59 of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act.  
391 In Malaysia, see Section 25 of the Competition Act.  
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the possibility to seal a determined element in the course of an inspection does not necessarily entail the 
confiscation of the said element392.  
Depending on the jurisdiction, a variety of elements can be sealed in the course of an inspection 
by the competition authority. In most countries, the competition authorities are empowered to seal 
evidential materials such as books, records, objects, or documents, irrespective of the medium on which 
these are stored. In such cases, the individuals in charge of the investigation will be entitled to seal these 
elements with the purpose of protecting them from destruction or concealment and preserving their 
content from manipulation393. Additionally, most jurisdictions also permit the competition authorities to 
seal certain premises where relevant information concerned with the investigation is being kept. This 
faculty empowers the individuals conducting the inspection to seal the inspected premises overnight in 
order to prevent the entrance of any unauthorized person who may destroy, conceal or alter the content of 
any relevant evidence stored on the sealed premises. Additionally, in some competition regimes where a 
judicial warrant is required to conduct an inspection, the competition authorities are empowered to order 
the seal of the concerned premises until the judicial warrant is available394.    
There are some restrictions to the exercise of this investigative power. Thus, in the majority of 
jurisdictions where competition authorities are allowed to seal premises, this faculty has been restricted to 
business premises only395. Alternatively, in some competition regimes, the competition authorities are 
allowed to seal residential premises too396. Finally, the ability to seal premises in the course of an 
inspection is also restricted by time; accordingly, a determined premise cannot be sealed indefinitely397.   
As to the ability of competition authorities to mark or stamp certain evidence in the course of an 
inspection, this power of investigation is mainly concerned with the preservation of the content of certain 
materials that have been found on the inspected premises. Thus, in jurisdictions where the competition 
authorities are empowered to mark or stamp a determined document, the latter will do so in order to avoid 
the document from being exchanged or altered, provided that in some of these countries the competition 
                                                          
392 In Mexico, according to Article 31 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition Whenever a sealed document or object is 
indispensable for the activities of the inspected undertaking; the latter will be allowed to use such elements once their content has 
been reproduced by the public servants conducting the inspection.   
393 In Kenya, according to Section 32(3)(d) of the Competition Act, the authorized persons may attach anything that has a bearing on 
the investigation on the premises inspected for examination and safekeeping. 
394 In Norway, see Section 25 of the Competition Act.  
395 In Bulgaria, Article 50(2)(6) of the Law on Protection of Competition allows the Competition Commission to seal any premises, 
means of transport and other locations, used by the inspected undertakings or associations of undertakings, as well as commercial or 
accounting books or other information media. In the EU, only business premises may be sealed (Article 20(2)(d) of Regulation 
1/2003). In Finland, Section 37(2) of the Competition Act allows the official conducting the inspection to seal business premises and 
business correspondence and data. In Latvia, according to Section 9(5)(4)(g) of the Competition Law, the non-residential premises, 
means of transport, structures and other objects and the storage facilities may be temporally sealed to ensure the preservation of 
evidence. In Mexico, according to Article 31 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the public servants in charge of the 
inspection are empowered to secure by sealing and marking the information, documents and offices and any other means which may 
contain evidence supporting the infringement of the competition law provisions. 
396 In Belgium, according to Article 44 §3 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition, the individuals conducting the 
inspection may seal the residential premises of heads of undertakings, directors, managers and other members of staff, without 
exceeding a period of 72 hours.  
397 In Lithuania, Article 26(4) of the Law on Competition allows the authorized officers of the Competition Council to seal the 
premises used by the undertaking under investigation for the time period necessary to carry out checks, however, no longer than 
three calendar days. In Macedonia, Article 41(1)(6) of the Law on the Protection of Competition, allows the authorized officials of 
the Commission to seal the business premises and books or other documentation for the period and the extent necessary for the 
examination, but not longer than seven days. 
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authorities are not entitled to seize, confiscate or remove any property from the premises inspected398. 
Nevertheless, in some competition regimes, the ability to stamp certain documents is not related to the 
fact that the competition authorities cannot seize relevant materials from the inspected premises399.  
(i) Power to Ask for Explanations and Statements 
 
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the individuals conducting an inspection in the course of an 
investigation by the competition authority are entitled to question certain individuals or to require a 
statement from those persons. Regarding the ability to question individuals, most competition regimes 
enable the persons in charge of an inspection to ask for explanations about the evidence gathered in the 
course of the inspection. This faculty serves the purpose of gaining insight clarification about the possible 
evidential value of the materials found during the inspection by the occupants of the inspected premises. 
The advantage that this power of investigation provides is that the clarifications are submitted by 
individuals that are familiar with the content and nature of the materials found on the premises, in 
addition, it allows the competition authorities to better scrutinize all the information collected during the 
inspection, and to effectively determine the evidential value of such information. In practice, the power to 
ask for explanations applies to both the information acquired by the officials of the competition authority 
while searching the inspected premises400, and additionally, to the information that has been obtained 
from the occupants of the inspected premises at the request of the individuals in charge of the 
inspection401.  
As to the form on which these explanations are produced, there are some differences across 
jurisdictions. For instance, in some competition regimes the explanations to the competition authority 
have to be rendered orally402, alternatively, in other competition regimes the explanations have to be 
produced in writing403, and finally, in some competition regimes there is the possibility to submit the 
explanations both orally and in writing404.  
In addition to the preceding power of investigation, in some jurisdictions, the competition 
authorities are allowed to require a statement from certain individuals. Depending on the jurisdictions, the 
subject-matter of the statements will vary, accordingly, in some competition regimes, the individuals 
conducting the inspection will be entitled to require from certain individuals on the inspected premises a 
                                                          
398 In Mexico, according to Article 31 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the individuals in charge of the inspection can 
mark certain documents with the purpose of safeguarding their content, give that these cannot be removed from the inspected 
premises. 
399 In Pakistan, according to Section 34 of the Act No. XIX of 2010, the Competition Commission is entitled to stamp, copy, 
impound any document in the course of an inspection under the provision of the Act.   
400 In Finland, see Section 37(2) of the Competition Act.  
401 In the UK, under Section 27 of the Competition Act, the investigating officer entering the concerned premises is empowered to 
require any person on the premises to produce any document considered to be related to the investigation, and if produced, to 
provide an explanation of it.  
402 In the EU, see Article 20(2)(e) of Regulation 1/2003.  
403 In Macedonia, an authorized person or other employee in the undertaking submitting a written explanation regarding the facts or 
documents relevant for determining the existence of a misdemeanor within a determined deadline (Article 41(1)(8) of the Law on 
the Protection of Competition). 
404 In Kazakhstan, according to Article 64(1)(3) of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Competition, the officers of the 
antimonopoly body are entitled to request from the directors, officers and other employees of the inspected undertakings, written 
and verbal explanations on questions arising during the inspection. In Lithuania, there is the possibility to get oral and written 
explanations from persons connected with the activity of the undertakings under investigation, and to request them to arrive in the 
office of the authorized investigating officer in order to provide explanations (Article 26(1)(5) of the Law on Competition). 
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statement on the facts or documents related to the subject-matter and the purpose of the inspection405. 
Alternatively, in other jurisdictions, the persons in charge of the inspection will be entitled to require 
certain individuals to state where a determined document may be found406. Lastly, the form in which the 
required statements may be produce also varies from country to country, in that sense, depending on the 
jurisdiction, the requested statements will be produced, orally407 or in writing408.  
(j) Power to Use or Cause the Use of Computer Systems 
 
Another investigation power that some competition authorities have in the course of an on-site inspection 
is the ability to use or cause to be used any computer system found on the inspected premises. Provided 
that certain relevant evidence concerned with the investigation in course may be digitally stored on 
computer systems, some competition regimes expressly allow the individuals conducting the inspection to 
use any computer inside the inspected premises to get access to such information409. Furthermore, some 
of these competition regimes may additionally provide for the possibility to require an individual in 
charge of the handling of the computer system to assist the persons in charge of the investigation to gather 
any relevant evidence stored on such system410, or to produce at the request of the persons in charge of the 
inspection any document digitally stored411. Finally, in some jurisdictions, the persons conducting the 
inspection will be entitled to have access to any necessary password, encryption code, decryption code, 
software or hardware or any other thing to allow access to the computer system412.   
(k) Other Powers of Investigation 
 
In addition to the most common investigation powers aforementioned, some competition regimes provide 
for other powers to be exercised in the course of an inspection. For instance, in some countries, the 
competition provisions empower the persons conducting the inspection to take photos or film in the 
course of the inspection413. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the persons in charge of the inspection are 
authorized to prohibit the individuals occupying the premises to leave the site under inspection, to move 
without permission, and to converse with other individuals on the premises414. Additionally, in other 
competition regimes, the official of the competition authority conducting the inspection are allowed to 
request the persons occupying the premises to show the content of their pockets or bags415. Moreover, in 
some competition regimes the competition authorities are empowered to order individuals to accompany 
                                                          
405 In Croatia, see Article 42(4)(7) of the Competition Act. 
406 In Singapore, see Section 64 and 65 of the Competition Act.  
407 In Denmark, see Section 18(1) of the Competition Act. 
408 In Croatia, see Article 42(4)(7) of the Competition Act. 
409 A bunch of jurisdictions have provisions that enable the persons conducting the inspection to search for, examine and copy 
documents and information, irrespective of the medium on which these are stored. Consequently, in practice this includes any 
material which is stored in computer systems.  
410 In Canada, Section 16 of the Competition Act authorizes the persons conducting an inspection to use or cause to be used any 
computer system on the premises to search any data contained in or available to the computer system. In Kenya, the individuals 
conducting the inspection may use any computer system on the premises, or require assistance of any person on the premises to use 
that computer system, to search data contained in the system (Section 32(3) of the Competition Ac).  
411 In the UK, according to Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act, the persons conducting the inspection may require any 
information which is kept in a computer and is related to any matter relevant to the investigation, to be produced in a form in which 
it can be taken away, and in which it is visible and legible.  
412 In Malaysia, see Section 27 of the Competition Act.  
413 In Russia, see Article 25(3)(3) of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Protection of Competition.  
414 In Latvia, see Section 9 of the Competition Law.  
415 In Denmark, see Section 18(1) of the Competition Act. 
129 
 
the officials conducting an investigation416. Finally, in most competition regimes the competition 
provisions enable the persons conducting the inspection to require the assistance of experts417 and police 
officers418.    
5. Powers of Investigation in Criminal Proceedings 
 
The nature of criminal proceedings reflects on the characteristics of the investigative powers used in such 
cases. The seriousness of the sanctions imposed on individuals and undertakings for the infringement of 
the criminal provisions of competition law makes the exercise of the investigation powers in criminal 
proceedings different from the powers used in civil or administrative proceedings. Thus, depending on the 
jurisdiction, there are certain differences in the application of investigative powers in criminal 
proceedings compared to the application of investigative powers in other procedures concerned with the 
enforcement of competition law.  
The first difference evidenced while conducting an investigation for the infringement of 
competition law in criminal proceedings is concerned with the authority in charge of the investigation, 
and accordingly, the authority vested with the powers of investigation. In some competition law regimes, 
the competition authority lacks competence to carry out an investigation for the infringement of 
competition law in criminal proceedings. This means that whenever a criminal proceeding concerned with 
a competition law matter is being instituted, a different institution than the competition authority will be 
empowered to exercise the powers of investigation. This mainly occurs in jurisdictions where the relevant 
criminal provisions do not grant the competition authorities competence to investigate the infringement of 
criminal offenses419. Instead, in other competition regimes, the competition authorities are entitled to 
conduct the investigation for the infringement of competition law, irrespective of the nature of 
proceedings, i.e. criminal, administrative or civil420. 
A further issue related to the investigative powers in criminal proceedings is concerned with the 
formalities and restrictions attached to the exercise of these powers. Due to the more intrusive nature of 
these powers of investigation, most jurisdictions have implemented more formalities to their application 
than the ones required in administrative/civil proceedings. For instance, in jurisdictions where the 
competition authorities were allowed to require information from the concerned parties in a voluntary 
way, such requirement has to be done through a formal request in criminal proceedings421. Additionally, 
in some competition regimes where the authorities have power to enter and search the premises related to 
                                                          
416 In Israel, see Section 46 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law.  
417 In Kazakhstan, see Article 64(1)(4) of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Competition. In Lithuania, see Section 26 of the 
Law on Competition. 
418 In Mexico, see Article 31(v) of the Federal Law on Economic Competition. 
419 In Russia, the Federal Antimonopoly Service is in charge of the application of the competition provisions in regular proceedings, 
however, whenever criminal proceedings are being instituted; those proceedings are handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
which has sole authority to conduct the criminal investigation. In the US, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice will 
request the opening of a Grand Jury Investigation to prosecute criminal offenses, in those procedures; the Grand Jury will be in 
charge of the investigation.  
420 In the UK, the OFT is the authority in charge of the investigations under the provisions of the Competition Act and the provisions 
criminal provisions of the Enterprise Act.  
421 In the US, both the FTC and the Antitrust Division are allowed to make voluntary requests for information and documents in 
civil proceedings, oppositely, in criminal proceedings, the Antitrust Division is only allowed to request information and documents 
through the issue of Grand Jury subpoenas Ad Testificandum, or subpoenas Duces Tectum, respectively (Antitrust Division Manual, 
III-91-94).    
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an investigation under their own discretion, and under the issue of a judicial warrant in 
administrative/civil proceedings, in criminal proceedings, these same authorities are only allowed to 
inspect the concerned premises under the prior attainment of a judicial warrant422.  
The main purpose of these formalities and restrictions in criminal proceedings is to impose 
certain boundaries on the government’s investigations in order to safeguard the fundamental rights of 
individuals in the course of a criminal procedure. Accordingly, it is fundamental that the authorities 
conducting a criminal investigation comply with every formal requirement during the procedure, 
otherwise, any piece of evidence that has not been collected in a proper way may be declared illegal. The 
main requirement for the correct exercise of investigation powers in criminal procedures is usually the 
prior acquisition of a judicial warrant that allows the authority to perform a certain activity in the course 
of an investigation. The absence of this judicial warrant, when required, will invalidate any piece of 
evidence collected in the investigation423. However, there are other requisites that have to be complied 
with when exercising a certain power of investigation in criminal proceedings, for instance, the 
participation of witnesses when conducting an on-site inspection, or when conducting a body-search424.  
Another issue that is concerned with the nature of criminal proceedings is the extent of the 
powers of investigation. Provided that the criminal offenses are more harmful to society, the powers of 
investigation granted to the authorities responsible for detection of these offenses tend to be more 
intrusive than the powers granted for investigations which are not related to a criminal offense. For that 
reason, besides the more traditional investigative powers (to request information, to request documents, to 
summon witnesses, or to enter and search premises), some competition regimes where certain 
anticompetitive practices are considered as criminal offenses have vested the authorities in charge of the 
procedure with additional powers of investigation with the purpose of providing such authorities with 
effective means for proving the existence of a criminal offense.  
In that sense, in some of these jurisdictions, the authorities conducting the investigation are 
empowered to carry out intrusive surveillance on the premises that are related to an investigation. This 
surveillance can be made through the introduction of a covert individual in the premises (an informant), 
or through the use of a surveillance device (recording device). As with other powers of investigation, the 
exercise of this one requires the acquisition, in advance, of a judicial warrant allowing the surveillance of 
the concerned premises425.   
Furthermore, in some countries the authorities conducting the investigation are allowed to 
intercept the communications of the persons who are suspected to be participants in anticompetitive 
                                                          
422 In the UK, the OFT is allowed to enter and search premises with or without a judicial warrant in non-criminal proceedings 
(Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act). However, under the provision of the Enterprise Act, the OFT is only allowed to enter 
and search premises in criminal proceedings under the issue, in advance, of a judicial warrant (Section 194 of the Enterprise Act). 
423 To see on what grounds a piece of evidence may be declared illegal in the Grand Jury procedure in the US, see the Grand Jury 
Manual (IV-D).  
424 In Japan, the participation of a female witness is required when the officials of the Federal Trade Commission are performing a 
body-search on a female (Section 109 of the Antimonopoly Act). 
425 In Russia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is empowered to monitor or record discussions under the provisions of Chapter 25 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. In the UK, under the issue of a judicial warrant, the OFT is allowed to 
use intrusive surveillance in criminal proceedings according to Sections 199 and 200 of the Enterprise Act. In the US, the Antitrust 
Division is entitled to petition the court the use of wiretaps and electronic surveillance (18 USC § 2516(1)(r)). 
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conducts considered as criminal offenses. Due to the intrusive nature of this power of investigation, the 
exercise of the latter is also subject to the issue, in advance, of a judicial warrant allowing the interception 
of the communications. Thus, depending on the jurisdictions the investigating authorities will be allowed 
to intercept a variety of communication which may include postal communications, electronic 
messages426, or telegrams427, among others. 
Finally, in other competition regimes, the competition authorities conducting the investigation 
may have additional powers in the course of the proceedings, such as to prohibit any person from entering 
or leaving certain premises that are related to a criminal investigation without their permission428, or to 
arrest and detain individuals who are suspects in a criminal investigation for the infringement of 
competition law429.  
6. Sanctions in the Course of an Investigation  
 
Most jurisdictions have implemented specific provisions aiming at protecting the integrity of the 
investigation process. As stated before, the secretive nature of antitrust infringements is also evident in 
the actions of the persons involved in anticompetitive practices in the course of an investigation by the 
competition authorities. The perpetrators of competition law breaches are frequently adept to 
concealment, which means that those persons are often wiling to obstruct the investigation in any way 
possible so they will not get caught by the competition authority. The most frequent obstructions to the 
investigations concerned with the infringement of the competition provisions are usually related to the 
failure to comply with an order to provide information or documents, to provide false or misleading 
information in response to such orders, or to obstruct a legal inspection by the officials of the competition 
authority, among others. Thus, with the purpose of safeguarding the process of investigation and to grant 
the competition authorities with effective powers of investigation, most competition regimes have 
introduced certain sanctions that can be imposed on the persons who fail to comply with an order or try to 
obstruct the investigation in any way.  
As with other features of the investigations concerned with the enforcement of the competition 
law provisions, the sanctions for the failure to comply with an order to provide information or documents, 
or the obstruction of the investigation are different from one country to another, however, some 
similarities can be observed while studying the provisions of some competition law regimes. 
In relation to the nature of the sanctions imposed for the failure to comply with an order 
requesting information or documentation, or for the obstruction of the investigation, this may be different 
depending on the jurisdiction. On the one hand, in some competition regimes, the sanctions imposed for 
                                                          
426 In Ireland, according to the provisions of the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages Act of 1993, the 
police or other public authority vested with investigative powers (Competition Authority), upon the acquisition of a judicial warrant, 
may intercept postal and telecommunication messages. 
427 In Japan, according to Article 103 of the Antimonopoly Act, the FTC is empowered to intercept postal items, correspondence 
mails or telegrams that are sent by or to criminal suspects. 
428 In Japan, see Article 108 of the Antimonopoly Act.  
429 Given that in Ireland hard core cartels are arrestable offences sanctioned with imprisonment for up to five years, the Gardaí is 
allowed to arrest and detain individuals suspected for participating in hard core cartel activities for up to twelve hours (Criminal 
Justice Act 1984). 
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these infractions are of a civil/administrative nature430. On the other hand, in some competition regimes 
these infractions amount to a criminal offense, and therefore, the sanctions imposed on the perpetrators 
have a criminal nature431. It has to be noted, however, that in most regimes that sanction criminally the 
failure to comply with an order or the obstruction of an investigation by the competition authority, the 
penalties for the participation in anticompetitive practices is not sanctioned criminally. This occurs 
because, in those regimes, the involvement in an anticompetitive conduct is not penalized criminally; 
instead, obstructing the labor of a functionary of State, such as an official of the competition authority, 
amounts to a criminal offense.      
A further issue related to the sanctions imposed for the failure to comply with an order or the 
obstruction of an investigation by the competition authority is the types of practices that are punished. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, there is a variety of actions that are sanctioned for interfering with the 
investigation by the competition authority, some of these include: failure to comply with an order to 
provide information or documents432; failure to comply with an order to give testimony433; giving 
inaccurate, untimely, untrue, imprecise, misleading or incomplete information434; breaking the integrity or 
destroying seals affixed by the competition authority435; attempting to impede or prevent an 
investigation436; destroying or the falsification of documents437; interfering with the investigation of the 
competition authority438;  obstructing an inspection by the competition authority439; or assaulting an 
official of the competition authority440; among others.    
A further difference regarding the punishment for the failure to comply with an order or the 
obstruction of an investigation by the competition authority is related to the persons on whom a sanction 
can be imposed. In this regard, in some competition regimes, only the undertakings can be punished for 
these infractions441, alternatively, other jurisdictions, allow the possibility to sanction both individuals and 
undertakings442.  
Similarly, the types of sanctions that can be imposed on the perpetrators of the preceding actions 
vary from one country to another. The most common sanction for this kind of infractions is the imposition 
                                                          
430 At the EU level, according to Article 23.5 of Regulation 1/2003, the fines imposed by the Commission on undertakings and 
association of undertakings for the obstruction of an investigation for the infringement of competition law shall not be of a criminal 
law nature.  
431 In Canada, Section 64 of the Competition Act establishes that every person who in any matter impedes or prevents or attempt to 
impede or prevent any inquiry or examination under the provisions of the Act, is guilty of a criminal offense.  
432 In South Africa, see Section 71(b)(ii) of the Competition Act.  
433 In Papua New Guinea, see Section 127 of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act.  
434 In Malaysia, see Section 23 of the Competition Act. In Pakistan, see Section 38(d) of Act No. XIX of 2010. In Honduras, see 
Article 46 of Decree No. 357-2005.  
435 In Malaysia, see Section 25.7 of the Competition Act.  
436 In Canada, see Section 64.1 of the Competition Act.  
437 In Malaysia, see Section 24 of the Competition Act.  
438 In Sri Lanka, see Section 36(3)(b) of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act.  
439 In Bulgaria, see Section 100(6)(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition.  
440 In Barbados, the assault, obstruction or interference with any Commissioner is punished with a fine of $40.000 or imprisonment 
for 6 months, or both (Section 44 of the Fair Trade Commission Act).  
441 In Switzerland, pursuant to Article 52 of the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition, only undertakings can 
be fined for the failure to submit requested information.  
442 In China, according to Article 52 of the Anti-monopoly Law, provides for fines to be imposed on entities and individuals for the 
failure to comply with a request for information. In Korea, both undertakings and individuals may be fine for the failure to comply 
with the requirements made by the FTC with a fine for negligence according to Article 69-2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act. 
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of administrative fines for the failure to comply with an order or the obstruction of the investigation443. 
Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the competition authorities can impose periodic penalty payments in 
order to compel a requested party to satisfy the petition of the competition authority444. In the most severe 
jurisdictions, the failure to comply with an order by the competition authority or the obstruction of an 
investigation is sanctioned with imprisonment445. Finally, there are other remedies that can be imposed to 
the parties that have failed to comply with an order or have obstructed the investigation, such as to order 
the parties to make a rectification within a time limit446, or to order the arrest of a witness duly summoned 
who fails to appear before the competition authority447.    
Finally, in practice, there have been a few cases on which the competition authorities have 
successfully sanctioned individuals and undertakings for failing to comply with an order or obstructing an 
investigation related to the infringement of the competition law provisions. Most of these are concerned 
with: the destruction or seals affixed by a competition authority448; the obstruction of an investigation by 
intentionally delaying the production of requested documents449; obstructing an inspection by a 
competition authority450; or the failure to appear before a competition authority to give testimony451.  
IV. LENIENCY PROGRAMS 
 
1. Introduction 
As seen before, the core of the competition law provisions is the prohibition of hard-core cartels452. The 
intrinsic anticompetitive nature of this type of practices has led jurisdictions to consider them as the 
“supreme evil of antitrust”453 and “cancers on the open market economy”454, consequently, these should 
                                                          
443 In Belgium, see Article 64 of the Act in the Protection of Economic Competition. In the EU, see Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003. 
In Romania, see Section 50 of the Competition Act. In Switzerland, see Article 52 of the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints 
of Competition. In Turkey, see Article 17 of the Law on the Protection of Competition. 
444 In Algeria, see Article 59 of the Competition Ordinance. In Bulgaria, see Article 100 of the Law on Protection of Competition. In 
Denmark, see Section 17 of the Competition Act. In the EU, see Article 24 of Regulation 1/2003. In Italy, see Section 14(5) of the 
Competition and Fair Trade Act. 
445 In the Fiji Islands, the failure to supply required information is an offense sanctioned with $1,000 and imprisonment for 12 
months, for natural persons, and with a fine of $5,000 for legal persons (Section 119 of the Commerce Commission Decree). In 
Malta, the failure to comply is a criminal offense sanctioned with a criminal fine and imprisonment for up to six months (Section 23 
of the Competition Act). in Mauritius, according to Section 52 of the Competition Act, a person who fails to comply with a request 
made by the Competition Commission shall be guilty of an offense, and sanctioned with a fine not exceeding 50,000 rupees and 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, for natural person, and a fine not exceeding 200,000 rupees, for legal persons. In the 
UK, pursuant to Section 42 of the Competition Act, the failure to comply with a request by the OFT is a criminal offense punished 
with criminal fines or imprisonment for up to two years. 
446 In China, according to Article 52 of the Anti-monopoly Law, if business operators refuse to provide related materials and 
information, or refuse to or obstruct the investigation, the antimonopoly authority shall order them to make rectification or impose a 
fine.  
447 In Malta, see the Second Schedule (Article 37)(8) of the Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority Act.   
448 In the EU, in May 2011, the Commission fined Suez Environnement and Lyonnaise des Eaux €8 million for the breach of a seal 
during an inspection. Press release available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/632&type=HTML  
449 In the US, in October 2004, a fish distributor was charged with obstructing the grand jury investigation of a suspected conspiracy 
for price fixing for intentionally delaying the production of documents that the grand jury subpoenaed. Press release available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/October/04_at_705.htm  
450 In the EU, in November 2007, in a case for the price fixing cartel of professional videotape producers, the Commission increased 
the fine on Sony by 30% for obstructing the Commission’s investigation during an on-site inspection. Press release available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1725  
451 In Ireland, in 2005, a director was successfully prosecuted for an offense under Section 31(4)(a) of the Competition Act (failure 
to appear before the Competition Authority on foot of a witness summons). See the 2006 Annual Report of the Irish Competition 
Authority (Page 12), available at: http://www.tca.ie/EN/News--Publications/Annual-Reports.aspx   
452 Chapter One, Section 7. 
453 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
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be considered as always unlawful without the need of any further inquiry455. From this recognition of 
hard-core cartels as the most egregious violations of competition law, the fight against this type of 
anticompetitive practices has become the focus of competition law policy and enforcement456. In this 
regard, most competition law regimes have implemented specific enforcement procedures and sanctions 
to prevent, discover and punish the formation cartels. In practice, the heavy persecution of hard-core 
cartels and the seriousness of the sanctions imposed on undertakings and individuals involved in this kind 
of behavior, which depending on the competition system may include high financial penalties on 
undertakings and even the imprisonment of individuals, have led the participants to take elaborate 
measures to try to conceal their unlawful activities. This in turn has exponentially challenged the 
enforcement actions of competition law enforcers, especially in detecting and proving the infringement of 
the competition law provisions.  
 For the abovementioned reasons, some competition systems have introduced specific programs 
that offer cartel participants a more lenient treatment in exchange for information and cooperation with 
the ultimate purpose of facilitating the discovery and termination of cartels. Leniency programs457 are 
systems that grant partial or total exoneration from the penalties that would otherwise be applicable to a 
cartel member which reports its cartel membership to a competition authority and offers its full 
cooperation during the investigation. This cooperation can consist in the facilitation of intelligence and/or 
evidence related to the competition law infringement, and/or the recognition of the infringement and 
acceptance of the reduced penalty. Additionally, it can also include the acceptance of remedial or 
compensatory measures. Finally, depending on the competition regime in question, the sanctions to be 
waived or reduced may include: financial penalties on undertakings, financial penalties on individuals, 
director disqualification and/or imprisonment.  
 According to the preceding, it goes without saying that in all competition regimes that have 
implemented leniency programs, the use of these is expressly restricted to hard-core cartels because of 
their particular nature458. Hence, other practices contrary the competition law provisions are not suitable 
for leniency programs, provided that these do not have the particular characteristics of cartels, such as 
being continuative, collective and hard to detect by the competition authorities459.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
454 MONTI, M., ‘Cartels Why and How? Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive behavior?’ Speech delivered to 3rd 
Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, September 2000.  
455 The approach of the US Supreme Court to declare hard-core cartels as illegal per se (Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United 
States, 356 US 1 (1958)) has been followed by most jurisdictions in the fight against this type of anticompetitive practices. 
456 OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 1998. 
457 The term “leniency program” or “leniency” is used in this section to make reference to all programs and situations which offer 
either full immunity (usually referred to as amnesty) or a significant reduction in penalties that would otherwise have been imposed 
on a participant in a cartel, in exchange for information about the cartel which satisfies specific standards prior to or during an 
investigation by the competition authority. 
458 In jurisdictions where the cartel activities include vertical agreements, such as vertical price-fixing (i.e. resale price maintenance), 
the leniency program also applies to this type of anticompetitive practices. This is the case of the UK where the prohibition of the 
Chapter I of the Competition Act covers both horizontal and vertical agreements. In this line, the OFT’s guidance on leniency 
recognizes its applicability to vertical restrictions of competition, specifically, to resale price maintenance (OFT, Leniency and no-
action: OFT’s guidance note on the handling of applications, 2008, p. 70). 
459 ZINGALES, Nicolo (2008), ‘European and American Leniency Programmes: Two Models Towards Convergence?’. Competition 
Law Review, Volume 5, Issue 1, p. 7. 
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 The origins of leniency programs, as we know them today, can be traced back to the 1970s460. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of effective leniency programs has involved a continuous process of 
reforms over the years461. With time and practice, leniency programs have become the most important 
investigative tool for detecting cartel activity in some competition systems. Moreover, the apparent 
success of leniency programs in these jurisdictions has inspired other competition regimes to implement 
leniency programs as part of their arsenal against hard-core cartels, in this sense, while in the 1990s only 
one jurisdiction had a leniency program, by 2010, over fifty competition regimes had implemented 
leniency programs462.  
2. Benefits and Negative Effects of Leniency Programs 
 
Over the years, and due to their success in cartel enforcement, leniency programs have been considered as 
the “single and most significant development in cartel enforcement”463, and as “one of the great 
successes of competition policy in recent years”464. This success of leniency programs in determined 
competition regimes provoked the proliferation of these programs all over the world. As a consequence, 
competition authorities have been driven to implement these kinds of programs for the professed benefits 
that these may have on the overall enforcement of the competition law provisions.  
 Accordingly, the implementation of an effective leniency policy may contribute to the optimal 
enforcement of the competition law provisions and improve the level of compliance of the antitrust rules 
through the increased detection and punishment of hard-core cartels. In particular, the implementation of 
leniency programs can contribute to the enforcement of competition law by: (a) improving the collection 
of information and evidence; (b) enhancing the difficulty of creating and maintaining cartels; (c) lowering 
the costs of adjudication; and (d) the restitution to injured parties465. 
(a) Leniency programs constitute a way in which competition authorities can obtain information and 
evidence from the undertakings and individuals that have committed an infringement of the 
competition law provisions. In this sense, leniency programs have the ability to improve the 
collection of information and evidence by encouraging competition law infringers to confess and 
implicate their co-conspirators, hence, providing first-hand and direct insider evidence of 
conduct that the other parties to the cartel want to conceal, this allows competition authorities to 
discover conspiracies that would otherwise go undetected. In practice, leniency programs allow 
competition authorities to collect all kinds of information, like documents but also intelligence 
                                                          
460 Contemporary leniency policy in competition law enforcement was first implemented in the US Corporate Leniency Policy of 
1978.  
461 In the US, the 1978 Corporate Leniency Policy has been replaced for the current Corporate Leniency Policy in 1993, three major 
revisions were made to the program: (1) amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investigation; (2) amnesty may still be 
available even if cooperation begins after the investigation is underway; and (3) all officers, directors, and employees who cooperate 
are protected from criminal prosecution. Similarly, in the EU the first Leniency Notice was adopted in 1996, this was later amended 
in 2002, when the main changes included: (1) immunity became automatic; and (2) fine reductions became more strictly aligned to 
the timing of the cooperation. In 2006, the European Commission amended the Leniency Notice again to clarify the threshold for 
immunity and the duty of cooperation of leniency applicants.  
462 HAMMOND, Scott D. (2010), ‘The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades’. Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division, Miami, 25 February 2010, available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf  
463 HAMMOND (2010), p.1. 
464 ITALIANER, Alexander (2011), ‘Zero Tolerance for International Cartels’. ICN Cartel Workshop, Bruges-Belgium, 2011, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2011_11_en.pdf 
465 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2007), ‘Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice’, 30 World Competition, pp. 38-45. 
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about the cartel. Moreover, these programs provide for a cheaper and more reliable collection of 
evidence of antitrust violations, given that such collection is done by the undertaking and its 
staff, thus, saving the competition authority’s resources. In addition, the evidence collected is 
highly reliable due to the fact that the leniency applicants do not have an incentive to provide 
unreliable information, given that this could jeopardize the benefit of a lenient treatment466.  
 
(b) Furthermore, leniency programs have the ability to destabilize existing cartels by increasing the 
difficulty of maintaining them and also of creating them in the first place. Successful cartels 
need constant efforts, for example, to coordinate the behavior of the cartelists, to increase their 
profits, and to prevent cartelists from cheating on the agreement467. The availability of an 
effective leniency program can raise the costs of creating and maintaining cartels, for instance, 
by increasing the possibility of cheating, by making collusion more difficult, by increasing 
uncertainty, by diminishing trust among cartelists, or by increasing the need for costly 
monitoring468. In practice, leniency programs work by disseminating distrust within the cartel 
and increasing the possibility of its members to confess to the competition authority469. Thus, the 
aim of leniency programs is the destabilization of the cartel and its eventual detection through 
confession470.  
 
(c) In addition to the costs saved by competition authorities in collecting evidence from leniency 
applicants, leniency programs can also save costs at the adjudication stage. This occurs in 
jurisdictions where the cooperation of leniency applicants includes the recognition of the 
infringement and the acceptance of the penalty. In such cases, the recognition of the 
infringement and the acceptance of the penalty will save the costs of adjudication and the costs 
of any further appeal. By lowering the costs of adjudication, competition authorities can devote 
their efforts and resources to investigate and punish other anticompetitive practices471. 
 
(d) Finally, in competition regimes where the restitution of injured parties is a requirement to obtain 
leniency472, this obligation of leniency applicants can be beneficial for the overall enforcement of 
competition law, provided that the restitution of the injured parties may contribute to the 
enforcement objective of corrective justice in cases where the injured parties would not have 
been successful in obtaining restitution through follow-on actions for damages, and when the 
litigation expenses have been saved473. In his sense, considerations of fairness may require 
                                                          
466 ICN, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual, Chapter 2: Drafting and implementing an effective leniency policy, May 2009, p. 2.  
467 LEVENSTEIN, Margaret C. & SUSLOW, Valerie Y. (2006), ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, 44 Journal of Economic 
Literature. 
468 WILS (2007), pp. 42-43. 
469 LESLIE, Christopher R. (2006), ‘Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, 31 Journal of Competition Law, p. 462. 
470 ZINGALES (2008), p. 8. 
471 WILS (2007), pp. 43-44. 
472 According to the provisions of the U.S. Leniency Program, leniency will be granted to a corporation reporting illegal antitrust 
activity before an investigation has begun if: (1) the Division has not received information from any other source; (2) the 
corporation took prompt and effective action to terminate its participation in the activity; (3) the corporation reports the wrongdoing 
with candor and completeness; (4) the confession is truly a corporate act; (5) the corporation makes restitution to injured 
parties, where possible; and (6)the corporation did not coerce other parties to participate in the activity and was not he leader in, or 
the originator of, the activity [emphasis added].  
473 WILS (2007), pp. 44-45. 
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leniency applicants to make efforts to terminate and correct the violation, for instance, by 
making restitution to the victims474.  
On the other hand, leniency programs can have negative effects on the optimal enforcement of 
competition law, these may include: (a) lowering the penalty level; (b) exclusive reliance on leniency; (c) 
facilitation of the creation and maintenance of cartels; and (d) negative moral effects475. 
(a) As to the interaction between leniency programs and the level of penalties, the fact that 
successful leniency applicants are granted full immunity or a reduction of the penalty in 
exchange for cooperation has a negative effect on the penalty level, and as a consequence, on 
deterrence itself. In this regard, in order to avoid unnecessary penalty reductions, the 
applicability of leniency programs should be restricted to horizontal hard-core cartels, provided 
that these are among the most serious violation of competition law476. Moreover, full immunity 
should be limited to the first applicant; hence, the reduction for further applicants must reflect 
their actual contribution to the investigation477.  
 
(b) Leniency programs only work as long as cartel members truly believe that their violation can be 
discovered and sanctioned by the competition authority in case they do not apply for leniency or 
that there is the possibility that one of the members defects from the cartel and informs the 
competition authority about the infringement. Competition authorities that have been successful 
in the implementation of effective leniency programs may face the risk of relying too much on 
these programs and lose their capacity to detect and prosecute violations outside leniency 
applications478. 
 
(c) Provided that cartels are complex organizations capable of learning, this can eventually lead 
cartel members to adapt their organization to leniency policies in order to minimize the 
destabilizing effect and if possible to exploit leniency policies to facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of cartels479. Moreover, given that the direct effect of leniency is to reduce penalties 
to at least some members, leniency programs might actually encourage collusion because they 
decrease the expected cost of misbehavior480.  
 
(d) Finally, leniency programs may have two additional negative effects, on the one hand, there is 
the concern of the retributive injustice of an antitrust offender escaping punishment, and on the 
other hand, there is the concern of the unequal treatment between the cartel member that has 
been granted leniency and the other members that receive full punishment for the same action. 
With regard to the first concern, it is considered that it is in the public interest to reward cartel 
members that are willing to terminate their participation and cooperate in the investigation, 
                                                          
474 OECD, Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes, 2002, pp. 9-10. 
475 WILS (2007), pp. 45-51. 
476 European Commission, Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006, para. 1.  
477 Idem, at para. 8 and 5 respectively.   
478 WILS (2007), pp. 47-48. 
479 WILS (2007), pp. 48-49. 
480 MOTTA, Massimo & POLO, Michele (2003), ‘Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution’, 21 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization. 
138 
 
independently of the other members of the cartel. Furthermore, the interest of the general public 
in the detection and punishment of secret cartels outweigh the interest in fining the cartel 
members that confess the infringement to the competition authority481. As to the second concern, 
it is suggested that even though some cartel members are relieved from prosecution, there will be 
other members to prosecute, and that their prosecutions will be more certain and successful as a 
result of the evidence obtained from the leniency applicants482.  
3. Rationale for Leniency Programs 
 
With regard to the overall structure of the public enforcement of the law, self-reporting is socially 
desirable. Self-reporting can be encouraged by lowering the sanctions for individuals who disclose their 
own infractions. In practice, self-reporting is socially desirable because of two reasons. On the one hand, 
self-reporting reduces the costs of enforcement, given that in cases where the violators reports to the 
enforcement authority, the latter does not have to identify and prove who the violator was. On the other 
hand, self-reporting reduces risk; accordingly, individuals will bear less risk because they know that if 
they infringe the law, they can report the infringement to the enforcement authority and suffer a lower and 
certain sanction compared to a full sanction483.  
 The secretive nature of hard-core cartels makes their discovery, investigation and prosecution a 
very difficult task for competition authorities. The fact that cartels are clearly illegal, and may even 
amount to a criminal offense in certain jurisdictions, has led cartel participants to conduct their unlawful 
activities with a great deal of secrecy and to take extra measures to hide any incriminating evidence. 
Moreover, provided that hard-core cartels are especially harmful for the competitive process and 
consumers, this type of anticompetitive practices are normally under the spotlight of competition law 
enforcement. In this regard, competition authorities devote most of their efforts in detecting and 
punishing as many cartels as possible, and have implemented for this purpose specific enforcement tools, 
like leniency programs that encourage cartel members to come forward and confess their participation in 
a determined cartel484. As will be explained bellow, some of the special characteristics of horizontal 
cartels make this kind of unlawful behavior suitable for being discovered and prosecuted thanks leniency 
programs. 
Hard-core cartels are characterized for being continuative, collective, and hard to detect485. In 
practice, due to the fact that cartels have a secretive nature and are difficult to detect and prosecute, 
leniency programs try to exploit the collective nature of cartels by pushing cartel members to defect and 
confess. Thus, the idea behind leniency programs is to turn one of the cartel members against the other(s) 
by creating a Prisoner’s Dilemma. A prisoner’s dilemma occurs when two parties pursue their own 
                                                          
481 European Commission (2006), para. 3.  
482 OECD (2002), p. 26. 
483 POLINSKY, A. Mitchell & SHAVELL, Steven (2007), ‘The Theory of Public Enforcement of the Law’. In: Polinsky & Shavell 
(eds) Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 1. Amsterdam: Esevier, pp. 437-438. 
484 According to the statistics published in 2010 by the International Competition Network, related to a survey made about anti-cartel 
enforcement in 46 jurisdictions over the past 10 years, most competition authorities devote great part of their efforts in combating 
cartel activities (ICN, Trends and Developments in Cartel Enforcement, Turkey, 2010, available at: 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc613.pdf).   
485 ZINGALES (2008), pp. 7-8. 
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interest acting in a rationally selfish manner, which ultimately results in both parties ending up in a worse 
position than if they had cooperated and pursued the group’s interests instead of their own. The strategy 
of leniency programs is to create distrust among cartel participants and encourage them to come forward 
before the competition authority and provide the latter with information, evidence and intelligence about 
the cartel in question in exchange for the total or partial exoneration from the sanctions that would 
otherwise be applicable to the leniency applicant486. Thus, when presented with this possibility, cartel 
participants must contemplate whether or not to apply for leniency and choose between two possible 
scenarios: do not report in the hope that the other co-conspirators will play the same; or report the cartel, 
if it is believed that it is imminent that the other members will report the cartel487.  
In light of the preceding, as stable cartels require trust among their members, the aim of 
competition law and more specifically of leniency programs is to create distrust among cartel members in 
order to prevent the formation of stable cartels. Accordingly, distrust can prevent companies from joining 
cartels and encourage cartel participants to report their anticompetitive activities to the government. The 
fact that leniency applicants report the cartel makes prosecution of the remaining cartel members much 
easier for the competition authorities. Ultimately, to create distrust among cartel participants can be a 
cost-effective mechanism to deter, uncover, and sanction hard-core cartels488.   
In addition, the increment in the penalties for cartel agreements in competition regimes has 
allowed leniency programs to become more successful. The fact that individuals and undertakings have 
been severely sanctioned in the past for their involvement in cartel activities with jail sentences and high 
financial penalties works as a strong incentive for both undertakings and individuals to come forward and 
report the cartel to the competition law enforcers. In practice, an effective leniency program and strong 
potential sanctions provide powerful “carrot and stick” incentives for cartel participants to be the first to 
report the cartel489.  
With regard to the justification for lowering the sanctions to be imposed on cartel participants 
that come forward before the competition authority and confess their participation in the cartel and 
provide sufficient information to prosecute their cartel co-conspirators, it has been suggested that 
lowering the penalties for self-reporting parties increases the overall welfare by reducing the enforcement 
costs, lowering risk, and allowing early remediation of damages490.   
4. Conditions for Effective Leniency Programs 
 
There are certain conditions and characteristics that make leniency programs effective. A fundamental 
factor for the success of leniency programs is the availability of a sound enforcement program that 
                                                          
486 SPAGNOLO, Giancarlo (2004), ‘Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes’ , C.E.P.R. Discussion Paper No. 4840 
(December 2004), available at: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=4840  
487 SAMÀ, Danilo (2008), ‘Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program’, MPRA Paper No. 14104, December 2008, 
available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14104/1/MPRA_paper_14104.pdf   
488 LESLIE, Christopher R. (2004), ‘Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust’. 82, 3 Texas Law Review.  
489 OECD, Using Leniency to Fight Hard Core Cartels, September 2001.  
490 MALIK, Arun (1993), ‘Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution’, 24(3) Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, pp. 241-257; KAPLOW, Louis & SHAVELL, Steven (1994), ‘Optimal Enforcement 
with Self-Reporting of Behavior’, 102 (3) Journal of Political Economy, pp. 583-606; and INNES, Robert (1999), ‘Remediation and 
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includes strong penalties for the infringement of competition law and a dynamic application of the 
antitrust provisions by the enforcement authorities. Accordingly, if the penalties are too weak or the 
competition provisions are rarely applied, then cartel members offered immunity from, or a reduction of 
the penalties will have little incentives to apply for leniency. In this sense, irrespective of how generous or 
well drafted a leniency policy is, it will not be effective unless there is an actual risk of imminent 
detection and punishment.  
 In practice, there are certain identified factors and conditions that make leniency programs 
effective for the detection and punishment of hard-core cartels491, these include: (i) A strong anti-cartel 
enforcement program, which involves active investigations to detect hard-core cartels and substantial 
sanctions for the participation in these kind of practices. This will lead cartel members to believe that 
there is an actual risk of being detected and sanctioned if they do not come forward and confess to the 
competition authority. Moreover, effective cartel enforcement can create a race between cartel members 
to be the first to apply for leniency and, in jurisdictions where there are leniency programs for individuals, 
there will also be a race between the undertaking and its employees; (ii) Significant sanctions that shall be 
imposed on cartel members that did not apply for leniency, provided that if sanctions are not high enough, 
cartel members will not confess their participation in the cartel given that the benefits of leniency are 
reduced or inexistent, moreover, the penalty imposed on the first applicant has to be much less than the 
imposed on following applicants; (iii) Transparency and predictability in the operation of leniency 
programs that allow potential leniency applicants to predict how they will be treated in case they come 
forward, and alternatively, what will be the consequences if the application is not made; (iv) Protection of 
the information provided by the cartel participant in order to protect the latter from being more exposed 
than non-applicants in follow-on actions.  
5. Different Approaches 
 
As abovementioned, due to the success of leniency programs in some competition regimes in the 
detection and punishment of cartel agreements, these programs have become the tool of choice to fight 
hard-core cartels. As a consequence, this success has provoked the adoption of leniency programs in new 
competition regimes in order to improve anti-cartel enforcement. In practice, the proliferation of leniency 
programs across jurisdictions has resulted in many cases in the adoption of different approaches in the 
design and application of these programs across the world. The most important features of leniency 
programs are discussed below. 
5.1. Scope of leniency programs 
 
Virtually all leniency programs are concerned with the detection of hard-core cartels, which are 
agreements or concerted practices between two or more competitors that have the purpose of restricting 
competition mainly by fixing purchase or selling prices, allocating production or sales quotas, sharing 
markets and fixing the output of competitive tenders. On the contrary, normally, other types of 
competition restrictions that are usually less difficult to discover and investigate do not fall under the 
                                                          
491 UNCTAD, The use of leniency programmes as a tool for the enforcement of competition law against hardcore cartels in 
developing countries, 2010, p. 3; and ICN (2009), p. 3.  
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scope of leniency programs. Nevertheless, there are competition systems that have implemented 
cooperation programs, which offer individuals and undertakings a lesser enforcement action, or no action 
at all, in exchange for cooperation in violations of the competition law provisions that are not related with 
hard-core cartels492.  
 In practice, the scope of the leniency programs is restricted in different ways depending on the 
competition system. For instance, in some jurisdictions, leniency programs are applicable to secret cartels 
only493. Alternatively, in jurisdiction with a broader scope of application, leniency programs are not 
restricted to secret cartels only, but also apply to cartels that already have been detected494. The aim of the 
possibility to allow cartel participants to apply for leniency is to ease the investigation of these cartels and 
reduce the costs of investigation, prosecution and punishment.  
 As seen in the beginning of this section, all leniency programs are concerned with horizontal 
hard-core cartels (price-fixing, market sharing, bid-rigging); however, there are a few jurisdictions that 
have a wider scope of application. For instance, in the jurisdiction with the widest scope of application, 
undertakings can apply for a reduction of financial penalties in exchange for cooperation in the 
investigation of restrains of competition other than cartel cases495. Similarly, other competition systems 
allow the application of their leniency programs not only to horizontal cartels, but also to vertical cartels, 
i.e. vertical price-fixing496. Finally, in some jurisdictions there are cooperation programs, which are 
alternative to leniency programs and do not apply to hard-core cartels, that offer a lower level of 
enforcement action in exchange for cooperation in the investigation of the anticompetitive conduct497. 
5.2. Types of leniency  
 
Overall, leniency programs can be of two types: leniency for undertakings, and leniency for individuals. 
The availability of these types of leniency programs usually depends on the sanctioning systems of the 
competition regimes. Hence, in jurisdictions where only the undertakings can be sanctioned for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, then leniency will be available only for undertakings. 
Alternatively, in competition systems where both undertakings and individuals can be sanctioned for their 
participation in anticompetitive practices, usually, the leniency policy allows both undertakings and 
individuals to apply for leniency.  
 
                                                          
492 For instance, in New Zealand, the ‘Cooperation Policy’ of the Commerce Commission of New Zealand offers cooperating parties 
a lesser enforcement action or no action at all for violations of the Commerce Act that do not involve cartel behavior.  For further 
information, please visit: http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/commission-policies/cooperation-policy/  
493 In Bulgaria, the leniency program is only applicable to cases related to secret cartels of undertakings (Commission for Protection 
of Competition, Decision No. 274 of 08.03.2011). 
494 In Spain, according to the provisions of the leniency notice, the leniency program is aimed at discovering secret cartels and 
advance the investigation of those already detected (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, Comunicación sobre el Programa de 
Clemencia, 2013, para. 6).  
495 In Finland, undertakings can apply for the immunity from, or reduction of financial penalties in cartel cases, additionally, 
undertakings can also apply, only for a reduction on the penalty, in other cases that do not involve hard-core cartels (see Sections 
14-18 of the Competition Act, 2011).  
496 Such is the case of the UK. 
497 In New Zealand, the Commerce Commission has implemented a Cooperation Policy aimed at encouraging individuals and 
businesses to cooperate in the investigation in exchange for a lower level of enforcement, or no action at all. Further information 
available at: http://www.comcom.govt.nz/cooperation-policy/ 
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(a) Leniency for undertakings 
 
Corporate leniency programs are systems under which undertakings can apply for the total or partial 
exoneration from the sanctions that would have been imposed upon them for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions by confessing their participation in the anticompetitive activities, fully 
cooperating in the investigation with the competition authority, and meeting any other requirements 
established by the competition regime in question. The further requirements for being granted leniency 
vary from one jurisdiction to another, however, these are mainly concerned with: the timeliness of the 
application, the completeness of the information provided and the cooperation in the investigation, and 
the role and responsibility of the undertaking in the creation and maintenance of the cartel. As would be 
expected, this type of leniency is the one available in jurisdictions where only undertakings can be 
sanctioned for violating the antitrust rules498. Even though it is suggested that sanctions on undertakings 
should be coupled with penalties imposed on individuals for their involvement in the violation in order to 
attain higher levels of deterrence499, in jurisdictions where this possibility is not available, it does not 
make any sense to implement mechanisms for individuals to confess their participation in cartel activities 
if these do not face an actual threat of being sanctioned for their implication in the anticompetitive 
practice, provided that these would not have enough incentives to come forward and report the cartel. 
Notwithstanding the preceding, in practice, the unavailability of mechanisms for individuals to report a 
cartel can weight against the effectiveness of the incentive to confess in the case of individuals who are 
determined to abide by the laws and are unwilling to act as firm-interest maximizers, when this would 
entail a risk of personal charges500. Finally, in jurisdictions where individuals can be sanctioned for their 
participation in cartel activities and no leniency programs are available for them, this lack of mechanisms 
to confess to the competition authority can reduce the overall effectiveness of leniency, given that, to the 
extent that undertakings care about their employees, they will have few incentives to apply for leniency, 
provided that such application will expose their employees to be sanctioned. Moreover, even in the case 
that undertakings do not care about their employees, they will not be successful in obtaining leniency due 
to the fact that their employees will be unwilling to cooperate to avoid incriminating themselves501.  
(b) Leniency for individuals 
 
Leniency programs for individuals are systems under which the directors, officers and employees of 
undertakings involved in cartel activities can obtain a more lenient treatment from the competition 
authority in exchange for information and cooperation in the investigation of an alleged infringement of 
competition law502. As explained above, this type of leniency is normally available in jurisdictions where 
                                                          
498 The most representative example of jurisdictions that only provide lenient treatment for undertakings is the EU, where according 
to the provisions of Regulation 1/2003, the penalties by the European Commission for the infringement of competition law are 
imposed only on undertakings and association of undertakings. In the same vein, the provisions of the Commission’s leniency notice 
apply solely to undertakings. 
499 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2001), ‘Does the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require Not Only Fines on Undertakings 
But Also Individual Penalties, In Particular Imprisonment?’ Paper presented at the 6th Competition Law and Policy Workshop at the 
European University Institute (Florence, 1-2 June 2001); and WILS, Wouter P.J. (2006A), ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and 
Practice’. World Competition.Volume 29, No. 2. 
500 ZINGALES (2008), p. 13. 
501 WILS (2007), p. 56. 
502 For example, in Colombia both legal and natural persons involved in anticompetitive practices can report the infringement in 
exchange for leniency (Article 14 of the Competition Act).  
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the individuals can be punished for their participation in anticompetitive practices503. Accordingly, it is in 
the interest of competition authorities and for the sake of the effectiveness of leniency programs to protect 
to the greatest extent possible managers, officer and employees of the undertakings applying for 
leniency504. In competition systems where leniency is available for both undertakings and individuals, this 
possibility can increase the effectiveness of leniency in a number of ways, for instance: by offering 
undertakings the possibility to obtain a discount in the penalties otherwise imposed on them and their 
employees; by creating a race to be first to confess and cooperate between undertakings and employees; 
and by reducing the risk of perverse effects of leniency policies, such as the possibility of undertakings 
that participate in a number of cartels to take turns to apply for leniency505. Nevertheless, even though the 
opportunity to avoid individual liability may be a significant factor in encouraging early co-operation, the 
success of certain leniency policies where only undertakings are subject to the competition law 
provisions, evidences that the threat of individual liability may not be a necessary condition for the 
success of leniency programs506.  
 In jurisdictions where individual and undertakings are allowed to file for leniency, such 
application can be made jointly or independently, depending on the provision of the leniency program. 
Hence, in some regimes, individuals can apply for leniency independently from their employees507, and 
alternatively, in other jurisdictions an application filed by the undertaking covers all the employees 
involved in the reported conduct508. Finally, in order to protect reporting employees from retaliations by 
their employers, in some jurisdictions there are specialized legislation that protects whistleblowers509.   
5.3. Degree of leniency 
 
There are different degrees of leniency that vary from one jurisdiction to the next that usually depend on 
factors, such as the timeliness of the application and the completeness of the information and cooperation 
provided to the competition authority. Overall, depending on the case, successful leniency applicants can 
either obtain full immunity from the penalties, or alternatively, a reduction or discount in the sanctions 
that would otherwise be applicable to a cartel member which reports its cartel membership to the 
competition authority. Typically, in order to obtain leniency, cartel participants have to comply with 
requirements, like confess their cartel membership, cease their participation in the cartel activity, and 
fully cooperate in providing significant evidence to aid in the proceedings against their cartel co-
conspirators.  
 As explained above, the level of leniency to be granted basically depends on the timeliness of the 
application and the evidential threshold required by the leniency policy of the competition system in 
                                                          
503 To see the jurisdictions where individuals can be sanctioned for the infringement of the competition law provisions, please see 
the Sanction and Remedies Section below.  
504 See Point 15 of the Explanatory Notes of the ECN Model Leniency Programme, 2012. 
505 WILS (2007), pp. 55-57. 
506 The success of the EU leniency program in spite of not being available for individuals shows that the threat of individual liability 
may not be a necessary condition for leniency programs to achieve some results (OECD (2001), p. 3). 
507 Such is the case of the Australian Leniency Programme.  
508 See the Bundeskartellamt Leniency Programme (2006).  
509 In Japan, employees are allowed to report violations of the Antimonopoly Law under the provisions of Article 45(1). In addition, 
reporting employees are protected from retaliations by their employers according to the provisions of the Whistleblowers Protection 
Act (2004).  
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question. Thus, a determined leniency applicant will be granted full immunity from the sanction or just a 
reduction of the penalty depending on whether or not the cartel participant was the first successful 
applicant.  
(a) Full immunity or exoneration 
 
Immunity or amnesty, depending on the jurisdiction in question, makes reference to the total exoneration 
from the penalties that would otherwise be applicable to a cartel participant who reports its cartel 
membership to the competition authority. As seen before, provided that the penalties that can be imposed 
for the violation of the cartel prohibition vary widely from one competition regime to the next, the 
exoneration offered in a determined leniency program will be related to the types of penalties available 
for the infringement of the anti-cartel provisions.  
 Consequently, the scope of the immunity offered by leniency programs is determined in practice 
by the sanctioning system of the competition regimes. For instance, in jurisdictions that only allow for the 
imposition of financial penalties on undertakings for the infringement of the anti-cartel provisions, their 
leniency programs will respectively provide for immunity from the financial penalties that would have 
been imposed on the undertakings if these have not been granted leniency510. In Such cases, given that 
individuals would not be encouraged to report the cartel since they cannot be sanctioned, offering 
leniency to individuals in these regimes would be useless. Moreover, in jurisdictions where individuals 
can be sanctioned with the imposition of financial penalties for their involvement in cartel activities, 
being granted full immunity means waiving the obligation of cartel participants of paying a fine as a 
reward for their cooperation in the investigation511. With regard to criminal penalties, in jurisdictions 
where undertakings can be sanctioned with the imposition of financial penalties of a criminal nature, 
some leniency programs allow the possibility to grant successful leniency applicants full immunity from 
the criminal penalties which means not being charged criminally and being relieved from paying the 
fine512. Similarly, in jurisdiction where individuals can be sentenced to prison, successful leniency 
applicants may be granted full immunity from criminal prosecution513. Finally, in some competition 
regimes that impose administrative fines and criminal convictions, the leniency program offers immunity 
regarding administrative financial penalties and prevents the commencement of criminal investigations 
regarding all crimes directly related to the cartel.514 
                                                          
510 That is the case of the EU Leniency Program.  
511 In New Zealand, according to Section 30 of the Commerce Act, 1986, individuals and undertakings can be sanctioned with the 
imposition of financial penalties for the breach of the cartel prohibition (up to $500,000 and $10,000,000, respectively), however, 
pursuant to the Cartel Leniency Policy and Process Guidelines, 12 April 2011, individuals, as well as undertakings, can receive 
conditional immunity from financial penalties where the applicant is the first participant in a cartel to apply for leniency and to meet 
the prescribed conditions. Available at: http://www.comcom.govt.nz/assets/The-Commission/Policies/Leniency/Cartel-leniency-
Policy-and-Process-Guidelines-12-April-2011.pdf   
512 For instance, in Ireland, where undertakings are charged criminally for their participation in cartel activities and sanctioned with 
financial penalties of a criminal nature, the leniency program provides for full immunity for undertakings that come forward and 
cooperate with the investigation, in such cases, immunity means not being charged criminally, and as a consequence, not having to 
pay any financial penalty (Irish Competition Authority, Cartel Immunity Programme, 2001, at para. 12, available at: 
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/Cartel%20Immunity%20Programme.pdf).  
513 In the US, according to the Leniency Policy for Individuals, the directors, officers and employees who come forward and confess 
their implication in the illegal activities can avoid criminal prosecution for antitrust violations.  
514 In Brazil, see Articles 86(4) and 87 of the Antitrust Law. 
145 
 
 As seen in the previous section, it is important for the effectiveness of leniency programs to 
provide potential applicants full certainty about the benefits of being granted leniency in order to 
incentivize cartel participants to come forward and report their illegal activities. Moreover, optimal 
leniency programs should grant full exoneration from all penalties at least for the first person to come 
forward515. In this sense, it is fundamental that leniency programs are in line with the sanctioning systems 
of the competition regime, provided that if the program only covers part of the sanctions that can be 
imposed for the infringement of the anti-cartel provisions, cartel members will be reluctant to report the 
cartel if they can still be sanctioned because the leniency program does not fully protect applicants from 
additional penalties. Hence, the possibility of being sanctioned for the reported cartel even after leniency 
has been granted can reduce the effectiveness of the program516.  
 The requirements for being granted full immunity vary from one competition regime to another, 
however, most jurisdictions share certain similarities in this regard which are related to the timeliness of 
the application and the stage of the investigation by the competition authority. Thus, in order for being 
granted full immunity from any penalty which would otherwise have been imposed, most competition 
regimes require the applicant to be the first cartel participant to file an application and provide the 
competition authority with sufficient evidence to commence proceedings in relation to the cartel. 
Alternatively, in order to broaden the scope of the programs and to encourage cartel participants to file for 
leniency, most competition systems allow cartel participants to apply for leniency if no other member has 
been granted immunity even if the competition authority has knowledge about the existence of the cartel, 
but does not have sufficient evidence to declare the infringement of the cartel prohibition. The purpose of 
granting immunity to cartel members in cases where the authority has already commenced proceedings to 
declare the antitrust violation is to ease the collection of incriminatory evidence and to terminate the 
cartel faster517. 
(b) Reduction of penalties 
 
In addition to the possibility to receive full immunity from penalties, potential cartel members that do not 
qualify for immunity may benefit from a reduction of any penalty that would otherwise have been 
imposed. It is in the interest of competition authorities to obtain the cooperation of those cartel members 
that do not qualify for immunity in order to ensure that cartel violations are more efficiently investigated 
and penalized. There are different scenarios where a cartel member is not suitable for being granted full 
immunity, but can obtain a reduction in the penalty imposed. For instance, in cases where no cartel 
member has filed for leniency but the competition authority has already initiated an investigation on the 
cartel in question. In this case, provided that the competition authority has already evidence about the 
existence of the cartel, no cartel member could be granted full immunity, however, to encourage their 
cooperation, certain competition regimes offer these the possibility to reduce the penalty to be imposed if 
they cooperate in the investigation. Additionally, in cases where a successful leniency application has 
                                                          
515 HARRINGTON, Joseph E. (2008), ‘Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs’. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume LVI, 
No. 2.  
516 For instance, in Spain, the leniency program only grants exoneration from the administrative sanction, even though cartels can 
also be prosecuted criminally.  
517 This is how immunities are granted in the EU according to the ECN’s Model Leniency Programme, 2012.  
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already been made, subsequent leniency applicants may be offered a reduction in the penalties if they 
fully cooperate in the investigation. The level of the reduction that subsequent applicants receive depends 
on a series of factors including the speed at which they approach the authority and the quality of the 
evidence they provide. It may also include a complete acceptance of responsibility for cartel behavior and 
other factors in mitigation. Finally, some cartel members cannot apply for full immunity due to the role 
they play in the cartel, i.e. coercers or ringleaders, however, these may qualify for a reduction of the 
penalty if provide full cooperation with the investigation. 
 The level of reduction of the penalty varies depending on the jurisdiction in question and on 
certain factors, such as the timeliness of the application and the value of the evidence provided to the 
competition authority. Despite the preceding, it is considered a good practice to create a significant 
difference between immunity and reduction of the penalties with the purpose of making application for 
immunity significantly more attractive. In this regard, most competition regimes reward the cooperation 
of cartel members that do not qualify for full immunity with a maximum reduction of 50% of the penalty 
which lowers in relation to subsequent applicants518; however, there are regimes where the penalty can be 
reduced up to 100%519.  
5.4. Excluded leniency applicants 
 
A frequent feature of leniency programs is to exclude certain applicants by virtue of their implication in 
the creation and maintenance of the cartel. As a general rule, most leniency programs require that the 
applicant did not coerced others into participating in the conduct520. Hence, as a matter of principle, an 
undertaking that has coerced one or more undertakings to join or remain in the cartel should be excluded 
from the benefits of leniency. Considerations of natural justice prevent an undertaking that has played 
such a role from escaping sanction altogether521.  
 Furthermore, other competition systems exclude cartel leaders from their leniency programs. In 
practice, with regard to the exclusion of cartel leaders, in most jurisdictions, leniency applicants are 
excluded from obtaining leniency only if they were the single ringleader of a conspiracy522. For instance, 
if in a cartel there are two ringleaders in a conspiracy of more than two undertakings, then all of them, 
including the two ringleaders, may qualify for leniency. Similarly, in a conspiracy of two undertakings 
where both of them have played a fundamental role in the cartel, both undertakings may be eligible for 
leniency. Moreover, leniency applicants should not be excluded under this condition for being the largest 
undertaking in the industry or for having the greatest market share. The purpose of reducing the scope of 
                                                          
518 In Japan according to the Antimonopoly Law, the JFTC will grant full immunity to the first applicant filed before the initiation of 
the investigation, and a reduction of 50% to the second applicant, 30% to the third through the fifth applicant, and a 30% reduction 
to any applicant filed after the initiation of the investigation.  
519 In Singapore, according to the Guidelines on Lenient Treatment for Undertakings Coming Forward with Information on Cartel 
Activity Cases, in cases where the Competition Commission of Singapore has opened an investigation related to a cartel, the 
members cannot file for full immunity but may benefit from lenient treatment by way of a reduction of up to 100% of the fine 
imposed if they are the first to come forward. Subsequent cartel members may benefit from a reduction of up to the 50%.   
520 European Competition Network, ECN Model Leniency Programme: Report on Assessment of the State of Convergence, 2010. 
According to the Report, half of the Network members have provisions that exclude coercers from immunity (Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, European Commission, Spain, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK).   
521 See point 22 of the Explanatory Notes of the ECN Model Leniency Programme, November 2012.  
522 Bundeskartellamt, Notice No. 9/2006 on the Immunity from and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases –Leniency Programme-, 7 
March 2006, p. 1, B.3(3).  
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this exclusion to the single ringleader is to provide the maximum amount of incentives and opportunities 
for undertakings to come forward and report their illegal activity523. 
 In some jurisdiction, recidivists are excluded from leniency programs524. The rationale for this 
exclusion is to prevent undertakings that have been granted leniency previously for a reported cartel from 
benefiting again from the total or partial exoneration of the penalty. Moreover, it has been partly 
suggested that the exclusion of recidivists could be a partial solution to prevent undertakings that 
participate in various cartels in different markets to take turns to  apply for leniency every time one of the 
cartels is, or is about to be detected by the competition authority. Nonetheless, the exclusion of recidivists 
would mean that leniency would no longer work in cases were the same group of undertakings that was 
found to be involved in cartel activity forms a new cartel. Thus, the fact that this group of undertakings 
cannot apply for leniency for being recidivists, would make the second cartel more stable than the first 
one, and as a consequence, encourage recidivism525. In this sense, in some of the jurisdictions where 
recidivist cartel members were allowed to apply for leniency, recent modifications have abolished this 
possibility526.  
 In addition, in some jurisdictions the initiators of the cartel are excluded from the leniency 
programs. The refusal of competition authorities to grant leniency to initiators is due to the fundamental 
role that these have played in the creation of the cartel. The foundation for denying leniency to cartel 
originators is to disqualify the most blatant violators527. This exclusion is generally coupled with other 
cumulative conditions, i.e. did not initiate the cartel, did not take steps to coerce others to join the cartel or 
to remain in it, or did not have a leading role in the alleged cartel528.  
 Finally, in some competition regimes, cartel participants are not excluded from the leniency 
programs by virtue of the applicant’s role and responsibility in the design and implementation of the 
reported cartel529. This approach is intended to encourage as many cartel participants as possible to come 
forward and report their unlawful activities, irrespective of their condition as initiator, coercer or leader. 
However, in some competition systems, the competition authority will not consider the role of the 
leniency applicant only when the latter is the first to come forward before the competition authority and 
cooperate with the investigation in a full, frank and timely manner. In such cases, the competition 
                                                          
523 HAMMOND, Scott D. & BARNETT, Belinda A. (2008), ‘Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Division’s 
Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters’, US Department of Justice, question 15.  
524 In Algeria, according to Article 60 of the Ordonnance Nº 03-03 de 19 juillet 2003 (Algerian competition act), the Conseil de la 
Concurrence can waive or reduce the sanctions to be otherwise imposed on undertakings in exchange for information and 
collaboration, however, this possibility is not allowed for recidivists.  
525 WILS (2007), pp. 48-49. 
526 In Greece, the requirement of “not being a recidivist” was abolished by the new Hellenic Competition Commission’s Leniency 
Programme of 15 November 2011.  
527 OECD (2002), p. 16. 
528 See point 1.3.1(d) of the leniency program of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition.  
529 In Canada, according to the provisions of the Leniency Program (2010), the role and responsibility of cartel participants is not a 
condition for eligibility. Similarly, in Italy, Comunicazione sulla non imposizione e sulla riduzione delle sanzioni ai sensi 
dell’articolo 1 della legge 10 ottobre, N. 287 (March 2013) (Italian leniency notice), does not take into consideration the condition 
or participation of leniency applicants in the reported cartel.  
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authority will consider the role and responsibility of subsequent leniency applicants, the degree to which 
the applicant benefited from the infringement, and any other aggravating or mitigating factor530. 
5.5. Marker System 
 
The marker system under a leniency program is a procedure for applicants to protect their place in the 
queue for a finite period of time that allows leniency applicants to gather all the necessary information 
and evidence to perfect their application. The applicant’s position is reserved in the queue for a given 
period of time that varies depending on each leniency program531. If the applicant fails to disclose 
sufficient evidence to determine the infringement of the anti-cartel provisions, the marker may be 
withdrawn. However, many competition regimes allow the possibility of extensions to the marker period 
if the applicant can demonstrate that an extension is necessary to perfect the application and that the 
applicant is making a good-faith effort to complete the application in a timely manner532. The availability 
of a clear marker system with reasonable extensions increase the incentives on cartel participants to self-
report their membership in a determined cartel, given that it makes the operation of leniency programs 
more transparent and certain.   
5.6. Leniency Plus and Penalty Plus Policies 
 
Besides the leniency program, in some competition regimes a leniency plus policy has been instituted in 
order to gather tips and leads about additional cartels. The leniency plus program operates in situations 
where an undertaking that does not qualify for leniency in an ongoing cartel investigation, discloses 
evidence about the existence of a second cartel, and complies with the requirements of the leniency 
program for the second infringement. In such cases, the undertaking will be granted leniency for the 
second violation and a reduction of the penalty for its participation in the first violation533. The ultimate 
objective of this type of programs is to further encourage leniency applicants to report additional cartels 
in the hope of benefiting from a more lenient treatment, and as a consequence, to discover additional 
cartels. 
Conversely to the abovementioned amnesty plus policy and as an additional incentive for 
leniency applicants, the penalty plus policy is intended to sanction leniency applicants that fail to report a 
separate infringement of the anti-cartel provisions that is later discovered by the competition authority. In 
                                                          
530 In Canada, pursuant to question 22 of the Leniency Program-FAQ’s, the Competition Bureau will recommend that no separate 
charges be made against first leniency applicants. Alternatively, the Bureau will consider whether or not to recommend that second 
and any subsequent leniency applicant be charged by considering several factors, including: the role of the applicant, the degree to 
which the applicant benefited from the offense, the fact that the applicant is a recidivist or has a criminal record, and any other 
relevant aggravating or mitigating factors.  
531 For instance, in Brazil, according to the Regulation 01/2012 of CADE the first position in the queue for leniency is hold for 30 
days.  
532 In Korea whenever an applicant requires additional time to obtain evidence or there are special circumstances that impede the 
applicant to submit the evidence at the time of the application, the KFTC may initially grant the applicant a 15-day period, which 
may be extended for up to 60 additional days if valid reason is provided to the KFTC.  
533 In Singapore, leniency applicants that do not qualify for leniency in a determined cartel investigation may furnish information 
about another cartel that they may be participating in or may be aware of in exchange for a reduction of the penalties. 
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such cases, the enforcers will consider the failure to report the cartel violation as an aggravating factor in 
sentencing534.  
5.7. Financial Rewards to Informants 
 
Another way to incentive cooperation in the detection and prosecution of cartels is to grant informants 
positive financial rewards or bounties535. The positive financial reward scheme consists in paying a 
monetary reward to those who provide information or evidence on cartel activity. Unlike leniency 
programs, the informant reward program targets third parties and not the cartel participants. The objective 
of this type of policy is to gather information and evidence on cartels in a more efficient way with as little 
effort and cost as possible by providing financial reward to informants. Moreover, this program is a 
strong cartel deterrent given that undertakings are conscious of being watched all the time and helps 
create a social awareness of the harmfulness of cartels536. In this sense, it has been argued that positive 
financial rewards can provide stronger tools than leniency programs for the preventions of cartels537.  
 In this type of programs, the amount of the financial reward will be determined by the degree of 
the violation reported and the strength of the evidence submitted by the informant. Hence, the more 
severe the reported infringement was and the strongest the submitted evidence was, the more amount of 
money will be rewarded to cartel informants538.   
6. Protection of Information539 
 
A fundamental feature of leniency programs is the protection of sensitive information provided by 
leniency applicants from unauthorized disclosure. The confidentiality of leniency application is important 
for applicants, provided that unauthorized disclosure could provoke commercial and even personal 
retaliations and exposure to liability in other jurisdictions. In this sense, the possibility of information 
being shared with other jurisdictions can seriously decrease the incentives of cartel participants to come 
forward.    
 In order to encourage cartel participants to come forward a cooperate with the competition 
authority, competition authorities usually promise applicants that the information provided in the frame of 
leniency programs will be strongly protected from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, most 
competition regimes provide for specific mechanisms to protect the information submitted by the 
                                                          
534 In the US, leniency applicants that do not qualify for leniency in one market may file for amnesty plus leniency by disclosing an 
offense in another market. In such cases, the Antitrust Division will recommend to the sentencing court that the undertaking receive 
a discount in its fine for the offense in the first market. In addition, the Antitrust Division has a penalty plus program, under which it 
may encourage a sentencing court to consider the failure to report a separate cartel that is discovered later by the Division as an 
aggravating sentencing factor. 
535 Such is the case of Korea that according to Article 64-2 of the MRFTA, the KFTC may pay a financial reward to any person 
reporting any violation of the Act providing proof of such violation.  
536 HUR, Joseph Seon (2004), ‘Cartel Detection Techniques of the KFTC’, presented at the Cracking Cartels Conference: 
International and Australian Developments. 
537 Referring to positive financial rewards for undertakings and individuals involved in cartel activities, see: AUBERT, C., REY, P., 
KOVACIC, W.E. (2006), ‘The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels’. 24 Int. J. Ind. Organ. 
538 Korean Fair Trade Commission, press release: ‘KFTC’s launch of Reward System for Informants’, available at: 
http://www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/rewardsystem.doc.  
539 For additional information on the disclosure of information contained in leniency applications and the interaction with private 
actions for damages, please see Chapter Three, Section VIII.4. 
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applicants, like maintaining the identity of the informant and the information provided as confidential540. 
Similarly, some jurisdictions will refuse to share information gathered via lenience applications with 
other enforcement agencies without the applicant’s consent541. At regional levels, there are propositions to 
limit the disclosure of evidence submitted in the frame of leniency programs in follow-on claims for 
damages542. Moreover, due to the fact that potential leniency applicants may fear to make a written 
application for the risk of follow-on litigation, some competition regimes provide for the possibility to 
make oral application to avoid the incriminating nature of written applications543. 
V. SETTLEMENTS 
1. Introduction 
 
Negotiated settlements or plea agreements between cartel participants544 and the enforcement 
authorities545 are an important enforcement tool to dispose competition law cases. Settlement systems 
have been implemented in many jurisdictions as a means to foster the early resolution of competition law 
cases and to achieve further objectives of the enforcement of competition law, i.e. efficient allocation of 
the competition authority’s resources, increase of the enforcement activity, and deterrence. In a broad 
sense, settlement agreements are instruments used by the enforcement authorities to obtain cooperation 
from the defendants in exchange for a lesser penalty. These procedures mean for the government a greater 
economy and broader enforcement, and provide the defendants an opportunity to avoid a protracted 
expensive trial attended by unfavorable publicity and potentially to be followed by damage litigation546.  
 According to the procedural rules, by default, competition law cases are resolved via the full 
disposal procedure. The standard procedure for the resolution of competition law cases varies heavily 
from one jurisdiction to another depending on the enforcement framework, however, in a broad sense, the 
standard procedure may include the full investigation and prosecution of the competition law 
infringement, the production of a fully reasoned and detailed decision or the litigation of the antitrust case 
before courts, and eventually the appeal process. On the one hand, the ordinary procedure is beneficial for 
the parties provided that it is governed by procedural rules, guidelines and case law aimed at guaranteeing 
the due process, and the quality and fairness of the decisions delivered by the enforcement authorities. On 
the other hand, the downside of resolving cases in full proceedings is that these procedures require time 
and the expenditure of the limited resources of the enforcement authorities and the defendants.  
                                                          
540 In Canada, the identity of leniency applicants and the information provided by these is treated as confidential by the Bureau.  
541 According to the provisions of the U.S. leniency program, the Antitrust Division will not share information provided by the 
applicants to foreign governments even if there is a bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement.  
542 In the EU, Article 6 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union (2013), determines that Member States shall ensure that, for the purpose of actions for damages, national courts 
cannot at any time order a party or third party to disclose leniency corporate statements.  
543 In India, cartel members can file a written leniency application, or contact the Commission orally to furnish the information 
relating to the existence of a cartel (Regulation 5(1) of the Lesser Penalty Regulations of the Competition Commission of India, 
2009). 
544 The settlement systems reviewed in this section are those implemented in the framework of anti-cartel enforcement. For the 
resolution of cases related to other anticompetitive practices via commitment decisions please see Section VI.2.1.d, below. 
545 Provided that the authorities responsible for the investigation and adjudication of cartel cases differ depending on the competition 
system in question, the term “enforcement authorities” or “enforcers” in this section makes reference to all public enforcers in 
charge of the investigation and/or prosecution of competition law cases (i.e. competition authorities, prosecutors and courts). 
546 BARNES, Stanley N. (1954), ‘Settlement by Consent Judgment’. Section of Antitrust Law, ABA Publishing, p. 8. 
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 In opposition to the full procedure for the adjudication of competition law cases, many 
jurisdictions have implemented different kinds of settlement systems to resolve competition law cases 
more expeditiously, thus, saving time and resources. Under the frame of the normal procedures, the 
enforcement authorities have to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate a determined case respecting and 
complying with all the rules of due process. In addition, the defendants have the prerogative of contesting 
the investigations and the decisions issued by the enforcement authorities in the exercise of their 
procedural rights of defense. The settlement systems for the early resolution of competition law cases are 
intended to relieve the enforcers and defendants from lengthy and expensive proceedings by simplifying 
the resolution of the case by relieving the enforcers of having to conduct a full investigation and 
adjudication of the case, and securing the admission or non-contestation of the antitrust infringement by 
the defendants. In this sense, settlement procedures refer to the disposal of a case by the enforcement 
authorities through a specific and simplified procedure where some of the formalities of a fuller procedure 
can be dismissed and some benefits be granted to the defendant in exchange for the admission or non-
contestation of the infringement and/or the offer or acceptance of remedies and/or penalties547.  
 Settlements procedures are not to be confused with commitment decisions. The latter are 
mechanisms through which the competition authorities can terminate their proceedings by adopting a 
commitment decision in exchange for undertakings or commitments on the part of the undertakings that 
have allegedly infringed the provisions of competition law. In practice, settlement procedures differ from 
commitment decisions in that a settlement decision does establish the infringement of the competition law 
provisions and requires an admission of guilt from the parties and the promise not to contest the 
settlement decision. Conversely, commitment decisions do not establish the infringement of the 
competition law mandates and do not require any admission by the parties. Moreover, settlement 
procedures are related to past behavior, while commitment decisions require commitments in relation to 
future behavior. Finally, settlement procedures are only available for cases related to cartel activity, 
whereas commitment decisions are appropriate for all the other competition law cases.  
2. Rationale for Settlement Systems 
 
The ability of competition law enforcers to detect and punish cartels is strictly related to their facility to 
obtain information about a determined anticompetitive conduct. In this regard, it is in the best interest of 
enforcers and the general public to offer cartel participants genuine incentives to cooperate with the 
investigation. Many competition regimes have implemented specific mechanisms to secure the 
cooperation of antitrust offenders, such as leniency programs548 or settlement policies. 
 The rationale for the implementation of settlement systems in the framework of anti-cartel 
enforcement is that due to the seriousness of cartel infringements and that these cases are normally long, 
expensive and procedurally complex to dispose, some competition regimes have adopted settlement 
policies to simplify the regular procedure thanks to the cooperation of the defendants549. Under regular 
                                                          
547 WILS (2008B).  
548 Section IV, above.  
549 DEKEYSER Kris & ROQUES Christian (2010), ‘The European Commission’s settlement procedure in cartel cases’, The 
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 4. 
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conditions, from the initiation of an investigation, to the adoption of a final decision by the enforcement 
authorities, the time lapse and resources invested are considerable in cartel cases, if one adds further 
appeals against these decisions550, the entire procedure could last years and spend a considerable amount 
of resources on the part of both the enforcers and the defendants. In this sense, as a way to improve the 
efficiency and performance of competition law enforcers in their relentless fight against cartels, some 
competition regimes have introduced settlement procedures to enhance deterrence by facilitating the 
enforcers to rapidly dispose cartel cases, and as a consequence, freeing up valuable resources for other 
investigations, and providing the defendants faster decisions and reduced penalties551.  
 A further justification for the introduction of settlement procedures, and in relation to leniency 
programs, depending on the scope of a determined leniency policy, settlement procedures can be 
alternatively used in cartel cases in jurisdiction where full immunity or leniency is only granted to the first 
successful applicant and/or where certain cartel members are ineligible due to their participation in the 
cartel. In such cases, settlement procedures provide ineligible cartel participants with an alternative way 
to benefit from an early resolution and lower penalties in exchange for their cooperation552.   
 Finally, settlement procedures are ultimately intended to free human and economic resources to 
allow competition law enforcers to deal with other cartel cases, and as a consequence, increasing the 
detection rate of hard-core cartels and the overall efficiency of the competition law enforcers. At the end, 
these settlement policies are expected to have a positive impact on deterrence553.  
3. Benefits of Settlement Systems 
 
Settlement procedures for the early resolution of cartel cases have become an important topic for 
discussion in international competition forums and a growing practice across jurisdictions due to the 
benefits that these kinds of procedures report to the overall enforcement of the anti-cartel provisions. Due 
to the benefits that these systems deliver, in certain competition regimes over 90 percent of the cartel 
members prosecuted for the infringement of the competition law provisions enter into settlement 
agreements with the enforcement authorities554.  
Despite the preceding, in order for a determined settlement system to be successful, such a system 
has to provide cartel participants and competition law enforcers with sufficient benefits and incentives to 
settle. However, state of the art settlement systems have proved to be beneficial for governments, 
enforcement authorities, cooperating defendants, the courts, the victims, and the general public. Besides 
                                                          
550 In the EU, ninety percent of the decisions of the European Commission are appealed, see: VELJANOVSKI, C. (2009), ‘European 
Cartel Prosecution and Fines, 1998-2009: A Statistical Analysis of Fines Under the 1998 Penalty Guidelines’ [online]. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1016014  
551 MEHTA Kirtimumar & TIERNO CENTELLA María Luisa (2010), ‘EU Settlement Procedure: Public Enforcement Policy 
Perspective’, in EHLERMANN & MARQUIS (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2008: Antitrust Settlements under EC 
Competition Law. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing. 
552 Such is the case in the U.S., where according to the Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Program, only the first undertaking 
to report a criminal antitrust violation and to meet the other conditions of the Program is granted full immunity –no criminal 
conviction, no criminal fine, and no jail sentence for cooperating employees. Nonetheless, undertakings and individuals that lose the 
race for leniency can still obtain reduced sentences in exchange for their cooperation by pleading guilty to criminal charges and 
entering into plea agreements with the Division.  
553 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels-frequently asked questions’. Brussels, 
30th June 2008.  
554 That is the current situation in the U.S. according to: HAMMOND Scott D. (2006), ‘The U.S. Model of Negotiated Plea 
Agreements: A Good Deal with Benefits for All’. OECD Competition Committee, Working Party No. 3. 
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the more obvious benefits that settlements procedures offer to enforcement authorities and settling cartel 
participants (resource savings and lesser penalties), this type of procedures also provide other additional 
benefits that will be discussed below. 
a) One of the most important benefits of settlements is the saving of time and resources (human and 
monetary). In opposition to regular procedures, in settled cases the resources and the time that 
would have been expended in the investigation and prosecution of all the cartel participants is 
saved thanks to the cooperation of the settling defendants. The immediate repercussion that these 
savings have is that the resources that would have been expended in a full procedure are freed-up 
to investigate and prosecute additional cartels, this can ultimately increase deterrence555. In 
addition, the settling cartel participants also benefit from the savings of time and resources given 
that the quick resolution of the cases allows the defendants to rapidly resolve their liability and 
move on.    
 
b) A further benefit of settlement is the cooperation provided by cartel participants to the 
investigation conducted by the competition law enforcers. The cooperation of settling cartel 
members provides important momentum in the ongoing investigation allowing a faster 
prosecution of non-settling cartel participants. In this sense, once a cartel member has settled, the 
other members hurry to settle the case. Moreover, thanks to the cooperation of setting cartel 
participants, the enforcers can gather important evidence to successfully prosecute additional 
members of the cartel. Notwithstanding the preceding, in jurisdictions where the settlement 
procedure is conducted once the investigation has concluded, these procedures are not intended 
to gather evidence about the cartel, but serve as a means to dispose the case more quickly. 
Lastly, the cooperation provided by cartel participants in the frame of settlement procedures can 
lead to the detection of other unidentified cartels (leniency plus)556. 
 
c) Transparency can be considered as a fundamental element of settlement and also as a benefit. In 
settlement negotiations, transparency is necessary to secure the cooperation of cartel members, 
as well as to foster public confidence that there is proportional and equitable treatment of 
competition law infringers. The practice of some competition agencies to upload prior settlement 
agreement on their websites557, allows potential settling parties to somehow predict the possible 
reward they would receive for they cooperation. Similarly, written settlement agreements 
constitute a public available record of the enforcers on their policies and positions that can be 
useful for the undertakings and the bar, and increases the transparency of the settlement policy. 
Finally, the production of model settlement agreements can increase transparency by informing 
prospective settling parties on the terms and obligations of singing a settlement agreement.  
 
                                                          
555 OECD, Experience with Direct Settlement in Cartel Cases, 2008, p. 7.  
556 For additional information on leniency plus programs, please see Section IV, above.  
557 For examples of websites that contain information on settled cartels cases, visit the websites of the: Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (http://www.accc.gov.au), the Canadian Competition Bureau (http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca), the 
German Bundeskrtellamt (www.bundeskartellamt.de) , the UK Office of Fair Trading (http://www.oft.gov.uk), or the U.S. 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (http://www.justice.gov/atr/).  
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d) A further benefit of settlements is that these procedures provide proportionality in the charges 
and the penalties. Settlement agreements contain agreed upon charges and penalties favorable for 
the public interest and proportional to other participants of the same cartel and other similarly 
situated cartel members in other cartels prosecuted. Usually proportionality is related to the 
timeliness and quality of the cooperation and the culpability of the settling party in relation to 
other members of the cartel when imposing or recommending the penalty to be imposed upon a 
settling cartel member. 
 
e) Certainty about the type of penalty or sentence to be imposed on settling cartel members is 
another benefit of this type of procedures. On order to provide certainty, some jurisdictions 
allow settling cartel members and the enforcers to agree upon the penalty or sentence before its 
actual imposition. In competition regimes where the competition authority is empowered to 
impose the sentence itself, the settling parties and the authority may previously reach a 
settlement agreement determining the sentence to be imposed. On the other hand, in jurisdictions 
where the competition authority recommends the imposition of the sentence to the competent 
court, normally, the courts follow the authority’s recommendation, thus providing a certain 
degree of certainty. Most settlement systems also provide for certainty in relation to future 
charges. Hence, in jurisdictions where individuals can be prosecuted for their participation in 
cartel activities, corporate settlement may provide certainty to the individuals that if they 
cooperate, they will not be prosecuted for the conduct to which their employer plead guilty. 
Settlement systems can also provide certainty to third parties like customers, banks, or 
shareholders, that the undertaking has resolved its liability.  
 
f) Finality is another benefit of settlement procedures. Settlement procedures allow the possibility 
to resolve definitively a determined matter. Such possibility is beneficial for both the enforcers 
and settling cartel participants. In the case of the enforcers, these can save their limited resources 
from investigations, prosecutions, litigations and appeals. Moreover, in jurisdictions where 
courts adjudicate competition law cases, these can also save the time and resources of full 
procedures. On the side of the defendants, thanks to settlement these can also avoid bad 
publicity, costly and lengthy procedures, and finally resolve their liability to move on.  
 
4. Drawbacks of Settlement Systems 
 
Even though settlement procedures can be beneficial for the overall enforcement of the anti-cartel 
provisions and, in some cases, may increase deterrence, there may also be some negative aspects against 
this type of procedures.  
 According to the legal and constitutional framework of some jurisdictions, the fact that settling 
cartel participants have to admit the infringement of the completion law provisions, and waive their right 
to appeal the decision and other procedural rights, can raise concerns in relation to the privilege against 
self-incrimination and be considered as a violation of the fundamental rights of defense.  
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 In order to incentive cartel participants to settle, normally, settlement policies offer certain 
benefits like lower penalties of less burdensome remedies. This constitutes an obvious drawback given 
that the enforcement authority will have to settle for something less than the maximum possible penalty 
that could have been imposed against a cartel participant in order to secure its cooperation. This will 
inevitably lead to lower penalties than the imposed in regular proceedings. In such cases, the reduction of 
the penalties can be regarded as enforcement losses. Considering that the levels of deterrence are strictly 
related to the amount of the fines imposed for cartel violations, the fact that these fines can be lowered in 
settlement procedures can decrease the level of deterrence. This situation is further exacerbated in 
competition systems where cartel violations are only sanctioned with the imposition of financial penalties, 
given that in competition regimes were cartel participants can be sanctioned with imprisonment for 
individuals and face a high level of private enforcement558.  Hence, settlements will only be desirable 
from the perspective of optimal enforcement if the losses provoked by the benefits granted to the 
defendants as an incentive to settle are outweighed by the enforcement gains resulting from the faster 
resolution of the case and the savings of time and resources559.    
 Moreover, in cases where in various settlement procedures the government has accepted less 
than the maximum they could have imposed in a regular case, these may influence the judgment of the 
enforcement authorities at the time of trying to determine the penalty to be imposed in following regular 
proceedings. As a consequence, the use of settlements and the imposition of lesser penalties can 
eventually reduce the penalties to be imposed on regular proceedings.  
 There also may be concerns about settlements compromising justice by requiring the imposition 
of a lesser penalty, and as a consequence, bargaining away charges and justice. Moreover, the term “plea 
bargaining” has some negative connotations due to fact that the general public and courts consider that 
prosecutors are bargaining away justice by securing agreements that allow defendant to plead guilty to 
lesser offenses560. 
 The use of settlements can diminish the deterrent effect of competition law, thus, the best 
approach for the adjudication of competition law cases should be through regular proceedings and the 
imposition of full penalties, especially, if the enforcers have sufficient elements of proof about the 
infringement. Settlements should be used in cases where the resources required for the investigation and 
prosecution of the cases are excessive or when the illegality of the challenged conduct if not crystal-clear. 
This is especially important for young competition regimes that require clarifying the content of their 
competition law provisions, and creating a strong reputation in relation to the rates of successful 
prosecutions of cases and imposition of fines561.  
 Other negative aspects of settlement procedures are related to the fact that settlements can result 
in lesser publicity than litigated trials. Moreover, settlements proceedings may not be considered as 
                                                          
558 STEPHAN Andreas (2009B), ‘The Direct Settlement of EC Cartel Cases’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 
58, p. 653. 
559 WILS (2008B), p. 12. 
560 O’BRIEN Ann (2008), ‘Cartel Settlements in the U.S and EU: Similarities, Differences & Remaining Questions’. 13th Annual 
EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop 5-6 (June 6, 2008), available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/235598.pdf   
561 MARCOS Francisco (2012), ‘Diminishing Enforcement: Negative Effects for Deterrence of Mistaken Settlements and 
Misguided Competition Promotion and Advocacy’. Working Paper IE Law School AJ8-187-I. 
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precedent in following related cases. Similarly, settlement decisions may not further develop cartel law. 
In addition, settlement procedures may have a negative impact on leniency programs by diminishing the 
incentives of cartel participants to apply for leniency562. Finally, settlements for imprisonment terms can 
result in increases in public expenditures on jail563.  
5. Interaction with Leniency Programs 
 
Settlement procedures and leniency programs in practice share some of their benefits and their ultimate 
finalities. Both settlement and leniency provide for certain benefits to successful settling parties and 
leniency applicants, as seen before, these benefits are related to the imposition of lesser penalties and the 
faster resolution of the competition law cases564. Moreover, competition law enforcers and the general 
public also benefit from these types of enforcement policies given that an expeditious resolution of a 
determined case saves the limited resources of competition authorities, allowing them to detect and 
prosecute other anticompetitive practices for the sake of competitive markets and consumer welfare. 
Similarly, with regard to the ultimate objectives of these enforcement policies, settlement procedures and 
leniency programs seek the earlier resolution of cases related to the infringement of the anti-cartel 
provisions through the cooperation of cartel participants in exchange for full immunity or a reduction in 
the penalties to be imposed, depending on the case, and eventually, the increase of deterrence.  
 Notwithstanding the preceding, leniency programs and settlement procedures are different 
mainly with regard to the timing and the extent of the benefits offered to the cooperating parties. For 
instance, with regard to the timing in which these enforcement policies operate, leniency applications are 
usually filed before the competition authority has initiated a formal investigation about a determined 
cartel or is even aware of the existence of the cartel. On the contrary, settlement procedures are conducted 
once the competition authority has knowledge about the cartel and has initiated a formal investigation. 
A further differentiation between leniency programs and settlement procedures is that related to 
the benefits offered to the cooperating cartel participants. In a broad sense, in the frame of leniency 
programs, the first successful leniency applicant can be granted full immunity, in addition, in competition 
regimes with an extended leniency program, subsequent leniency applicants can be granted a reduction in 
the penalties. On the other hand, in settlement procedures, settling cartel participants only benefit from a 
reduction in the penalties to be imposed.   
 From these differences is evident that leniency programs are intended to discover cartel activity 
by encouraging cartel participants to come forward and report the cartel to the competition authority in 
exchange for full immunity to the first member that reports the cartel and provides sufficient evidence and 
intelligence to prosecute the other cartel members, and a reduction in the penalties to subsequent leniency 
applicants, where available. Alternatively, settlement procedures are intended to incentive cartel 
participants that have lost the leniency race but are still in a position to offer timely and valuable 
                                                          
562 ICN, Cartel Settlements, 2008, pp. 17-18.  
563 POLINSKY & SHAVELL (2007), p. 436. 
564 For more on the benefits of leniency programs, see Section IV, above. 
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cooperation to collaborate with the investigation and not to challenge the charges in exchange for a 
reduction in the penalties.  
Thus, in competition regimes where according to the provisions of the leniency programs only the 
first cartel participant to come forward can be granted leniency565, settlement procedures provide a strong 
incentive for the other members of the cartel to cooperate with the investigation in exchange for a 
reduction in the penalties. In these regimes, full immunity to the first cartel participant to report the 
infringement is granted under the provisions of leniency programs, whereas, penalty reductions for cartel 
members that have lost the race for leniency are available via plea agreements or settlement.  
 Nevertheless, as seen before, there are jurisdictions where leniency is not reserved for the first cartel 
participant to come forward. In these regimes, full immunity is granted to the first successful applicant, 
however, following leniency applicants can be granted a reduction in the penalties if they comply with the 
requirements of the program. Unlike the abovementioned example, in these jurisdictions both the grant of 
full immunity and the reduction of the penalties operate under the frame of the leniency program 
(extended leniency program). Additionally, in some of these competition systems, there is also in place a 
settlement policy that offers further incentives for cartel participants that are not eligible for being granted 
leniency to cooperate with the investigation and settle in exchange for a reduction in the penalties. Hence, 
in cases where there cannot be further reductions on leniency grounds provided that the authority has 
sufficient evidence about the cartel, the other cartel members can obtain a reduction in the penalties via 
plea agreements or settlement. Given that the cartel members cannot provide timely and valuable 
information in such cases, the reduction is granted in exchange for the non-contestation of the charges 
against these members. However, in order to maintain the attractiveness of leniency programs, the 
reductions available in settlement procedures for the cartel participants that are not eligible for leniency 
have to be considerably low in comparison to the ones available for successful leniency applicants; 
provided that if settlement incentives are too high, cartel members will prefer these over leniency 
programs566.  
6. Types of Settlement Systems  
 
Given that there are different anti-cartel enforcement regimes across the world, there is also a variety of 
settlement systems that are shaped by different factors such as the type of enforcement regime, the 
persons that can be prosecuted for the infringement of the cartel provisions, the sanctions available, and 
the legal and constitutional framework.   
(a) Criminal enforcement regimes 
 
In competition regimes where cartel activities are prosecuted criminally, both undertakings and 
individuals may be sanctioned with the imposition of financial penalties or imprisonment. In such cases, 
the undertakings and individuals involved in cartel behavior may resolve cartel charges by entering into 
                                                          
565 In this type of leniency programs, leniency refers to full immunity from the penalties.  
566 ICN (2008), p. 7. 
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plea agreements in the framework of the criminal plea system available for all crimes. In these regimes, 
plea agreements are subject to the approval of the court responsible for the imposition of the sentence.  
 In competition regimes where the investigation and the criminal prosecution of cartel cases are 
conducted by different authorities, once the investigation is completed by the competition authority, this 
will refer the case to the public prosecutor. The latter will be empowered to conduct plea negotiations and 
will recommend a plea and sentencing to the court567. Alternatively, in other competition regimes, the 
competition authority is empowered to investigate and prosecute cartels criminally. In these regimes the 
competition authority is authorized to negotiate and enter into criminal pleas with cartel participants568.  
(b) Civil enforcement regimes 
 
In other competition systems where cartel behavior amounts to civil violations, the competition authority 
is entitled to negotiate civil settlements in cartel cases. Normally, in such regimes the competition 
authorities have a wide margin of discretion in deciding whether to settle cartel cases. These early 
resolution agreements are reached between the competition authority and the cartel participants, which 
are offered a reduction in the penalties in exchange for an admission of liability and the waiver of certain 
rights of defense569.   
(c) Administrative enforcement regimes 
 
In some competition regimes cartel conduct is prosecuted under an administrative regime. In this type of 
regimes, competition authorities are in charge of the investigation and prosecution of cartel violations. 
Moreover, the competition authorities are empowered to reach settlement agreements with one, some or 
all the parties to a cartel. The competition authorities have wide discretion in deciding which cases are 
suitable for settlement. In these regimes, the settling cartel participants are granted a reduction in the 
penalties in exchange for the admission of a streamlined procedure and the waiver of some rights of 
defense570.  
VI. SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES 
 
In order to have a sound competition law system that controls, prevents and sanctions the infringement of 
the antitrust provisions, every competition regime has to address the fundamental issue of how to punish 
the competition law offenders and how to remedy the harm inflicted to competition and the affected 
persons by the anticompetitive practices of the latter. Accordingly, this part of the present study is 
concerned with the sanctioning system of competition law regimes and to illustrate how the different 
                                                          
567 In Canada, the Canadian Competition Bureau investigates the cartel and refers the evidence to the Director of Public Prosecution 
for criminal prosecution. The Director then conducts plea negotiations and recommends a plea and sentencing.  
568 In the U.S., the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice is allowed to investigate and prosecute criminally cartels. 
The Antitrust Divisions is also empowered to negotiate and enter into plea agreements.  
569 In the UK, the OFT has discretion to enter into agreements with one or more parties under investigation in relation to violations 
of the Competition Act whereby a reduction of the penalty can be granted in return for an admission of liability and various other 
types of cooperation.  
570 In the EU, the European Commission is empowered to reach settlement agreements with cartel participants that cooperate with 
the Commission and waive some of their rights of defense. As a reward, the Commission grants a fixed 10% settlement discount to 
the parties that reach a settlement agreement.  
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regimes approach this issue. The sanctions and remedies reviewed in this chapter are the mechanisms 
utilized in public competition law enforcement, this means; the application of the competition law 
provisions by public authorities, such as competition authorities and judicial authorities.  
Due to the compulsory and remedial nature of competition law, virtually all competition law 
regimes have established sanctions and remedies for the infringement of the competition law provisions. 
For the effective and efficient enforcement of any set of legal provisions, such as competition law, it is 
fundamental to adopt a sound legislative framework with effective sanctions for offenders and a strong 
institutional structure that actively polices the behavior of the recipients of the law for those who violate 
these legal provisions, all this, with the ultimate purpose of finding and terminating unlawful conducts, 
when these have been committed, and to prevent or deter unlawful conducts from happening in the future. 
Additionally, in order to apply the concerned legal provisions in an efficient manner, the enforcement 
functions will have to be performed with reasonable accuracy and promptitude and at a reasonable cost. 
In this sense, it has been argued that it is not enough to have a well-established competition law 
framework, but it is also fundamental for the accomplishment of the competition law policy objectives, to 
have strong enforcement mechanisms that ensure a reasonable degree of compliance with the law571.  
Irrespective of the competition regime in question, in particular, the different sanctions and 
remedies established in most competition law regimes serve as tools or mechanisms for the 
accomplishment of the objectives of competition law policy and the enforcement functions. Thus, in 
practice, these sanctions and remedies will be intended to fulfill some of the enforcement functions of 
competition law, such as: deterrence, punishment and compensation. Accordingly, the imposition of 
sanctions and penalties will serve as deterrence to the competition law offenders and to other market 
participants to refrain from engaging in anticompetitive practices in the future. Similarly, the imposition 
of sanctions and remedies will serve as punishment for those market participants that have breached the 
competition law provisions through their anticompetitive conduct. Finally, with regard to the award of 
remedies, these will, in some instances, serve as compensation for the persons that have been injured by 
the anticompetitive practices of the competition law offender. This will occur primordially in civil 
proceedings where the injured persons will instigate a civil action before the relevant court with the 
purpose of being compensated for the harm suffered as a consequence of the unlawful conduct of the 
defendant, nonetheless, in some competition law regimes where the competition authority can order the 
infringing undertakings to pay the injured persons an amount as compensation for the harm inflicted upon 
them, this remedy issued by the competition institution in public proceedings will accomplish the 
compensation function.   
In particular, with regard to the sanctioning systems, most competition law regimes have 
established a variety of mechanisms through which the enforcers of the competition provisions can 
accomplish the enforcement functions. Furthermore, in order to accomplish the enforcement functions 
more efficiently, the majority of competition regimes use sanctions and remedies in conjunction, given 
that the imposition of sanctions and remedies serve different purposes in the enforcement of competition 
                                                          
571 POSNER (2001), p. 266. 
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law. On the one hand, the imposition of sanctions for the breach of the antitrust rules is intended to 
encourage market participants to comply with competition law and to punish them for their unlawful 
practices. On the other hand, the imposition of remedies, which is complementary to the imposition of 
sanctions, is intended to safeguard or restore competition in cases where market participants have 
distorted or are about to distort competition in a determined market.  
Despite the aforementioned, in practice, just like with the statutory commands, the competition 
law enforcers and the investigative techniques, the sanctions and remedies that can be imposed for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions vary from one competition regime to another.  
1. Sanctions for the Infringement of Competition Law 
 
Looking at the different sanctioning systems of some competition regimes, some differences and 
similarities can be noticed, most of which are concerned with: the enforcement authority empowered to 
impose the sanctions and the different type of sanctions that can be imposed by these authorities while 
enforcing the competition law provisions.  
1.1. Authorities Empowered to Impose Sanctions 
 
Depending on the competition regime, different enforcement bodies may be empowered to impose 
sanctions for the infringement of competition law. For instance, in some regimes the competition 
authority holds sole jurisdiction to impose sanctions to the violators of the antitrust rules. Alternatively, in 
other competition regimes where the competition authorities lack competence to impose sanctions for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, this function will be performed by judicial authorities, 
such as courts of general jurisdiction, courts specialized in competition law matters, or even the Supreme 
Court. Additionally, in some competition systems, the power to impose sanctions will be vested both on 
the competition authority and on courts. In those cases, the power of the competition authority to impose 
sanctions will be limited to such conducts as the refusal to supply information, the production of false 
information, or the failure to modify agreements, while the courts will have competence to impose 
sanctions, such as the imposition of penalty payments or imprisonment, where available.  
1.2. Types of Sanctions 
 
Overall, the sanctions that can be imposed by the enforcement authorities while applying the competition 
law provisions can be forced upon persons that infringe the substantive provisions of competition law -
prohibitions against anticompetitive agreements, the abuse of a dominant position, and mergers or 
concentrations that create or reinforce a dominant position; that commit procedural violations -refusals to 
supply information, the production of false, incorrect or misleading information, etc.; or that fail to 
comply with a decision by the relevant enforcement authority –decisions ordering the cease of 
anticompetitive conducts, decisions imposing interim measure, decisions accepting commitments, 
decisions blocking proposed mergers, etc.  
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1.2.1. Sanctions for the Violation of the Substantial Provisions of Competition Law 
(a) Nature of the sanctions 
 
Depending on the competition regime, the sanctions that can be imposed for the infringement of the 
substantive provisions of competition law can be administrative, civil or criminal in nature. In practice, 
the nature of a determined sanction shall be given by virtue of the types of the proceedings in which these 
are imposed. In this sense, administrative sanctions will be imposed by administrative authorities, such as 
the competition authority, in administrative proceedings. On the contrary, with regard to civil and 
criminal sanctions, these will be imposed by judicial authorities in civil or criminal proceedings, 
respectively. 
 In addition to the aforementioned, the availability of these types of sanctions, with regard to their 
nature, varies from one competition regime to another. Accordingly, in some competition systems, the 
violation of the substantial provisions of competition law can be punished only with the imposition of 
administrative sanctions572. On the other hand, there are jurisdictions where the infringements of the 
substantial provisions of competition law are punished with criminal sanctions only573. 
(b) Persons who can be sanctioned for the breach of the substantive provisions of competition law  
 
The persons who can be sanctioned for the infringement of the substantive provisions of competition law 
vary depending on the competition regime. As a general rule, most competition regimes allow the 
imposition of these sanctions on undertakings that have infringed the substantive provisions of 
competition law; moreover, in some competition regimes the imposition of sanctions is strictly restricted 
to undertakings574. Alternatively, in some competition regimes, beside the imposition of these sanctions 
on undertakings, the individuals responsible for the infringement in question can also be sanctioned for 
the breach of the substantive provisions of competition law575. The main differences that can be found in 
this regard are concerned with the types of the sanctions that can be imposed for these infringements. 
 As stated above, in practice, the types of sanctions that can be imposed for the infringement of 
substantial provisions of competition law on individuals and undertakings vary from one jurisdiction to 
another. Overall, in most competition regimes where sanctions for the infringement of the substantial 
provisions of competition law can be imposed on undertakings and individuals, both of them can be 
punished with the imposition of pecuniary penalties, irrespective of their nature. However, there are 
                                                          
572 In the EU, according to the provisions of Regulation 1/2003, the penalties imposed by the European Commission for the 
infringement of the EU’s competition provisions are of an administrative nature, moreover, Article 23(5) of the Regulation 
establishes expressly that the decisions of the Commission imposing fines shall not be of a criminal law nature. In Honduras, 
according to Article 36 of the Law for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, the infraction to the rules of the Law and its 
regulations must be sanctioned with administrative seizure by the Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Competition.   
573 In Ireland, criminal sanctions can be imposed both on companies and individuals for the breach of the competition provisions. 
For instance, hard-core cartel offenses are punishable, on summary conviction, with criminal fines not exceeding €3,000 and/or six 
month’s imprisonment for individuals, and on indictment, by criminal fines of €4 million or 10% of turnover and/or five years’ 
imprisonment in the case of individuals. In cases related to non-hard core breaches, penalties are limited to criminal fines.  
574 In the EU, according to the provisions of Regulation 1/2003, the penalties imposed by the European Commission for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions are imposed only on undertakings and association of undertakings.  
575 In Qatar, according to the provisions of the Article 18 of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices, a fine may be imposed on any person responsible for the management of an undertaking that has been found to have 
violated the provisions of the Law who has knowledge of and has contributed to the violation.  
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sanctions which are excusive for the individuals, such as: imprisonment or director disqualification. 
Conversely, there are sanctions that by their nature can only be imposed on undertakings, such as the 
ineligibility for official financing or participation in public tenders.   
(c) Types of sanctions imposed for the breach of the substantive provisions of competition law  
1. Financial Penalties  
 
The imposition of financial penalties is the most common approach used to sanction the infringement of 
the substantial provisions of competition law across jurisdictions. The fact that the costs of administering 
and the imposition of financial penalties are relatively low compared to other types of sanctions, such as 
imprisonment, make this option more appealing for most competition regimes. Additionally, the 
versatility of financial penalties has also contributed to the proliferation of this type of sanction among 
jurisdictions, for example, the possibility to impose these sanctions in administrative, civil or criminal 
proceedings, or the faculty to impose these sanctions on individuals and undertakings, ease the 
application of these penalties in cases related to the enforcement of the competition law provisions. 
Moreover, the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of the substantial provisions of 
competition law serves many purposes and has different effects on competition, such as: deterrent effects, 
moral effects and may also raise the costs for participating in anticompetitive practices576.  
 As to the enforcement authorities that are empowered to impose pecuniary penalties for the 
infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law, there is a variety of arrangements adopted 
in this regard that vary depending on the competition regime in question. Overall, depending on the 
nature of the pecuniary penalty, i.e. administrative, civil, or criminal, a different enforcement authority 
will be empowered to impose these types of sanctions. For instance, the imposition of administrative fines 
in administrative proceedings will be made by authorities within the administrative branch of the 
government, such as the competition authority577. On the contrary, the imposition of civil and criminal 
pecuniary penalties will be made in civil and criminal proceeding by judicial authorities of the relevant 
jurisdiction578. At least in one competition regime, only the Supreme Court, at the request of the 
competition authority, is empowered to impose financial penalties, both on individuals and undertakings, 
for the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law579. 
 Moreover, in relation to the persons who can be fined for the violation of the substantial 
provisions of competition law, different approaches have been adopted depending on the competition 
                                                          
576 See, WILS (2006A), p. 11. 
577 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt has authority to impose financial penalties for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions. In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading is empowered to impose financial penalties for the infringement of competition 
law.  
578 In Australia, the ACCC has to bring court actions for the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of competition 
law. In Ireland, the Competition Authority is not a decision-making body; consequently, the latter has to bring court action in order 
to obtain the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of the competition law provisions. In Sweden, the Competition 
Authority can bring actions against undertakings before the Stockholm District Court and request a judgment ordering the payment 
of fines for the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law. In the US, federal courts hold jurisdiction to impose 
financial penalties for the infringement of the Sherman Act, moreover, these penalties are of a criminal nature and can be imposed 
both on individuals and undertakings.  
579 In Jamaica, pursuant to Article 47 of the Fair Competition Act, the Supreme Court can impose financial penalties on individuals 
and undertakings for the violation of the competition law provisions.  
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regime. Thus, in some regimes, the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law is restricted to undertakings only580. Alternatively, in other 
competition regimes, the imposition of financial penalties for these infringements can be inflicted upon 
undertakings and individuals581. The main purpose of allowing individuals to be fined for the 
infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law is to punish those who decide on the 
undertaking’s business strategy. Thus the ultimate purpose of fining individuals for the breach of 
competition law is to recognize the liability of managers, director or employees for their participation in 
the infringement of competition law. In this sense, some competition regimes have established specific 
provisions that prohibit that the fines imposed on individuals are assumed by the undertakings on behalf 
of their employees, these prohibitions are intended safeguard the deterrent and punishment effects of the 
sanctions imposed on the individuals for their participation on the infringement of the competition law 
provisions582. However, in some competition systems, the undertakings are the guarantor of any fine 
imposed or damages claimed to be paid by the managers that have committed an infringement whether on 
their own behalf, or on the behalf of the undertakings583. 
 In addition, in some competition regimes, financial penalties can be imposed on complainants for 
the amount that would have been imposed in case the reported infringement of the substantial provisions 
of competition law would have been declared, in cases where the complaint has been rejected and it has 
been demonstrated that the purpose of the complaint was to restrict competition, prevent the entry of new 
competitors to the market, or provoke the exit of a competitor from the market584.  
 A fundamental issue for the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law is the one related to the maximum amount of the financial 
penalty. Most jurisdictions provide for a statutory limit for the imposition of financial penalties, 
accordingly, in practice, this issue is addressed in different ways depending on the competition regime in 
question. For instance, in some competition regimes the maximum amount of the financial penalty is 
expressed as a percentage of the turnover of the competition law offender585. Moreover, in some 
                                                          
580 In the EU, according to the provisions of Regulation 1/2003, the European Commission cannot impose sanctions on individual 
directors, managers or employees of the undertakings that are responsible for the infringement of the competition law provisions.  
581 In Portugal, in December 2009, the Competition Authority fined €14,7 million on five (EUREST, TRIVALOR, UNISELF, ICA, 
SODEXO PORTUGAL) mass catering undertakings for anticompetitive practices in the market for meals and refectory, canteen and 
restaurant management services. In addition, the Competition Authority also delivered a guilty verdict in the case of five managers 
of the defendant undertakings, €20,000 were imposed on the managers of SODEXO, ICA/NORDIAGL, UNISELF, ITAU and 
GERTAL. See press release at: http://www.concorrencia.pt/vEN/News_Events/Comunicados/Arquivo/Pages/2009_CA-imposes-
fines-on-five-mass-catering-undertakings.aspx. In Denmark, on March 2011, the High Court of Eastern Denmark imposed a fine of 
DKK 500,000 on two environmental laboratories, Milana A/S and Miljolaboratoriet I/S, and fines of DKK 25,000 on the managers 
of the companies for bid-rigging.  
582 In Chile, according to Article 26 of the Antitrust Act, the fines imposed on individual cannot be paid by the legal persons where 
the former exercised their functions or by their shareholders. In New Zealand, according to Sections 80A and 80B of the Commerce 
Act, an undertaking cannot indemnify a director, servant, or agent of the undertaking for payment of a pecuniary penalty or costs 
incurred in defending or settling a proceeding where that director, servant, or agent is found to have engaged in price fixing. If an 
undertaking does indemnify a director, servant or agent for breaches of the price fixing prohibition the undertaking may have to pay 
additional penalties. In the US, in the case of conviction, undertakings are prohibited from paying the criminal fines of its employees 
unless expressly permitted to do so under state law (18 U.S.C. § 3572).  
583 In Qatar, see Article 18 of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices. 
584 In Nicaragua, PROCOMPETENCIA can impose such financial penalties on complainants pursuant to Article 46(f) of the Law 
for the Promotion of Competition.  
585 In China, pursuant to Articles 46 to 48 of the Anti-monopoly Law, business operators that took part in an anticompetitive 
agreement or abused their dominant position shall be subject to the imposition of a fined between 1% and 10% of the sales revenue 
made in the previous years. In Hungary, pursuant to Article 78 of the Competition Act the maximum fine for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law may not exceed 10% of the net turnover achieved in the business year preceding that in 
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competition regimes, the maximum amount of the financial penalty will be determined in terms of a 
specific figure586. Additionally, in other competition regimes, the maximum amount of the financial 
penalties will be set by reference to a variable unit587. Finally, in some competition regimes, the 
maximum amount of the fine shall be equivalent to the amount of the economic benefit obtained for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions588. 
 When calculating the amount of the financial penalty for the infringement of the substantial 
provisions of competition law, there are certain aggravating and attenuating circumstances that may affect 
the amount imposed. As to the aggravating circumstances, in some competition regimes, the amount of 
the financial penalty imposed for the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law will be 
increased in cases where the competition law offender is a recidivist589. The rationale for increasing the 
amount of the penalty for repeating offenders is based on the premise that sanctioning repeat offenders 
more severely can be socially advantageous. Thus, from the deterrence perspective, making sanctions 
depend on offense history may be beneficial for two reasons. One, the use of offense history may create 
an additional incentive no to violate the law; provided that the detection of an infringement does not only 
imply an immediate sanction, but it also means a higher sanction for future violations, in this sense, 
repeating violators will be deterred more. Two, determine the level of sanctions on the offense history 
also allows society to take advantage of information about the dangerousness of individuals and the need 
to deter them590. In practice, there have been cases where the competition authority has considered 
recidivism as an aggravating factor and has increased the fine imposed by up to 100%591. 
Moreover, in some competition regimes, the amount of the financial penalty for the infringement 
of the substantial provisions of competition law may be increased in cases where the competition law 
offender has played an important role in the realization of the infringement592. Similarly, in some 
jurisdictions, the amount of the financial penalty will be increased where the competition law offender 
                                                                                                                                                                          
which the decision establishing the violation is reached. In the EU, according to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission is entitled to impose a maximum administrative fine of 10% of the undertaking’s worldwide annual turnover.  
586 In Canada, administrative financial penalties may not exceed $10 million, on the other hand, criminal offenses, such as cartel 
agreements, can be punished by terms of imprisonment of up to 14 years and/or up to $25 million. In Jamaica, the Supreme Court 
may impose fines not exceeding 1 million dollars for individuals, and five million dollars for undertakings. In the US, according to 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, corporation and individuals that infringe these provisions can be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100 million, for corporations, and $1 million, for individuals.  
587 In Brazil, according to Article 37 of the Antitrust Law, infringing undertakings shall be subject to a fines from 0,1% to 20% of 
the gross pretax revenue during the latest financial year. In the case of managers liable for the infringement, a fine from 1% to 20% 
of the fine imposed to the undertaking shall apply.  
588 In Honduras, pursuant to Article 37 of the Law for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, the amount of the fine imposed 
for the antitrust infringement has to be equivalent to three times the amount of the economic benefit obtained by the economic agent 
responsible for the infringement of the competition law provisions.  
589 In Brazil, pursuant to Article 37 of the Antitrust Law, the financial penalties imposed for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions will be doubled in case the offender is a recidivist. Similarly, in Mexico, according to Article 35 of the Federal Law on 
Economic Competition, the recidivist offender can be sanctioned with a fine of up to the double amount of the financial penalty 
fixed by the Federal Competition Commission. 
590 POLINSKY & SHAVELL (2007), pp. 438-439. 
591 Under the 2006 EU Finning Guidelines, recidivism is an aggravating factor in respect of which the Commission can increase the 
fine by up to 100%, such was the case in the calcium carbide decision, where the Commission applied a 100% increase to the fine 
imposed on Akzo Noble, which was found guilty of involvement in four previous cartels (Case COMP/39.396 – Calcium Carbide 
and magnesium based reagents for the steel and gas industries). 
592 In the UK, according to the 2012 OFT’s Guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, the amount of the fine for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions can be increased in cases where the infringing undertaking has played the role of 
leader or instigator in the infringement.  
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has refused to cooperate with or has obstructed the investigation for the alleged infringement of the 
competition law provisions593.  
On the contrary, in some competition regimes, the amount of the financial penalty imposed for 
the violation of the substantial provisions of competition law will be reduced in cases where the conduct 
of the perpetrator of the antitrust infringement meets certain circumstances established by law. For 
instance, in jurisdictions where leniency programs have been established, the competition law offender 
will benefit from a reduction of the financial penalty or will be granted immunity from the fine if it 
discloses, in a manner specified by the relevant provisions, agreements or concerted practices between 
competing undertakings that have as main purpose, to directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices, 
to share markets, to collude tenders, or to allocate production or sales quotas. In practice, the leniency 
programs established in most competition regimes are very similar with regard to their requirements. 
Accordingly, most competition regimes restrict their leniency programs to cartel activities. In addition, 
most leniency programs grant total immunity from the financial penalty in cases where the competition 
authority is not aware of the anticompetitive agreement, and where the leniency applicant is the first one 
to request lenient treatment. Alternatively, in cases where the competition authority has already gained 
knowledge of the anticompetitive agreement, the latter will reduce the financial penalty of the person who 
provides the competition authority with information to fully clarify the facts of the case. Besides the 
requirement of being the first to apply, most competition regimes additionally require the leniency 
applicant to: stop the participation in the infringement in question; to fully cooperate with the competition 
authority to clarify the relevant facts in the case; and that the applicant has not forced any other person to 
participate in the infringement. A further issue related to the leniency programs is concerned with the 
persons who are allowed to apply for leniency. On the one hand, in competition regimes where financial 
penalties can be imposed only on undertakings, lenient treatment will only be available for 
undertakings594. On the other hand, in competition regimes where financial penalties can be imposed on 
undertakings and individuals595, both undertakings and individuals will be allowed to apply for leniency 
individually596.     
Moreover, in some competition regimes with criminal sanctions for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions, the undertakings involved in anticompetitive practices may agree with the 
competition authority to plead guilty and to cooperate with the competition authority in the investigation 
in exchange of a reduction in the amount of the financial penalty597. 
                                                          
593 In the EU, pursuant to the provisions of the European Commission’s Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant 
to Article 2382)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, the amount of the fine can be increased when the competition law offender has refused 
to cooperate with or has obstructed the Commission in carrying out is investigation. 
594 In Austria, given that financial penalties can be imposed on undertakings only, then, only undertakings will require lenient 
treatment from the Federal Competition Authority. 
595 In Australia, where financial penalties maybe imposed on undertakings and individuals for the infringement of the cartel 
prohibitions, both undertakings and individuals can apply to the ACCC for leniency.   
596 In Portugal, the Competition Authority fined the managers of several undertakings involved in a cartel in the catering and related 
services and grated full immunity from the fine to one of the managers who applied for leniency individually.  See press release at: 
http://www.concorrencia.pt/vEN/News_Events/Comunicados/Arquivo/Pages/2009_CA-imposes-fines-on-five-mass-catering-
undertakings.aspx 
597 In the US, Samsung agreed to plead guilty on color display tube price-fixing conspiracy, to cooperate with the Antitrust Division 
in the ongoing investigation and to pay a $32 million criminal fine. See the Department’s press release at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/268592.htm. 
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Ultimately, in some jurisdictions, the amount of the financial penalty may be reduced when the 
offender has demonstrated that it has terminated the infringement as soon as the competition authority 
intervened; when the offender demonstrates that its participation in the infringement is limited; when the 
offender demonstrates that it is acting under severe duress or pressure; or when the offender demonstrates 
genuine uncertainty as to whether the anticompetitive practice constituted an infringement of the 
competition law provisions; among others.   
Traditionally, the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of the substantial 
provisions of competition law is made through a reasoned decision of the enforcement authority, i.e. 
competition authorities or judicial authorities. Furthermore, in most competition systems, the decisions of 
the competition authorities or the competent courts imposing financial penalties to the competition law 
offenders can be appealed before the competent appellate body598.  
Finally, with regard to the enforcement of a decision by the competition authority to impose a 
financial penalty on the perpetrator of an infringement of the competition law provisions, in most 
competition regimes, if a sanctioned individual or undertaking fails to pay within the period of time 
specified by the competition authority’s decision, and no appeal has been commenced against the 
imposition or the amount of the financial penalty within the time allowed, or such an appeal has been 
made and the penalty upheld, the competition authority may commence proceedings before the competent 
court to recover the required amount as a civil debt. In other competition regimes, the competition 
authority will notify the tax administration the failure of the concerned person to pay the financial penalty 
imposed for the antitrust infringement599. Finally, in some competition regimes, the competition authority 
will vested with the same powers as a civil court for the purposes of the recovery of the amount of a 
financial penalty imposed for the infringement of the competition law provisions600. 
2. Imprisonment 
 
Irrespective of the specific type of competition law sanction in question, one of the main functions of 
these sanctions is to deter market participants from engaging in anticompetitive practices. In particular, 
depending on the type of sanction, the level of deterrence may be higher or lower. In the case of financial 
penalties imposed for the violation of the substantial provisions of competition law, the amount of the 
financial penalty imposed is directly related to the deterrence level of this type of competition law 
sanction. Thus, in practice, this would mean that the higher the amount of the financial penalty, the higher 
the level of deterrence on the market participants to obey the competition law provisions. Even though, 
the amount of financial penalties imposed for the violation of the substantial provisions of competition 
                                                          
598 In the UK, the decisions of the OFT imposing financial penalties for the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition 
law, can be appealed before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the latter can impose, revoke, or vary the amount of the fine. Further 
appeal can be made before the Court of Appeal in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Court of Session in Scotland.  
599 In Kosovo, if an enterprise fails to meet the deadline for payment of the pronounced punitive administrative measure, the 
Competition Authority shall notify the Kosovo Tax Administration, in the area where it resides or the seat of the sanctioned person, 
in order to force the enterprise to pay the punitive administrative measure pursuant to provisions for payment of taxes (Article 63 of 
the Law on Protection of Competition).  
600 In Pakistan, the Competition Commission has the same power of civil courts for the recovery of the amount of financial penalties 
(Section 40 of Act No XIX of 2010).  
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law has increased in the last decades601, it has been stated that these are not high enough to comply with 
the desired deterrence effects of competition law sanctions. In this sense, in order to reach effective 
deterrence with only fines on companies, it would require impossibly high fines that are over the statutory 
ceilings of most competition regimes, and are likely to exceed the undertaking’s ability to pay. This, in 
turn, would result in the fined undertakings being forced into bankruptcy, which would entail undesirable 
social costs602. 
 Moreover, the fact that the majority of financial penalties imposed for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law are inflicted upon undertakings and not upon the individuals 
who decide on the undertaking’s business strategy makes that the imposition of these financial penalties 
does not punish those who are actually responsible for the violation of the competition law provisions603. 
Accordingly, in order to prevent that undertakings assume the responsibility of their managers and 
employees, it would be advisable that the competition law provisions consider the possibility of 
sanctioning the actual individuals responsible for the breach of the substantial provisions of competition 
law.  
In relation to the aforementioned, some competition regimes have established criminal sanctions 
on individuals, such as imprisonment, for the violation of the substantial provisions of competition law 
with the purpose of increasing deterrence and to sanction the individuals responsible for such violations. 
Even though, some competition regimes have established criminal sanctions on individuals since its 
inception604, in recent years, there has been a trend to criminalize competition law sanctions; provided 
that the enforcement practice over the past years shows that the mere application of financial penalties on 
undertakings does not effectively deter market participants from violating the substantial provisions of 
competition law605. On the other hand, there are competition regimes where a decriminalization process 
has occurred. In these jurisdictions, there were criminal sanctions for the violation of the competition law 
provisions; however, these have been abolished from the antitrust provisions because these criminal 
systems were badly conceived and the criminal antitrust provisions were rarely applied606.  
With regard to the types of criminal sanctions for the infringement of the substantial provision of 
competition law, as previously seen, in some competition regimes, financial penalties of criminal nature 
                                                          
601 In the UE, the European Commission has imposed over €17 billion in fines for the infringement of competition law in the last 
decade (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf). Similarly, in the US, the Antitrust Division has imposed over 
$5 billion in criminal antitrust fines in the same period (http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2012/criminal-
program.html#d2).  
602 WILS, Wouter P. J. (2008A), ‘Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement’. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 63. 
603 CSERES, K.J., SCHINKEL, M.P., and VOGELAAR, F.O.W. (2006), ‘Law and economics of criminal antitrust enforcement: an 
introduction’. In: CSERES, K.J., SCHINKEL, M.P., and VOGELAAR, F.O.W. (ed). Criminalization of Competition Law 
Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU Member States. Cheltenham (UK); Northampton (USA): Edward Elgar, 
pp. 1-29. p. 7-8. 
604 In the US, since its adoption in 1890, the provisions of the Sherman Act impose criminal sanctions involving imprisonment on 
individuals in cases of competition law violation.  
605 In the UK, the Enterprise Act 2002 has added a criminal cartel offence, limited to hard-core cartels, punishable with 
imprisonment and/or fines for individuals only, as well as a sanction of director disqualification for individuals.  Other jurisdictions 
such as: Canada, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, and Malta have introduced criminal sanctions for the 
breach of the substantial provisions of competition law.  
606 In Austria, a long tradition of individual criminal sanctions for cartel agreements was abolished in 2002; nevertheless, 
imprisonment for bid-rigging is still available. In France, antitrust enforcement was exclusively criminal under the provisions of the 
competition acts of 1953 and 1958. After the reforms of 1977 and 1978, the enforcement of the competition provisions relies 
essentially on administrative fines on undertakings, imposed by the Competition Council. Similarly, in the Netherlands, after the 
reform of 1997, the sanctions for the infringement of the competition provisions are purely administrative. 
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can be imposed both on individuals and undertakings for the antitrust violation. However, in some 
competition regimes, and under certain circumstances, the individuals responsible for the infringement of 
the competition law provisions can be sanctioned to serve imprisonment terms for their participation in 
anticompetitive practices. 
In practice, due to the seriousness of this type of criminal sanction, there are certain restrictions 
to the application of this kind of punishment. For instance, irrespective of the competition regime in 
question, the competence to order the imprisonment of an individual that has been convicted for violating 
the competition law provisions is always vested on judicial authorities. Even in competition regimes 
where the competition authority is empowered to declare the infringement of the competition law 
provisions and is entitled to impose certain sanctions, the ability to sentence individuals to imprisonment 
for breaching the antitrust rules is a prerogative of criminal courts607. This happens because criminal 
procedures tend to have stringer procedural protections that are designed to avoid false convictions. 
Hence, with the purpose of safeguarding the rights of the accused individuals in criminal proceedings, the 
enforcement functions in these procedures are separated within different enforcement authorities. As a 
consequence, in most competition regimes where individuals that infringe the substantial provisions of 
competition law can be punished with imprisonment, the traditional enforcement functions, i.e. 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication, will be performed by different enforcement authorities with 
the purpose of safeguarding the procedural rights of the defendants608.  
Furthermore, in most competition systems, the anticompetitive conducts for which an individual 
can be sentenced to prison are also restricted. For example, in most jurisdictions, the imprisonment 
sanction is reserved for horizontal restrictive agreements or hard-core cartels that involve price-fixing 
arrangements, bid-rigging and market allocation schemes609. Furthermore, in some competition regimes, 
the possibility to impose imprisonment is limited exclusively to cases related to bid-rigging610. The scope 
of imprisonment has been restricted to the most harmful infringements of competition law because of the 
more onerous nature of this type of sanction compared to other punishments, like the imposition of 
administrative fines. The reason for this is that financial penalties are socially costless to impose; on the 
contrary, imprisonment is socially costly611. Nonetheless, at least in theory, in some competition regimes 
the criminal provisions apply to all types of horizontal restrictive agreements as well as unilateral 
monopolistic behavior612.   
                                                          
607 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt is empowered to impose financial penalties for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions. Nevertheless, criminal courts hold sole jurisdiction to imprisonment convictions in cases related to bid-rigging.  
608 For instance, in the US, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is in charge of the investigation and participates as 
prosecutor in criminal cases; however, the decision-making function is vested on the federal courts.  
609 In the UK, individuals are guilty of a criminal offense and sanctioned with a maximum imprisonment of five years, in cases that 
involve agreements to fix prices, to limit or prevent supply, to limit or prevent production, to divide markets, to collude tenders 
(Section 188 of the Enterprise Act). In 2008, in the Marine Hose Cartel, three directors were sentenced to imprisonment for between 
two and a half and three years for cartel offences. The directors were also disqualified from acting as company directors for periods 
between five and seven years. See OFT’s press release at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2008/72-
08#.UL5GgZZmnTo.  
610 In Austria and Germany, imprisonment can only be imposed in cases related to bid-rigging.  
611 BENTHAM, Jeremy (1789), ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation’. In: The Utilitarians, New York: 
Anchor Books, 1973, p. 183. 
612 In the U.S., since the adoption of the Sherman Act in 1890, violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act have been punishable under 
U.S. federal law with criminal fines for both undertakings and individuals and with imprisonment for individuals, however, by long 
tradition the Antitrust Division restricts criminal prosecution to hard-core violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act such as price-
fixing, bid-rigging, and market or customer allocation.  
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Similarly to the possibility to reduce the amount of the financial penalty imposed for the 
infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law, in some competition regimes and under 
certain circumstances established by law, the terms of imprisonment imposed on individuals involved in 
anticompetitive practices can be reduced. For instance, in some jurisdictions the defendant may agree to 
plead guilty to a particular charge in return for some concessions, such as the reduction of the term of 
imprisonment613. Furthermore, in some regimes with imprisonment sanctions for individuals, leniency 
programs for individuals have been established614. In such cases, the individuals involved in 
anticompetitive practices can avoid criminal prosecution for the infringement of the substantial provisions 
of competition law by confessing their role in the illegal activities, fully cooperating with the competition 
authority, and meeting other specified requirements. Accordingly, this possibility allows directors, 
managers and employees of undertakings involves in cartel activities to come forward to the competition 
authority and apply for leniency to avoid criminal prosecution in exchange of cooperating with the 
competition authority to clarify the facts in the case. The individuals applying for leniency may do so 
independently from their undertakings, in such cases; the individual will be granted immunity from being 
prosecuted while the undertaking will face full responsibility for its involvement in the anticompetitive 
conduct. As stated before, the award of leniency is subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions 
established by law, in most competition regimes, individuals are required to meet the following 
conditions: that at the time the individual comes forward to the competition authority to report the 
anticompetitive activity, the authority has not received information about the illegal activity being 
reported from any other source; that the individual reports the illegal activity with candor and 
completeness and provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the competition authority 
throughout the investigation; and that the individual did not coerce another party to participate in the 
illegal activity and was not the leader in, or the originator of, the activity615.  
Finally, with regard to the term of imprisonment established for the infringement of competition 
law, the period of time that the sanctioned individuals have to serve varies from one jurisdiction to 
another. There is not a simple formula for the optimal imprisonment term. According to the relevant 
literature, the optimal term of imprisonment could be such that there is either under-deterrence or over-
deterrence. On the one hand, a low term of imprisonment might be socially desirable due to the fact that it 
means that the costs of imprisonment are reduced for those persons who commit harmful acts. On the 
other hand, a high term of imprisonment might be socially desirable given that it means that the costs of 
imprisonment are reduced because fewer persons would be committing harmful acts616. In practice, 
depending on the competition system, the maximum imprisonment terms range from one year to ten years 
                                                          
613 In the U.S., on November 2012, a director of an automobile parts supplier pleaded guilty in a price-fixing and bid-rigging 
conspiracy and agreed to serve one year of imprisonment. See press release at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/288861.htm.  
614 For instance, individuals may apply for leniency to avoid criminal prosecution in Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. 
615 For additional information on leniency programs,  please see Section IV, above.  
616 POLINSKY, A. Mitchell & SHAVELL, Steven (1984), ‘The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment’, 24 Journal of Public 
Economics. 
170 
 
in the most stringent jurisdictions617. For example, just recently, the longest-ever prison sentence -five 
years- was imposed on an individual who participated in a price-fixing conspiracy618. 
3. Other sanctions for the breach of the substantial provisions of competition law 
 
Besides the imposition of administrative financial penalties for the infringement of the substantial 
provisions of competition law, some competition systems have introduced other sanctions of an 
administrative nature with the purpose of punishing the perpetrators of the competition law violation. In 
practice, normally, the application of these other administrative sanctions for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law is made in conjunction with other sanctions, such as the 
imposition of financial penalties. Accordingly, the function of these administrative sanctions is 
supplementary to the imposition of other types of sanctions.  
 For instance, with regard to the application of these administrative sanctions, in some 
competition regimes, the competition authority will be empowered to confiscate the illegal gains of 
undertakings involved in anticompetitive practices, such as restrictive agreements or the abuse of a 
dominant position619. Similarly, in other regimes, the infringement of the substantial provisions of 
competition law may be sanctioned with the confiscation of permits or licenses required to operate in a 
determined activity620. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the competition authority may order the 
publication of the decision declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions, in whole or in 
part, in an official gazette or a widely circulated newspaper at the expense of the perpetrator of the 
infringement621. Additionally, elsewhere, the persons involved in bid-rigging activities may be deprived 
of the right to participate in future government tenders622. In some regimes, the persons involved in 
anticompetitive practices related to the abuse of intellectual property rights can be required to grant 
compulsory licenses of the said intellectual property rights623. Moreover, in other countries, the 
competition law offenders may be prohibited from exercising commercial activities on their own or on 
representation of others624. Finally, in some competition regimes, the individuals responsible for the 
infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law can be disqualified from acting as a 
company director for a determined period of time625.  
                                                          
617 Three years in Israel and Norway; five years in Canada, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia and the UK; six years in Argentina; ten years in 
South Africa and the U.S. 
618 On December 6, 2013, a U.S. Federal Judge sentenced the former president of SeaStar Line LLC to five years in prison for his 
participation in a price-fixing conspiracy (United States v. Frank Peake, Case No. 3:11-cr-00512, U.S. Dist. Ct., DPR.). 
619 In China, according to Articles 46 and 47 of the Anti-monopoly Law, the anti-monopoly authority is empowered to confiscate the 
illegal gains of business operators involved in monopoly agreements, and business operators that have abused their dominant 
position, besides the possibility to order the cease of the infringement and the imposition of a financial penalty.  
620 In Panama, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is required to remove the commercial or industrial license from any natural 
or legal person that has been sanctioned more than once for being involved in monopolistic practices (Article 104 of Law Nº 45 of 
31 October 2007).  
621 This possibility exists in Brazil, France and Portugal.  
622 In Brazil, according to Article 38 of the Antitrust Law, the persons involved in bid-rigging cannot participate in future 
government tender for a period of five years. In Portugal, according to Article 45 of the Competition Act, the undertakings cannot 
participate in public tenders for a period of two years.   
623 In Brazil, see Article 38 of the Antitrust Law.  
624 Idem.  
625 In the UK, directors that have been convicted for the criminal cartel offense of the Enterprise Act can be disqualified from acting 
as a company director for up to fifteen years (Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as amended by the Enterprise Act).  
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1.2.2. Sanctions for procedural violations 
 
Apart from the preciously seen sanctions that can be imposed for the infringement of the substantial 
provisions of competition law, most competition regimes have established sanctions for procedural 
violations. Procedural violations are usually related to acts of individuals and undertakings that affect or 
impede the investigation and/or procedure for the alleged infringement of the competition law provisions. 
Accordingly, prior to the commitment of a procedural violation, the aim of these sanctions is to protect 
the integrity of the investigation and the procedure through their deterrent effects on individuals and 
undertakings, moreover, once a procedural violation has been committed, then the aim of these sanctions 
is to punish the persons responsible for the violation, and additionally, to compel the persons responsible 
to remedy the procedural violation. 
 Overall, the sanctions for procedural violations can be imposed for acts that are related to the 
investigation of an alleged infringement of competition law conducted by the competition authority, such 
as: the failure to comply with an order to provide information or documentation related to the 
investigation 626; failure to comply with an order to give testimony627; the production of inaccurate, 
untimely, untrue, imprecise, misleading or incomplete information628; breaking the integrity or destroying 
seals affixed by the competition authority629; attempting to impede or prevent an investigation630; 
destroying or the falsification of documents631; interfering with the investigation of the competition 
authority632; obstructing an inspection by the competition authority633; assaulting an official of the 
competition authority634; willfully interrupt the proceedings or misbehaves in the place where the hearing 
is being conducted635; defamation of the enforcement authority or one of its members636; among others.  
(a) Nature of the sanctions for procedural violations 
 
The nature of the sanctions imposed for procedural violations varies from one jurisdiction to another. For 
instance, in some competition regimes, the sanctions for procedural violations have an administrative 
nature, given that these sanctions are imposed by administrative authorities such as the competition 
authority in administrative proceedings637. Alternatively, in other competition regimes, the sanctions for 
procedural violations have a criminal nature, in these cases; the sanctions are imposed by courts of 
criminal jurisdiction in criminal proceedings638. The main reason for these differences is that depending 
                                                          
626 In South Africa, see Section 71(b)(ii) of the Competition Act.  
627 In Papua New Guinea, see Section 127 of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act.  
628 In Malaysia, see Section 23 of the Competition Act. In Pakistan, see Section 38(d) of Act No. XIX of 2010. In Honduras, see 
Article 46 of Decree No. 357-2005.  
629 In Malaysia, see Section 25.7 of the Competition Act.  
630 In Canada, see Section 64.1 of the Competition Act.  
631 In Malaysia, see Section 24 of the Competition Act.  
632 In Sri Lanka, see Section 36(3)(b) of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act.  
633 In Bulgaria, see Section 100(6)(3) of the Law on Protection of Competition.  
634 In Barbados, the assault, obstruction or interference with any Commissioner is punished with a fine of $40.000 or imprisonment 
for 6 months, or both (Section 44 of the Fair Trade Commission Act).  
635 In South Africa, see Section 73 of the Competition Act.  
636 Idem.  
637 In the EU, according to Article 23.5 of Regulation 1/2003, the fines imposed by the Commission on undertakings and association 
of undertakings for the obstruction of an investigation for the infringement of competition law shall not be of a criminal law nature. 
638 In Canada, Section 64 of the Competition Act establishes that every person who in any matter impedes or prevents or attempt to 
impede or prevent any inquiry or examination under the provisions of the Act, is guilty of a criminal offense.  
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on the competition regime, the commitment of procedural violations may constitute an administrative 
offense, in jurisdictions where the offenders are punished with administrative sanctions, or conversely, 
may amount to a criminal offense, in jurisdictions where procedural violations sanctioned criminally.  
(b) Persons who can be sanctioned for procedural violations 
 
In relation to the persons that can be sanctioned for committing procedural violations, this issue varies 
from one jurisdiction to another. In this sense, in some competition regimes, the ability to impose 
sanctions for procedural violations is strictly restricted to undertakings639. On the contrary, in other 
competition regimes, this kind of sanctions can be imposed on both individuals and undertakings640.  
(c) Types of sanctions that can be imposed for procedural violations  
 
The sanctions that can be imposed on undertakings and individuals for procedural violations are different 
depending on the competition regime in question. In the majority of competition regimes, the most 
common sanction for these procedural violations is the imposition of administrative fines by 
administrative authorities641. In addition in some cases, the commitment of procedural violations is 
sanctioned with an increase of the financial penalty imposed for the infringement of the substantial 
provisions of competition law642. Furthermore, in some competition regimes, the competition authority 
can impose periodic penalty payments with the purpose of compelling the offender to comply with an 
order by the competition authority643. Alternatively, in the most stringent jurisdictions, the commitment of 
procedural violations is sanctioned with the imposition of criminal sanctions, in such cases; these 
sanctions are imposed by the relevant court of criminal jurisdiction. The criminal sanctions for procedural 
violations include the imposition of financial penalties644, and in the most extreme cases, the imposition 
of imprisonment645.  
                                                          
639 In Switzerland, pursuant to Article 52 of the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition, only undertakings can 
be fined for the failure to submit requested information.  
640 In China, according to Article 52 of the Anti-monopoly Law, provides for fines to be imposed on entities and individuals for the 
failure to comply with a request for information. In Korea, both undertakings and individuals may be fine for the failure to comply 
with the requirements made by the FTC with a fine for negligence according to Article 69-2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act. In Ireland, in 2005, a director was successfully prosecuted for an offense under Section 31(4)(a) of the Competition Act 
(failure to appear before the Competition Authority on foot of a witness summons). See the 2006 Annual Report of the Irish 
Competition Authority (Page 12), available at: http://www.tca.ie/EN/News--Publications/Annual-Reports.aspx. 
641 In Belgium, see Article 64 of the Act in the Protection of Economic Competition. In the EU, see Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003. 
In Romania, see Section 50 of the Competition Act. In Switzerland, see Article 52 of the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints 
of Competition. In Turkey, see Article 17 of the Law on the Protection of Competition. In the EU, in May 2011, the Commission 
fined Suez Environnement and Lyonnaise des Eaux €8 million for the breach of a seal during an inspection. Press release available 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/632&type=HTML.  
642 In the EU, in November 2007, in a case for the price fixing cartel of professional videotape producers, the Commission increased 
the fine on Sony by 30% for obstructing the Commission’s investigation during an on-site inspection. Press release available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1725. 
643 In Algeria, see Article 59 of the Competition Ordinance. In Bulgaria, see Article 100 of the Law on Protection of Competition. In 
Denmark, see Section 17 of the Competition Act. In the EU, see Article 24 of Regulation 1/2003. In Italy, see Section 14(5) of the 
Competition and Fair Trade Act. 
644 In the US, in October 2004, a fish distributor was charged with obstructing the grand jury investigation of a suspected conspiracy 
for price fixing for intentionally delaying the production of documents that the grand jury subpoenaed. Poll Fish Distributors was 
charged with obstruction of justice, which carries a maximum penalty for a corporation of a $500,000 fine. Press release available 
at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/October/04_at_705.htm. 
645 In the Fiji Islands, the failure to supply required information is an offense sanctioned with $1,000 and imprisonment for 12 
months, for natural persons, and with a fine of $5,000 for legal persons (Section 119 of the Commerce Commission Decree). In 
Malta, the failure to comply is a criminal offense sanctioned with a criminal fine and imprisonment for up to six months (Section 23 
of the Competition Act). In Mauritius, according to Section 52 of the Competition Act, a person who fails to comply with a request 
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Finally, there are other sanctions that can be imposed to the parties that have failed to comply 
with an order by, or have obstructed the investigation of, the competition authority, such as to order the 
parties to make a rectification within a time limit646, or to order the arrest of a witness duly summoned 
who fails to appear before the competition authority647.     
1.2.3. Sanctions for the failure to comply with decisions by the authority 
 
In most competition regimes the failure to comply with a decision by the relevant enforcement authority 
is subject to certain sanctions. Irrespective of the enforcement authority empowered to issue a determined 
decision concerned with the enforcement of the competition law provisions, most competition regimes 
sanction the failure to comply with decisions related to: the requirement to stop an infringement of the 
competition law provisions; the imposition of interim measures; the imposition of financial penalties for 
the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law; the acceptance of commitments to 
terminate an investigation by the competition authority; the acceptance or prohibition of a proposed 
merger or acquisition; or the order to divest parts of business; among others.  
 In practice, the imposition of these sanctions is ancillary to the imposition of sanctions for the 
infringement of the substantial provisions of the competition law provisions. The main purpose of these 
sanctions is to compel the sanctioned party to comply with a determined decision issued in relation to the 
enforcement of the competition law provisions.  
 With regard to the nature of these types of sanctions, depending on the competition regime, they 
may be administrative or criminal, in nature. Thus, in cases where the failure to comply with a decision 
for the enforcement of the competition law provisions constitutes an administrative offense, the sanctions 
imposed against these violations will be of an administrative nature. Alternatively, in jurisdictions where 
the failure to comply with one on these orders amounts to a criminal offense, the sanctions imposed will 
have a criminal nature.  
 As to the sanctions that can be imposed for the failure to comply with an order for the 
enforcement of the competition law provisions, these vary from one jurisdiction to another. The most 
common approach is the imposition of financial penalties that have an administrative nature and are 
imposed by the competition authority648. Furthermore, in some competition regimes, the competition 
                                                                                                                                                                          
made by the Competition Commission shall be guilty of an offense, and sanctioned with a fine not exceeding 50,000 rupees and 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, for natural person, and a fine not exceeding 200,000 rupees, for legal persons. In the 
UK, pursuant to Section 42 of the Competition Act, the failure to comply with a request by the OFT is a criminal offense punished 
with criminal fines or imprisonment for up to two years. 
646 In China, according to Article 52 of the Anti-monopoly Law, if business operators refuse to provide related materials and 
information, or refuse to or obstruct the investigation, the antimonopoly authority shall order them to make rectification or impose a 
fine.  
647 In Malta, see the Second Schedule (Article 37)(8) of the Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority Act.   
648 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Section 48 of the Competition Act, the Council of Competition may impose a fine in the 
amount of up to 10% of the total annual income of the economic entity for the preceding year, for not acting according to decisions 
that: assess the compliance of an agreement with the provisions of the Act; establish exemptions for the prohibitions of the Act; 
declare the abuse of a dominant position; declare the compatibility of a concentration with the provisions of the Act; impose interim 
measures; or establish measures to re-establish effective competition.  
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authority may impose periodic penalty payments for non-compliance with its decisions649. Alternatively, 
in some competition regimes, the failure to comply with a decision by the competition authority is 
sanctioned with financial penalties of criminal nature and/or imprisonment650. Finally, in some regimes 
the non-compliance with the decisions by the competition authority can be sanctioned with the 
prohibition of the concerned persons to contract with the State651. Moreover, the persons that failed to 
comply with a decision by the competition authority may also be forced to close their businesses until 
they comply with the competition authority’s decision652.  
2. Remedies 
 
Normally, in relation to the enforcement of the competition law provisions, the implementation of 
remedies does not have a punitive nature like the imposition of sanctions, furthermore, the purpose of 
remedies is to maintain and/or restore competition in the future. In this sense, depending on the 
competition system, the imposition of remedies may be intended to end a determined competition law 
infringement, to compensate the victims of the competition law infringement, and to restore competition.  
1. Types of Remedies 
 
Depending on the type of remedy, these can be classified as behavioral remedies or structural remedies. 
Behavioral remedies usually are intended to modify or constrain the behavior of undertakings. On the 
other hand, structural remedies are intended to restore the competitive structure in a determined market.  
(a)  Interim Measures 
 
Interim measures or preliminary injunctions are behavioral remedies granted as a preliminary measure 
during a pending case with the purpose of preventing an undertaking from infringing or continuing to 
infringe the substantial provisions of competition law. In practice, depending on the competition regime 
in question, the enforcement authority empowered to implement these types of remedies may be different. 
For instance, in some competition regimes where the competition authority is not a decision-making 
body, the power to impose interim measures will be vested on courts of general jurisdiction that have 
authority to decide on cases related to the enforcement of competition law653. Moreover, in other 
competition regimes where the competition authority does not have decision-making functions and where 
specialized courts have been established for the enforcement of the competition law provisions, the latter 
                                                          
649 In Belgium, the Competition Council may impose periodic penalty payments on undertakings and association of undertakings of 
up to 5% of the average daily turnover for the non-compliance with orders imposing financial penalties for the infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law (Article 63 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition).  
650 In Botswana, according to Section 76 of the Competition Act, a person who fail to comply with a decision by the Competition 
Commission can be sanctioned with a fine not exceeding P500,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, or both.  
651 In Nicaragua, according to Article 37 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition, the economic agents that fail to comply with 
the decisions of PROCOMPETENCIA will be forbidden to contract with the government, additionally, PROCOMPETENCIA can 
request the policy for assistance to close the businesses of the concerned economic agents until they comply with its decisions.  
652 In Nicaragua, pursuant to Articles 37 and 46 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition, PROCOMPETENCIA can order the 
closure of the businesses of the economic agents that failed to comply with a decision for the enforcement of the competition law 
provisions.  
653 In Australia, the ACCC has to commence proceedings before the relevant court requesting the imposition of interim measures. In 
Ireland, the Competition Authority does not itself have powers to impose interim measures; it has to apply to the Circuit Court or the 
High Court for injunctive relief. In Panama, the Authority for the Protection of Consumer and the Defense of Competition has to 
request the relevant judicial authorities the imposition of interim measures. In the US, the FTC and the Antitrust Division are not 
empowered to impose interim measures; this power is vested on federal courts. 
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will be entitled to impose interim measures under the request of the competition authority654. Finally, in 
some competition regimes where the competition authority has been granted decision-making functions, 
the authority will be empowered to impose interim measure against anticompetitive conducts at its own 
discretion655.  
Due to the urgent nature of interim measures, in most competition regimes, the imposition of 
these remedies is subject to certain established conditions, provided that interim measures are urgent 
remedies which are imposed prior to the adoption of a final decision by the relevant enforcement 
authority declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions. As a general rule, the imposition 
of these remedies can be done only when there are serious indications that an infringement of the 
substantial provisions of competition law has occurred or is currently taking place656. Additionally, most 
competition provisions require for the imposition of interim measures the existence of a risk of serious 
and irreparable damage to: competition657; undertakings658; the general economic interest659; the interest 
of consumers660; or a particular person or category of persons661; among others.   
With regard to the timing for the imposition of interim measures, most competition provisions 
allow the enforcement authorities to implement this kind of remedies at any time in the course of an 
investigation for the alleged infringement of competition law and during the proceedings for the 
declaration of such infringement. However, in some jurisdictions, the imposition of interim measures will 
be done only after the investigation for the alleged infringement of competition law has been concluded, 
and where the results of the investigation show a possible infringement of the substantial provisions of 
competition law662.   
In competition regimes where the competition authority is empowered to impose interim 
measures, the latter may do so on its own initiative or after receiving a request by a person affected by the 
alleged infringement of competition law663. In cases where the competition authority imposes interim 
measures on its own, it has to make sure that the conditions required for the imposition of these remedies 
are met and that such remedies are appropriate to prevent the negative effects they are trying to avoid. 
Instead, in the case that the imposition of interim measures is requested by someone outside the 
competition authority, besides the fulfillment of the required conditions for the imposition of interim 
                                                          
654 In Austria, the Cartel Court, which is a specialized court responsible for the enforcement of competition law in Austria, has 
jurisdiction to decide on the applications made by the Federal Competition Authority requesting the imposition of interim measures. 
In South Africa the Competition Tribunal is entitled to impose interim measures at the request of the Competition Commission.  
655 In Bulgaria, the Commission for Protection of Competition is entitled to impose interim measures (Article 8 of the Law on 
Protection of Competition). In Germany, pursuant to the provisions of Section 32a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, the 
Bundeskartellamt has authority to order interim measures if there is a risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition. In 
Kenya, the Competition Authority is empowered to implement interim measures pursuant to Section 37 of the Competition Act.  
656 In India, Section 33 of the Competition Act allows the Competition Commission to impose interim measures when it is satisfied 
that an infringement has been committed.  
657 In Bulgaria, see Article 56 of the Law on Protection of Competition.  
658 In Belgium, see Section 62 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition.  
659 In Kenya, see Section 37 of the Competition Act.  
660 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Article 40 of the Competition Act.  
661 In Malaysia, see Section 35 of the Competition Act.  
662 In Mexico, after the Executive Secretary of the Federal Competition Commission has concluded its investigation, it will issue a 
preliminary decision declaring the provable responsibility of the investigated person. Only after this preliminary decision has been 
issued, the Executive Secretary will be allowed to propose the adoption of interim measures (Article 34 bis 4 of the Federal Law on 
Economic Competition).  
663 In Albania, pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 of the Law on Competition Protection, the Competition Commission may 
adopt interim measures at any time of the procedure under its own initiative or at the request of the concerned undertakings.  
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measures, the requesting person will have to provide as much evidence as possible, demonstrating that the 
alleged violation of competition law is causing, or is likely to cause the negative effects that the award of 
interim measures is supposed to prevent. Furthermore, depending on the competition regime, other 
persons may also request the relevant enforcement authority the implementation of interim measures, 
such as consumers664, or ministers665.   
On the other hand, in competition regimes where the imposition of interim measures is 
competence of the judicial authorities, the implementation of these remedies can be requested by the 
competition authority or by persons affected by the alleged infringement of the competition law 
provisions. With regard to the requests made by the competition authority, these will occur in 
jurisdictions where the competition authority is not empowered to issue a decision declaring the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, nor to award interim measures on its own, accordingly, 
the competition authority, in the course of an investigation or after the investigation is concluded, will 
bring a case before the relevant court for the declaration of the infringement of competition law and/or for 
the implementation of interim measures against anticompetitive conducts prior to the final determination 
of an infringement of competition law by the court handling the case666. As stated before, other persons 
than the competition authority may also bring an action before the competent court to declare the 
infringement of the competition law provisions and to request the award of interim measures in order to 
prevent loss or damage and preserve the status quo. However, since these proceedings are instituted by 
private parties in private proceedings, these do not correspond to this part of the study. 
Irrespective of the enforcement authority that is empowered to impose interim measures against 
anticompetitive conducts, the latter has sole jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness of the requested 
interim measure. As a consequence, the enforcement authority will be allowed to dismiss an application 
made for the imposition of interim measures on its merits. Hence, in jurisdictions where the imposition of 
interim measures has been delegated to the competition authority, the latter will be allowed to dismiss any 
application by any person requiring the imposition of interim measures if it considers that such remedy is 
not appropriate667. Similarly, in jurisdictions where the judicial authorities are empowered to impose 
interim measures, these will be allowed to dismiss the applications made by the competition authority or 
by other interested persons668. Nevertheless, even though the enforcement authorities have sole 
jurisdictions to decide if an application for the imposition of interim measures is appropriate or not, in 
                                                          
664 In Belgium, the Competition Prosecutor has decided that consumers are competent to ask for interim measures when they are the 
victim of restrictive practices (Decision of 27 September 2010). 
665 In Belgium, according to Article 62 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition, the imposition of interim measures 
may be requested by the person who made the complaint for the alleged infringement of competition law, the Minister for Economic 
Affairs, or the minister with responsibility for the sector concerned.  
666 In Australia, the ACCC does not have the power to impose interim or final relief, consequently, it has to commence proceedings 
for interim measures before the relevant court, and the latter will determine if the remedies sought by the ACCC are appropriate.  
667 In France, the Autorité de la Concurrence, in its decision of 10 January 2012, rejected Hewlett-Packard’s request for interim 
measures against Oracle, provided that the conditions to grant interim measures, namely the existence of a serious and immediate 
threat of damage to the economy or the complainant, were not met in the case.  
668 In the USA, the FTC challenged LabCorp’s $57.5 million acquisition of rival clinical laboratory testing company Westcliff 
Medical Laboratories, requesting the Federal District Court of California a preliminary injunction to prevent integration of a merger 
in the medical laboratory industry. The court rejected the FTC petition and denied the preliminary injunction, then, the FTC 
appealed the district court decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which denied the FTC’s appeal. On April 22, 
2011 the FTC issued an order dismissing its complaint and closing its investigation. See: 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9345/index.shtm  
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some competition regimes, these decisions by the enforcement authorities are subject to further review 
before the relevant appellate body669.  
In practice, in the majority of competition regimes, the competition authorities or the judicial 
authorities empowered to impose interim measures may implement such measures as they consider 
appropriate for the sake of competition, consumers and the concerned undertakings. Generally speaking, 
the authorities empowered to impose interim measures against anticompetitive practices will usually 
require the recipients of the interim measures to: enter or terminate specific contractual relationships670, or 
to act or refrain from acting in a certain way671. 
Due to the extraordinary nature of this kind of remedy, the term of effect of the interim measures 
is limited in time in all regimes672, however, if necessary, this time limit may be extended673. In most 
competition regimes, the enforcement authorities imposing the interim measures have wide jurisdiction to 
                                                          
669 In Belgium, the decisions of the Competition Prosecutor determining that the request for the imposition of interim measures is 
inadmissible or unfounded can be appealed before the President of the Competition Council (Section 62 of the Act on the Protection 
of Economic Competition). In South Africa, the refusal of the Competition Tribunal to gran interim measures can be appealed 
before the Competition Appeal Court (Section 49C of the Competition Act).  
670 In the USA, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ has required two digital jukebox undertakings to end an illegal non-compete 
agreement as an interim measure. See the September 2, 2005 Division’s complaint at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f210900/210960.htm. In France, in 2011, the Autorité de la Concurrence imposed interim measures 
suspending the execution of a contract between La Poste and Mondial Relay for the creation of a service which stores and 
distributes consumers’ parcels outside their place of residence. Taking into account the strong market power of La Poste, the 
importance of Mondial Relay’s network of collection point and the barriers to entry, the Competition Authority considered that the 
implementation of the agreement would marginalize actual and potential competitors. In Argentina, the Secretariat of National 
Commerce has imposed an interim measure in the cable television sector and ordered a leading cable television provider to refrain 
from certain contractual conditions that may be contrary to the competition law provisions. Decision of the National Commission 
for the Defense of Competition of August 17 2011, available at: 
http://www.cndc.gov.ar/dictamenes/RES%20Y%20DICT%20C.1397.pdf. 
671 In the UK, on February 2006, the OFT under the provisions of Section 35 of the Competition Act, imposed interim measures on 
London Metal Exchange (LME) at the petition of Spectron Group Plc. LME was ordered not to extend the trading hours on its 
electronic trading platform, because, according to Spectron, this would force Spectron’s eMetal electronic trading platform, which 
competes with LME’s platform, to exit the market. In France, the Apple’s distribution model for the IPhone has been challenged by 
the Autorité de la Concurrence. On December 2008, the former Conseil de la Concurrence decided to suspend Apple’s five years 
exclusive deal with France Telecom’s Orange pending an in-depth investigation into the merits of the case (Décision n°08-MC-01 
17 December 2008). In Belgium, on May 2012, the President of the Competition Council imposed interim measures to Port Real 
Estate SA at the request of Armajaro Trading Limited. The requested undertaking, a warehouse keeper, was ordered to maintain a 
minimum volume of loading out of Robusta coffee sold on the NYSE LIFFE Exchange in London. Press release of the Competition 
Council available at: http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/20120525_Press_Release_tcm327-178502.pdf. In another case, in a 
decision of 25 November 2010, the President of the Competition Council ordered De Beers to supply rough diamonds to Antwerp 
trader Spira. The decision follows a request for interim measures filed by Spira, awaiting the outcome of its complaint lodged with 
the Belgian Competition Authority in 2009. The European Commission imposed interim measures on the Chambre de Commerce et 
d’Industrie de Morlaix at the request of the Irish ferry operator, Irish Continental Group (ICG). The European Commission decided, 
prima facie, that the Chambre de Commerce had abused its dominant position as the operator of the Port of Roscoff by refusing ICG 
access to the port. The Commission has decided that the Chambre de Commerce must grant ICG access to the port of Roscoff by 
June 10th 1995. Press release available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-95-492_en.htm?locale=en. In Italy, the 
Competition Authority brought a case for an alleged abuse of a dominant position against Merck, a multinational pharmaceutical, 
for the refusal to grant Dobfar, a chemical-pharmaceutical company, a license to produce the active ingredient needed for the 
manufacture of certain drugs. In this case, the Competition Authority considered that an infringement of the competition provisions 
had occurred and ordered Merck, by means of an interim measure, to grant the license (Italian Competition Authority, decision of 15 
June 2005, A364 Merck-Principi Attivi in Boll. 23/2005).  
672 For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina interim measure can be imposed for three months; in Mexico for four months; in Croatia 
for six months; and in Malaysia for twelve months. In all the previous jurisdictions the term of effect of interim measures can be 
extended. In some jurisdictions like Germany, there is not a specific period of time; however, interim measures cannot be imposed 
for more than one year in total, i.e. including an extension of the period. Similarly in Pakistan, the order implementing interim 
measures shall remain in force for the period specified in the order but not beyond the date of the final order (Section 32 of Act No. 
XIX of 2010). 
673 In Switzerland, on May 2012, the Swiss Competition Commission decided to extend, for a period of one additional year, the 
interim measures that were ordered in 2011 with regard to the supply by the Swatch Group of mechanical watch movements and 
watch components. The extension has the purpose of allowing other companies in the watch industry to plan alternative sources of 
supply for the next year. See press release at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/watches-idUSL5E8GF40Z20120515.  
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terminate these measures and to review or modify them674. Provided that the imposition of interim 
measures is only temporary, in most competition regimes, once the competent authority has declared that 
the competition law provisions have been infringed, it may then replace the interim measures with a 
permanent or long-term cease or desist order or an order requesting a positive conduct from the 
defendant675. Additionally, an interim measure may be replaced, when appropriate, by the acceptance of 
binding commitments that terminate the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant, and as a consequence, 
the procedure for the declaration of the infringement of competition law is also terminated676. Moreover, 
the enforcement authority may withdraw the interim measures whenever it considers that this remedy is 
no longer necessary677. Finally, as a general rule, in case the interim measures are not replaced by 
permanent orders or by binding commitments, these will only last until the procedure for the alleged 
infringement of competition law is completed or terminated678.  
The imposition of interim measures is made in a reasoned decision by the enforcement 
authorities. Nonetheless, in most competition regimes, the decisions of the enforcement authorities 
imposing interim measures against anticompetitive practices can be appealed before the relevant appellate 
body679. As a consequence, the appellate bodies will be allowed to quash680 or upheld681 the orders 
imposing interim measures while reviewing the decisions of the enforcement authorities. Despite the 
preceding, in some jurisdictions, the decisions of the enforcement authority imposing interim measures 
                                                          
674 In Malaysia, the Competition Commission may at any time withdraw a direction imposing an interim measure (Section 35 of the 
Competition Act). In Pakistan, an order for the imposition of interim measures may be reviewed, modified or canceled by the 
Competition Commission (Section 32 of Act No. XIX of 2010). 
675 In the US, in its final judgment, a court required two jukebox manufacturers to end an anticompetitive non-compete agreement, 
this remedy was previously requested by the Antitrust Division as preliminary injunction (United States v. Ecast, Inc. and NSM 
Music Group, Ltd., December 16, 2005). 
676 In France, the Autorité de la Concurrence received a complaint from Navx arguing that Google had abused its dominant position 
by suddenly terminating its contract on Adworks (Google’s service to sell online advertisement space on Google), and showing 
discriminatory treatment. The Competition Authority considered that there was a prima facie case, provided that Google probably 
held a dominant position on the advertising market related to online searches, and that the wording of its terms and conditions 
lacked clarity. In this sense, the Competition Authority required Google to restore Navx’s Adwords account, among other interim 
measures. After the measures imposed by the Competition Authority were adopted, Google offered commitments addressing the 
Authority’s concerns (Décision nº 10-MC-01 du 30 juin 2010 relative à la demande de mesures conservatoires présentée par la 
société Navx. http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/10mc01.pdf). Similarly, in France, the interim measures imposed by 
the Autorité de la Concurrence suspending the implementation of a cooperation agreement between La Poste and Mondial Relay in 
the parcel delivery sector in 2010 was included in the commitments that La Poste offered the Competition Authority in 2011.  
677 In the UK, the OFT decided that the interim measures requiring London Metal Exchange not to extend the trading hours on its 
electronic trading platform where no longer necessary to prevent serious and irreparable damage and to protect the public interest. 
See OFT’s press release at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/london-metal-
exchange#.ULMxspawVGw  
678 In El Salvador, according to Article 13 of the Competition Law, the interim measures imposed by the Superintendent will remain 
so long as the proceedings which led to their imposition. In Kenya, the interim measures imposed by the Competition Authority are 
adopted until the ongoing investigation is concluded (Section 37 of the Competition Act).  
679 In Israel, any party injured by a decision of the Antitrust Tribunal imposing interim measures may appeal against such decision to 
the Supreme Court (Section 39 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law). In Kenya, the decisions of the Competition Authority 
imposing interim measures can be appealed before the Competition Tribunal (Section 73 of the Competition Act). In South Africa, 
the decisions of the Competition Tribunal imposing interim measures are appealed before the Competition Appeal Court (Section 37 
of the Competition Act).  
680 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt decided to order Scandlines, the owner of the Puttgarden terminal, to grant access to the 
terminal to competing ferry companies in interim proceedings, provided that the public’s interest in opening up the market to 
competition outweighed Scandlines’ interest in having the exclusive and unlimited use of its terminal. However, on August 2000, 
the Düsseldorf Regional High Court overturned the decision of the Bundeskartellamt ordering Scandlines to grant access to its 
terminal (OLG Düsseldorf WuW/E DE-R 569 – Puttgarden II (2000)). 
681 In France, on February 2009, the decision of the Conseil de la Concurrence imposing interim measures on Apple requiring the 
latter to suspend its five years exclusive deal with France Telecom’s Orange was appealed before the Paris Court of Appeal, 
however, the decision imposing interim measures of the Conseil was upheld by the Court of Appeal (CA Paris 4 February 2009). 
Similarly, the decision of the Italian Competition Authority ordering Merck to grant another pharmaceutical the license to produce 
active ingredient needed for the manufacture of certain drugs, by means of an interim measure, was confirmed by the Italian 
Regional Administrative Tribunal of Lazio (Administrative Tribunal of Lazio 7 March 2006, nº 1713).  
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cannot be appealed682. Due to the urgent nature of interim measures, as a general rule, the commencement 
of an appeal against the decision by the enforcement authorities implementing the interim measures does 
not suspend the effects of these decisions683.  
Finally, in some competition regimes, the recipients of a decision by the enforcement authorities 
imposing interim measures are entitled to recover any damages that could arise from the imposition of the 
interim measures in question684. In this sense, in some competition regimes the enforcement authorities 
can require a bond from the applicant as a condition to grant interim measures685, alternatively, in some 
jurisdictions, such bond will be requested by the party on which the interim measure is being imposed686. 
(b) Permanent Orders  
 
Most competition provisions allow the enforcement authorities the imposition of permanent or long-term 
orders intended to bring an infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law to an end when 
the authorities have issued a decision declaring the breach of the competition provisions. In practice, in 
most competition regimes, the enforcement authorities are entitled to give such orders as they consider 
appropriate to bring the antitrust infringement in question to an end. Thus, the main purpose of this type 
of remedies is the immediate termination of an anticompetitive conduct. Even though, the effects and 
purpose of these orders may be similar to interim measures or preliminary injunctions, i.e. to terminate 
the infringement of competition law, the difference between these two types of remedies is concerned 
with the timing for the implementation of these remedies and their duration. Accordingly, the imposition 
of interim measures will be done, in most competition regimes, at any time during the proceedings for the 
declaration of the competition law violation and will last until the proceedings are completed, while the 
imposition of permanent or long-term orders will be done at the end of the said proceedings and once the 
enforcement authority has declared that the competition provisions have been breached, these orders are 
permanent.  
The enforcement authorities empowered to impose these permanent or long-term orders may 
vary from one jurisdiction to another. Provided that the imposition of these types of orders is made once 
the infringement of the competition law provisions has been declared, and is usually annexed to the 
                                                          
682 In Croatia, the decisions of the Competition Agency implementing interim measures cannot be appealed; however, the injured 
parties may take actions before the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia (Article 51 of the Competition Act).  
683 In Bulgaria, according to Article 56 of the Law on Protection of Competition, an appeal against the imposition of interim 
measures, shall not suspend the application of this type of remedy.  
684 In Canada, the Competition Tribunal has the power to order an inquiry into damages arising from an interim order by the 
Tribunal, but can refuse to order damages where there is a deliberate and flagrant breach of the interim order. In a case related to the 
chicken industry in Canada, Nadeau Poultry Farm Ltd. applied to the Competition Tribunal under the Competition Act’s refusal to 
deal provisions to force Group Westco Inc. to continue supplying it with chickens. The Tribunal ordered Westco to continue 
supplying Nadeau pending the hearing of the application. However, Westco made changes to the way it supplied chickens to 
Nadeau, after the latter brought contempt proceedings, the Tribunal decided that Westco disobeyed the interim order and fined it 
$75,000. Westco applied to the Tribunal for an inquiry as to damages arising from the injunction, however, according to the 
Tribunal the fact that Westco had deliberately and flagrantly breached the interim order disentitled it to collect damages arising from 
the injunction (Nadeau Ferme Avicole Limitée/Nadeau Poultry Farm Limited v. Groupe Westco Inc. and Groupe Dynaco, 
Coopérative Agroalimentaire and Volailles Acadia S.E.C. Volailles Acadia Inc./and Acadia Poultry Inc. Available at: 
http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CasesAffaires/CasesDetails-eng.asp?CaseID=293). 
685 In Chile, according to Article 25 of the Antitrust Act, the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia can require, when 
necessary, a bond from the requesting party that covers any loss caused by the interim measure. In Hungary, the Competition 
Council may require a bond as a condition, if the interim measure is required by the party under investigation (Article 72 of the 
Competition Act).  
686 In Mexico, the recipient of an interim measure can request the Federal Competition Commission a bond that covers any harm to 
the process of competition (Article 34 bis 4 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition).  
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decision declaring the competition law breach, it is logic that the power to impose these remedies is 
vested on the enforcement authority that is responsible for the decision declaring the antitrust 
infringement. In line with this, in competition regimes where the competition authority does not have 
decision-making functions, the competent enforcement authority will be empowered to implement these 
permanent orders687. Conversely, in competition regimes where the competition authorities are decision-
making bodies, the latter will be entitled to impose permanent orders for the termination of the antitrust 
infringement688, additionally, in some jurisdictions, the competition authority can either order or 
recommend the termination of the infringement689. Nevertheless, there are jurisdictions where, even 
though the competition authority is not entitled to impose sanctions for the infringement of competition 
law, the authority is allowed to order the termination of the anticompetitive practices that are contrary to 
the competition law provisions690.    
These types of remedies are very versatile because they can be imposed on a variety of persons 
and on different situations. For instance, in most jurisdictions, these orders may be given to such persons 
as the enforcement authority deems appropriate, which depending on the competition regime will include 
individuals and undertakings. Moreover, in some competition systems, the ability to impose permanent 
orders is not restricted to the infringing undertakings, provided that the enforcement authorities can 
impose permanent orders addressed to, for instance, the parent company of an infringing undertaking 
which, though not the actual perpetrator of the violation, has a subsidiary which is the responsible for the 
antitrust infringement691. 
As stated before, these permanent orders requiring the termination of the competition law 
infringement may be imposed on a variety of situations which usually relate to the type of anticompetitive 
conduct in question. In particular, these orders may require the persons concerned to modify a determined 
agreement or conduct, or to terminate a determined agreement or cease the conduct. For instance, the 
enforcement authority may order a cartelist to terminate anticompetitive agreements692, additionally; the 
authority may also order a dominant undertaking to stop abusing its dominant position693, these directions 
                                                          
687 In the US, in civil matters, the FTC can seek an order from the district court requiring companies to cease unfair methods of 
competition or practices.  In South Africa, according to Section 58 of the Competition Act, the Competition Tribunal has the power 
to order the termination of prohibited practices.   
688 In Botswana, when the Competition Commission determines that a breach of the prohibitions of the Competition Act has 
occurred, the Commission will give an enterprise or enterprises involved in any of the prohibited practices such directions as are 
necessary to bring the infringement to and end (Section 43 of the Competition Act). In China, according to Article 46 of the Anti-
monopoly Law, where a business operator has violated the provisions of the Law by entering into a monopoly agreement, the 
NDRC or the SAIC shall order the business operator to stop the illegal act. In Italy, according to Article 15(1) of Law No. 287 of 
1990, when the Competition Authority finds and infringement of the competition law provisions, it can order the companies 
involved to put an end to the infringement within the deadline that is establishes in its final decision.  
689 In Cyprus, according to Section 22 of the Protection of Competition Law, where the Competition Commission has found an 
infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law, it has authority to order or recommend to the enterprise or trade 
association concerned to terminate the infringement within a fixed period of time.  
690 In Finland, although the Finnish Competition Authority cannot impose sanctions for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions by itself, it has to propose the imposition of penalty payments to the Market Court; the Authority has the power to order 
an undertaking to terminate the infringing conduct or to impose a delivery obligation (Section 9 of the Competition Act).    
691 In the UK, see the OFT Enforcement Guideline of December 2004, at paragraph 2.2. 
692 In Lithuania, on December 2011, the Competition Council has concluded that since 1998 to 2011, the Lithuanian Shipbrokers 
and Agents Association and part of its members have agreed to apply minimal ship agency tariffs and to monitor the compliance 
thereof. For these prohibited agreements the Competition Council has imposed fines on the Lithuanian Shipbrokers and Agents 
Association and its 32 companies providing ship agency services for 12 million litas and ordered termination of the anticompetitive 
agreements. See press release at: http://kt.gov.lt/en/index.php?show=news_view&pr_id=945  
693 In Italy, the Competition Authority fined Pfizer, a leading pharmaceutical for abusing its dominant position by misusing its 
pharmaceutical patents to exclude generics from the Italian market. In its decision, the Competition Authority found that Pfizer had 
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are usually known as cease and desist orders. Furthermore, these permanent orders may also require a 
positive action from its recipient, such as: to inform concerned parties that the infringement has been 
terminated694; to publish the infringement decision and corrective orders695; to grant access to essential 
facilities696; to supply a service697; to give access to studies required for the production of certain 
products698; to modify anticompetitive agreements699; or to allow other undertakings to enter into a 
determined market700. 
These permanent or long-terms orders requiring the termination of the competition law 
infringement or the positive actuation of the recipient are usually implemented through a written reasoned 
decision, and are likely to from part of the infringement decision in cases where the decision and the 
permanent orders are addressed to the same person. In some competition regimes, the recipients of the 
permanent orders are notified with a draft of the decision that includes the facts on which the enforcement 
authority relies, the objection raised by the authority, the action proposed to take and the reasons backing 
the decision. This notification is made with purpose of allowing the recipients to make any appropriate 
representation against the proposed decision and the corrective directions701.  
Finally, in the majority of competition systems, the decisions by the enforcement authority 
imposing the permanent or long-term orders for the termination of the competition law infringement or 
the positive actuation of the recipient can be appealed before the competent appellate body. However, as a 
general rule, the commencement of an appeal against the decisions imposing these permanent orders does 
not suspend the effects of these directions.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
abused its dominant position, fined Pfizer €10.6 million and ordered to stop its abusive conducts (Decision of the Italian 
Competition Authority A431 - RATIOPHARM/PFIZER of 11 January 2012).  
694 In Switzerland, on May 2012, the Competition Commission found that BWM Ltd had foreclosed the Swiss market by preventing 
its dealers from selling BWM and MINI cars to Swiss customers. In order to remedy its anticompetitive conduct the Commission 
ordered BMW Ltd to inform its dealers that it will amend the contracts with its dealers by removing the export ban clause. See press 
release (in French) at: http://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=fr&msg-id=44680.    
695 In Korea, the KFTC imposed a fine of 25.7 billion won on four telecommunication operators (KT, Dacom, Onse Telecom and 
Hanaro Telecom) for agreeing to jointly determine and maintain distance call rates. The KFTC also required the operators to 
publicize their violations and the corrective order on major daily newspapers.    
696 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt prohibited Scandlines Deutschland GmbH from refusing competing ferry companies access to 
the Puttgarden terminal upon payment of an adequate fee. The Bundeskartellamt concluded that Scandlines had a dominant position 
both with respect to the control of the terminal facilities, and the downstream market of providing ferry services. The alternative 
transportation routes were not interchangeable with the Puttgarden-Rödby route, while legal and physical obstacles prevented the 
competitors from constructing their own terminal at Puttgarden. The Bundeskartellamt found that the public’s interest in opening up 
the market to competition outweighed Scandlines’ interest in having the exclusive and unlimited use of its terminal and ordered the 
latter to allow access to the terminal facilities.  
697 In Sweden, the Swedish Competition Authority ordered the sole electricity provider for the city of Haparanda, Ekfors Kraft AB, 
to supply energy to the city’s street lightning facility (Decision of the Swedish Competition Authority (Ekfors) of 25 August 2010). 
698 In Italy, the Competition Authority fined Bayer Cropscience for refusing to provide access to studies required for market 
authorization of fungicides. In its decision of 5 July 2011, the Competition Authority fined Bayer Cropscience Srl and Bayer 
Cropscience AG €5,124 million for abuse of dominant position by refusing to provide Sapec Agro S.A, and other companies, to 
certain studies required to acquire market authorization for fosetyl-based products, and ordered Bayer to allow access to the said 
studies (Decision of the Italian Competition Authority of 11 May 2011, A415 - SAPEC AFRO/BAYER-HELM).  
699 In Switzerland, the Competition Commission has fined German BMW Ltd with 156 million Swiss Francs for preventing direct 
and parallel imports into the Swiss market. The Competition Commission determined that BMW foreclosed the Swiss market by 
prohibiting its dealers in the EEA from selling BMW and MINI cars to Swiss customers. The Competition Commission ordered 
BWM Ltd to amend its dealers ‘contracts in the EEA by removing the export ban clause.  
700 In Lithuania, the Competition Authority fined the State-controlled operator of the national airport, Vilniaus tarptautinis oro 
uostas, for abusing its dominant position by preventing Naftelf from entering the market for the supply of aviation gasoline and jet 
fuels to airplanes in the Vilnius International Airport. In this case, the Competition Authority imposed a fine of LTL 171,00 on 
Vilniaus tarptautinis oro uostas and ordered to cease the anticompetitive conduct, and within not longer than three months to allow 
Naftelf the possibility to enter the market for the supply of aviation gasoline and jet fuels to airplanes in the Vilnius International 
Airport. See press release at: http://kt.gov.lt/en/index.php?show=news_view&pr_id=574  
701 In the UK, see Rule 5 of the OFT Rules (The Competition Act 1998 (Office of Fair Trading’s Rules) Order 2004 (SI 
2004/2751)).  
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(c) Divestiture and Rescission  
 
Divestiture is the most common structural remedy used in merger or acquisition cases. This type of 
structural remedy aims to make changes in asset or ownership structure of the merging undertakings in 
order to remove any anticompetitive concerned that the transaction in question may rise. In Practice, its 
application varies from one competition regime to another, and especially with regard to the merger 
notification system established in each regime. However, given that this type of remedy is one of the most 
drastic, it should be used to restore competition and not to punish those who restrain trade, moreover, it is 
not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or whether other remedies, less 
harsh, are available702.  
The purpose of divestiture is to address the possible lessening of competition by either creating a 
new source of competition through disposal of a business or assets from the merger parties to a new 
market participant or strengthening an existing source of competition through disposal of a business or 
assets to an existing market participant independent of the merging undertakings. The effects of a 
successful divestiture will be to address the loss of rivalry resulting from a merger by changing or 
restoring the structure of the market.   
 In competition regimes where a pre-merger notification system has been established, normally, 
the competition authorities evaluate the effects of the proposed merger or acquisition in advance. The 
early evaluation of the competition authorities in competition regimes that have established pre-merger 
notification systems permits competition authorities to assess any anticompetitive concern that the 
proposed transaction may provoke in the market where the merger will take effect. The fact the 
competition authorities in these competition regimes can scrutinize the anticompetitive effects of a 
proposed merger or acquisition in advance allows competition authorities to impose any appropriate 
remedy before the proposed transaction is completed. In these cases where the merging undertakings are 
obliged to notify the merger transaction before its actual implementation, one of the most common 
remedies imposed by competition authorities is the divestiture of specific parts of the undertakings 
involved in the transaction, i.e. a production site or a distribution network. In practice, depending on the 
competition regime in question, the imposition of this kind of remedy can be done under the sole 
discretion of the competition authority, or alternatively, it can be proposed by the undertakings involved 
in the transaction. In cases where the divestiture remedy is imposed by the competition authority at its 
sole discretion, after reviewing the prosed transaction and evidencing that if completed as proposed it will 
raise competition law issues, the competition authority will order the involved undertakings the 
divestiture of the specific parts of the undertakings that may be problematic from the competition law 
perspective703. Conversely, in competition regimes where the undertakings involved in the proposed 
transaction are allowed to suggest to the competition authority the divestiture remedy, the latter will do so 
                                                          
702 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 603, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951). 
703 In Poland, the Competition Authority may either impose on the parties an obligation to, or accept an obligation proposed by the 
parties to divest part of their business. In 2007, the Polish Competition Authority conditionally cleared a merger that was referred 
back from the European Commission. In its decision the Competition Authority cleared the transaction consisting in Carrefour 
Nederland B.V. acquiring Ahold Polska Sp. Z o. o., by ordering that by the end of 2008 Carrefour disposes of any rights, including 
the right of ownership, the right of perpetual usufruct and the right to rent, the eight stores located in Grodzisk Mazowiecki, 
Jaworzno, Chrzanów, Pabiance, Sochaczew and Zamość (Decision of the President of UOKiK of 28 June 2007, No. DOK-86/2007).  
183 
 
in different situations depending on the competition regime. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the 
merging undertaking will be allowed to suggest the divestiture remedy once they have notified the 
transaction to the competition authority and the latter has considered that the transaction will raise 
competition law issues if completed as proposed, in those cases, as a way to remedy the anticompetitive 
effects of the prosed transaction in advance, the merging undertakings can suggest the divestiture of parts 
of their undertakings in order to remove any concern the competition authority may have704. On the other 
hand, in other competition regimes, the merging undertakings can hold informal consultations with the 
competition authority prior to formal notifications, in these cases, the competition authority examines the 
proposed transaction to determine if it will raise competition law issues, if it considers that the transaction 
is problematic, then the merging undertakings can propose the competition authority a remedial measure 
such as divestiture on a voluntary basis and prior to any formal notification705.  
In competition regimes where post-merger notification systems have been established, the 
application of the divestiture remedy is different from jurisdictions with pre-merger notification systems. 
Given that in these competition regimes the competition authority may interfere after the merger or 
acquisition in question has been fully completed, any remedy that the competition authority considers 
suitable will have to be imposed after the transaction has been implemented. In these cases, after the 
transaction has taken place, the competition authority will evaluate if the transaction is problematic from 
the competition law perspective, and if so, the competition authority may order the divestiture of specifics 
parts of the merged undertakings if it considers this remedy to be appropriate to solve the competition law 
problems the transaction provoked706.   
Moreover, the imposition of the divestiture remedy may also be implemented in competition 
regimes where the notification of a transaction that may raise competition law issues due to its size or 
other aspects, is not mandatory. In these cases, the competition authority may be entitled to order the 
divesture of transactions that have already been completed707.  
Finally, even though, the divestiture remedy is the most frequently used measure for the control 
of anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, in some competition regimes, this kind of remedy may also 
be implemented in cases related to the abuse of a dominant position. In such cases, the competition 
                                                          
704 In Turkey, the Competition Authority has cleared the acquisition by Mars Sinema Turizm ve Sportif Tesisler İşletmeciliği A.Ş., 
of the majority shares of AFM Uluslararası Film Prodüksiyon Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. the two largest cinema chains in Turkey. The 
Competition Authority cleared the transaction subject to the proposed divesture of twelve cinemas and the notification of ticket 
prices (Decision 11-57/1473-539 of 17.11.2011).  
705 In Japan, the parties are allowed to hold voluntary prior consultations with the JFTC in advance to formal merger notifications. 
At this early stage, the JFTC evaluates the effects of the proposed transaction on competition and communicates its concerns to the 
merging undertakings, allowing them the possibility to submit a remedial measure on a voluntarily basis, the appropriateness of 
which is assessed by the JFTC.  
706 In Korea, according to the provisions of Article 16 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and the Notice on Merger 
Remedies of June 2011, the Korean Fair Trade Commission is allowed to impose structural remedies, such as divestiture. 
707 In the UK, the Competition Commission has prohibited a completed merger in the healthcare waste services industry and 
required the divestment of the acquired businesses. On May 2012, the Commission has announced that it will require Stericycle Inc 
to sell Ecowaste Southwest Limited, which was acquired by the former on 2011. See press release at: http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2012/mar/cc-requires-stericycle-to-sell-ecowaste-southwest.   
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authority may require the dominant undertaking to divest part of its business with the purpose of creating 
a new source of competition or strengthening an existing source of competition in a determined market708.   
With regard to the rescission remedy, the main purpose of this type of measure is the abrogation 
of a determined transaction, which is effective from its inception, and is intended to restore the merging 
undertakings to the positions they would have occupied if the transaction had ever been completed. In 
most competition regimes where this type of remedy is available it is considered to be an ultima ratio 
measure, which is implemented when competition cannot be preserved by any other means. In practice, 
through the imposition of this type of remedy, the competition authority may order the partial or total 
desconcentration of transactions which are contrary to the competition law provisions709.    
(d) Commitments or Undertakings 
 
Most competition regimes allow the possibility for competition authorities to accept commitments or 
undertakings offered by a person or persons if they consider that those commitments or undertakings will 
eliminate any concern about the lawfulness of the allegedly anticompetitive practices. These are voluntary 
remedies which are offered by the concerned undertakings, accordingly, these kinds of remedies cannot 
be ordered by the competition authority or a judicial authority. As a general rule, the persons concerned 
with the investigation by the competition authority are allowed to offer commitments at any stage of the 
investigation and up until a decision is made710, however, in some competition regimes, the concerned 
parties have to submit the commitments before the statement of objections has been notified711. As a 
result, the main effect that the acceptance of the proposed commitments by the competition authority has 
is the immediate termination of the investigation for the alleged infringement of the substantial provisions 
of competition law.  
In addition to the timing requirement for the acceptance of commitments, depending on the 
competition regime in question, there are other additional requirements that may have to be fulfilled in 
order for the proposed commitments to be accepted. For instance, in some competition regimes, the 
ability of the parties involved in suspected anticompetitive practices to be allowed to propose 
commitments for the termination of the proceedings for the declaration of the antitrust infringement will 
be restricted in the frequency in which they can offer commitments712. Moreover, in some competition 
regimes, the acceptance of a commitment proposed in exchange for the termination of an investigation for 
the alleged infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law may be subject to the payment 
                                                          
708 In Armenia, pursuant to Article 19 of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition, the Commission for the Protection of 
Economic Competition is empowered to order the disaggregation of economic entities abusing their dominant position twice or 
more within a year. In France, the Autorité de la Concurrence may, in the case of an abuse of dominant position or a state of 
economic dependency, impose a transfer of assets or the cancellation of joint control that contributed to the emergence of market 
power, even if the acquisition of these assets or joint control had previously been authorized in the context of a merger control 
review (Article L. 430-9 of the Commercial Code).  
709 In Mexico, according to Article 35(II) of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the Federal Competition Commission is 
empowered to order the total or partial desconcentration of a concentration that is forbidden by the provisions of the Law.  
710 In Mexico, according to Article 33 bis 2 of the Federal on Economic Competition, the concerned parties may offer commitments 
before a final decision for the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law is reached.  
711 In Croatia, the concerned parties can offer commitments following the initiation of an investigation for the alleged infringement 
of competition law and at the latest before the statement of objections has been notified (Article 49 of the Competition Act).  
712 In Mexico, according to Article 33 bis 2 of the Federal Law on Economic Competition, the concerned parties will be allowed to 
offer commitment only once every five years.  
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by the proposing undertakings of a sum of money713. Nevertheless, in some competition regimes, such 
obligation to pay may only be required in cases that are concerned with cartel infringements714. 
In particular, in most competition regimes, the decision to accept commitments, and 
consequently, to terminate the proceedings for the declaration of the infringement of competition law is at 
the sole discretion of the competition authority. Nonetheless, some competition authorities have 
developed guidelines as to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to accept commitments715.  
Despite the preceding, in some jurisdictions, there are circumstances established by the competition 
provisions under which the competition authorities cannot accept commitments from the concerned 
undertakings. For instance, in some competition regimes, the competition authority will not adopt 
commitment decisions in cases of serious infringements of the competition law provisions716. Moreover, 
in some jurisdictions, the competition authority will not accept commitments in cases involving secret 
cartels between competitors, which may include: price-fixing; bid-rigging; establishment of output 
restrictions or quotas; sharing markets; and dividing markets717. Finally, in other competition regimes, the 
competition authority will not accept commitments in cases where the conduct of the concerned 
undertakings has resulted in a substantial distortion of competition718.  
As to the nature of the proposed commitments, these can be structural or behavioral, or even a 
combination of both. For example, commitments might involve a person agreeing to cease or modify its 
conduct in a particular area719. Moreover, commitments may also require a person granting licenses 
related to intellectual property rights720. In some cases, the concerned commitments may remove a 
particular anticompetitive clause from an agreement721. Furthermore, the proposed commitments may 
oblige the concerned undertakings to refrain from abusing their dominant position by applying 
anticompetitive conditions722. Additionally, in some cases the proposed commitments may require the 
                                                          
713 In Israel, pursuant to Section 50B of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law, the consent decree agreed between the General Director 
of the Antitrust Authority and the concerned undertakings may include an obligation to pay a sum of money to the State Treasury.  
714 In Brazil, according to Article 85 of the Antitrust Law, the proposed commitments have to include a pecuniary contribution to the 
Fundo de Defesa de Direitos Difusos in cases related to cartel infringements.  
715 In the UK, see the OFT’s guidance as to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to accept commitments. 
716 In Bulgaria, pursuant to the provisions of Article 75 of the Law on Protection of Competition, the Commission for the Protection 
of Competition shall not issue a decision accepting commitments in cases of serious infringements of the Law.  
717 In the UK, see paragraph 4.4 of the OFT’s 2004 Guidance note on Enforcement.  
718 In the Czech Republic, the Office for the Protection of Competition shall not issue a commitment decision in cases where the 
conduct of the concerned undertakings has resulted or could have resulted in the substantial distortion of competition (Article 7 of 
the Act on the Protection of Competition).  
719 In France, on July 2012, the Autorité de la Concurrence accepted commitments from eleven banks to abolish the main interbank 
fees applicable to the use of non-cash means of payment from 1 September 2013 onwards. See press release at: 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=418&id_article=1895. In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt accepted 
the commitments offered by the League Association and the German Football League (DFL) relating to the joint award of media 
rights and declared them binding. The commitments include e.g. guarantees concerning the application of a fair, non-discriminatory 
and transparent award procedure. See press release at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/Presse/2012/2012-
01-13_PR_DFL_E.pdf.  
720 In Italy, on March 2007, the Italian Competition Authority accepted and made obligatory Merck’s commitment to grant free 
licenses to allow the manufacture and sale in Italy of the active ingredient finasteride and related generic drugs two years before 
Merck’s exclusive rights were due to expire. This decision terminates the proceedings brought by the Authority in relation to 
Merck’s alleged abuse of its dominant position in the production and sale of certain active pharmaceutical ingredients. 
721 In Portugal, in the Bayer / Sapec case, concerning a non-compete clause included in a contract between the two companies for the 
distribution of various agro-chemical products.  The proceedings were terminated in 2007 by the competition authority with a 
commitment decision requiring Bayer to suppress the anticompetitive clause in its relationship with the distributors. 
722 In Lithuania, the Competition Council closed an investigation into a possible infringement of the abuse of dominance provisions 
by Viasat World Limited and Viasat AS, which are companies in the distribution of TV channels, following the commitments 
proposed by Viasat World Limited. The proposed commitments included the obligation to apply non-discriminatory distribution 
terms for the Viasat Sport Baltic channel to all providers of multichannel subscriber television services. See press release at: 
http://kt.gov.lt/en/index.php?show=news_view&pr_id=941. In Poland, the Competition Authority accepted commitments offered by 
Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (PGNiG) and closed the proceedings related to an alleged abuse of dominant position 
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concerned undertakings to disgorge a portion of their ill-gotten gains from their illegal behavior723. 
Finally, commitment decisions may also require structural remedies such as divestiture724.  
With regard to the effects of the decisions accepting commitments, as a general rule, these 
commitments are binding on the proposing parties725. As stated before, the main effect that these 
commitments have is the immediate termination of the investigation and the proceedings for the alleged 
infringement of the competition law provisions conducted by the competition authority. Thus, if the 
competition authority accepts the commitments, its decision makes them binding upon the parties and 
concludes that there are no longer grounds for action, thereby closing the investigation of the case without 
any infringement decision.  As opposed to infringement decisions, the commitment decisions do not draw 
conclusions on the anticompetitive nature of the litigious practice. They terminate the procedure without 
any recognition of liability of the parties, or imposing any sanction on them. Accordingly, in practice, the 
fact that the competition authority has accepted binding commitments does not preclude third parties from 
bringing private actions before civil courts.  
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the competition authority has to terminate the investigation and 
the proceedings that were related to the subject matter of the proposed commitments, the competition 
authority can reopen the investigation in cases where the circumstances have changed since the 
commitments were accepted; the persons bound by the commitments have failed to comply to the terms 
of the commitments; or the information that led the competition authority to accept the commitments was 
incomplete, false or misleading726.  
Moreover, in some competition regimes, the competition authority can review the proposed 
commitments and modify them if the authority believes that the conditions of the proposed commitments 
constitute an excessive burden for the concerned undertakings, if such alteration does not harm others or 
the public interest727. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the proposed commitments can be released by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
on the Polish natural gas market. The alleged abuse consisted in PGNiG impeding its industrial customers’ ability to switch 
suppliers. On April 2012, the Authority closed its investigation and refrained from imposing fines in exchange of the abolition of the 
contractual clauses that impeded PGNiG’s customers to switch supplier. In addition, if PGNiG fails to execute Authority’s decision, 
it may be fined with up to €10,000 per day of failure to comply. See press release at: 
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=3360.  
723 In the US, the federal district court in the New York City decided that the Department of Justice was entitled to seek 
disgorgement as a remedy for an alleged Sherman Act violation, accordingly, the Court approved a consent decree, which required 
KeySpan to pay $12 million to settle a federal antitrust lawsuit brought by the Antitrust Division (February 2, 2011, Memorandum 
and Order in U.S. v. KeySpan Corp., 10-cv-1415 (WHP).  
724 In Turkey, the Competition Authority has cleared the acquisition by Mars Sinema Turizm ve Sportif Tesisler İşletmeciliği A.Ş., 
of the majority shares of AFM Uluslararası Film Prodüksiyon Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. the two largest cinema chains in Turkey. The 
Competition Authority cleared the transaction subject to the proposed divesture of twelve cinemas and the notification of ticket 
prices (Decision 11-57/1473-539 of 17.11.2011). 
725 In Croatia, pursuant to Article 49 of the Competition Act, the Competition Agency shall by means of a decision make the 
proposed commitments binding on the undertakings. In Germany, according to Section 32b of the Act Against Restraints of 
Competition, the Bundeskartellamt may by way of a decision declare the proposed commitments to be binding on the concerned 
undertakings.  
726 In Croatia, see Article 49 of the Competition Act. In the Czech Republic, see Article 7 of the Act on the Protection of 
Competition. In Germany, see Section 32b of the Act Against Restrictions of Competition.  
727 In Brazil, according to Article 85 of the Law Nº 12.529, of 30 November of 2011, the CADE is empowered to modify the 
conditions of the proposed commitments is these suppose an excessive burden on the concerned undertakings, if the modification 
does not harm other or the public interest.  
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the competition authority where, it is requested by the persons who gave the commitments728, or the 
competition concerns identified at the time of their acceptance no longer arise729. 
In most competition regimes, in practice, the accepted commitments have the same force and 
effects of the other remedies implemented unilaterally by the competition authority, provided that these 
commitments are accepted via a reasoned decision by the competition authority. As a general rule the 
decision accepting commitments has to be published with the purpose of allowing interested third parties 
the possibility to make any representations against the proposed commitments. Ultimately, in most 
competition regimes, the decision of the competition authority accepting commitments can be reviewed at 
the request of any sufficiently interested person before the relevant appellate body.  
Finally, in competition regimes where the competition authority does not have the power to issue 
a decision declaring the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law, the latter will also 
lack competence to terminate a proceeding that has been instituted before the relevant enforcement 
authority. Accordingly, during the investigative stage, in cases where the competition authority has not 
yet instituted a court action for the declaration of the antitrust infringement, the authority may agree with 
the investigated undertakings not to proceed with a court action in exchange for commitments to 
terminate any conduct the authority considers contrary to the competition law provisions730. Furthermore, 
in cases where the competition authority has already brought a court action for the declaration of the 
antitrust infringement, any agreement between the competition authority and the defendant for the 
termination of the anticompetitive practice will have to be approved by the court handling the case731. 
Finally, in some jurisdictions, the competent court may, at the request of the competition authority, accept 
the commitments agreed between the competition authority and the concerned undertakings732. 
(e) Restitution to Injured Parties 
 
Finally, in some competition regimes, as a way of remedying the harmful effects of the anticompetitive 
conduct of the perpetrators of the competition law infringement, there is the possibility to order or accord 
the restitution to those who have suffered harm resulting from the said anticompetitive conduct. Unlike 
civil actions for damages, where the injured parties bring a private action before the relevant court with 
the purpose of recovering the amount suffered in damages caused by the anticompetitive conduct of the 
competition law offender, in these cases, the restitution for the harm suffered for the competition law 
infringement is awarded by the competition authority in public proceedings. As stated before, depending 
                                                          
728 In Israel, the competent court may amend the provisions of the consent decree when all the parties to the consent decree file a 
consensual request to amend the decree.  
729 In Singapore, the Competition Commission may release an accepted commitment for the termination of the proceedings where it 
has reasonable grounds for believing that the commitment is no longer necessary or appropriate for the purpose of remedying, 
mitigating or preventing the substantial lessening of competition (Section 60A of the Competition Act). 
730 In Ireland, in the course of an investigation for the alleged infringement of competition law, the competition authority may agree 
with the concerned undertakings not to bring a court action in exchange of commitments aimed removing any anticompetitive 
concern.  
731 In the US, the Antitrust Division may negotiate consent decrees with the concerned undertakings to bring the alleged 
infringement of the competition law provisions to an end. However, these consent decrees have to be submitted to a federal court for 
approval.  
732 In Israel, according to Section 50B of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law, any court of competent jurisdiction may, upon the 
request of the General Director of the Antitrust Authority, accord the force of a ruling to a consent agreement reached between the 
General Director and another person.  
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on the competition regime, the restitution of injured parties may be ordered by the competition authority, 
or alternatively, this remedy may be accorded between the competition authority, the perpetrator of the 
competition law infringement and the injured parties. In cases where the restitution remedy is ordered by 
the competition authority, the latter will, at the time of issuing a final decision declaring the infringement 
of the competition law provisions, order a compensation payment for the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct of the competition law offender. Furthermore, in such cases, the restitution 
remedy is usually coupled with other sanctions or remedies, such as the imposition of financial penalties 
or the order to terminate anticompetitive practices733.  
 On the other hand, in some competition regimes, the restitution of the injured parties can be 
accorded between the competition authority, the persons involved in practices that are supposed to be 
contrary to the competition law provisions and the injured parties. In practice, this type of remedy is 
available before the relevant authority has reached a decision declaring the infringement of the 
competition law provisions and it is instituted as an agreement between the competition authority and the 
concerned persons to compensate and terminate the alleged anticompetitive practices in exchange for 
closing the investigation for the infringement of competition law734.   
VII. REVIEW AND APPEALS 
1. Introduction 
 
In most jurisdictions the initial decisions of the relevant enforcement authorities applying the provisions 
of competition law are subject to be reviewed by the competent authority. Provided that some decisions 
for the enforcement of competition law tend to restrict and limit the rights and freedoms of their 
addressees -decisions that restrict the ability of their recipients to contract, or decisions imposing 
sanctions on their addressees-, it is fundamental for every competition regime to address the possibility of 
the concerned persons to seek some kind of review against the decisions of the enforcement authorities in 
competition law cases.  
In practice, flawed decisions of the enforcement authorities in competition law cases can harm 
the rights of their addressees, third parties and the public interest. Accordingly, in order to avoid flawed 
decisions by the enforcement authorities, most competition regimes have established mechanisms to 
ensure that the decisions issued by the enforcement authorities are fair and lawful. In this sense, the 
recipients of these competition law decisions are entitled to request their review before the competent 
authority.  
                                                          
733 In Indonesia, pursuant to Article 47 of Law 5/1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business 
Competition, the Business Competition Supervisory Commission is allowed to impose sanctions in the form of administrative 
measures against undertakings violating the provisions of the Law, inter alia, stipulating a compensation payment to the injured 
parties resulting from the anticompetitive conduct of the infringing undertakings.  
734 In South Africa, according to Section 49D of the Competition Act, in the course of an investigation of a complaint, the 
Competition Commission may agree with the respondent of the complaint the termination of the investigation, such agreement will 
binding with the approval of the Competition Tribunal, and may include, with the consent of the complainant, the award of damages 
to the complainant.  
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The possibility to request the revision of a decision by a public authority, such as the competition 
authority or judicial authorities empowered to decide on competition law cases is a fundamental 
guarantee to due process. The main purpose of allowing the recipients of the decisions and possibly 
affected third parties to request the review of a determined decision is to permit them to challenge the acts 
of public entities when these have acted abusively or unlawfully.  Moreover, the availability of reviewing 
mechanisms for the decisions by public authorities creates strong incentives for these authorities to 
comply with the due process when adopting their decisions and to be more meticulous in the decision-
making process, given that the possibility of their decisions being challenged and quashed constitutes a 
strong incentive for the enforcement authorities.  
Due to the particularities of each competition regime, the appellate process in competition law 
cases may be different from one competition regime to another. In particular, most differences are 
concerned with the types of decisions that can be reviewed or appealed; the person who are entitled to 
bring an appeal against a competition law decision; the authorities that are allowed to review the 
competition law decisions; the standard of the review in each competition system; the effects of the 
review; and the decisions of the reviewing authorities.     
2. Types of Decisions that can be reviewed 
 
In the same way in which the authorities in charge of issuing the initial competition law decision and the 
authorities in charge of the review of such decisions vary from one jurisdiction to another, the decisions 
of the enforcement authorities that can be challenged also vary strongly from one competition regime to 
the other.  
 Overall, in competition regimes where the competition authority is empowered to issue decisions 
in relation to the infringement of the competition law provisions, provided that the authority is an 
administrative body within the administrative branch of the government, every decision of the 
competition authority that has the nature of an administrative act shall be subject to be appealed before 
the competent appellate body. Conversely, in competition systems where the power to adopt decisions 
concerned with the infringement of the competition law provisions is hold by courts of general 
jurisdiction, these courts will be allowed to adopt any decision that is  contemplated in the general rules of 
civil or criminal procedure, moreover, the appellate process in such cases will also follow these general 
rules. 
Irrespective of the fact that, depending on the jurisdiction, the initial decisions for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions can be issued by different enforcement authorities, such as 
competition authorities or courts of general jurisdiction, in practice, there are several competition law 
decisions of these enforcement authorities issued in the course of the investigations and the proceedings 
for the alleged infringement of the competition law provisions that can be appealed before the relevant 
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appellate authority. There are, however, competition regimes where the relevant provisions establish 
restrictive lists of the decisions by the competition authority that are subject to be appealed735.  
From a chronological perspective, some of the decisions of the enforcement authorities issued in 
the course of an investigation for the alleged infringement of the competition law provisions can be 
appealed before the competent appellate authority, such decisions may include: decisions imposing 
interim measures736; decisions accepting commitments737; or decisions ordering the inspection of 
premises738. Additionally, in some competition regimes, the investigated undertakings can lodge an 
appeal against the actions of the officials of the competition authority that conducted the investigation739. 
Furthermore, prior to the initiation of the formal proceedings for the alleged infringement of the 
competition law provisions, certain decisions of the enforcement authorities can be appealed by the 
parties interested in the initiation of the said proceedings, for instance, in some competition regimes, the 
decisions of the enforcement authority declining the initiation of the proceeding for the alleged 
infringement of competition law can be appealed by the interested parties740, instead, there are other 
jurisdictions where the decisions to initiate proceedings is at the sole jurisdiction of the enforcement 
authority, and consequently, no appeal is allowed against such a decision741. Ultimately, the decisions of 
the enforcement authorities at the end of the proceedings for the alleged infringement of the competition 
law provisions can be appealed before the competent appellate bodies, depending on the competition 
regime in question, such decisions may include: decisions declaring the infringement742, or the non-
infringement of the competition law provisions743; decisions granting or denying exemptions to restrictive 
agreements744; decisions ordering the termination of an anticompetitive practice745; decisions ordering the 
divestiture of assets of infringing undertakings746; decisions imposing financial penalties for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions747; decisions declaring the dominance of a determined 
                                                          
735 In Sweden, the Article 1 of the Chapter 7 of the Competition Act provides for a restrictive list of decisions by the Competition 
authority that can be appealed before the Market Court.  
736 In Malaysia, the decisions of the Competition Commission imposing interim measures in the course of an investigation can be 
appealed before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (Section 51 of the Competition Act).  
737 In Kenya, a person aggrieved by a determination of the Competition Authority to enter into an agreement of settlement with the 
undertakings concerned with an investigation for the alleged infringement of the competition law provisions, can bring an appeal 
before the Competition Tribunal (Section 40 of the Competition Act).  
738 In France, the concerned parties can challenge the validity of an order authorizing the inspection and the conditions in which the 
inspection itself was performed before the First President of the Court of Appeal (Article L. 450-4 of the Commercial Code).  
739 In Lithuania, according to Article 27 of the Law on Competition, the undertakings under investigation can appeal the actions of 
the investigating officers; such an appeal is made before the Competition Council.  
740 In Argentina, pursuant to Article 52 of the Law for Defense of Competition, the dismissal of an accusation by the Tribunal for the 
Defense of Competition can be appealed.  
741 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to Article 32 of the Competition Act, the decisions of the Council of Competition declining 
the initiation of proceedings cannot be appealed. Similarly, in Bulgaria, the decision of the Commission on Protection of 
Competition to initiate proceedings cannot be appealed according to Article 92(c) of the Law on Protection of Competition.  
742 In Singapore, the decisions of the Competition Commission declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions can be 
appealed before the Competition Appeal Board (Section 71 of the Competition Act).  
743 In Malaysia, the decisions of the Competition Commission declaring the infringement or the non-infringement of the competition 
law provisions can be appealed before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (Section 51 of the Competition Act). 
744 In Tanzania, the decisions of the Fair Trading Commission granting or denying exemptions to certain restrictive agreements or 
proposed mergers can be appealed before the Fair Competition Tribunal (Section 61 of the Fair Competition Act).  
745 In Turkey, pursuant to Article 55 of the Act on the Protection of Competition, the decisions of the Competition Board ordering 
the termination of an infringement can be appealed before the Council of State as the court of first instance.  
746 In India, according to Section 53A of the Competition Act, the decisions of the Competition Commission ordering the divestiture 
of assets or businesses of an undertaking enjoying a dominant position can be appealed before the Competition Appellate Tribunal.  
747 In the UK, according to Section 46 of the Competition Act, the decisions of the Director General of Fair Trading imposing 
financial penalties for the infringement of competition law and the amount of such penalties may be appealed to the Competition 
Commission.  
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undertaking748; decisions amending former orders issued by the competition authority749; or decisions 
allowing, prohibiting or allowing proposed mergers subject to certain conditions750; among others. 
In some competition regimes, the infringement of the substantial provisions of competition law 
is determined via a decision by the competition authority. Alternatively, other actions by the competition 
authority, such as, the request of information in the course of an investigation for the alleged infringement 
of the competition law provisions or the imposition of interim measures, are adopted via a resolution by 
the competition authority. From the perspective of the appeal process, the decisions issued by the 
competition authority are final and are subject an administrative dispute before the competent court. On 
the other hand, with regard to the resolutions issued by the competition authority, these will be reviewed 
by the competition authority itself in administrative proceedings751.  
  Finally, not only the actuation of the enforcement authorities can be subject to an appeal before 
the competent appellate authorities provided that in some competition regimes the failure by the 
enforcement authority to take a certain action that it is obliged to carry out can be appealed. However, in 
order for the failure to act of the enforcement authority to be appealable, the actuation of the enforcement 
authority has to be requested by an applicant that is entitled to demand such an action and the 
enforcement authority has failed to act within a reasonable period of time752.    
3. Persons who can Appeal Competition Law Decisions 
 
The legal standing to bring an action against the decisions by the enforcement authorities for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions varies widely from one competition regime to another. 
For instance, in the most stringent competition regimes, the ability to appeal a competition law decision 
by the enforcement authority is restricted to the parties in the proceedings for the alleged infringement of 
the competition law provisions, i.e. the complainant and the concerned undertakings753. Additionally, in 
some competition regimes, the competition law decisions of the enforcement authorities can be appealed 
by the parties to the proceedings and by any third person that has legal interest754. In some competition 
                                                          
748 In Denmark, the decisions of the Competition Council declaring that one or more undertakings hold a dominant position can be 
appealed before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (Section 19 of the Competition Act. 
749 In India, pursuant to Section 38 of the Competition Act, the Competition Commission may review any order it has passed with 
the purpose of rectifying any mistake included in such order. However, the decision of the Commission rectifying the passed order 
can be appealed before the Competition Appellate Tribunal by any affected person (Section 53D of the Competition Act).  
750 In Israel, the decisions of the General Director of the Antitrust Authority objecting a merger or imposing conditions to the parties 
in the transaction can be appealed by the merging parties. In addition, the decisions of the General Director allowing proposed 
mergers can be appealed by any affected person before the Antitrust Tribunal (Section 22 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law). In 
Ireland, the decision of the Competition Authority allowing mergers subject to certain conditions and prohibiting mergers can be 
appealed by the merging undertakings before the High Court (Section 24 of the Competition Act).  
751 In Serbia, against the decisions of the Commission for Protection of Competition, i.e. declaring the infringement of the 
competition law provisions, administrative disputes can be initiated by the concerned parties. Alternatively, with regard to the 
resolutions of the Commission, i.e. ordering the production of information or imposing interim measure, these can be reviewed by 
the Commission itself (Article 38 of the Law on Protection of Competition).  
752 In the EU, according to Article 265 of the TFEU, it is possible to bring an action before the General Court, and ultimately to the 
Court of Justice, for the failure to act of the Commission. In Germany, pursuant to Section 63 of the Act Against Restraints of 
Competition, the failure of the cartel authority to take a decision in a reasonable period of time can be appealed.  
753 In Germany, according to Sections 63 and 54 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, the right to appeal against the 
decisions of the cartel authority is restricted to those who applied for the institution of proceedings and to cartels, undertakings, 
trade and industry associations or professional organizations against which the proceedings are directed.  
754 In Bulgaria, pursuant to Article 64 of the Law on Protection of Competition, the decisions of the Commission on Protection of 
Competition may be appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court by the parties to the proceedings and by third persons that 
have legal interest.  
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regimes, the right to appeal competition law decisions by the enforcement authorities can be exercised by 
consumers who are interested parties in the proceedings for the alleged violation of competition law755. 
Moreover, in some competition regimes, certain Ministers may appeal the competition law decisions of 
the enforcement authorities756. Finally, in some competition regimes, the authorities of the public 
administration can appeal the competition law decisions of the enforcement authorities757.  
4. Authorities Responsible for the Review of Competition Law Decisions 
 
Just as the enforcement authorities that are allowed to issue decisions for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions, the type of decisions that can be appealed and the persons who can bring 
such an appeal vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the authorities empowered to review the competition 
law decisions of the enforcement authorities also vary from one jurisdiction to another.  
 Whenever the recipient of a competition law decision by the enforcement authorities believes 
that the decision is in violation if its rights and freedoms, and contrary to the law, it may bring an action 
before the competent authority to review the decision of the enforcement authorities. Depending on the 
competition system, the review of the competition law decisions will be made by the competition 
authority itself, by general administrative courts, by specialized administrative courts, by judicial courts, 
by certain Ministers, or by the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction in question.   
5. Different Types of Review 
(a) Administrative Review by the Competition Authority 
 
As stated before, in some competition regimes the decisions of the competition authority in relation to the 
infringement of the competition law provisions can be reviewed by the competition authority itself. 
However, depending on the jurisdiction, this review by the competition authority does not constitute an 
appeal of the contested decisions, but it is a faculty granted to the competition authority to review its 
decisions before these can be challenged in judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the review of the 
competition law decisions made by the competition authority is performed in administrative proceedings.  
In some competition regimes, the possibility of requesting the administrative review by the 
competition authority of the decisions for the infringement of the competition law provisions rests on the 
discretion of the parties concerned with the decisions. Hence, in such jurisdictions, the parties affected by 
a decision of the competition authority may choose to file an appeal before the competition authority 
requesting the review of the contested decision, or alternatively, they may choose to file a lawsuit before 
                                                          
755 In Barbados, pursuant to Section 37 of the Fair Trading Commission Act, the decisions of the Fair Trading Commission can be 
appealed by consumers who are interested parties in the proceedings.  
756 In France, the parties and the Minister of Economy can lodge an appeal for annulment or reversal of the Authority’s decisions 
enforcing the competition law provisions before the Paris Court of Appeal (Article L. 464-8 of the Commercial Code).  
757 In Moldova, according to Article 27 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, public administration authorities can appeal the 
decisions of the National Agency for the Protection of Competition. In Romania, according to Article 9 of the Competition Act, 
central or local public administration authorities can appeal the decisions of the Competition Council before the Bucharest Court of 
Appeal.  
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the relevant court requesting the judicial review of the decision in question758. Conversely, in some 
competition regimes, the affected parties by the competition law decision of the competition authority are 
obliged to request the administrative review of the competition authority in first instance, once the 
authority has issued a decision concerned with the requested review, if the concerned parties are not 
satisfied with such decision they can bring an appeal before the competent judicial authority759.  
With regard to the procedure before the competition authority to review the contested decisions 
for the infringement of competition law, this varies depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, in some 
competition regimes, the competition law decision will be reviewed by all the members of the 
competition authority in a plenary session760. Moreover, in other competition regimes, the administrative 
review of the competition authority decision is resolved by the head of the authority761. Furthermore, in 
some jurisdictions, the decisions of the competition authority may be reviewed by a corporate body 
within the competition authority762. Finally, in some competition regimes, the decisions of the 
competition authority are reviewed by collegiate body formed by some of the members of the competition 
authority that sit specifically to review the competition law decisions763.  
 In most jurisdictions where the decisions of the competition authority can be reviewed by the 
latter, the decisions of the authority in relation to such reviews are not definitive. Thus, in practice, a 
variety of authorities may review the decisions of the authority related to the administrative review of the 
contested decisions related to the infringement of the competition law provisions. For example, in some 
competition regimes, the decisions of the competition authority reviewing contested decisions for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions can be further reviewed by courts or general 
jurisdiction764 or by the Supreme Court765. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the decisions of the 
competition authority related to the review of contested decisions can be appealed before administrative 
courts766. Additionally, in some competition regimes, the decisions of the competition authority in cases 
related to the administrative review of challenged decisions for the infringement of competition law can 
be appealed before appellate courts specialized in competition law matters767. Finally, in some countries, 
                                                          
758 In Korea, the parties affected by a decision of the KFTC may file an appeal before the Commission requesting the revision of the 
concerned decision (Article 53 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act), in addition, the affected parties may also file a 
lawsuit before the Seoul Appellate Court requesting the judicial review of the KFTC’s decision (Article 54 of the Act).  
759 In China, according to Article 53 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the persons who disagree with a decision of the SAIC or the NDRC 
may apply for administrative review.  These reviews will be undertaken by the SAIC or the NDRC themselves.  Further appeals 
may be brought via an administrative lawsuit to the courts. 
760 In Korea, the administrative review of the KFTC’s decisions is deliberated in plenary session by all the members of the KFTC 
(Article 37-3 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act).  
761 In Nicaragua, according to Article 39 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition, the decisions issued by the President of 
PROCOMPETENCIA are reviewed by the latter, which is the head of the competition authority. 
762 In El Salvador, the decisions of the Superintendence of Competition are reviewed by the Directive Council, which is a corporate 
body within the Superintendence.  
763 In Pakistan, the decisions of the Competition Commission are reviewed by the Appellate Bench of the Commission, which is an 
appellate bench constituted by at least two members of the Competition Commission.  
764 In the US, in administrative procedures, the decisions of the FTC can be appealed before the Commission; further appeal can be 
made before a federal circuit court of appeals.  
765 In Barbados, the decisions of the Fair Competition Commission reviewing its own decisions can be appealed before the High 
Court.  
766 In Mexico, the decisions of the Federal Competition Commission related to the administrative review of challenged decisions can 
be appealed in administrative proceedings before District Courts.  
767 In Pakistan, the decisions of the Appellate Bench of the Commission reviewing the decisions of the Competition Commission 
can be appealed before the Competition Appellate Tribunal.  
194 
 
the decisions of the competition authority reviewing contested decisions for the infringement of 
competition law can be further reviewed by the competition authority768.   
 Finally, in most competition regimes where this possibility of the competition authority to 
review its own decisions for the infringement of the competition law provisions exists, such 
administrative review is normally made at the request of the parties affected by the decision in question, 
notwithstanding the preceding, in some competition regimes, this administrative review can be performed 
at the request of the concerned parties or at the sole discretion of the competition authority769. Moreover, 
in some competition regimes where the request for the judicial review of the competition decision has to 
be lodge to the competition authority, the latter, without remitting the appeal to the appellate court, may 
revoke or change the contested decision in whole or in part if it considers the appeal to be justified770.  
(b) Administrative Review by Ministries 
 
In some competition regimes there are other mechanisms to review the decisions of the competition 
authority that have an administrative nature. For instance, in such competition regimes, there may be the 
possibility to request a determined Ministry the administrative review of the decisions of the competition 
authority in respect to the infringement of the competition law provisions. Usually, this happens, in 
competition regimes where the competition authority is somehow related to the Ministry in question771. 
(c) Judicial Review by Administrative Courts 
 
Apart from the previously studied possibility for the concerned persons to request the competition 
authority the administrative review of its decisions in relation to the infringement of the competition law 
provisions, in some competition regimes, the decisions of the authority can be appealed by the interested 
parties before courts of administrative jurisdiction. In most competition regimes where the competition 
authority is empowered to issue decisions for the infringement of the competition law provisions, 
provided that the authority and the proceedings in which it issues the decisions are of an administrative 
nature, the appeal process follows the general rules of administrative law. Hence, in such cases, the 
judicial review of the decisions by the competition authority will be handled by administrative courts. 
Depending on the competition regime, the decisions of the administrative courts may be final772, or 
alternatively, further appeals may be lodge before the competent court773.  
                                                          
768 In Nicaragua, the decisions of the President of PROCOMPETENCIA reviewing challenged decisions for the antitrust 
infringement may be further reviewed by the Directive Council of PROCOMPETENCIA.  
769 In Barbados, the decisions of the Fair Trading Commission can be review by the Commission at the request of the interested 
parties or at its own motion.  
770 In Poland, the decisions of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection are subject to appeal before the Court of 
Consumer and Competition Protection. In case of an appeal, the interested parties will file the appeal before the President of the 
Office who will remit the appeal to the Court; however, if the President considers that the appeal is justified, the latter will revoke or 
modify the contested decision without remitting the case to the Court. The parties that lodged the appeal will be informed that the 
decision has been revoked or modified.  
771 In Norway, some of the decisions of the Competition Authority are subject to appeal before the Ministry of Government 
Administration, Reform and Church Affairs.  
772 In Bulgaria, the decisions of the Competition Commission can be appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, the 
decisions of which are final. In Croatia, the decisions of the Competition Agency are appealable before the Administrative Court of 
the Republic of Croatia. In Finland, the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court against the decisions of the Market Court for 
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(d) Judicial Review by Specialized Competition Courts 
 
In some competition regimes, courts or tribunals specialized in competition law matters have been 
established for the review of the decisions of the competition authorities in relation to the infringement of 
the competition law provisions. The purpose of creating these specialized courts or tribunals is to enhance 
the expertise of the authorities responsible for the review of the competition law decisions. In addition, 
the availability of such specialized bodies contributes to the development of a sound jurisprudence in the 
application of the competition law provisions. Thus, in practice, several competition regimes have 
established this type of specialized courts in competition law matters to review the decisions of the 
competition authorities for the infringement of the competition law provisions774. Finally, the decisions of 
these specialized competition courts or tribunals are not final in most competition regimes, which mean 
that such decisions can be further appeal before the competent appellate authority, normally the highest 
court of the jurisdiction in question775, notwithstanding the preceding, there are competition regimes 
where the decisions of the specialized tribunals reviewing the decisions of the competition authorities are 
final776. 
(e) Judicial Review by Judicial Courts 
 
In competition regimes where the competition authority lacks jurisdiction to adopt decisions for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, usually, such task has been awarded to courts of general 
jurisdiction, which will be responsible for the decision-making process in competition law matters. In 
these jurisdictions, the role of general courts is fundamental in the development and enforcement of 
competition law. Moreover, the appellate process in these jurisdictions follows the general rules of civil 
or criminal procedure, depending on the jurisdiction and the infringement of competition law. In practice, 
the role of the judicial courts while reviewing the competition law decisions of general courts of a lower 
instance is to decide if the initial competition law decisions have been adopted in a fair way, respecting 
the procedural rights of the parties and in compliance with due process.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
the infringement of the competition law provisions are final. In Serbia, the decisions of the Commission for Protection of 
Competition can be appealed before the Administrative Court.  
773 In Greece, the decisions of the Hellenic Competition Commission can be appealed before the Athens Administrative Court; 
further appeal may be lodge before the Supreme Administrative Court. In Switzerland, the decisions of the Competition 
Commission can be appealed, in first instance, before the Federal Administrative Court. Appeals against the decisions of the latter, 
in points of law, can be made before the Federal Supreme Court.   
774 In Denmark, the Competition Appeal Tribunal; in India, the Competition Appeal Tribunal; in Israel, the Antitrust Tribunal; in 
Malaysia, the Competition Appeal Tribunal; in Malta, the Competition and Consumer Appeal Tribunal; in Pakistan, the Competition 
Appellate Tribunal; in Poland, the Court of Consumer and Competition Protection; in Seychelles, the Appeal Tribunal; in 
Singapore, the Competition Appeal Board; in South Africa, the Competition Appeal Court; in Tanzania, the Fair Competition 
Tribunal; in the UK, the Competition Appeal Tribunal; in Zambia, the Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal. 
775 In India, the decisions of the Competition Appeal Tribunal are reviewed by the Supreme Court of India. In Israel, the decisions of 
the Antitrust Tribunal are appealed before the Supreme Court. In Seychelles, the decisions of the Appeal Tribunal can be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court. In Pakistan, the decisions of the Competition Appellate Tribunal are reviewed by the Supreme Court. In 
South Africa, the decisions of the Competition Appeal Court can be reviewed by the Supreme Court, or under certain circumstances, 
by the Constitutional Court. In the UK, the decisions of the Competition Appeal Tribunal are reviewed by the Court of Appeal in 
proceedings in England and Wales, in proceedings in Scotland, before the Court of Session, and in proceedings in Northern Ireland, 
before the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. In Zambia, the decisions of the Competition and Consumer Tribunal can be 
reviewed by the High Court.  
776 In Tanzania, the decisions of the Fair Competition Tribunal while reviewing the decisions of the Fair Competition Commission 
are final (Section 61 of the Fair Competition Act).  
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 Generally speaking, the judicial review by general courts of the decisions in relation to the 
infringement of the competition law provisions that have been adopted by lower courts of general 
jurisdictions that have authority to decide on cases that are related to the application of the competition 
law provisions is performed in competition regimes where the competition authority is not empowered 
with decision-making functions777. Notwithstanding the preceding, in some competition regimes where 
the competition authority is entitled to adopt an initial decision in relation to the infringement of the 
competition law provision, the review of such decisions is also made by judicial courts of general 
jurisdiction778. In addition, in some competition regimes, the initial competition law decisions of the 
competition authority can, at the discretion of the concerned parties, be appealed before courts of general 
jurisdiction or reviewed by the competition authority itself779. Moreover, in some competition regimes, 
the decisions of the competition authority can be appealed before arbitration courts780.  
 Finally, irrespective of the enforcement authority responsible for the adoption of the initial 
decision for the infringement of the competition law provisions, the decisions of the judicial courts 
handling the appeal action are usually subject to further judicial review by a judicial court of last 
instance781.  
(f) Judicial Review by the Supreme Court 
 
In some competition regimes, the judicial review of the decisions by the competition authority in relation 
to the infringement of the competition law provisions is made by the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction in 
question782. The main virtue of this appeal mechanism is that the review of the competition law decisions 
is handled by a single court, such as the Supreme Court. This exclusive faculty of the Supreme Court to 
review the decisions of the competition authority enhances the expertise of the judges reviewing such 
decisions and also contributes to the creation of a uniform and sound case law on competition law 
matters. As to the disadvantages of this approach, due to the fact that Supreme Courts are courts of last 
                                                          
777 In Ireland, the Competition Authority does not have the power to issue decisions in respect to the infringement of the competition 
law provisions, provided that this competence is reserved for courts. In practice, court decisions in competition law cases can be 
appealed in the same way that other civil or criminal cases may be appealed. Thus, decisions of the Circuit Court can be appealed to 
the High Court, and decisions of the High Court can be appealed to the Supreme Court. In New Zealand, the High Court of New 
Zealand holds jurisdiction to decide in the cartel prohibitions have been infringed and to impose financial penalties for such an 
infringements. The decisions of the High court in competition law cases can be appealed before the Court of Appeal.  In the US, the 
FTC and the Antitrust Division do not have authority to impose fines or declare the infringement of competition law in civil or 
criminal cases; rather, they have to bring an action before courts to adjudicate the alleged violations. The defendants in such actions 
have the right to appeal the final decisions or remedies imposed to the federal circuit court of appeals and ultimately to the Supreme 
Court.  
778 In Belgium, pursuant to Article 75 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition, the decisions of the Competition 
Council and of its president may be appealed against the Brussels Court of Appeal. In France, according to Article L.464-8 of the 
Commercial Code, the decisions of the Autorité de la Concurrence can be appealed before the Paris Court of Appeal. In Germany, 
according to Section 63 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, the decisions of the Bundeskartellamt are subject to appeal to 
the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf. 
779 In Korea, the decisions of the KFTC may be appealed before the Seoul High Court, or alternatively, these can be reviewed by the 
KFTC itself. These possibilities rest on the discretion of the concerned parties.  
780 In Russia, according to Article 52 of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition, the decisions and determinations of the 
Antimonopoly Authority can be appealed to an arbitration court.  
781 In France, the decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal can be reviewed by the Commercial Chamber of the Cour de Cassation. In 
Germany, the decisions of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf can be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. In Ireland, the 
decision of the High Court can be appealed to the Supreme Court. In Korea, the decisions of the Seoul High Court can be appealed 
to the Supreme Court. In the USA, the decisions of the federal circuit court of appeals can be appealed before the Supreme Court.  
782 In Austria, the decisions of the Cartel Court can be appealed to the Supreme Court as the Higher Cartel Court. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the decision of the Competition Council can be appealed to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Chile the 
decisions of the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia can be appealed before the Supreme Court. In Cyprus, the decisions 
of the Commission for the Protection of Competition can be appealed in last instance to the Supreme Court.  
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instance, the decisions of these courts are final and do not admit further review. Nevertheless, in some 
competition regimes, before the Supreme Court makes a final decision on the cases, the Court can remit 
the contested decision to the competition authority for reconsideration783.  
6. Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review in the appeal process against decisions of the competition authorities in respect to 
the infringement of the competition law provisions is concerned with the degree of examination allowed 
in the appeal process. As with other characteristic of the appeal process, the standard of review varies 
widely from one jurisdiction to another. Generally speaking, the standard of review in appeals against 
competition law decisions may range from a marginal test of review restricted to aspects related to the 
procedure and manifest errors of law of the challenged competition law decision to an intense review that 
may even be concerned with the merits of the case.  
 In competition regimes with the lowest level of standard review the courts responsible for the 
judicial review of the challenged competition law decision will only assess any manifest error that the 
competition authority may have committed in the application of the law. In such cases, the appellate 
authority will be entitled to cancel any obviously unreasonable decisions. In these competition regimes, 
the standard of review allows the judicial authorities to review whether the competition authority has 
acted within its jurisdiction and whether it has respected the basic principles of procedural fairness784.  
 In competition regimes with a higher standard of review, the judicial authority will be 
empowered to assess the legality of the competition law decisions that is being challenged, additionally, 
the appellate court will also assess if the challenged decision complies with the procedural requirements. 
Moreover, while doing this, the judicial authority will determine if the competition authority has correctly 
interpreted and applied the competition law provisions when adopting the contested competition law 
decision785.  
 Moreover, higher standards of review can be allowed in competition regimes where the judicial 
authority responsible for the judicial review of contested competition law decisions can fully review the 
merits of the case by assessing all relevant facts in addition to the correct interpretation and application of 
the competition law provisions to the facts. In practice, this standard of review permits the judicial 
                                                          
783 In Mauritius, when the Supreme Court is reviewing the decisions of the Competition Commission, the Court may, before making 
a final determination on the case, remit the contested decision to the Commission for reconsideration.  
784 In Cyprus, the appeals against the decisions of the Commission for the Protection of Competition are handled by the Supreme 
Court. While reviewing the decisions of the Commission, the Supreme Court is limited to assess the legality of the competition law 
decisions and is not allowed to review the merits of the case or to substitute the decision of the Commission with its own decision.  
785 In Belgium, the Brussels Court of Appeal, which is the authority responsible for the judicial review of the decisions by the 
Competition Council, is entitled to decide on both facts and the law. However, it has developed a restrictive view of its functions as 
an appellate body. According to its decision in the Honda case, the Court will limit itself to verifying compliance with procedural 
requirements, whether the facts have been correctly established and whether the Council has not made any manifest error in the 
application of competition law or has exceeded its powers (Brussels Court of Appeal Judgment, February 2, 2009, 18th Chamber, 
Cases 2005/MR/3 and 2005/MR/4).  
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authority to go beyond the control of legality, provided that the reviewing court also needs to assess the 
factual evidence at the basis of the contested competition law decision786.  
 Ultimately, in competition regimes with the highest standard of review, the judicial authorities 
responsible for the review of the challenged decisions by the competition authority will be allowed to 
review the case fully, in addition, the judicial authority will also be entitled to substitute its own analysis 
to the assessment of the competition authority787.  
 A further issue related to the standard of review of competition law decisions is the possibility of 
admitting new evidence in the appeal process. The possibility to admit new evidence will appear in 
jurisdictions where the appellate authority is allowed to examine the factual basis of the challenged 
decision by the competition authority. Accordingly, depending on the competition regime, some 
jurisdictions will admit new evidence in the course of the appeal process without any restriction788. 
Alternatively, in some competition regimes the admissibility of new evidence in the appeal process will 
only occur in cases where the evidence could not have been known earlier789. Ultimately, in some 
competition regime the appellate authority can only consider the evidence that was available to the 
competition authority at the time the decision was adopted790. 
7. Effects of the Judicial Review  
 
Another important issue related to the appeal process of competition law decisions is the one concerned 
with the effects of an appeal in relation to the application of the competition law decision that is being 
challenged. In particular, depending on the competition regime in question, the initiation of the appeal 
process against a competition law decision may have different effects on the application of the contested 
competition law decisions. For instance, in some competition regimes, an appeal against a competition 
law decision does not suspend the obligation of the addressees to comply with the decision of the 
competition authority during the period of its examination791. On the other hand, in some competition 
                                                          
786 In Italy, according to the Council of State’s case law, the administrative courts’ standard of review allow the latter to fully review 
the accuracy of the findings of fact made by the Competition Authority. This allows appellate courts to assess the proofs collected 
by the Competition Authority, as well as the evidence presented by the parties in the proceeding, given that the courts’ access to the 
facts is not restricted. Thus, if judicial review is to be effective, the standard of review cannot be limited to the external review by 
the appellate courts, but must entail a penetrating control of Authority’s decisions by the courts (See Judgments Nos. 926 of March 
2, 2004, Gemeaz Cusin/ICA; 280 of February 3, 2005, Codacons/ICA; 1271 of March 10, 2006, ICA/Telecom Italia; and 1397 of 
March 16, 2006, Assobiomedica/ICA). 
787 In Malaysia, the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which is the authority responsible for the judicial review of the decisions by the 
Competition Commission, has wide powers to exercise during the appeal process, such as: to summon the parties to the proceedings 
or any other person; to procure and receive evidence and to examine all such persons as witnesses as it considers; to require the 
production of any information, document or other thing in the possession of the requested person; to administer any oath; to admit 
or reject evidence adduced; among others (Section 57 of the Competition Act). At the conclusion of the appeal process, the Tribunal 
may confirm, annul, modify, or issue a new decision. In addition, the Tribunal may remit the decision to the Competition 
Commission for reconsideration, and give any order or direction as the Commission could itself have given.   
788 In Germany, according to Section 63 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, an appeal against the decisions of the cartel 
authority may be based upon new facts and evidence.  
789 In the Czech Republic, while reviewing the decisions of the Office for Protection of Economic Competition, the Chairman may 
examine new facts and evidence only if they could not have been known earlier (See Decision of the Chairman of the Office for 
Protection of Economic Competition ref. No. R 059-070, 075-078/2007).  
790 In Papua New Guinea, according to Section 43 of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act, the Appeals 
Panel, while reviewing the decisions of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission, can only consider the information 
that was available to the Commission when it made the decision that is the subject of the application for review.  
791 In Moldova, according to Article 27 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, an appeal to a court against the decisions of the 
National Agency for the Protection of Competition does not suspend the obligation to comply with the decision, unless the court 
decides otherwise.  
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regimes the initiation of an appeal may have suspensory effects on the application of the contested 
decision792. Moreover, in some competition regimes the judicial review of a competition decision does not 
have a suspensive effect on its own, in such cases; the interested parties may require the appellate court 
the suspension of the execution of the contested decision793. Furthermore, in some competition regimes, 
the suspension of the effects of the competition decisions can be made by the appellate court under its 
own discretion794. 
8. Different Types of Decisions 
 
Finally, once the appellate authority has examined an appeal that has been lodged against a decision by 
the competition authority for the infringement of the competition law provisions, there is a variety of 
decisions to be issued at the culmination of the appeal process that vary from one competition system to 
another. Despite the differences that one may encounter from legislation to legislation, in some 
jurisdictions the competition law provisions provide for the following decisions in relation to the 
termination of appeal process: to confirm the contested decision795; to fully or partially annul the 
contested decision796; to modify the contested decision797; to issue a new decision798; to remit the 
contested decision to the competition authority for further examination799; to revoke, increase or reduce a 
financial penalty800; to substitute directions by the competitions by the competition authority or to give 
new directions801. 
 
 
                                                          
792 In Argentina, pursuant to Article 52 the Law for Defense of Competition, an appeal against the imposition of financial penalties 
for the infringement of competition law has suspensive effects. The situation is similar in Singapore and the UK, pursuant to Section 
71 and Section 46 of the Competition Acts, respectively.  
793 In Belgium, at the petition of the interested parties, the Brussels Court of Appeal may suspend, in all or in part, the enforcement 
of the contested decisions of the Competition Council (Article 75 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition).  
794 In the US, the sentencing court has the discretion to suspend the payment of a fine while the defendant brings an appeal against 
the decision imposing the financial penalty. However, in suspending the payment of the fine, the court may request the defendant to 
deposit all or part of the fine into the court’s registry pending appeal or to post a bond.  
795 Barbados; India; Ireland; Israel; Jamaica; Kenya; Latvia; Lithuania; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; New 
Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Singapore; South Africa 
796 Barbados; India; Israel; Ireland; Jamaica; Kenya; Latvia; Lithuania; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; New 
Zealand; Singapore; South Africa 
797 India; Ireland; Israel; Jamaica; Kanya; Latvia; Lithuania; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; New Zealand; Singapore; South Africa 
798 Malaysia; Mauritius; New Zealand; Singapore 
799 Barbados; Jamaica; Lithuania; Malaysia; Mauritius; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Singapore; South Africa 
800 Barbados; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; New Zealand; Singapore 
801 Barbados; Malaysia; Mauritius; New Zealand; Singapore 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction  
 
The enforcement of competition law is characterized by a multiplicity of enforcers, remedies and 
procedures. This characteristic is due to the fact that a single competition law infringement may harm a 
variety of individuals in different ways, thus, giving rise to a series of public and private actions. In most 
competition law regimes both private parties and public institutions have standing to file an action, either 
public or private, to remedy the anticompetitive effects of a determined conduct. Since the possibility of 
concurrent proceedings exists in the enforcement of competition law, most jurisdictions have established 
mechanisms through which those proceedings can safely interact with each other. 
 Even though, the possibility to privately enforce the competition law provisions is available in 
many jurisdictions, most competition systems rely on an enforcement model based on the application of 
the antitrust provisions by the government. Accordingly, in many competition regimes there is a 
governmental monopoly of competition law enforcement, which is the de facto rule in many countries1.  
 Irrespective of the other possible procedures that may arise from the infringement of competition 
law, this part of the study focuses on the private enforcement of the competition rules. Throughout this 
chapter, an effort has been made in order to refer to the most important and peculiar procedures, rules, 
cases, and enforcers concerned with private antitrust enforcement. Even though this chapter does not only 
comprise the most traditional comparison between the USA and EU competition law, this is by no means 
an exhaustive study of all the jurisdictions reviewed, provided that some of them have been studied more 
thoroughly than others. Additionally, due to the fact that in the majority of jurisdictions most of the 
substantive and procedural issues are grounded on general provisions, it would require a tremendous work 
to compile an exhaustive study concerning all the procedural aspects of most competition law regimes 
due to the vast universe of general civil and commercial rules that are applied in conjunction with the 
competition rules. Furthermore, the fact that most jurisdictions have established wide and abstract 
competition law provisions regarding private antitrust enforcement, coupled with the lack of sound case 
                                                          
1 CRANE, Daniel A. (2010), ‘Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement’. 63,3 Vanderbilt Law Review, p. 677. 
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law on the subject, enhances the difficulty to make a complete study of private enforcement on those 
countries. Finally, the purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with insightful information about 
some of the most important private procedures in the application of competition law by highlighting the 
peculiarities found in some jurisdictions that are not found in others, in order to draw a comprehensive 
picture of the private enforcement of competition law around the world.  
2. Definition 
 
In order to study the private enforcement of competition law, it is fundamental to provide for a definition 
of what should be considered as private antitrust enforcement. For the purposes of this study, which 
intends to describe and compare the application made by private plaintiffs of the competition provisions 
across jurisdictions, a broad definition of such subject will be better suited. Thus, such a definition would 
entail the enforcement of the competition rules instigated or through the intervention of private parties. 
However, such definition shall not include the claims interposed by private parties to the competition 
authorities (privately triggered public enforcement), provided that the procedure in those kind of actions 
is public/administrative, and also, the nature of the remedies available in such proceedings is 
public/administrative too.  
From the stated above, it is evident that a proper definition of private enforcement of competition 
law should be refined a bit more. Consequently, by developing on the characteristics of the private 
antitrust actions one may evidence that: on the one hand, the individuals who instigate the private action 
before courts have to act as a party in the subsequent proceedings, unlike what happens in some public 
antitrust actions where the private individuals who instigate the action do not necessarily take part in the 
public procedure; and on the other hand, the litigation has to end with some kind of civil remedy such as: 
the nullity of the challenged agreement, injunctive or declaratory relief, and/or the award of damages. 
Thus, the private enforcement of competition law would entail a procedure in which a private party 
interposes a civil claim or counterclaim regarding an infringement of the competition rules, and which 
ultimately ends with the imposition of a civil remedy.  
3. Modalities of Litigation in Private Antitrust Actions 
 
(a) Sword Litigation and Shield Litigation  
 
On the one hand, the competition rules in private antitrust litigation can be brought before courts as a 
shield. For instance, in disputes related to contractual liability, when a plaintiff claims the performance of 
a contract, or claims damages for the breach of the contract by the defendant, in such cases, the defendant 
may use the competition rules as a shield and raise the nullity of the contract with the purpose of avoiding 
its contractual obligations. On the other hand, competition rules can also be used as a sword in civil 
proceedings, in those cases; the plaintiff brings a civil action claiming damages, nullity, injunctive relief, 
or declaratory relief. This modality of enforcement aims to end the infringement of the competition rules 
and/or to remedy the harm inflicted on the antitrust victims. 
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(b) À Titre Principal and À Titre Incident  
 
Regarding the enforcement of competition rules as the main issue (à titre principal), this kind of actions 
can be filed, on the one hand, before specialized competition law courts, where such courts will primarily 
determine the application of the competition law provisions to the case; and on the other hand, before 
ordinary courts, where the latter will determine the applicability of the competition rules to the 
defendant’s conduct as the main issue and disregarding its civil consequences. Furthermore, the 
competition law provisions may also be applied as a secondary issue (à titre incident), for instance, in 
disputes concerned with the nullity of an agreement, the competition law provisions will be applied as a 
secondary issue in determining if the contested agreement is subject to the antitrust rules. 
(c) Stand-Alone Actions and Follow-On Actions 
 
In stand-alone actions, the application of the competition rules occurs without the existence of a previous 
decision of the competition authority declaring the infringement of the competition provisions. Thus, the 
ability to bring a stand-alone action depends on the capacity of the plaintiffs to discover the wrongdoing 
through their own means. On the contrary, follow-on actions take place once a public authority has issued 
a decision condemning the defendant’s conduct as unlawful, in those cases, the private plaintiffs will be 
allowed to rely on the findings of the competition authority.   
4. Desirability and Benefits of Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
Even though it has been suggested that the public enforcement of competition law is superior to and better 
suited than private enforcement2, and that the application of the antitrust provisions are a matter of public 
policy3; private actions for the infringement of the antitrust provisions provide for some attractive benefits 
to competition in general and for the welfare of consumers. The recent trend to strengthen and encourage 
the proliferation of private antitrust actions shows the determination of jurisdictions to establish a 
competition law regime where both public and private enforcement complement each other4.  
 Private enforcement can benefit the overall enforcement of competition law by assisting the 
government in the application of the competition provisions; given that, even the best funded agencies in 
the world do not have enough resources to pursue all the antitrust infringements. In such cases, the 
possibility of private parties to enforce the competition provisions can save the taxpayer a significant 
                                                          
2 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2005B), ‘Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement’. Oxford [etc.]: Hart Publishing, p. 118. The author 
states that since the main goal of the enforcement of competition law is to ensure that the antitrust prohibitions are not violated, 
public enforcement is inherently superior over private enforcement, mainly for three reasons: (i) public enforcement benefits from 
more effective investigative and sanctioning powers; (ii) as private enforcement is driven by the private profit motive, it 
systematically diverges from the general interest; and (iii) private enforcement is more expensive than public enforcement. 
3 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union (Proposal Directive for damages actions), 2013. 
4 The private enforcement of competition law has been a fundamental issue in the modernization process of EU competition law. 
Back in 2004, the European Commission carried out the Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of the violation of EC 
competition rules (Ashurst Report), to try to identify the obstacles to successful actions for damages. In 2005, the Commission 
published the Green Paper to identify the main obstacles to a more efficient system of damages claims and to set out different 
options for further reflection and possible actions to improve damages claims both in follow-on and stand –alone cases (Green Paper 
on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005). In 2008 the Commission issued its White 
Paper that suggests specific policy options and measures aimed at helping all victims of EU antitrust infringements get access to 
effective redress mechanisms (White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008). 
Finally, in 2013, was elaborated the Proposal for a Directive for damages actions, supra note 3. 
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amount by shifting the costs and risks of public antitrust litigation5. Furthermore, private parties applying 
the competition rules can reinforce the efficiency of competition law in cases where the public authorities 
would not intervene – for priority reasons6, or when private parties are better suited to apply the 
competition provisions –, because the former may have better information about the market and the 
infringement (cases brought by competitors). As a result, the availability of private antitrust enforcement 
would entail that the work load of competition authorities will be lowered, thus, allowing public enforcers 
to focus their resources on the most harmful anticompetitive practices. Finally, given that the public 
application of the competition law provisions produce direct effects in relations between individuals and 
create, for the individuals concerned, rights and obligations which the competent courts must enforce, the 
latter play a fundamental role in the enforcement of competition law7. 
 For the reasons stated above, it has been noted that private antitrust enforcement can be a 
significant complement to public enforcement, which can enhance the effectiveness of a determined 
competition law regime by strengthening deterrence and compliance, providing compensation to the 
antitrust victims, and also, by helping to create a sound competition culture8. Furthermore, a public 
governmental monopoly in the enforcement of the antitrust provisions may be as negative as the private 
economic monopolies controlled by competition law9.  
5. Objectives of Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
The primary objective of private antitrust enforcement is the compensation of the antitrust victims, 
provided that no other kind of enforcement, in particular public enforcement, may comply with this 
fundamental endeavor. In particular, the compensation objective of competition law enforcement requires 
the private application of the antitrust provisions, given that this enforcement objective cannot be 
achieved through public enforcement because the award of damages is outside the field of competence of 
competition authorities10. However, private enforcement of competition law can additionally serve other 
enforcement objectives. Generally speaking, competition law enforcement pursues three different 
objectives. The first is to prevent the antitrust violations, or when they have taken place already, to bring 
them to an end. The second is to remedy the negative effects caused by the infringement of the 
competition law provisions. And the third is to punish the infringer for its anticompetitive conduct and to 
deter him and others from violating the competition law provisions in the future. In practice, it has been 
argued that, in a well-designed competition law regime, these three objectives can be accomplished 
through private actions applying the competition law provisions. For instance, the first objective would be 
satisfied through cease and desist orders and negative or positive injunctions imposed by civil courts. As 
to the second objective, private antitrust enforcement can remedy the antitrust infringement by 
                                                          
5 LANDE, Robert H. & DAVIS, Joshua P. (2008), ‘Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases’. 
University of San Francisco Law Review. Vol. 42.   
6 See the Case Selection and Prioritization of Chapter Two (III.2). 
7 European Commission (2013), p. 21. 
8 OECD, Private Remedies, 2007, p. 10. 
9 CRANE (2010), p. 677. 
10 European Commission (2013), p. 2.  
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compensating the victims for the harm suffered. Finally, the third objective can be satisfied through the 
award of punitive damages in civil actions11. 
 Despite the preceding and the alleged benefits of private antitrust enforcement, there is only one 
jurisdiction in the world where private enforcement far outnumbers public enforcement12. In such 
jurisdiction, there is a 10 to 1 rate between private antitrust actions and public actions applying 
competition law13. Even though there are other countries that have achieved a decent level of private 
enforcement, in the majority of jurisdictions this kind of actions have not yet flourished do to a variety of 
obstacles faced by private enforcers. 
II. PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Actions for damages constitute the bulk of private enforcement of competition law; moreover, as stated 
before, in some countries there is a 10 to 1 rate between private actions for damages and public actions 
applying competition law. However, not all competition law regimes have obtained this rate of success 
regarding the application of the competition rules by private plaintiffs. This lack of private enforcement 
of the competition provisions is due to a series of factors, such as: the absence of specific statutory basis; 
lengthy proceedings; lack of specialization of general courts; limitations on standing and on the 
aggregation of damages claims; difficulties in proving causation and the extent of harm; uncertainty with 
regard to the availability and scope of the passing-on defense; uncertainty in the calculation of damages; 
absence of punitive damages; short limitation periods, difficulties in recovering litigation costs and fees; 
absence of contingency fees; non-binding effect of competition authorities’ infringement decisions; and 
restrictive rules of evidence14.         
Private actions for the infringement of competition law serve different objectives than public 
enforcement. Thus, the main function of an action for damages is primarily to compensate the harm 
caused to the victims of an anticompetitive practice. Albeit, private actions for damages may also serve 
other enforcement objectives, such as: the punishment of past infringements and deterrence of future 
infringements. Additionally, private actions for damages help the persecution of anticompetitive practices 
by introducing private resources into the enforcement process, and therefore, saving public resources and 
allowing public authorities to pursue the most harmful cases.  
 
                                                          
11 KOMNINOS, Assimakis P. (2008), ‘EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by 
National Courts’. Oxford [etc.]: Hart Publishing, p. 8.  
12 CRANE, Daniel A. (2011A), ‘Enforcing Competition Law with Multiple Agencies and Private Enforcers’. Hokkaido Journal of 
New Global Law and Policy, Vol 10, p. 66. 
13 See: Sourcebook of Criminal justice Statistics, available at: http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412004.pdf    
14 VAN GERVEN, Walter (2005), ‘Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules’. Paper presented at the Joint IBA and European 
Commission Conference on Antitrust Reform in Europe: A Year in Practice (Brussels, 9-11 March 2005). Available at: 
http://www.ibanet.org/Conferences/05_confs_antitrust_reform_in__Eu_A_year_in_Practice_papers.aspx   
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2. Statutory Basis for the Private Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
With respect to the statutory basis for the private enforcement of competition law, the approach used in 
most legal systems can be generally divided in two. On the one hand, some countries have opted to 
implement specific competition law provisions establishing the right of antitrust victims to privately 
enforce the competition provisions15, or declaring the obligation of competition law violators to 
compensate the victims for the harm caused by their anticompetitive conduct16. On the other hand, most 
legal systems do not have specific statutory basis for the private enforcement of competition law but base 
the latter on general civil or commercial law provisions17. Additionally, in some jurisdictions the right of 
victims to receive compensation for any harm caused -not necessarily antitrust harm, is considered as a 
Constitutional principle, and therefore, is contemplated in the Constitution of these countries18. 
Irrespective of whether a competition law regime has adopted specific competition law 
provisions regarding private antitrust actions or not, all jurisdictions that allow private plaintiffs to sue for 
the harm caused by an anticompetitive conduct refer, at least in some degree, to general provisions for the 
substantive and procedural rules governing such claims19. In consequence, the specific competition 
provisions merely establish the right of the victims to bring a civil action, or the obligation of the 
perpetrator to compensate the victims and rely on general civil or commercial regulations to deal with all 
procedural and substantive issues20. Moreover, in some jurisdictions with specific competition rules 
allowing a victim to file a civil claim, the latter may also bring private actions for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions, which are grounded on general provisions21.  
The specific provisions concerned with the private enforcement of competition law may 
additionally contain other issues besides the right of antitrust victims to be compensated. Thus, in some 
jurisdictions these provisions may deal with issues such as: the legal standing, the legal forum, the 
calculation of damages, interests, and collective claims, among others. 
On the one hand, regarding who has standing to bring a private antitrust action, the legal 
provisions of some jurisdictions establish the locus standi of legitimated plaintiffs. A variety of natural 
                                                          
15 In Canada, Section 36 of the Competition Act allows any person who has suffered loss or damage arising from a competition law 
infringement to sue for the injury caused. 
16 For instance, in Taiwan, Section 31 of the Fair Trade Act establishes that any enterprise that infringes any of the Act’s provisions 
and consequently the rights and interests of others shall be liable for damages. 
17 In Belgium, private actions for the infringement of the competition provisions are not mandated by statute, thus, the victims of the 
infringement have to file a general civil or commercial law action before a civil or commercial judge, basing their claims on the 
relevant provisions of the Belgian Civil Code or the Act on Unfair Trading Practices in conjunction with EU or Belgian competition 
law. In Greece, there are no especial provisions for the private enforcement of competition law. Actions for damages in civil courts 
must be based on the general tort provisions of the Greek Civil Code (Article 914). Similarly, in Italy actions for damages resulting 
from the infringement of competition law may be brought under Article 2043 or Article 1218 of the Civil Code for claims based on 
tort or contract law respectively.  
18 The Brazilian Federal Constitution, in its Article 5, item XXXV establishes the right to sue for any injury or the threat of a 
determined right, however, this provision is not exclusive for competition law infringements. 
19 For instance, in Israel, the specific competition law provisions rely on general tort provisions to compensate antitrust victims. 
Section 50 of the Israeli Competition Act establishes that a violation of the Act constitutes tort, thus, referring the issue to the tort 
provisions. According to Section 71 of the Tort Ordinance, courts have to grant compensatory damages or issue an order designed to 
remedy the tortuous injury. 
20 In Finland, Section 20(1) of the Finnish Competition Act recognizes the duty of the infringing undertakings to compensate for the 
damage caused by their anticompetitive conducts, while paragraph (2) of the same provision refers to the Tort Liability Act for the 
procedural issues of damages claims. 
21 In Canada, antitrust victims may bring an action for damages based on Section 36 of the Competition Act; furthermore, a plaintiff 
may also bring an action under the common law. The most frequent claim based in common law is the tort of conspiracy (Canada 
Cement LaFarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452). 
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and legal persons are allowed to bring private actions for the infringement of the antitrust provisions 
depending on each legal system, thus, some jurisdictions have adopted a wide approach allowing any 
injured person to sue for the damages caused by an anticompetitive conduct, including natural persons, 
undertakings, organizations and public bodies. Conversely, other jurisdictions have more restrictive 
provisions and may only allow undertakings to claim damages. Likewise, there are competition law 
provisions that regulate the plaintiffs’ standing in collective actions. 
On the other hand, there are competition law provisions that establish who shall be liable for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions. Thus, in those jurisdictions, the specific competition law 
provisions will determine who shall be responsible for the infringement of the competition rules, 
depending on which jurisdiction, such responsibility can rely on: undertakings and trade associations22, or 
even managers23. 
The main argument for the implementation of specific competition law provisions is that these 
may facilitate private enforcement of competition law and encourage private plaintiffs to sue for the 
violation of the antitrust rules. In practice, the existence of a specific rule allowing private antitrust 
plaintiffs to bring an action before courts in order to remedy the injury caused by the antitrust violator 
serves as an incentive to private enforcers. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the adoption of specific 
competition provisions has been coupled with other measures with the purpose of facilitating private 
antitrust enforcement, this measures may include: the alleviation of the standard of proof, the availability 
of collective redress mechanisms, or the existence of measures that assist with the calculation of damages, 
among others.   
Notwithstanding, in some legal regimes, the adoption of specific legal provisions may restrict the 
possibilities to file private claims. For instance, in some countries the competition law provisions may 
grant standing to bring an action for damages only to undertakings or to plaintiffs that have a contractual 
relationship with the perpetrator related to the anticompetitive conduct in question24, thus, restricting the 
standing to bring an action for damages. Moreover, other restriction imposed by specific competition law 
provisions is the requirement of a prior decision of the competition authority declaring the infringement 
of the competition rules; as a consequence, in those jurisdictions stand-alone actions are not permitted25. 
3. Legal Forum for Private Antitrust Claims 
  
The legal forum for private actions for the breach of competition law varies widely from one jurisdiction 
to another. The following are the most commonly used rules for the designation of competent courts in 
competition law related matters.  
                                                          
22 In Japan, Section 25 of the Antimonopoly Act establishes that any undertaking or trade association in violation of the provisions 
of the Act shall be liable for damages. 
23 In Ireland, Section 14(1)(b) of the Competition Act allows any person injured by the violation of the competition rules to bring an 
action against the undertakings itself or any director, manager or other officer of such an undertaking.  
24 Before 2005, the Swedish Competition Act used to allow only companies and contracting parties to claim damages under the 
Competition Act. 
25 Section 65 of the South African Competition Act, establishes that antitrust victims will be allowed to seek compensation for 
damages before civil courts only after the competition authorities (Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court) have reached a final decision declaring the unlawfulness of a certain conduct. Consequently, only 
follow-on actions are allowed under South African law.   
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As a general rule, most countries grant jurisdiction to general courts to handle competition law 
disputes. This approach is based on general civil or commercial rules and does not require any degree of 
specialization or expertise to decide on competition matters26. It is worth noticing that this approach is not 
exclusive for countries that do not have specific competition law provisions, given that jurisdictions with 
competition rules on private actions for damages may also refer this disputes to general courts27. On the 
one hand, this method to grant jurisdiction has the virtue of being inexpensive and is not a burden to the 
already limited judicial resources. On the other hand, the lack of expertise of general courts in 
competition matters enhances the desirability of specialized courts. 
There are some legal regimes that restrict a bit more the number of general courts that have 
jurisdiction on competition law disputes. This may be the case where competition disputes are decided 
only by commercial courts28. This reference to commercial courts is due to a certain degree of 
specialization of commercial courts because they usually handle disputes between persons engaged in 
commerce, disputes between undertakings, or cases related to commercial acts. By contrast, civil courts 
are generally concerned with disputes between individuals. 
Another measure to restrict the number of general courts that have jurisdiction over competition 
matters is to assign private antitrust disputes to specific civil or commercial courts29. By doing so, the 
general courts designated gain experience and expertise in the application of competition law and will 
eventually become some sort of specialized courts in competition law matters. As an advantage, the 
jurisdictions that have adopted this measure will avoid the expenditure of extra resources in the creation 
of specialized competition courts.    
In other systems, first instance jurisdiction in competition cases is given to higher general courts 
than would normally be competent in other types of civil actions for damages30. The idea again is to 
assign competition cases to higher courts that have more expertise and experience in the application of the 
competition rules in order to obtain better judgments. By building a strong and sound competition case 
law, the legal certainty in antitrust disputes will be enhanced, and as a result, this will contribute as an 
incentive for the private enforcement of competition law. Notwithstanding, assigning private antitrust 
actions to higher courts may increase obstacles to private enforcement as well. Thus, on the one hand, 
                                                          
26 The most significant example of such system is the US where all antitrust litigation is handled by general courts, however, since 
competition law disputes have been decided by general courts since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the US judicial 
system has developed an important and sound jurisprudence on which general courts may rely.  
27 For instance, in Argentina according to Article 51 of the Law for Defense of Competition, any affected person by a prohibited act 
shall exercise the action to recover damages before a competent judge pursuant to the civil law. 
28 In Austria, commercial courts are empowered to handle the infringement of the Federal Act against Unfair Competition. 
Similarly, pursuant to Section 69(2) of the Croatian Competition Act, commercial courts have jurisdiction in all damages claims 
based on infringements of the Act. In the Czech Republic, Section 9(3)(k) of the Civil Procedure Code, lists the protection of 
competition as a commercial matter and grants jurisdiction to regional courts to decide in first instance. In France, eight specified 
Tribunaux de Commerce are competent to decide on competition matters pursuant to Loi sur les nouvelles regulations economic du 
15 mai 2001. In Spain, pursuant to the First Additional Provision of the 2007 Competition Act, Commercial Courts will have 
jurisdiction to apply the competition provisions in private proceedings according to Article 86 ter (f) of Ley Orgánica 6/1985 del 
Poder Judicial, notwithstanding, civil courts may have jurisdiction to handle follow-on actions for damages according to a Court 
Order of the Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (Court Order of Audiencia Provincial de Madrid of April 10, 2008, Vodafone, 
83/2008). 
29 For instance in France, pursuant to Article L.420-7 all competition matters are allocated to specialized chambers within eight civil 
courts (Tribunaux de Grande Instance) and eight commercial courts (Tribunaux de Commerce). All decisions of these courts are 
appealed before the Appeal Court of Paris (Cour d’appel de Paris). 
30 In Germany, all cases in which competition law is applied, even if the only question is whether or not competition law is 
applicable, are exclusively handled by regional courts (Landgericht), the second tier in the hierarchy of ordinary courts (Section 87 
of the Act against Restraints of Competition). 
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claims before higher courts are usually more expensive and more time consuming than would be under 
normal circumstances. And on the other hand, higher courts may not be suitable for small consumer’s 
claims. 
Another measure to limit the number of competent courts is to repeal the common provisions 
delimitating the court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the value of the claim. For instance, in some countries, in 
general actions for damages there is a common delineation of competences between district and circuit 
courts regarding the value of the subject matter of the dispute. However, in competition law cases this 
delineation may be abolished and always grant jurisdiction to the circuit court irrespective of the value of 
the claim31. This measure increases the degree of expertise in competition cases, but at the same time, it 
may also suppose higher costs and procedural burdens on private enforcers for the reasons stated above. 
Similarly, in some jurisdictions the competence of a determined court may be dependent on the amount of 
damages that a certain court may award for the infringement of competition law32.  
Some legal systems establish that when any ordinary court is deciding on a competition matter it 
will always form a panel to reach the final decision33. Moreover, for more expertise, there is also the 
possibility to refer the competition case to a specific panel in a specific court that has a certain level of 
expertise in competition law cases34. Additional expertise will result in jurisdictions where these specific 
panels are also in charge of the judicial review of the competition authority’s decisions35. Finally, special 
competition law panels may be formed at the appeal level to review the inferior court’s decisions36.  
The competence of a determined court in competition cases may also depend on which set of 
competition law rules the court applies. For instance, in some countries which are part of international 
organizations, their courts are obliged to apply both national and supranational competition law37. In such 
cases, some courts may be granted jurisdiction to enforce the national competition law provisions, while 
other courts will be in charge of the enforcement of the international competition rules38.   
                                                          
31 In Slovenia, the general delineation line between the district and circuit courts is 20.000 EUR, however, pursuant to Article 32(2) 
of the Civil Procedure Act, in disputes concerning the protection of competition the circuit courts shall have jurisdiction irrespective 
of the value of the subject-matter.  
32 In Australia, pursuant to Section 86AA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Federal Magistrates Courts may enforce the 
provisions of the Act but they cannot award damages greater than A$750,000. 
33 In Slovenia, whenever a circuit court is hearing a competition law case, the court must decide in a panel formed by one 
professional judge and two lay members (Article 33(3) of the Civil Procedure Act). However, this only happens where competition 
law is raised à titre principal. 
34 In the UK, the Chancery Division of the High Court has jurisdiction to hear private actions regarding competition law.  
35 In Sweden, pursuant to Section 3:26 of the Competition Act, the Stockholm District Court is competent in the first instance to 
decide on competition law cases. The Stockholm District Court will refer competition law cases to a specific chamber composed by 
judges and economic experts. This specific court is deemed to be better suited for competition law issues provided that the Swedish 
Competition Authority’s decisions are appealed before this specific chamber. 
36 In Germany, special panels at the Higher Regional Courts (Oberlandesgericht) handle appeals from damages claims (Section 91 
of the Act against Restraints of Competition). Further appeals on issues of law are assigned to a special panel at the Federal Court of 
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) (Section 94 of the Act against Restraints of Competition). 
37 At the European Union level, national courts are obliged to apply the EU competition rules (Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v 
Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR 1-6297; and Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi et al v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA et al [2006] ECR 1-6619). 
38 In the European Union, the national courts of the Member States are obliged to directly enforce the EU competition law 
provisions. In practice, in some Member States different courts enforce the EU and the national competition law rules. For instance, 
in Italy actions based on EU competition law are handled by local courts of first instance (Tribunali Ordinary), and actions based on 
Italian competition law are filed before the competent Court of Appeal (Corte d’Appello).  
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A similar scenario appears in countries that have a federal governmental structure. Here the 
plaintiff has the possibility to choose whether to apply federal or state law39. In such cases when the 
plaintiff sues under federal law, jurisdiction will be granted to federal courts. On the other hand, when the 
plaintiff applies state law, the competent court will be the respective state court. In practice, this 
possibility may stimulate forum shopping. Notwithstanding, in some circumstances this availability may 
serve as an incentive for the plaintiff, provided that it will be able to choose which legislation and which 
court is better suited for its claim40. 
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court may be subject to the plaintiff’s decision in some 
jurisdictions. This may be the case where the plaintiff has the possibility to sue for the recovery of 
damages under the general civil provisions, and additionally, the plaintiff also has the possibility to file a 
claim based on specific competition rules. In the first scenario, general courts will have jurisdiction to 
decide in cases enforcing the general civil provisions. In the second scenario, the enforcement of specific 
competition rules may be granted to specific courts empowered to handle competition matters41. 
The jurisdiction of a court may also be different when a public entity is a party in the 
proceeding42. In these cases, jurisdiction will be granted to administrative courts which usually handle the 
disputes between private parties and the government. As a result, administrative courts will decide on 
cases where a public entity has infringed the competition provisions in the exercise of its public authority, 
or where a public entity has brought an action seeking compensation or the annulment of a determined 
agreement infringing the competition rules43.  
A determined court may be competent to decide on a competition law matter depending on the 
type of action filed before it. Some legal regimes may determine the jurisdiction of a court based on if the 
competition rules are applied as the main or principal issue of the dispute (à titre principal) or only as a 
subsidiary issue (à titre d’incident)44. Likewise, in some countries the jurisdiction of a court may also 
vary depending on whether the plaintiff is filing a stand-alone or follow-on action45. Moreover, the 
jurisdiction of a court may also be different regarding the kind of action or remedy sought by the plaintiff, 
for instance, in some legal regimes a certain court may only be competent to decide on actions for 
damages and a different court may have jurisdiction to hear actions seeking injunctive or declaratory 
                                                          
39 See 15 U.S.C §15, Clayton Act. 
40 The US federal system allows prospective plaintiffs to sue before federal or state courts, and to either apply federal or state law. 
For instance, after the Illinois Brick case, indirect purchasers are not allowed to sue for damages before federal courts (Illinois Brick 
Co. v. Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977)), however, indirect purchasers have the possibility to bring actions for damages under state law.  
41 In Sweden, according to Chapter 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, a plaintiff may bring an action before the competent court 
for tort claims. Additionally, pursuant to Section 3:26 of the Competition Act, a plaintiff will be able to bring an action for damages 
for the breach of competition law before the Stockholm City Court. In Germany, a plaintiff may choose to bring an action before a 
regional court or may choose to sue before a specific chamber for commercial matters at regional courts (Landgericht) (Section 87 
of Act against Restraints of Competition). 
42 France, Lithuania, Portugal. 
43 For instance, in France see the case involving the railway company: Administrative Supreme Court, 19 December 2007, SNCF v 
Campenon; and 19 March 2008, SNCF v. Fougerolle Ballot and SNCF v. Dumez. 
44 In Slovenia, the special panel formed in the circuit courts (Article 34 Civil Procedure Act) has only jurisdiction in cases where the 
competition rules are applied à titre principal. In Ireland, pursuant to Section 14 of the Competition Act, private actions can be filed 
to the Circuit Court or the High Court; however, the latter will only handle cases where competition law is applied à titre principal. 
45 In the UK the Competition Appeal Tribunal has only jurisdiction to hear follow-on cases, thus, stand-alone cases will have to be 
filed to the High Court. 
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relief46. Finally, in some countries, a determined court will be competent to enforce the competition law 
provisions depending on whether the case concerns a collective claim or just an individual claim47. 
In some legal regimes, the jurisdiction to handle competition law disputes may be delegated to 
intellectual property courts48. This is due to the close relationship between competition law and the 
protection of intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, in practice, the interaction between competition 
law and intellectual property has to be well balanced, provided that the abusive exercise of intellectual 
property rights may seriously harm competition49, and at the same time, the over-enforcement of 
competition law may reduce innovation50. The interaction between intellectual property rights and 
competition law, not only has to do with the jurisdiction of the courts, provided that in some countries, 
both competition law and intellectual property may be assigned to the same public authority51, or the 
process of obtaining evidence for competition law cases may be governed by intellectual property rules52. 
 In some jurisdictions, there is a specialized competition tribunal that has jurisdiction to decide on 
private antitrust disputes. At this moment, a differentiation should be made between: (i) general courts 
with specialist judges or panels; (ii) specialized competition courts that have administrative jurisdiction; 
(iii) and specialized courts that have authority to decide on private claims. The first kind of court is just a 
general court that has been entrusted with the application of competition law in private disputes. The 
second kind is a specialized court which has been created specifically to apply competition law but lacks 
authority to handle private claims53. Finally, the third kind is a specialized court which is formed by 
specialized members and that has competence to handle private claims related to the application of 
competition law54. 
                                                          
46 In the UK, the High Court may handle both injunctive relief and damages claims; on the contrary, the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal may only handle actions for damages. 
47 In Sweden, pursuant to Section 3 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act, group actions are handed by specifically assigned 
district courts in each Swedish county. Moreover, in the UK, the Competition Appeal Tribunal is competent to handle representative 
actions for damages according to Section 47B of the Competition Act.   
48 The Chinese Supreme Court has determined that all antimonopoly cases, including private enforcement, must be resolved at the 
Intellectual Property Court.   
49 In China, Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law establishes that a business operator’s conduct to eliminate or restrict market 
competition by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be governed by the provisions of the Act. 
50 In Korea, pursuant to Article 59 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act no action for damages will be interposed against 
the legitimate exercise of intellectual property rights. Additionally, the Korean Fair Trade Commission has released the Guidelines 
of Reviewing Undue Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights to establish which practices amount to the abusive exercise of those 
rights.  
51 In Peru, the Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (INDECOPI) is a 
public authority in charge of both competition law and intellectual property issues. Moreover, there is also a tribunal that handles the 
two subjects, the Tribunal of Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property; however, this is an administrative court which is not 
related to the private enforcement of competition law.    
52 See Article 121 of the Italian Industrial Property Code. 
53 The Australian Competition Tribunal is a specialist tribunal which has the power to authorize proposed acquisitions that would 
otherwise breach the competition provisions if the acquisition would result in a public benefit. The Tribunal has also authority to 
review the decisions of the ACCC, but cannot award civil remedies. In Austria, the Cartel Court, which is a specialized court, is not 
empowered to award private remedies for the infringement of competition law. See cases: Austrian Supreme Court, 16 Ok 14/04, 
Judgment of 11 October 2004; and Austrian Supreme Court, 16 Ok 10/02, Judgment of 16 December 2002. In Denmark, the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal is an administrative body in charge of the judicial review of the decisions issued by the Danish 
Competition Authority (Konkurrencestyrelsen) and the Danish Competition Council (Konkurrencerådet). In Peru, the Tribunal for 
the Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property is not allowed to award damages for the violation of competition law.  
54 The Competition Appeal Tribunal in the UK is a tribunal that is specialized in competition law matters and was created by Section 
12 and Schedule 2 of the Enterprise Act 2002. The CAT has jurisdiction to hear actions for damages and other monetary claims 
where there exists a prior decision by the OFT or the European Commission. However, the CAT has also other functions, such as: 
the review of the Office of Fair Trading decisions and other sector regulators and the review of decisions issued by the secretary of 
State, the OFT and the Competition Commission in merger cases. 
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Furthermore, in some competition law regimes, the award of damages is conducted by the 
competition authority, provided that ordinary courts are not empowered to apply the competition law 
provisions55. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, administrative courts specialized in competition law 
matters can award damages whenever the competition authority and the investigated undertaking have 
reached an agreement in the course of the investigation. The award of damages will be included in the 
agreement if such an award has been requested by the party that has filed the complaint to the competition 
authority in the first place56. However, these two last proceedings are of an administrative nature and 
consequently do not comply with the characteristics of private antitrust enforcement.  
Finally, with the globalization of commerce the infringement of competition law is taking an 
international perspective, provided that a certain anticompetitive conduct may harm several persons in 
various jurisdictions. Accordingly, the internationalization of antitrust infringements plus the raise of 
private antitrust enforcement has increased the number of cross-border antitrust cases. International 
antitrust litigation raises questions about the jurisdiction and the choice of law; however, since these 
matters are governed by the principles of private international law, they are excluded from this study57.   
4. Standing to Bring a Private Action for the Breach of Competition Law   
 
An infringement of the competition law provisions may harm different market participants, such as 
competitors, direct purchasers and indirect purchasers, among others. Thus, every competition law regime 
must establish which market participant(s) should be entitled to bring a private action for the infringement 
of the competition law provisions. As a result, the question of who has standing to sue for the damages 
suffered due to an anticompetitive conduct constitutes a fundamental issue concerning the private 
enforcement of competition law.   
As a general civil rule, in most jurisdictions any natural or legal person of full capacity has 
standing to sue or be sued in courts of the state of his domicile. Notwithstanding, this principle has been 
limited in order to avoid unmeritorious claims. For instance, in most jurisdictions a plaintiff will only be 
allowed to bring an action for damages if its rights or interest have been affected by the defendant’s 
conduct, also known as genuine grievance. Depending on which jurisdiction, the type of interest required 
will be defined as: personal, existing, real58, sufficient59, legal60. 
In addition, in systems where the competition law provisions have a protective purpose, the 
standing to sue for damages is reserved to those plaintiffs who can assert the violation of a rule of law that 
has as main purpose the protection of the plaintiff against the alleged harm. This requirement is based on 
                                                          
55 In Indonesia, the Commission for Supervision of Business Competition (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, or KPPU) is an 
independent institution that reports only to the President and the Parliament. Pursuant to the provisions of Law No. 5 1999 on the 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (Indonesian Competition Act), the KPPU has authority to 
award private remedies such as the nullity declaration of anticompetitive agreements and the award of damages to injured parties. 
This is because the Indonesian competition regimen does not allow private actions for the infringement of competition law. 
56 In South Africa, the Competition Tribunal can award damages in the agreement reached between the Competition Commission 
and the investigated undertaking if such a remedy has been requested by the party who file the complaint to the Competition 
Commission (Section 49D(3) of the Competition Act).   
57 For additional information about international antitrust litigation, please see Chapter One, Section 10 (c). 
58 In France, in order to pursue a claim the plaintiff must have an interest in the case which has to be personal, existing and real. 
59 In the Netherlands, the plaintiff is required to have sufficient interest in the case pursuant to Section 3:303 of the Dutch Civil 
Code. However, in practice, such interest is presumed, but this presumption is rebuttable.  
60 In Italy, legal interest is required from the plaintiff in order to bring an action for damages.  
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the German doctrine of the protective purpose of the norm (Schutznormtheorie) which determines that if a 
certain law (competition law in our case) is meant to safeguard a defined subject or a determined group of 
people, a person who does not belong to that specific group does not have standing to sue based on that 
particular norm61.  
Some competition law regimes have adopted specific competition rules regarding the standing of 
private plaintiffs in actions for damages. Some of these specific provisions have established terms such as 
“affected parties”62, “injured in his business or property”63, or “potentially injured”64 with the purpose of 
determining who has standing to sue for the infringement of competition law. Depending on which 
jurisdiction, the spectrum of individuals allowed to sue for damages will be wider or narrower. Thus, in 
some competition law regimes any person or entity harmed by the anticompetitive conduct of the 
defendant will have standing to sue for the damages arising from such unlawful conduct65. Conversely, 
some jurisdictions have opted to establish exclusive lists of individuals who have standing to bring an 
action for damages, such lists may include: affected parties66, competitors67, undertakings68, plaintiffs 
who have a contractual relationship with the defendant69, specified bodies70, associations with legal 
capacity71, or public entities72.  
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions the standing to sue for damages is related to the goals and 
objectives of the competition law regime in question. For instance, in countries where the competition 
rules have as objective the protection of competition and not of competitors for their own sake73, standing 
will be denied to plaintiffs claiming injuries that are not of the type that the competition provisions are 
intended to prevent. As a result, in those jurisdictions, the potential plaintiff will have to prove not only 
                                                          
61 The German doctrine of Schutznorm, is also followed, in different extents, in Austria, Italy, Greece and the Netherlands. 
However, in Germany, the 7th amendment of the Act against Restraints of Competition abolished this provision in German law.  
62 Section 33 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition. 
63  Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 
64 Article 29 of the Antitrust Law. 
65 In Australia, see Section 82 of the Competition and Consumer Act. In Canada, see Section 36 of the Competition Act. In Israel, 
see Section 50 of the Competition Act. In the US, see Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 
66 In Germany, see Section 33(1) of the Act against Restraints of Competition. In Japan, see Section 25 of the Japanese 
Antimonopoly Act. In Peru, see Section 58 of the Antitrust Law. 
67 In Turkey, pursuant to Article 58 of the Competition Act competing undertakings affected by the limitation of competition are 
allowed to sue for damages.  
68 In Finland, pursuant to Article 18(a) of the Act on Competition Restrictions, only business undertakings are allowed to bring an 
action for damages for the infringement of the provisions of the Act, however, other plaintiffs may sue for damages based on 
general tort provisions. Similarly, in Sweden only undertakings and contracting parties were allowed to bring actions for damages, 
however, this provision has been repealed in 2005 and now anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of the 
competition rules is allowed to claim damages before Swedish courts.  
69 In Finland, before the 1998 amendment of the Act on Competition Restrictions, only business undertakings that had a contractual 
relationship with the defendant were allowed to sue for damages. In Sweden before the 2005 amendment, only undertakings and 
contracting parties could bring an action for damages under the Competition Act. 
70 In the UK, Section 47B of the Competition Act allows specified bodies to bring representative follow-on actions on behalf of 
named consumers. Pursuant to Section 47B(9) of the Competition Act, a specified body is an entity which has been specified by an 
order made by the Secretary of State. 
71 In Germany, according to Section 33(2) of the Act against Restraints of Competition, associations with legal capacity for the 
promotion of commercial or independent professional interests may sue for damages if they have a significant number of member 
undertakings selling goods or services of a similar or related type on the same market. 
72 Pursuant to Section 53N of the Indian Competition Act, the Central or a State Government or a local authority, along with any 
enterprise or any person, may file an application for compensation to the Appellate Tribunal, the latter, however, is an 
administrative tribunal. 
73 The US Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co., v. United States, established the fundamental US antitrust objective of protection of 
competition and not competitors (Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States – 370 U.S. 294 (1962)).  
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the injury suffered due to the defendant’s conduct, but that the injury is actually the result of a practice 
that has lessened competition in order to be granted standing to sue for damages74.   
4.1. Potential Private Plaintiffs 
 
In practice, the potential claimants who can bring an action for damages for the infringement of the 
competition rules may be divided in two categories. The first category includes the third parties to the 
anti-competitive agreements, persons who did not take part in the alleged unlawful agreement but suffer 
the anticompetitive effects of the latter. The second category consists of the parties participating in the 
anti-competitive agreements; these are the co-contracting parties to the unlawful agreement. 
(a) Third Party Plaintiffs  
 
As to the first category, the list of potential third parties may include: (i) Direct purchasers; (ii) Indirect 
purchasers; (iii) Competitors; and (iv) Other third party plaintiffs, such as: shareholders, suppliers, 
employees and associations.  
(i) Direct Purchasers 
 
 Direct purchasers have been commonly recognized to have standing to sue for the damages arising from 
an anticompetitive practice before ordinary courts75. This posture has been widely acknowledged by 
courts and legislators across the world as a prerogative of direct purchasers given to the close relationship 
between the latter and the perpetrators76. This close relationship is due to the fact that these plaintiffs have 
directly purchased from the defendant a product or service with a price that has been artificially inflated 
by the anticompetitive conduct of the antitrust offender. The most frequent claim filed by direct 
purchasers is for the overcharges suffered due to the price inflation; this is the difference between the 
price actually paid to the monopolist or cartelist for the affected product and the price that would have 
prevailed but for the anticompetitive conduct of the perpetrator. Finally, in some jurisdictions, the 
possibility to recover damages is restricted to direct purchasers only; the rationale behind this limitation is 
related to concerns about multiple recoveries of damages77.   
                                                          
74 In the US case law, it has been established in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. that a plaintiff cannot recover damages 
if it have not demonstrated that the challenged conduct has created anticompetitive effects. In that case, the plaintiff who was the 
owner of some bowling alleys claimed that a rival’s purchase of a large number of bowling alleys infringed the antitrust provisions 
by reducing competition. However, the court found that since the defendant had acquired otherwise failing bowling alleys, the 
defendant had actually preserved competition (Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. – 429 U.S. 477 (1977)). Similarly, in 
Israel a plaintiff will only be granted standing to sue if it shows that it has suffered an antitrust injury of the type the competition 
rules are aimed to prevent (CrimC (Jer) 417/97 State of Israel v. Israel Phoenix Ins. Co. [2001] ISRDC, Antitrust 5000788; CrimA 
4855/02 State of Israel v. Burovitch [2005] ISRSC, 59(6) 776). 
75 According to the US case law, only direct purchasers are allowed to sue for damages based on federal law (Clayton Act). In the 
Illinois Brick case (supra note 40), the court disallowed indirect purchasers to bring damages claims for the infringement of the 
federal competition law provisions. Furthermore, in the Hannover Shoe case the court held that direct purchasers are the best suited 
to effectively enforce the antitrust statutes and were the appropriate plaintiffs to claim for damages (Hannover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe. Mach. Corp., 329 US 481 (1968)). Moreover, the Supreme Court established three federal antitrust policy goals related to the 
exclusion of indirect purchasers litigation: (1) avoiding unnecessary complicated litigation; (2) providing direct purchasers with 
incentives to bring private antitrust actions; and (3) avoiding multiple liability of defendants. Despite the above, indirect purchasers 
in the US are allowed to recover damages based on the law of many states.  
76 For instance, the Turkish Supreme Court has confirmed that persons who have purchased directly from the perpetrator of an 
anticompetitive conduct have clear standing to sue for damages based on Article 58 of the Competition Act (Decision of the 19 th 
Civil Law Chamber: E: 1999/3350 K: 1999/6364, 01.11.1999; E:2002/2827 K:2002/7580, 29.11.2002). 
77 ROACH, Kent & TREBILCOCK, Michael J. (1996), ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Laws’. Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 
Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 502. 
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(ii) Indirect Purchasers 
 
An indirect purchaser is one who is not the immediate buyer from the alleged competition law violator78, 
or one who does not purchase directly from the defendant79. Most frequently, when indirect purchasers 
sue for damages they tend to claim the recovery of the amount of the unlawful overcharge that has been 
passed on to them; this is the difference between the price actually paid and the price that would have 
been paid in the absence of the antitrust violation. Nevertheless, occasionally, indirect purchasers may 
also sue for the lost profits; this is the loss resulting from the reduction of sales caused by the increase in 
prices. 
The issue of the indirect purchasers’ standing to sue for antitrust damages is very controversial 
and there is a divided opinion among legislations on whether to allow or disallow such type of claims. On 
the one hand, there are jurisdictions that have expressly barred indirect purchasers from recovering 
damages arising from an antitrust infringement due to the difficulty involved in such kind of claims and to 
the risks those actions can suppose to the defendants and to the judicial system itself. On the other hand, 
some competition law regimes clearly allow and encourage the possibility of indirect purchasers to bring 
damages claims for the harm suffered by an anticompetitive conduct, provided that this kind of claims are 
supported by the enforcement objectives of compensation of the antitrust victims and deterrence of future 
infringement of competition law.  
The main argument against granting standing to sue for damages to indirect purchasers is that the 
harm suffered by such plaintiffs is too remote from the supposed infringement, and therefore, private 
actions for antitrust damages would turn to be too complicated due to the extremely difficult task of 
showing the exact effects of the anticompetitive overcharge. In such cases, the compensation objective of 
antitrust enforcement would not be accomplished as the real economic victims of mist competition law 
infringements are normally downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote from the 
infringement to locate and compensate80. This being the case, by allowing such distant claims the risk of 
duplicative recoveries would increase because direct and indirect purchasers will be allowed to recover 
from a single overcharge81. Similarly, the burden of proof required to demonstrate such remote harm will 
be too complex and expensive, provided that in most cases the overcharged amount to the indirect 
purchasers might be insignificant compared to the litigation costs involved in such complex litigations82. 
Finally, in some countries, the courts have considered indirect purchasers to be secondary recipients of 
the competition rules83, or that they do not have a legitimate cause of action to claim damages84, and as a 
consequence denying the latter standing to bring an action before courts.  
                                                          
78 Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 US 199, 207 (1990) 
79 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 US 93, 97 (1989) 
80 CRANE (2010), p. 677. 
81 Illinois Brick Co v. Illinois (supra note 40). 
82 The US Supreme Court denied indirect purchasers standing to sue for damages based on the Clayton Act, given that for 
procedural economy reasons, direct purchasers are considered to be a more efficient plaintiff and a better private attorney-general 
(Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, supra note 40). In response to this decision, state legislatures and courts have permitted indirect 
purchasers to file antitrust damages claims grounded on state law. Consequently, the rule limiting federal antitrust recoveries to 
direct purchasers does not prevent indirect purchasers from recovering damages flowing from state antitrust law violations.  
83 In Italy the Supreme Court denied indirect purchasers standing because they were indirect beneficiaries of the competition rules 
(Corte di Cassazione, judgment n. 1811 of March 4, 1999, Montanari c. Cassa Risparmio Genova e Imperia; Corte di Cassazione, 
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Conversely, the idea of impeding indirect purchasers from recovering antitrust damages has been 
considered to be contrary to the competition law objective of compensation of antitrust victims and 
deterrence of future antitrust violations85. Moreover, in most competition law regimes the principle of full 
compensation of antitrust victims is recognized, thus, a limitation on the possibility of indirect purchasers 
that have been affected by the unlawful conduct of the defendant will be contrary to such fundamental 
principle. To minimize the risk of multiple recoveries of damages by indirect purchasers, a possible 
approach would allow indirect purchasers standing to bring an action, while exercising caution in 
awarding damages to reduce the risk of duplicative recovery86. Generally speaking, in the majority of 
jurisdictions, actions for damages by indirect purchasers are in theory possible. Nevertheless, the lack of 
specific provisions and of relevant case law, plus the difficulties faced by such plaintiff in establishing 
causation and damages, has prevented the proliferation of this kind of actions. There are however, some 
cases where courts applying the competition law provisions have recognized the right of indirect 
purchasers to be compensated for the damages arising from a competition law violation87.  
(iii) Competitors 
 
A competitor is an individual in the same industry or a similar industry which offers a similar product or 
service. Usually, competitors of competition law infringing parties may have a claim against the latter 
based on the losses suffered due to the anticompetitive conduct of the violator. In practice, competitors’ 
claims may be based on actual and potential losses, thus, not only actual competitors will have standing to 
sue, but also, potential competitors. Potential competitors will usually claim that the unlawful conduct of 
the defendant is preventing them from entering the market, therefore, in order to recover damages they 
will have to prove their actual intention to enter the market and that they were prepared to do so within a 
reasonable period of time88. 
Traditionally, antitrust case law has established that competitors can indeed suffer antitrust injury 
of the type the competition rules are meant to prevent, and therefore, it is widely accepted that 
competitors have standing to sue for competition infringements as affected parties89. Additionally, in 
jurisdictions where a legal interest is required in order to bring an action before courts, competitors are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
judgment n. 17475 of December 9, 2002, Axa Assicurazioni c. Larato). However, this posture has been repealed by the Unipol case 
(Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), judgment n. 2207 of February 4, 2005, Unipol Assicurazioni c. Ricciardelli). 
84 In Canada, in April 2011, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia denied standing to indirect purchasers by reversing 
certification orders in the Microsoft and Sun-Rype cases by determining that indirect purchasers have no cause of action recognized 
in law and as a consequence no capacity to sue to recover an alleged overcharge (Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft 
Corporation, 2011 BCCA 186; and Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company, 2011 BCCA 187).  
85 European Commission, Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
2005, para. 179. 
86 ROACH & TREBILCOCK (1996), p. 502. 
87 At the European Union’s level the ECJ has determined that any individual who has suffered actual loss caused by a contract or by 
conduct liable to restrict or distort competition must be entitled to compensation before a national court (Courage case; and 
Manfredi case, supra note 37). In Italy, according to the Supreme Court’s case law indirect purchasers have standing to sue for 
damages provided that competition law aims to protect all market participants (Unipol Assicurazioni c. Ricciardelli, supra note 83). 
In Japan, a person or entity, including indirect purchasers, has standing to bring actions for damages based on Sec 25 of the AMA or 
Sec 709 of the Civil Code (Case No. Showa 60 (O) 933, MINSHU vol. 43, No. 11, p. 1259 (Supreme Court, Dec. 8, 1989)). In 
Poland, an indirect purchaser successfully recovered damages based on Article 405 of the Civil Code in relation to the provisions of 
the Unfair Competition act (Judgment of 10 August 2006, ref. no. V CSK 237/06).  
88 Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc, 649 F2d 466, 475 (7th Cir. 1982) 
89Carpet Group International; Emmert Elseav.oriental Rug Importers Association, Inc.; Bashian Bros., Inc.; Alfandari and 
Etessami Oriental Rug Co., Inc.; Moussa Etessami & Sons Corp.; Noonoo Rug Co.; Pande Cameron & Co. of New York; Kelaty 
Rugs International; Daniel Hodges; George Newman; Isaac Etessami,carpet Group International Corporation and Emmert Elsea, 
Appellants., 227 F.3d 62, 77 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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considered to have sufficient interest to bring an action before courts90. Finally, in jurisdictions where the 
competition rules have a protective purpose, competitors are considered to have standing provided that 
they are subject to the protective scope of competition law.   
Finally, in some jurisdictions with specific competition rules on standing, such provisions have 
expressly acknowledged the standing of competitors to sue for the harm caused to them as a result of the 
infringement of the competition provisions91. Moreover, in some competition law regimes that expressly 
allow competitors to sue for damages, the latter are allowed to recover all the damages caused to them, 
while other plaintiffs may only recover the overcharge caused by the defendant’s conduct92. 
(iv) Other Third Party Plaintiffs 
 
Besides the previously seen more traditional antitrust plaintiffs, there are other third party plaintiffs who 
may initiate an action for damages for the infringement of the competition rules, such as: shareholders, 
which may seek compensation from the infringing party due to the damages caused to their corporation93; 
suppliers to market participants may have standing in cases where the plaintiff is harmed by a price-
fixing conspiracy formed by its buyers that have lowered the market price94; employees, who just like 
suppliers supply labor, have standing to sue when there is a conspiracy between the employer and others 
to lower wages or impose other conditions of employment95; associations that have purchased products 
that were the subject of anticompetitive conduct96. 
(b) Parties to the Anti-competitive Agreement as Potential Plaintiffs 
 
Regarding the second category, the parties to an infringing agreement may also bring an action for 
damages for the violation of the competition provisions, as long as the co-contracting party did not bear a 
significant responsibility for the infringement. This limitation aims at preventing litigants to profit from 
their own unlawful conduct, and as a consequence, the award of damages will not be available when a 
party is found to bear significant responsibility for the violation of the competition rules97. 
Finally, in practice, in the most developed competition law regimes, the competent courts have 
placed limits on individuals who can bring a suit for the violation of the competition provisions, thus, 
determining who has standing to sue. However, this issue is unresolved in young competition regimes 
that have not yet developed a sound jurisprudence on this matter. Hence, despite the fact that a certain 
competition regime has or not specific competition rules on standing, ultimately, the competent courts 
will decide who has standing to sue for a determined antitrust infraction.  
                                                          
90 According to the Austrian Supreme Court, both competitors and consumers may sue for damages under the Federal Act against 
Unfair Competition and the Civil Code (Austrian Supreme Court, 4 Ob 53/98t, Judgment of 24 February 1998). 
91 In Germany, the Act against Restraints of Competition in Section 33(1) expressly recognizes competitors as an affected party and 
grant standing to the latter to bring actions for damages. 
92 Pursuant to Article 58 of the Turkish Competition Act, competing undertakings are allowed to recover all the damages caused by 
the defendant’s conduct, while other plaintiffs can only recover as damages the difference between the cost they paid and the cost 
they would have paid if competition had not been limited. 
93 Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910)  
94 SAS of P.R. v. P.R. Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1995) 
95 Eichron v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001) 
96 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 531 (3d Cir. 2004) 
97 In the European Union’s case law, the right of co-contracting parties in an anticompetitive agreement to sue for damages has been 
established in the Courage case (supra note 37). 
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5. Collective and Representative Claims 
 
The availability of mechanisms that allow classes of market participants and consumers to exercise their 
rights collectively is considered to be an incentive for a more efficient private enforcement of competition 
law98. The incorporation of such mechanisms is intended to pursue objectives like: procedural economy, 
the reduction of the litigation costs and the saving of judicial resources.  
Competition law infringements usually have widespread effects on the market, and as a result, 
such infringements may injure a variety of market participants. Thus, it is fundamental that the victims of 
the anticompetitive conducts have effective mechanisms through which they can remedy the injury 
inflicted upon them by the unlawful conduct of the competition law violator. The possibility to 
collectively sue for the infringement of competition law results especially appealing to certain groups of 
antitrust victims, such as: plaintiffs with limited resources, plaintiffs with small claims and indirect 
purchasers. 
In cases where the victims of the antitrust violations have enough resources to cover their 
litigation expenses, the costs associated to the proceedings will not deter the plaintiff from filing a 
damages claim. However, in cases where the plaintiff has limited resources to file the claim, the litigation 
costs will act as a strong deterrent, especially in competition law cases due to the complexity and 
expensiveness of such kind of claims. Likewise, plaintiffs with small claims will normally be reluctant to 
file a claim for damages provided that the amount recoverable will be too small to turn its individual 
claim cost effective99. Finally, the obstacles faced by indirect purchaser in order to successfully claim for 
damages may be reduced if some form of collective redress would be available.   
Accordingly, in order to accomplish the competition law enforcement objectives of 
compensation of victims and deterrence of future infractions, and to avoid the reluctance to sue of 
antitrust victims with limited resources or with small claims and indirect purchasers, all competition law 
regimes should consider the implementation of mechanisms that allow groups of plaintiffs to exercise 
their rights collectively to create an efficient enforcement of competition law100. Ultimately, the 
availability of such mechanisms will also benefit the judicial system by reducing the costs and waste of 
judicial resources101.  
 The possibility to collectively claim for the infringement of the competition rules is not restricted 
to actions aimed at the award of damages. Many countries have included collective and representative 
                                                          
98 In France, Conseil de la concurrence, Avis du 21 Septembre relatif à l'introduction de l'action de groupe en matière de pratiques 
anticoncurrentielles, recommended the implementation of a collective redress mechanism to encourage private claims. 
99“It will be very unlikely for practical reasons, if not impossible, that consumers and purchasers with small claims will bring an 
action for damages for breach of antitrust law. Consideration should therefore be given to ways in which these interests can be 
better protected by collective actions. Beyond the specific protection of consumer interests, collective actions can serve to 
consolidate a large number of smaller claims into one action, thereby saving time and money”. Commission’s Green Paper (supra 
note 3), p. 8. 
100 In its White Paper (supra note 3), the European Commission has proposed two collective redress mechanisms: (1) representative 
action, where damages actions are brought by certified entities on behalf of injured parties; and (2) opt-in collective actions, where 
injured parties join their single actions (page 4). 
101 For instance, in France, the lack of a collective redress mechanism for victims of competition law infractions resulted in an 
aggregation of claims, filed by the Association de Défense des Consommateurs UFC-Que Choisir, contained of the individual 
claims of 3.606 consumers affected by a telecommunication cartel that was previously condemned by the French Competition 
Council for unlawful collusive behavior. 
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actions for plaintiffs seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief. Moreover, some competition law 
regimes with specific competition rules allowing some mechanism to collectively pursue a civil claim for 
the violation of the competition provisions restrict this kind of actions to the award of injunctive relief102. 
The reason for this restriction is that in damages claims the courts need to know a series of factors about 
each particular victim –actual loss, fault of the victim, causal link- in order to determine if such person 
has truly suffered the kind of injury claimed, and in practice, this kind of assessment can only be done 
individually. Notwithstanding the above, there are also specific competition provisions that provide for 
both injunctive and monetary relief for collective plaintiffs103. 
 The spectrum of collective redress mechanisms varies widely across jurisdictions. Firstly, the 
majority of these collective proceedings are based on general provisions, and consequently, they are not 
exclusive for competition law matters. Secondly, there are some collective proceedings that are based on 
rules related to the protection of consumers104. Thirdly, some of these proceedings are grounded on unfair 
competition provisions105. And finally, there are specific competition law regulations allowing individual 
plaintiffs to collectively enforce the competition rules106. As a result of the diversity of collective 
proceedings some jurisdictions have more than one mechanism to join individual claims, and these may 
be grounded on more than one set of rules107. 
5.1. Types of Collective Redress Mechanisms  
 
In a broad sense, collective redress mechanism used to remedy the infringement of the competition law 
provisions may be summarized in: public interest litigation, class actions, collective claims, representative 
actions, joint actions, and assignment of claims. The reader must be advised that the use of these terms is 
made in a broad sense, provided that the definitions and characteristics of these legal mechanisms may 
vary from one jurisdiction to another.    
(a) Public Interest Litigation  
 
This kind of action is usually brought by a representative organization and it is not made on behalf of any 
identified individuals but for the benefit of the public at large108. The difference between this kind of 
                                                          
102 Section 14 of the Austrian Act against Unfair Competition provides for collective actions seeking injunction, these may be 
brought by associations that promote the economic interest of entrepreneurs, provided that such associations represent interest which 
are affected by the offence or by the Federal Chamber of Labor, the Federal Economic Chamber, the Presidential Conference of the 
Austrian Chambers of Agriculture or by the Austrian Trade Union Federation. 
103 In Italy, consumers’ associations may bring collective actions for damages and for injunctive relief on behalf of their represented 
consumers according to Article 140-bis and 137 of Law 260/2005, respectively. See also Article 47 of the Brazilian Antitrust Law. 
104 In Italy, Law 260/2005 (Consumer Code) allows consumers’ associations with nationwide presence which have been registered 
in the Ministry of Economic Development to bring private actions for damages (Article 140-bis) and for injunction (Article 137) on 
behalf of their represented consumers. Similarly, in Estonia the Consumer Protection Board can file collective claims related to 
consumer protection. 
105 In the Czech Republic collective actions are grounded the unfair competition provisions of the Commercial Code (Section 53 et 
seq).   
106 In Germany, Section 33(2) of the Act against Restraints of Competition; in India, Section 53N(4) of the Competition Act. 
107 For instance, Taiwan’s Code of Civil Procedure allows joining multiple parties and claims, and follows an opt-in approach for 
aggregating claims and parties. It also allows representative claims where all individuals have to be identified and named. 
Additionally, the Consumer Protection Law also provides for a mechanism where a qualified consumer’s group may bring in its 
own name an action for damages approved by the Consumer Ombudsman. Also, where multiple consumers are injured, a 
consumers’ protection group may accept assignment of the rights of claims of consumers and bring an action in its own name. 
Finally, an association or foundation may bring an injunctive relief action against an undertaking that has harmed the interests of the 
general public. 
108 For instance, in Sweden pursuant to the Group Proceedings Act, an action may be brought by an authority appointed by the 
government to act on behalf on a group of individuals, pursuing claims of public interest.  
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proceeding and other collective actions for the infringement of competition law is that the amount 
awarded as damages is somehow returned to the general public, given that there is not an identified group 
of victims109. Furthermore, this kind of proceedings may in some cases end up in a court declaration 
establishing the competition law infringement and consequently the civil liability of the perpetrator. After 
the civil liability of the defendant has been declared, the victims of the antitrust infringement can file an 
action claiming damages110.  Moreover, in some competition law regimes, the competition authority has 
standing to bring a collective civil action for damages on behalf of a large group of persons or 
consumers111. 
(b) Class Actions 
 
In this kind of procedure, one party or a group of parties brings an action as representative of a larger 
class of unidentified individuals. Class action proceeding may be based either on an opt-in or opt-out 
system. On the one hand, in class actions which are based on an opt-in system, each individual victim has 
to manifest expressly its desire to be considered as a member of the class. On the other hand, in class 
actions based on an opt-out system, only those class members who have previously opted-out of the class 
action are not bound by the judgment in the case. With regard to the amount awarded as damages, this is 
granted to the members of the class as a whole. Consequently, each member of the class will be entitled to 
a part of the amount awarded. A clarification has to be made regarding class actions. The “class action” 
terminology was conceived in the USA litigation, and accordingly, collective actions that correspond to 
the characteristics of the term only exist in the US. Notwithstanding the foregoing, some jurisdictions 
have, to some extent, adopted collective proceedings that resemble in some aspects to US-style class 
actions112.  
                                                          
109 In Greece, the Consumer Protection Law (L.2251/1994) authorizes consumer protection organizations to bring collective claims 
on behalf of consumers in general against an undertaking infringing the consumer protection rules (Article 10.16). Any amount 
recovered by this action is made to the organization and will be spent to promote the protection of consumers.  
110 In Brazil after the Public Prosecutor’s Office has filed an action to declare the defendant’s civil liability, any injured party has to 
file a claim to qualify as victim (Article 82 of the Consumers Defense Code (Law N° 8.078/90)). If nobody qualifies as a victim, the 
amount recovered will go to the Found for diffuse Rights. Similarly in Greece, according to Article 10 of the Consumer Protection 
Law a consumer protection organization may file an action to court requesting a declaratory decision for the right of consumers to 
recover damages.  
111 In Australia, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission may bring a collective action for damages on behalf of 
persons who have suffered loss or damage, provided that those affected are identified in the proceeding and have consented to the 
proceeding (Section 87(1B) of the Competition and Consumer Act). In Hungary, the Competition Authority may file a civil law suit 
on behalf of consumers who were injured by a competition law infringement pursuant to Section 92 of the Competition Act. In Peru, 
the Competition Authority (Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual) has the 
ability to bring collective actions on behalf of consumers (Legislative Decree 716, Article 51, as amended by Legislative Decree 807 
of 1996). The INDECOPI besides has authority to empower any public or private entity to bring collective actions on behalf of 
consumers (Directiva Nº 001-2003-INDECOPI/DIR sobre Normas para la Intervención de Asociaciones de Consumidores en 
Procedimientos Administrativos ante la Comisión de Protección al Consumidor y demás Organismos Funcionales del Indecopi 
(22/07/2003)). The Peruvian Competition Authority’s collective action is based in an opt-out system, and it is the duty of the 
competition authority to distribute the amount of damages awarded to consumers that can prove an injury and a legitimate interest in 
the claim.  
112 In Australia, a very similar US-Style class action based on an opt-out system has been established in Part IVA of the Federal 
Court of Australia Act; in Austria, an opt-in class action proceeding is possible under Section 29 of the Consumer Protection Act; in 
Canada, two or more “identifiable” persons can bring a class action, subclasses may be created where the members have claims that 
raise common issues not shared by all class members, such that they need distinct representation to safeguard their interests; in 
Denmark, individual plaintiffs have some kind of class action proceeding to collectively claim compensation; in Finland, the Act on 
Class Actions allows class actions brought by consumers only –not undertakings, however, since Article 18a of the Act on 
Competition Restrictions only allows undertakings to sue for damages, it is not clear if the provisions of the Act on Class Actions 
will apply to actions related to competition law; in Israel, Section 4 of the Class Action Law establishes that injured parties may 
bring a class action, and also, under some conditions, qualified entities, such consumer associations, on behalf of identified victims; 
in Italy, Article 140-bis of Law 260/2005 provides for an opt-in class action aimed expressly at the recovery of damages; in 
Portugal, Article 2 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic allows the acção popular, which is a kind of opt-out class action 
for the protection of general interests, such as consumer protection, and consequently, applicable to competition disputes; in 
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(c) Collective Claims 
 
It is a civil proceeding where a single claim is interposed on behalf of a group of identified or identifiable 
individuals. The amount of damages granted will be awarded to the group as a whole113. Some 
jurisdictions have proceedings where the court can approve collective settlements, in such cases, the 
parties that have resolved their dispute out of the tribunals can ask the court to declare the settlement fair 
and binding114.  
(d) Representative Actions 
 
It is a form of collective action consisting on a single claim which is brought by a representative 
association on behalf of a group of identified individuals, where the award of damages is granted to the 
individual members. A representative organization is a foundation or an association which represents the 
interests of other persons in accordance with the objectives described in its articles of association. This 
kind of procedure is reserved to actions ending in the award of injunctive relief in some competition law 
regimes115; however, there are also some jurisdictions that allow this kind of proceeding for damages 
claims116, or for both kinds of actions117. Additionally, representative actions may be reserved to 
consumers only, given that this kind of actions may be based on consumer protection legislation118. 
(e) Joint Actions 
 
Most jurisdictions allow this kind of civil collective proceeding where individual actions of several 
plaintiffs are joined by the judge. This kind of proceeding allows several plaintiffs to individually pursue 
their claims in a single action. In joint actions, the judge hearing the case will decide to join separate 
claims provided that there is a connecting link between the individual claims. The connecting link may be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Sweden, the Group Proceedings Act provides for three types of class actions (Public, organizational and private) (Sections 1 and 4-6 
of the Group Proceedings Act). 
113 In Australia, any person who has a personal claim may bring a representative proceeding on behalf of other persons according to 
the Federal Court of Australia Act. In India, Section 53N(4) of the Competition Act establishes that where any loss or damage is 
caused to numerous persons having the same interest, one or more of such persons may make an application on behalf of other 
persons interested under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Korea, Article 53 of the Civil Procedure Act allows 
multiple claimants to bring together an action for damages. In Spain, pursuant to Article 11(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, a group of 
identifiable harmed consumers or users may collectively sue for the injury suffered. 
114 This possibility exists in Dutch law and is based on an opt-out mechanism, thus, the settlement will be binding even to non-
parties if they did not expressed their desire to opt-out from the settlement (Articles 7:907-910 of the Dutch Civil Code and 1013-
1018 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure). To see some examples of collective settlements approved by the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal, go to: www.shellsettlement.com or www.vediorsettlement.com 
115 Section 14 of the Austrian Act against Unfair Competition provides for a kind of collective action for injunction that may be 
brought by associations that represent interests which are affected by the infringement of the competition rules. The Czech 
Commercial Code (Section 54(1)) allows representative actions brought by consumers or undertakings associations seeking 
injunctive relief. In the Netherlands, pursuant to section 3:305a-c of the Civil Code, collective actions by representative 
organizations may bring an action for declaration or injunction, but not for monetary relief. 
116 In the UK, pursuant to Section 47B of the Competition Act an action for damages or other sums of money may be filed to the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal by a specified body on behalf of a group of individually named consumers. Bodies may be specified 
in an Order made by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 47B(9) of the Competition Act. This kind of actions is restricted to 
actions where the infringement has already been established by a decision of the OFT, European Commission or Tribunal (follow-
on action only). See case: Consumers’ Association v JJB Sports (Case No 1078/7/9/07).  
117 In Germany, Section 33(2) of the Act against Restraints of Competition provides that certain associations have standing to bring 
actions for damages and for injunctive relief. 
118 In Brazil, Article 47 of the Antitrust Law, referring to Article 82 of the Consumer Defense Code, provides for a civil collective 
action brought by a civil association which objectives are the protection of the rights protected by the Consumer Defense Code. In 
Croatia, representative actions can be brought under the Consumer Protection Act. In France there is the possibility to bring 
representative claims by consumers’ association. The association must be registered and recognized as representative, moreover, the 
association has to be mandated by at least two consumers that suffered an injury caused by the same conduct (article L.422-1 of the 
Consumer Code). In Spain, Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Act provides for a representative action brought by consumers 
associations involving the protection of the general interests of the consumers and users. 
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that the separate claims are suited against the same defendant or that the harm caused to the plaintiffs 
arose from the same infringement. Unlike class actions or collective claims, joint actions are put together 
only for procedural economy reasons. Hence, when the judge is making his decision, he will manage 
individually each joined claim and damage award119.  
(f) Assignment of Claims 
 
A group of potential claimants may assign their rights to sue to an unconnected third party who will 
litigate in its own name for its own account. This is a growing practice where a third party collects the 
assignments of damages claims of cartels victims and files the action for damages on its behalf against the 
cartel members120. In this kind of actions, the third party holds a previously determined percentage of any 
recovered amount. 
(g) Parens patriae Litigation 
 
It is a kind of collective action brought by public officials, such as the public prosecutor, Ombudsmen, or 
any other public authority, on behalf of specific individuals121. These actions may have some advantages 
with regard to other collective actions, for instance, in some cases, the public authority will not need to 
pay court fees or other expenses upfront, plus the losing collective plaintiff is not condemned to pay the 
legal expenses of the winning party, unless malicious prosecution is proven122.  
6. Fault Requirement 
 
As with other questions regarding the private enforcement of competition law, the fault requirement 
manifests the interaction between competition law and the general civil rules of liability. Accordingly, the 
majority of jurisdictions refer the issue of the fault requirement to the general civil provision; however, 
there are some jurisdictions that have adopted specific competition law provision regarding this matter123.  
To establish the civil liability for damages in competition law cases, most jurisdictions require 
proof of the existence of an antitrust violation and an injury resulting directly from the infringement in 
question. Additionally, some legal systems require the existence of fault; this requirement will be fulfilled 
either by showing intent or negligence on the hand of the violator of the competition provisions. The 
requirement of fault varies from one legal system to another, in this regard: some jurisdictions require 
both illegality and fault to successfully claim damages; in others, once the requirement of illegality has 
                                                          
119 For instance see Section 11 of the Austrian Civil Procedure Act. In Croatia, see Article 196 of the Civil Procedure Act. In the 
Czech Republic, see Section 112(1) of the Czech Civil Procedure Code. In Spain, see Articles 12 and 72 of the Civil Procedure Act. 
In the Netherlands, see Chapter 14 of the Dutch Code of Judicial Procedure. In Peru, see the Civil Procedure Code Articles 85 and 
89.  
120 For instance, in Germany, Cartel Damage Claims SA, a Belgian company, acquired and got assigned the damages actions for the 
cement cartel of 29 individual customers and filed an action before the Düsseldorf District Court. For details, visit: 
http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/German%20Cement  
121 In Austria, an action for injunctive relief may be brought by the Federal Chamber of Labor, the Federal Economic Chamber, and 
the Presidential Conference of the Austrian Chambers of Agriculture or the Austrian Trade Union Federation, pursuant to Section 14 
of the Austrian Act against Unfair Competition. In the US, state attorneys general can bring parens patriae actions under 15 U.S.C. 
§15c, also, under state law, state attorneys general can bring an action on behalf of their citizens.  
122 For instance, in Brazil when the Federal or State Prosecutor’s Office files a public collective action for the declaration of the civil 
liability of the antitrust violator, the Office will not have to pay any expenses or fess up front, and at the end of the proceeding if the 
Office is not successful in its claim it cannot be ordered to pay the legal expenses of the prevailing party.  
123 For instance, Section 33(3) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition provides the right of compensation for any 
injury caused by the infringement of competition law that has been committed negligently or by willful act. 
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been fulfilled by finding the infringement of competition law, the fault element is automatically 
presumed; finally, in some jurisdictions liability may also exist where there is fault even in the absence of 
an unlawful conduct, in such cases the violation is in itself considered to establish fault. 
In the first scenario, apart from a proven infringement of the competition rules, the presence of 
fault on the side of the perpetrator is required in order to establish the civil liability of the defendant. As a 
consequence, the plaintiff will have to demonstrate that the infringement from which the harm suffered 
arose was committed negligently or intentionally by the defendant124. In some countries this has to be 
generally established in relation to the infringement of the competition provisions125, while in others, the 
fault has to be proven with regard to the effects of the infringement126. 
In second scenario, the element of fault is presumed if illegality is shown. Hence, there is a 
rebuttable presumption regarding the fault requirement whenever there is a proven infringement of the 
competition rules. In such cases, the burden of demonstrating the fault element is reversed to the 
defendant, therefore, the defendant will be able to absolve himself from any civil liability by proving that 
it did not act intentionally or negligently127. In these regimes, the presumption of fault is a way to 
facilitate private enforcement of competition law, provided that the claimant is relieved from the burden 
of proving fault. 
In the third scenario, the violation of the competition rules (illegality) will suffice to determine 
that the perpetrator acted with fault128. Consequently, the finding of an infringement of the competition 
provisions, either by a competition authority or by a court declaration, will presuppose ipso facto that the 
fault requirement is satisfied129. In these legal systems, the antitrust infringement constitutes fault by 
itself, provided the serious consequences of the latter130.  
III. RULES OF EVIDENCE 
 
There are mainly two issues related to the rules of evidence in antitrust private actions for damages. The 
first is who bears the burden of proof, and the second is what has to be proven to successfully bring an 
action for damages. As to the first issue, it is widely accepted that it is the plaintiff who bears the burden 
                                                          
124 In Greece, the plaintiff has to prove the existence of fault, whether intentional or negligent, on the part of the defendant (Articles 
914 and 330 of the Greek Civil Code). 
125 See Section 33 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition. 
126 See Article 33(1) of the Swedish Competition Act. 
127 In Austria, it is the plaintiff who has to prove the anticompetitive behavior, damage, causation and fault, nonetheless, the burden 
of proof is reversed with respect to the fault requirement in cases where the defendant has violated contractual obligations or an act 
with protective effect, such as the competition rules (Section 1311 of the Austrian Civil Code). In Lithuania, the defendant’s fault is 
presumed when the latter’s conduct has been declared unlawful; nonetheless, this presumption is rebuttable (Article 6.248(1) of the 
Civil Code).  
128 The Japanese approach is based on the strict liability of the perpetrator. Pursuant to Section 25(b) of the Japanese Antimonopoly 
Act, the violator of the competition provisions may not be exempted of its civil liability by proving the non-existence of intention or 
negligence on its part. Similar is the situation in the Czech Republic that follows the strict liability approach (Commercial Code 
Sections 373-386).  
129 The European Commission in the Opinion 11 of its Green Paper on Damages determined that proof of the infringement should be 
sufficient to determine the liability of the defendant. Similarly, the ECJ in the Manfredi case (supra note 37) established the 
constitutive conditions of individual civil liability without making any reference to the fault requirement. 
130 See the Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages (supra note 85), at paragraph 109. 
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of proof in actions for damages131. Regarding the second issue, widely speaking, most jurisdictions 
require the plaintiff to prove: the competition law infringement, the injury suffered, and the causal link 
between the infringement and the injury. However, this list is by no means exhaustive, provided that some 
competition law regimes may additionally require other facts to be proven in order to award damages. 
1. Burden of Proof 
 
Traditionally, the fact that the burden of proof is borne by the plaintiff has been considered a serious 
obstacle for the private enforcement of competition law132. Along with the high standard of evidence 
required by most competition law regimes, these heavy tasks imposed on private plaintiffs have impeded 
the proliferation of damages claims for the infringement of the antitrust provisions almost around the 
world133. Moreover, this situation worsens in stand-alone cases given that the plaintiff cannot rely on the 
previous findings of the competition authority to support its claim.  
 For the reasons stated above, some competition law regimes have, in some ways, alleviated the 
burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff. Therefore, some of these regimes have opted to establish legal 
presumptions as a manner of relieving the plaintiff from such a demanding duty. Others have instituted 
the concept of prima facie case or evidence as a way of reducing, in principle, the load of evidence 
required from the plaintiff. Additionally, some jurisdictions have included situations that lead to a 
reversal of the burden of proof. Finally, the burden of proof required from the plaintiff may be lowered 
depending on the type of anticompetitive conduct and on the legal provisions on which these actions are 
grounded. 
(a) Legal Presumptions  
Regarding the alleviation of the burden of proof, as stated before, some competition law regimes have 
established legal presumptions that work as a way to decrease the load imposed on the plaintiff. For 
instance, in some jurisdictions the fault requirement is presumed, in those regimes, the unlawful conduct 
of the defendant will automatically presume fault134. Moreover, some competition law provisions 
establish legal presumptions with regard to amounts or figures that otherwise would have to be calculated 
by the parties in the proceeding, such as, the market share of a dominant undertaking or the price 
increased by the anticompetitive conduct. The reason for the establishment of such presumptions is that 
the calculation of those elements, especially in competition law matters, might constitute a very 
overwhelming task for private plaintiffs135. Additionally, some competition law regimes have introduced 
a legal presumption by which harm is presumed if a dominant undertaking offers goods or services 
bellow its cost price unless the defendant provides an objective justification136. Finally, there are antitrust 
                                                          
131 For example, at the European Union’s level, Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 establishes that the burden of proving an 
infringement of the competition rules rest on the party alleging the infringement.  
132 See the Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages (supra note 85), at para 33. 
133 With few exceptions like the 10 to 1 rate in the US. 
134 See Section II. 6. above.  
135 For instance, Section 10(3) of the Czech Competition Act establishes that it is presumed that an undertaking that has less than 
40% of market share in the relevant market is not dominant. Additionally, Section 88(c) of the Hungarian Competition Act 
establishes a legal presumption in cases related to hard-core cartels, in such cases, it will be presumed that the infringement has 
raised the prices by 10%. 
136 See Section 20(4) Sentence 2 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition. 
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provisions that establish rebuttable presumptions regarding to the authorship of certain documents in a 
proceeding grounded on the competition rules137. 
(b) Prima Facie Evidence 
As to the prima facie evidence, some jurisdictions have instituted this legal concept in order to lower, in 
principle, the burden of proof borne by the plaintiff. In such cases, in principle, it will be sufficient for the 
claimant to prove a determined fact within the sphere of the defendant in order to discharge his burden of 
proof, which then turns into the defendant to disprove. The most common case is that where a 
competition authority has declared that a certain conduct constitutes an infringement of competition law. 
Thus, in follow-on actions for damages the competition authority’s declaration will be considered by civil 
courts as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation, and as a result, the plaintiff will no longer have to 
prove that the defendant’s conduct resulted in a violation of the competition provisions138. In other legal 
systems, private plaintiffs will be able to rely on judgment or decree in a preexisting civil or criminal 
action by the government and use it as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation139. 
(c) Reversal of the Burden of Proof 
There are also competition law regimes that have introduced situations that lead to a reversal of the 
burden of proof as a way to incentive private claims. Those situations may take place, for example, when 
the burden of proving that the defendant acted intentionally or negligently is turned to the defendant. A 
similar scenario may occur in cases concerning the abuse of dominance; here the competition provisions 
shift the burden of proof to the alleged dominant undertaking140. Moreover, in competition law regimes 
that provide for some kind of exemption to prohibited practices provided that those conducts produce 
more desirable effects than harm to competition, the burden of proof will shift to the defendant who will 
have to show that its conduct shall be exempted from the application of the competition provisions due to 
its desirable effects141. 
 
 
                                                          
137 Section 12 of the Irish Competition Act establishes a list of legal presumptions regarding the authorship of documents that 
applies both for civil and criminal proceedings. 
138 In this respect see Section 43 of the Israeli Competition Act, according to which the infringement declaration issued by the Israeli 
Antitrust Authority is considered as prima facie evidence.  
139 In Australia, private plaintiffs can rely on the findings of facts made by a court as prima facie evidence of those facts pursuant to 
Section 83 of the Trade Practices Act. Additionally, Section 33(4) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition establishes 
that whenever there is a final decision made by the cartel authority, the European Commission, or the competition authority –or 
court acting as such- in another Member State of the European Community, declaring the infringement of the German or EU 
competition provisions, the court will be bound by such decision. In the US, Section 5 of the Clayton Act relieves private plaintiffs 
of having to prove the infringement on the antitrust rules by allowing them to introduce as prima facie evidence in their actions for 
damages a judgment or decree obtained from a successful government antitrust case against the same defendant.  
140 In Austria, pursuant to Section 5(2) of the Austrian Cartel Act, the dominant undertaking has to prove the absence of below cost 
pricing. In Germany, in cases related to the abuse of a dominant position the burden of proof of a justification is shifted to the 
defendant (Section 20 of the Act against Restraints of Competition). In Estonia, the Supreme Court has determined that in abuse of 
dominant position cases, the challenged undertaking has to prove that its activities are in compliance with the competition 
provisions (Case No 3-3-1-66-02). 
141 At the EU level, the provisions of Article 101(3) of the TFEU (ex Article 81(3) TEC) establish that the competition provisions of 
the act shall not a apply to agreements and concerted practices which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. In such cases, 
according to Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003, the undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 81(3) 
shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fulfilled.    
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(d) Burden of Proof Depending on the Type of Challenged Conduct and Legal Provisions  
Finally, the burden of proof in competition law matters may vary depending on the type of 
anticompetitive conduct and on the legal provisions on which these actions are grounded. In the first case, 
some competition regimes may require a lower standard of proof in cases related to anticompetitive 
conducts that are unlawful by its object, given that such conducts are deemed so harmful to competition 
that they are intrinsically unlawful without the need to assess their effects on the market – price-fixing, 
bid-rigging, or market and customer allocation142. In the second case, the burden of proof laid on the 
plaintiff will be minor if its claim is grounded on specific competition provisions, conversely, if its action 
is based on general provisions the burden of proof may be heavier143.  
2. Standard of Proof 
 
Regarding the standard of proof, most civil law countries do not have established concepts regarding the 
standard of proof like the ones forged in common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, most countries do not 
have provisions regulating the standard of proof for cases related to the infringement of the competition 
rules. As a result, in those countries, general civil standards will apply. 
 On the one hand, in common law countries, there are general definitions regarding the standard 
of proof, such as: “preponderance of evidence”, “balance of probabilities” or “preponderance of 
probabilities”, and “beyond all reasonable doubt”. These general definitions have been transposed to 
competition law litigation as they are frequently used by common law courts in competition law related 
matters. The first three (preponderance of evidence, balance of probabilities and preponderance of 
probabilities) are associated to private actions for damages, while the third one (beyond all reasonable 
doubt) is used in antitrust criminal proceedings. This differentiation is given by virtue of the nature of the 
proceedings and the remedies sought by the plaintiff in each kind of action144. Despite the preceding, 
some civil law countries have adopted the common law definitions in some ways, nonetheless, even in its 
broadest sense; these are not fully equivalent to the standard of proof required in most common law 
countries145. 
 On the other hand, in civil law countries, there are no specific definitions for the standard of 
proof. Nonetheless, the vast majority of civil law jurisdictions have furnished a standard of proof that 
                                                          
142 In the US, these kinds of practices are deemed to be illegal per se; consequently, courts have declared that these practices always 
or almost always tend to restrict competition. In these cases, the plaintiff will only have to prove the existence of the conspiracy to 
establish that the practice restricts trade. Conversely, in claims against vertical price-fixing, exclusivity arrangements, boycotts, 
tying, etc., the illegality of the conduct will be measured through the “rule of reason” test. In such cases, the plaintiff will have to 
prove that the practice has unreasonably restricted competition. Similarly, in Switzerland, according to Section 5 of the Cartel Act 
price fixing agreements, agreements that reduce the quantities of goods or services to be produced, and agreements to allocate 
markets are presumed to lead to the elimination of effective competition. 
143 For instance, in Korea if the plaintiff bases its claim on the provisions of the Civil Code, he will have to prove: the existence of 
the infringement, the defendant’s intentionality or negligence, the illegality of the conduct, the existence of harm, and the causal link 
between the infringement and the injury. However, if the plaintiff grounds its claim on the provisions of the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act, it will be relieved from proving the defendant’s intentionality or negligence (Article 56 of the MRFTA). 
144 In Australia, Canada, Ireland, Singapore, the UK and US (India does not have criminal provisions for the infringement of 
competition law), when the public authority is enforcing the competition rules in criminal proceedings it has to prove the facts of its 
allegation “beyond all reasonable doubt”. In the same countries, when the competition rules are enforced by private plaintiffs in 
civil proceedings, they will only have to prove their allegations under the “preponderance of evidence” (US) “preponderance of 
probabilities” (India) or the “balance of probabilities” standards (Australia, Canada, Ireland, Singapore and the UK). 
145 For instance, in Greece the plaintiff will have to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of breach, the damage suffered and 
the causal link. 
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requires, in a broad sense, that the plaintiff wins the conviction of the judge handling the case. 
Additionally, some civil law countries have introduced its own terminology regarding the standard of 
proof required in civil law claims, such as: “proven” or “shown” (Sweden), “almost certainty” (Latvia), 
“no reasonable doubts” (Lithuania), “entire conviction” (Luxembourg), “plausible” (Netherlands), 
“practical certainty” (Poland). 
3. Admissible Forms of Evidence 
 
As with other procedural issues related to the private enforcement of competition law, the admissible 
forms of evidence are governed by general civil provisions. These general provisions vary widely among 
jurisdictions; however, some general observations can be made about the forms of evidence. 
The first differentiation that can be made regarding the admissibility of evidence is concerned 
with the forms of evidence available. In this regard, in some jurisdictions the party who bears the burden 
of proof is restricted to an exhaustive list of forms of admissible evidence146. Conversely, in other 
jurisdictions, the party who bears the burden of proof is not limited by the form of evidence that can be 
presented in the proceeding147. Additionally, there are countries that provide for a non-restrictive list of 
forms of evidence allowed, thus, the party who bears the burden of proof will be allow to present other 
forms of evidence besides the ones expressly stated in the concerned provisions148. Finally, some 
jurisdictions may provide for a list of forms of evidence which are not allowed before courts149.    
Widely speaking, the most common forms of evidence permitted by courts are: (i) documents, 
either public or private; (ii) electronic documents; (iii) material evidence; (iv) cross-examination; (v) 
confessions or statements made by the parties; (vi) questioning of witnesses; (vii) experts opinions; (viii) 
affidavits; (ix) reports and statements of competent bodies, individuals or legal entities; and (x) judicial 
inspections. 
In some jurisdictions, there is a hierarchy regarding the forms of evidence available. In this 
sense, some jurisdictions attribute greater evidential value to certain forms of evidence. In most countries 
where such a differentiation exists, documental evidence forms the backbone of the evidence adduced by 
the parties in the proceeding150. The term “document”, however, has been given a wide interpretation by 
most legislations and courts, and as a consequence, it may include all notes, records, tapes, electronic 
media or anything on which evidence or information is recorded in an intelligible manner. Additionally, 
live testimonies may be preferred over written statements in some jurisdictions151. Finally, in some 
jurisdictions, written evidence may have a higher evidential value than verbal testimonies152. 
                                                          
146 Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Switzerland. 
147 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, UK, Ukraine, US.  
148 See the Argentinean Civil and Commercial Code (Sections 387 to 480) which establishes a non-restrictive list of forms of 
evidence. See also Article 299 of the Spanish Civil Procedure Act. 
149 See Section 56 of the Australian Evidence Act. 
150 Belgium, France, UK. 
151 In Sweden, the evidential value of live testimonies is higher than any written statement, moreover, written statements will only be 
allowed under certain circumstances (See Chapter 35 of the Code of Judicial Procedure). 
152 Belgium and Luxembourg.  
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4. Disclosure of evidence 
 
In practice, antitrust litigation is conventionally fact-intensive. As a consequence, the burden of proof 
borne by private plaintiffs in competition cases is one of the main obstacles for the proliferation of this 
kind of actions, provided that the plaintiff has to sufficiently prove to the court the infringement of the 
competition rules, the harm suffered and the causal link. A particularity of antitrust litigation is the 
existence of an asymmetry with regard to the information held or known by the litigating parties, as a 
result, it is a laborious endeavor for the plaintiff to produce all the necessary evidence in order to sustain 
its claim due to the fact that most of the relevant information is usually concealed and in the possession of 
the defendant or of third parties, and in most cases, the plaintiff does not even know of its existence.    
It has been argued that the lack of mechanisms that facilitate the collection of all the relevant 
evidence is one of the main impediments to bring private damages actions for the infringement of the 
competition rules153. This scenario worsens in stand-alone actions, given that in such actions, the plaintiff 
cannot rely on the previous findings of the competition authority, and therefore, the burden of proof on 
the plaintiff is even heavier. On the other hand, in jurisdictions where the litigating parties have broad 
rights to demand the disclosure of evidence, the discovery process can be abused with the purpose of 
prolonging the case for strategic reasons, to gain access to confidential information, and to impose 
unjustified costs on a party154.  
The general framework concerning the gathering of evidence in private actions for damages in 
competition law cases can be divided in two. On the one hand, there are the civil law countries; in these 
countries the parties have limited powers to compel the other party or third parties to produce relevant 
evidence. However, in most cases, the parties may request the judge to order the other party or third 
parties to disclose the requested evidence. On the other hand, there are the common law countries, where 
disclosure is almost entirely conducted by the parties with minimal intervention of the judge. Unlike in 
civil law countries, under this system the parties are under the obligation to produce all relevant evidence 
without a formal requirement of the other party.  
(a) Disclosure in civil law countries 
 
In civil law countries the parties requiring the production of evidence rely on the judge who is entitled to 
demand the disclosure of evidence from the other parties. Thus, in most of these countries, the disclosure 
of relevant evidence can be made at the request of one of the parties in the litigation, or the production of 
evidence can also be ordered ex officio by the judge155, however this situation rarely occurs156.   
                                                          
153 Considering the low number of actions where damages were claimed in the EU, the Commission assigned a study to the law firm 
Ashurst in 2004 (Ashurst Report, supra note 3). The study has a comparative description of the legal obstacles for antitrust victims 
to recover the damages suffered by virtue of the infringement. Regarding the access to evidence, the Report established that the fact 
that in most Member States parties are not under the obligation to produce relevant information is a clear obstacle to private actions 
for damages. See pages 4 and 5 of the Report. 
154 WITHROW, J.R. & LARM, R.P. (1976), ‘The “Big” Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor’. 62 Cornell Law Review, 1, 
pp. 26-28.  
155 In Germany, see Section 142 of the Civil Procedure Code. In Turkey, see Article 75(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
156 In most civil law countries, judges apply the actori incumbit probatio principle, by virtue of this principle; courts will rarely 
order other parties to summit requested evidence. 
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The most determinant element when requesting the production of evidence is the level of 
specification or identification of the requested documents. Depending on the jurisdiction, the requesting 
party will have to specify with more or less detail the documents it seeks to obtain from the other party. 
At the end of the spectrum, there are the most stringent jurisdictions, which demand that the requesting 
party specifically identifies the document that is requesting to the other party157. However, the 
identification requirement varies among jurisdictions and some countries may be more lenient in this 
aspect. Finally, some other requirements may be demanded before awarding an order for the disclosure of 
requested evidence. For instance, some jurisdictions may require that the requesting party must have a 
legitimate interest in obtaining the evidence and that documents in question concern a legal 
relationship158. 
Irrespective of the level of identification demanded to the requesting party seeking the 
production of a determined document, the decision to whether or not grant an order for the disclosure of 
the documents will ultimately rely on the judge’s discretion. In most jurisdictions, the judge will only 
grant an order for disclosure once he has evaluated the relevance of the document and its connection with 
case, and when he considers that there is not another way to obtain the requested document that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. 
The scope of an order to disclose evidence awarded by a court includes the parties in the 
proceeding, third parties who might have relevant information concerned with the case159 and even public 
bodies, such as a competition authority160. Further, the scope of the order is not limited to the documents 
that are under the possession of the requested parties, but extents to documents to which the requested 
party has a legal right of access. 
The disclosure mechanisms established in civil law countries, where the plaintiff only has 
limited power to compel the production of evidence, induces the plaintiff to depend on the voluntary 
cooperation of the requested party, or to seek the uncommon intervention of the courts, and as a 
consequence, have been deemed insufficient for the purpose of gathering evidence in competition law 
cases. Subsequently, the difficulty of obtaining evidence in civil law jurisdictions has been identified as 
one of the major obstacles to private actions for damages for the infringement of competition law161.  
The problem with these procedures of disclosure is that in most jurisdictions, the requesting 
party has to identify, almost precisely, all documents demanded to the courts, and since in most antitrust 
cases, especially hard-core violations, all incriminating information will be hidden and in possession of 
the defendant, it is very difficult for the plaintiff to extensively identify that kind of evidence provided 
that, generally, the plaintiff will not even be aware of the existence of the most incriminating documents. 
                                                          
157 In Germany, see Section 422 of the Civil Procedure Code. In France, see Article 142 Civil Procedure Code. In Spain, see Articles 
256 and 328 of the Civil Procedure Act. 
158 See Article 843(a) of the Dutch Civil Code of Procedure. 
159 See Article 139 of the French Civil Procedure Code. 
160 In France, the court can request the production of documents held by public bodies such as the French Competition Authority 
pursuant to Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The same happens in Sweden according to Chapter 38 of the Code of Judicial 
Procedure. 
161 See pages 4 and 5 of the Ashurst Report (supra note 3).  
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On the contrary, the argument in favor of this high degree of identification is that by raising the level of 
specification, all unmeritorious claims and fishing expeditions162 will be avoided. 
Moreover, with regard to the authority of judges to order the production of certain evidence 
requested by a party to the proceeding, courts will rarely use its power to ex officio request relevant 
information, especially in jurisdictions where the courts apply the actori incumbit probatio principle (on 
the plaintiff rests the proving), and as a result, the courts will only asses the evidence produced by the 
parties in the proceeding when deciding on the case. 
From the evidenced above, the disclosure mechanisms of civil law countries are considered to be 
insufficient to gather all the necessary information to sustain a private damages action for the 
infringement of the competition rules. In that sense, some suggestions have been made in order to 
overcome this obstacle, such as: the creation of specialized courts that are better suited to handle 
competition cases163, the availability of gaining access to the files of the competition authority164, and 
some kind of court controlled discovery procedure165. 
(b) Disclosure in common law countries 
 
In common law countries, apart from the general duty of disclosing relevant information and the authority 
vested on the judges to order the production of specific documents, the parties in the proceeding can 
obtain evidence through pre-trial discovery. Pre-trial discovery is conceived as the pre-trial compulsory 
disclosure of all relevant documents to the case. During the discovery process, the parties may request the 
disclosure of and inspect any information from the other party with regard to the facts in the case. The 
discovery procedure also covers the information possessed by third parties; nevertheless, this kind of 
discovery is usually more restricted.  
The scope of the discovery process varies among jurisdictions. Some common law countries 
have a very broad scope, given that the parties to a civil lawsuit are under the obligation to disclose all 
relevant evidence without awaiting a discovery request from the other party166. Furthermore, the parties 
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, which is not protected, that is relevant to the claim or defense 
of a party in the litigation, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of 
any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter167. 
 The amount of documents than can be disclosed through the discovery process may be broader 
depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, some countries may require that the parties in the proceeding 
disclose all the documents on which they rely on, and also those documents which either adversely affect 
                                                          
162 The term “fishing expedition” describes a strategy to obtain evidence in an unfocused manner, through very broad discovery 
requests, from another party in the hope that some relevant evidence for a damages claim might be found. 
163 OECD (2007), p. 133. 
164 See Option 6 of the Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages (supra note 85). 
165 At the EU level, the White Paper on Damages (supra note 3) established a form of court-ordered discovery based on fact-
pleading, in this procedure the plaintiff will expose the relevant facts in detail and present all the available evidence supporting his 
allegations (pages 4 and 5). This proposal is resembles the approach of the Intellectual Property Directive (Directive 2004/48/EC). 
166 See Rule 26(a)(1) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
167 See Rule 26(b)(1) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
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their own case or the other party’s case, or even the ones that support another party’s case168.  Moreover, 
the discovery process may not be restricted to only documents under the physical possession of the 
requested party, but may extent to documents that have been under the control of the requested party in 
the past, or documents that the latter had a right to possession, or a right to inspect or take copies169. 
Other jurisdictions have restricted a bit more the discovery process. For instance, in some 
countries, the parties in the proceeding may only request documents that are relevant to the matters in 
dispute and that their disclosure is necessary to dispose fairly of the case or to minimize costs. In such 
cases, the requesting party will have to specify the precise category of documents demanded and the 
reasons why they are required170. Another restriction occurs in jurisdictions where there is not automatic 
discovery, thus, the obligation to disclose can only be ordered by the court171. 
With regard to non-party discovery, usually this kind of disclosure is stricter than inter-party 
discovery, thus, discovery against third parties or public authorities who are not directly involved in the 
proceedings will normally be more restricted172. Likewise, in some countries, non-party discovery will 
only happen after it has been ordered by the court173. Finally, in the more stringent jurisdictions, non-
party discovery may not be permitted at all174.  
Finally, common law pre-trial discovery has its own drawbacks. It has been argued that this kind 
of procedure can be expensive and time consuming, provided that the parties will have to spend a lot of 
time and resources on producing all the documents to the other party175, additionally, it also may impose 
an overly broad and burdensome disclosure obligation on the litigating parties 176. Furthermore, the 
introduction of pre-trial discovery should not be regarded as the panacea that will eliminate the obstacles 
faced by victims of the competition law infringement seeking compensation for the harm suffered in civil 
law countries, provided that only in one common law country with pre-trial discovery (USA) the number 
of private enforcement actions is significantly higher with respect to other countries that have similar 
disclosure procedures177. 
5. Limits of disclosure 
 
In most jurisdictions there are some limitations for the production of evidence in damages actions for the 
infringement of competition law. In such cases, a party may refuse to disclose certain evidence provided 
                                                          
168 See Rule 31.6 of the UK Civil Procedure Rules. In the process of disclosure, the parties are required to conduct a “reasonable 
search” for the documents concerned (Rule 31.7 of the Civil Procedure Rules). 
169 Rule 31.8 of the UK Civil Procedure Rules. 
170 This is the situation in Ireland.  
171 In the UK, discovery is restricted to what is necessary in the individual case, observing the overriding objective of handling cases 
justly (Rule 1.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules). In the UK there is not automatic discovery, however, in practice; the parties in the 
litigation will agree disclosure among themselves, provided that the court will order it anyway.  
172 In Ireland, non-party discovery is more restricted than inter-party discovery, and the judge has authority to refuse an order for 
non-party discovery.  
173 See Rule 31.17 of the UK Civil Procedure Rules, according to this rule, the Office of Fair Trading may be requested to provide 
certain documents. 
174 In Cyprus, there is no non-party discovery. However, third parties may be ordered by the court to disclose relevant information 
during the trial. 
175 See the Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages (supra note 85), at para 56.  
176 See the Commission’s White Paper on Damages (supra note 3), at page 5. 
177 OECD (2007), p. 133. 
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that such information may be protected by virtue of the professional secrecy privilege, the protection of 
trade secrets, or when it is part of an administrative/public proceeding.   
(a) Professional secrecy 
 
The professional secrecy is a legal privilege that protects communications between a professional legal 
adviser and its clients from being discovered where these contain confidential information supplied by a 
client to its legal adviser, or advice supplied by the latter to its clients178. The main purpose of this legal 
principle is the protection of the confidentiality of certain communications179, like: lawyer-client, 
psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets 
of state and other official information, or the identity of an informer180. The importance of the protection 
of such communication is fundamental to guarantee a fair access to the judicial system, and has even been 
recognized by the Constitutions of some countries181. 
In practice, the scope of this legal principle varies from one jurisdiction to another. The main 
point of divergence related to the professional privilege is the extent of the protection conferred by this 
privilege. In jurisdictions where the professional privilege has a wide angle of protection, all disclosure 
will be protected by the professional secrecy privilege, in such cases; all privileged information will be 
safe from disclosure. For instance, in some jurisdictions, attorney-client communications will not be 
disclosed even if they are contained in the records of public authorities182, moreover, a party may even 
claim the professional secrecy privilege as an objection to interrogatories, requests for admission, 
depositions, or a court may quash or modify a subpoena whenever the disclosure of privileged 
information is being required183.   
 Some jurisdictions differentiate legal assistance from legal advice with respect to whether or not 
apply the professional privilege. The former, would concern the instructions from a legal adviser on how 
to complete a legal mortgage, which will not be protected by the professional privilege if they are not 
related to the conduct of litigation184. And the latter, will be protected by professional privilege, given that 
it is presumed that when an individual seeks legal advice he is more prone to litigate185. 
 Finally, some countries provide that only the communications between independent attorneys 
and its clients will be protected by the professional privilege, and conversely, the communications 
sustained by an in-house attorney and its client will not be covered by the professional secrecy 
                                                          
178 See Rule 26(b)(1) of the USA Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the parties may gain through discovery any 
non-privileged matter. 
179 Perrigon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (D.C. Cal. 1978). 
180 Rule 501 of the US Federal Rules of Evidence. 
181 In Spain, attorney-client communications are privileged according to Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution. The Spanish 
Competition Authority acknowledged this in its Decision of July 22, 2002, Pepsi-Cola v. Coca-Cola, exp. R508/02. See also Article 
2 paragraph 18 of the Peruvian Constitution. 
182 In the US, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, a party in a proceeding has the right to make a request seeking all 
relevant public information contained in the administration records. However, privileged information, such as attorney-client 
communications are protected from being disclosed in such a manner (5 U.S.C. §552(B)(4)). 
183 See Rules 33(b)(4), 36(a)(1), 26()(1) and 45(c)(3)(A) of the USA Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
184 See Irish case law: Smurfit Paribas Bank Ltd. V AAB Export Finance Ltd [1990] 1 IR 473. 
185 See Irish case law: Smurfit Paribas Bank Ltd. V AAB Export Finance Ltd (No 2) [1991] 2 IR 19. 
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privilege186. Nevertheless, in some countries, the clients of in-house attorneys may claim legal privilege 
concerning their communications with those attorneys187.  
(b) Trade secrets  
 
A party in a proceeding may also refuse to disclose certain evidence, provided that such information is 
considered to be a trade secret188. The extent to which disclosure can be refused based on the protection of 
trade secrets also varies among jurisdictions. In some countries, only third parties may refuse to disclose 
evidence on the grounds of trade secrets protection189. In other countries, the court may decide to held, the 
whole or parts of, the hearing behind closed doors for the purpose of protecting trade secrets from being 
revealed190. The level of protection differs depending on what kind of documents may be refused from 
disclosure: some may protect only trade secrets or information on the structure of competitors191, while 
others may cover technical work equipment and working methods192. Finally, in some jurisdictions, the 
disclosure of trade secrets is entirely up to the discretion of the court193, and in some cases, the parties to a 
proceeding may not refuse to produce certain evidence based on trade secret protection194. 
(c) Privileged information in public documents 
 
Some documents contained in public records may also be exempted from disclosure given that they may 
be privileged or may contain sensitive information, e.g. trade secrets about a party in a civil procedure195. 
In such cases, the request for disclosure will be sent to the public body holding the information –patent 
office, competition authority, or any other public authority. With regard to the access to public documents 
a bunch of countries have specific regulations concerning the access to information hold by public 
bodies196. Since the nature of such information is considered to be public, in theory, it should be 
accessible to any citizen, in some cases including foreigners197, who requires it. However, there are 
exceptions to the duty of disclosure of public documents which may be based on legal privilege, the 
protection of trade secrets, or the principle of secrecy of criminal investigations, among others. 
                                                          
186 In Sweden, the Stockholm City Court determined that an independent foreign attorney (from Scotland) was protected by legal 
privilege (Ä 10773-03, Konkurrensverket v. Nynäs AB et al., July 14, 2003). This is also the position at EU level (Joined cases T-
125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chamicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
ECR II-03523). 
187 Ireland. 
188 Under Article 843 of the Dutch Civil Code of Procedure, a party in a proceeding may request the production of certain 
documents, unless these are considered trade secrets. Moreover, in Sweden the disclosure of trade secrets is protected by the Act on 
Protection of Trade Secrets. In the US a party may refuse to disclose trade secrets information pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In the UK, in proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the latter may be prevented from 
disclosing business secrets (CAT Rule 53).   
189 See Section 142(2) of the German Civil Procedure Code. 
190 In the US, the court may order a party who is refusing to produce certain evidence to disclose the documents to the court in 
camera, in order to determine if those documents may be withheld from disclosure on grounds of privilege (Privilege, in the sense of 
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Similar is the situation in Denmark where the court may hold the hearing behind closed 
doors to protect trade secrets. 
191 France. 
192 Germany.  
193 In Israel, the court will disapprove the disclosure of trade secrets whenever it may affect the competitive environment. 
194 Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Malta, Portugal. 
195 For instance, in Spain pursuant to Article 42 of the Competition Act, all confidential documents in the antitrust procedure are 
exempted from being disclosed in court. 
196 For example, in the US the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.S. §552 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)); in France, Law of 17 July 
1978 (Loi n078-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d'amelioration des relations entre l'administration et Ie public et 
diverses dispositions d'ordre administratif, social et fiscal); or in Sweden the Publicity and Secrecy Act. 
197 In Sweden, any individual, including foreigners, may access information held by public institutions thanks to the constitutional 
principles guaranteeing public access to information. 
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With regard to the disclosure of information held by the competition authorities, most of them 
will refuse to provide to civil courts sensitive information obtained in a prior investigation or public 
proceeding about a party now litigating in a civil dispute198. Additionally, the competition authorities are 
generally reluctant to provide confidential information provided by the defendant in a leniency 
application199. This is mainly because the disclosure of information acquired by the competition authority 
via leniency applications can severely affect the effectiveness of leniency programs, as potential 
applicants will be discouraged to come forward and report the cartel200.    
6. Sanctions for the failure to disclose 
 
In most countries a party that refuses to disclose requested evidence is subject to penalties. The sanctions 
that may be imposed range from financial penalties to imprisonment in the more stringent jurisdictions.  
 Even in common law countries, which characterize for having broad pre-trial discovery 
procedures, where the parties conduct most of the process without the intervention of the judge, there are 
some mechanisms to compel the refusing party to produce the evidence required. In those cases, the court 
may first require that the parties meet to try to reach a mutually agreeable solution, if the parties request 
the intervention of the court via a motion to compel discovery without meeting previously, the court can 
deny the motion on that basis alone201. If after meeting the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the 
court will grant a motion to compel if it considers that the refuse to disclose is not substantially justified. 
Furthermore, if the compelled party does not produce the requested evidence after being ordered by the 
court, then the court may impose a series of sanctions on the non-complying party202. 
 The most common penalty for the failure to disclose requested evidence is monetary sanction. 
The monetary sanctions may be imposed on the parties to the proceeding203, to third parties that were 
requested to produce certain evidence204, and additionally, against the party’s attorneys205. Moreover, the 
financial penalties may take different forms, such as fines, payment of damages or periodic penalty 
payments206. 
                                                          
198 In Peru, Article 32 of the Antitrust Law determines the obligation of the competition authority of keeping confidential any 
sensitive information gathered during its investigation. In Switzerland, according to Articles 25 and 40 of the Cartel Act, the 
competition authorities are bound by professional secrecy, thus, the information collected in the performance of their duties can only 
be used for the purpose of the investigation. 
199 The French Competition Authority established in its 2005 annual report that the effectiveness of leniency programs would be 
affected by the disclosure of privileged information and business secrets when required by courts (Annual Report 2005, Etude 
thématique, p. 145).  
200 For additional information on the protection of documents contained in leniency applications, please see Chapter Two, Section 
IV.6. Additionally, for information about the disclosure of leniency applications in follow-on civil procedures, please see Section 
VIII.4, below.  
201 Rule 37(a)(1) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Use Techno Corp. v. Kenko USA, Inc., No 06-02754, 2007 
WL 3045996 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007). 
202 Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judge may impose a variety of sanctions on the requested 
party: (1) consider the matters or facts that were the subject of the order compelling discovery to be established for the purposes of 
litigation; (2) prohibit the non-compliant party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing 
designated matters into evidence; (3) strike pleadings in whole or in part; (4) stay proceedings until the order is complied with; (5) 
dismiss the action in whole or in part; (6) render default judgment against the non-compliant party; (7) consider as contempt of court 
the failure to comply with the order. 
203 Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. 
204 Belgium, Czech Republic and Denmark. 
205 Rules 37(b)(2)(c) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
206 France and Estonia. Also in Germany but only when disclosure is demanded from a third party. 
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 In the most stringent jurisdictions, the courts may sanction a party that refuses to comply with a 
disclosure order: with imprisonment (only third parties)207, commit them to legal custody (only third 
parties)208, or order a writ of attachment against them209. Moreover, some courts may opt to dismiss the 
action in case of a non-complying plaintiff, or struck out the defense in case of a non-complying 
defendant210.  
 In other jurisdictions, the courts may draw conclusions from the refusal to comply with an order 
to produce certain information. The extent of the conclusions drawn varies among jurisdictions. In some 
countries, the refusal to disclose will lead the judge to consider that the matter or facts that were subject to 
the order of disclosure are established for the purposes of the proceeding211. However, in other 
jurisdictions the refusal may not be conclusive and other evidence will be required212. 
 Finally, in the less intrusive jurisdictions, the courts cannot order the disclosure of evidence 
which is requested inter-parties213.   
7. Admissibility of expert witnesses  
 
Due to the multidisciplinary nature of antitrust litigation, experts are a necessary asset for an effective 
enforcement of the competition rules. The experts provide the specific knowledge or technical expertise 
required in the most complex antitrust cases. In competition law litigation, experts from fields like 
economics, statistics, econometrics, industries and markets are employed by courts and by the litigating 
parties to assist them on specific issues such as: to determine if a certain market is conducive to collusion, 
to calculate the market share of a determined undertaking, to calculate the amount of damages that rise 
from an anticompetitive conduct, or if there is a procompetitive rationale to sustain the defendant’s 
conduct.  
 The approach most jurisdictions have with regard to the appointment of experts can be 
summarized in two systems. In the first one, the courts are empowered to appoint an expert to provide the 
court with specialized advice concerning certain facts of the case; such appointment can be done at the 
request of the parties in the dispute or ex officio by the court. In the second one, the parties in the 
proceeding will hire experts on their own either to provide them with specific advice before filing the 
case, or to testify before the court as expert witnesses supporting the party’s allegations.  
 There are some issues with these two approaches however. On the one hand, when the judge 
appoints an expert to assist him in the decision process, the parties may often decide to challenge any 
opinion of the expert which is unfavorable for the party’s case. On the other hand, when the parties 
appoint an expert to advise them or to testify as an expert witness, the opinion of the latter will be biased 
or impartial most of the times, provided that the experts are paid by the parties to sustain the facts alleged 
                                                          
207 In Germany, the court may order the imprisonment for up to six months of a non-complying third party in case of repeated 
disobedience. 
208 In Denmark, the court may commit a non-complying third party to legal custody for a period no longer of six months. 
209 Ireland. 
210 Ireland. 
211 Germany, Latvia, US. 
212 France, Hungary, Italy. 
213 Denmark, Germany.  
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in their claims, consequently, the other party will more than frequently challenge the report or testimony 
presented by the other’s party expert. As a solution to these issues, it has been proposed a mixed system 
where the court’s expert assists the court in evaluating the evidence submitted by the parties’ experts214. 
The evidence produced by an expert is always submitted to the court as a written report, 
irrespectively if it is made by an expert appointed by the court or by the experts hired by the parties. 
Additionally, the experts’ evidence may take the form of a testimony when the expert appears as a 
witness in the proceeding. As with other procedural issues related to the private enforcement of 
competition law, the experts matter is mostly regulated by general civil provisions. Notwithstanding, 
there are some competition law regimes that have specific competition law provisions allowing parties to 
appoint their experts to provide them with specific evidence in proceedings concerning the infringement 
of the competition rules215.  
(a) Experts Appointed by Courts 
 
The appointment of an expert in civil litigation may be done in most countries by the court acting ex 
officio whenever the court believes it needs an expert opinion in a specific matter216. In most cases, the 
experts appointed by the courts work under the supervision of the latter, and the judge will not be bound 
by the conclusions made by the expert217. Moreover, the court will reserve for itself the ability to instruct 
the expert on the form, extent and scope of the report218. Under some jurisdictions, the parties might have 
to ask the permission of the court before making any question to the testimony or comment on the report 
submitted by the expert appointed by the court219. Albeit, in other countries the parties are free to ask and 
comment on the evidence presented by the court’s expert220. Additionally, in some countries, the parties 
in the proceeding may be under the obligation to cooperate with the court’s expert when the latter is 
gathering all the evidence it considers relevant to the establishment of the case221. Moreover, the 
appointment of the expert in some countries may not be precluded to the assistance of the court with 
regard to specific disciplines, such as economy or specific industries, but it may also be used to help the 
court on issues that are more typical to the judiciary, i.e. assist the court to conduct the discovery process 
among the litigating parties222. 
 Depending on the jurisdiction, whenever a party makes a request for the appointment of an 
expert, the courts will be more or less prone to accept the party’s request. In some countries, the 
appointment of an expert at the request of a party is entirely up to the discretion of the judge; hence, the 
                                                          
214 OECD (2007), p. 13. 
215 See Section 9 of the Irish Competition Act.  
216 In some countries the appointment of exerts can only be done by the courts acting at its own motion. In Denmark, pursuant to the 
Administration of Justice Act, only the court may appoint experts. Similarly, in Taiwan, only the court may appoint experts at the 
petition of the parties (Article 325 and 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
217 See Article 246 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
218 Denmark, Italy, Germany. 
219 Denmark. 
220 Germany, the Netherlands. 
221 In the Netherlands the parties are obliged to assist the court’s expert in its information gathering, the failure to do so may allow 
the court to draw whatever concussions it considers necessary. In Turkey, according to Article 75(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 
the parties have to produce all the necessary evidence required by the expert, and the failure to such order will drive the court to 
make a negative inference on the disputed matter.  
222 See Article 75 of the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure. 
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judge will freely accept or reject the request of the parties223. The courts may sometimes require the 
participation of the parties when appointing an expert. Thus, in some jurisdictions, the parties will be 
allowed to make a statement with their opinion before the appointment of the expert224. Moreover, in 
other countries, the courts may not deny a request made by a party asking for the appointment of an 
expert in the proceeding225. 
(b) Experts Hired by the Parties 
 
The parties may freely appoint experts to assist them in proving its case in some countries226. The most 
frequent task of experts assigned by the parties is to assist the latter with the calculation of the damages 
that the plaintiff has suffered for the alleged anticompetitive conduct of the defendant227. The experts 
hired by the parties may, in some circumstances, have to interact with the experts appointed by the courts, 
thus, the experts of the parties will have to ask questions to the court’s expert witness, or comment on the 
report issued by the court’s expert228.  
In order to foster the objectivity in the proceeding of the experts hired by the parties, some 
jurisdiction, may require that the experts states under oath that he has acted as objectively as possible with 
regard to all facts that could benefit or harm either parties in the proceedings, and that he is aware of the 
criminal sanctions which might be incurred if fails to fulfill his duty as an expert229. Moreover, in some 
jurisdictions, the parties are under the obligation to disclose to the other parties the identity of the person 
being assigned as an expert before the beginning of the trial230. 
(c) Requisites to be appointed as an Expert  
 
In some jurisdictions not any person can be appointed as an expert in a proceeding. Some countries have 
list of authorized experts and institutions from which the court may select an expert to appear in the 
proceeding231. In addition, some courts have refined the requirements that an expert has to fulfill in order 
to be appointed by the judge. For instance, a court may only accept experts that by reason of their 
training, experience or knowledge satisfy the expectations of the court232. Furthermore, in some 
jurisdictions, the courts may call as an expert a determined public authority, or officer qualified on the 
matter at trial233. Even though, these are not experts appointed either by the judge or by the parties, in 
some countries, the evidence provided by the experts appointed by the competition authorities in their 
                                                          
223 Germany. 
224 In Hungary, at least in theory, the parties should be heard before the appointment of the expert, and if possible, their opinions 
should be taken into account.   
225 Canada, UK, US. 
226 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Peru, Spain, UK, US, Norway, 
227 In Canada, see cases: Axiom Plastics Inc. v. E.I. DuPont Canada Co., [2007] O.J. No 3327 (S.C.J.), aff’d [2008] O.J. No 1973 
(Div. Ct.); or Irving Paper Ltd. V. Atofina Chemicals Inc. [2009] O.J. No 4021 (S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused [2010] O.J. No 2472 
(S.C.J.).  
228 Italy. 
229 See Article 335(2) of the Spanish Civil Procedure Act. 
230 Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
231 In France, the courts will only appoint independent and registered experts (Code of Civil Procedure, Article 232 et seq). In 
Ireland, a non-exhaustive list of categories of experts is provided for in the Rules of the Superior Court, which includes: scientists, 
architects, dentists, doctors, engineers, accountants and actuaries. 
232 In Ireland, see case: Attorney General (Ruddy) v. Kenny (1960) 94 I.L.T. 185, 190. 
233 In Sweden, see Chapter 40, Section 1 of the Code of judicial Procedure. 
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own investigations or in public actions for the infringement of the competition rules, may be used later by 
a private enforcer in a civil action for the violation of competition law234. 
(d) Evidential Value of the Experts’ Report  
 
Generally, the value of the evidence submitted by an expert may vary depending if the latter was 
appointed by the court or by the parties. Usually, the evidential value of the report or testimony presented 
by an expert that has been appointed by the court is higher than the evidence submitted by the expert 
hired by the parties. Furthermore, the evidential value of an expert’s report may only be admitted by the 
court if such a report is submitted by a recognized expert235. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the 
opinion of an expert hired by the parties is not considered as expert evidence, but it is merely a 
substantiated party statement236. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the evidence submitted by an expert 
hired by a party may be accepted or rejected under the sole discretion of the court237. Finally, in some 
countries, the finding of an infringement of the competition rules is considered as a legal issue that should 
only be decided by the court; consequently, the courts will not admit any expert evidence in this regard238. 
8. Level of Causation 
 
In any antitrust action for damages the requirement of causation, i.e. causal link between the harm 
suffered and the infringement of the competition rules, must be fulfilled in order to recover damages. 
Thus, through the element of causation, the courts will determine the defendant’s liability that arises from 
its alleged anticompetitive conduct.  
The element of causation in competition law cases may be too complex to prove for private 
plaintiffs, thus, the parties will often utilize economic experts and statistical experts to help them satisfy 
the causation requirement. The damage suffered by an antitrust victim is most of the times incarnated as 
the financial loss caused to the victim by the unlawful conduct of the defendant, which is reflected as the 
payment of supra-competitive prices. In those cases, the victim will have to prove that the payment of a 
supra-competitive price is the consequence of the alleged anticompetitive conduct of the defendant in 
order to be awarded damages. Nevertheless, the defendant may allege that such price increase is not 
caused by its unlawful conduct, but is the consequence of the normal functioning of the market or of the 
actions of third parties. As a result, proving causation will require, in most cases, heavy economic 
analysis which may be too burdensome for individual plaintiffs with little claims and especially in stand-
alone actions.     
The level of causation required in private competition law litigation is extremely diverse among 
jurisdictions, plus, the fact that there are no competition law cases in most countries that clarify this issue 
reduces the availability of a clear picture on this matter. 
                                                          
234 India and Turkey. 
235 In Ireland there is a non-exhaustive list of experts in the Rules of the Superior Court, which includes: scientists, architects, 
dentists, doctors, engineers, accountants and actuaries 
236 Germany. 
237 For instance, in Spain a court decided a case basing its decision on the evidence presented by the claimant’s expert, and 
considered that the defendant’s expert evidence stating that no injury was caused was not credible (Decision of October 9, 2009 of 
the Audiencia Provincial de Valladolid). 
238 Hungary. 
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8.1. Direct and Indirect Causal Link 
 
In a broad sense, the requirement of causation may be divided in jurisdictions that require a direct causal 
link; and jurisdictions that require an indirect causal link between the infringement of the competition 
rules and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Therefore, in practice the success of an action for damages 
will be subject to the demonstration of the required level of causation. Thus, in some countries, the courts 
may require direct causation in order to award damages239, i.e. the damage would not have occurred to the 
same extent in the absence of (but for)240 the plaintiff’s behavior, or that the infringement of the 
competition rules is a condicio sine qua non241 of the damage. However, other jurisdictions refer to terms 
such as: adequacy242, reasonable causation243, proximate causation244, remoteness or directness245 in order 
to determine causation. 
Finally, some jurisdictions may lower the requirements to prove causation, or even turn the 
burden of proof to the defendant. For instance, when a defendant has created a risk of damage and 
actually damage subsequently occurred, then the level of causation will lower for the plaintiff246. 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions the burden of proof is shifted if the defendant acted grossly negligent247.  
IV. GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION 
  
The grounds of justification are special circumstances that make the infringement of a right or breach of a 
duty reasonable and therefore lawful. In private antitrust litigation, the defendant may be capable of 
exonerate himself from the civil liability that arises from the infringement of the competition provisions 
caused by its anticompetitive conduct, based on such grounds of justification. Normally, in those cases, 
the onus of proving that the practice is not unlawful is on the defendant.  
 There are some general grounds of justification that may be applied to competition law matters. 
For instance, the force major justification may apply in competition law cases, which consists in an event 
that is unpredictable, irresistible and independent of the defendant’s willfulness. Also, in cases where the 
defendant has acted in a state of emergency or out of necessity, its actions will be justified, and therefore, 
not be considered as unlawful. Additionally, an anticompetitive conduct may be justified in cases of self-
defense, when the anticompetitive conduct is in response to the anticompetitive conduct of another party. 
There is no closed list of grounds of justifications, however, the most commonly used in 
competition law cases are: (i) the act of the state that encourages or compels the infringement; (ii) the 
                                                          
239 Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Sweden, UK, US. 
240 Taiwan, US. 
241 Germany, Italy. 
242 France. 
243 Korea. 
244 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig. (supra note 96); Catlin v. Wash. Energy Co., 791 F2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986); Mid-
West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F. 2d 573, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1979); Reibert v. Atl. Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 
731 (10th Cir. 1973). 
245 UK. 
246 The Netherlands. 
247 Denmark. 
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consent of the plaintiff to the unlawful conduct of the defendant; (iii) the passing-on defense; and (iv) the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. 
(a) The Act of the State that Encourages or Compels the Infringement 
 
The anticompetitive practices of the defendant may be justified whenever a public body has encouraged 
or compelled the anticompetitive conduct. Such will be the case where a public authority passes a specific 
compulsory legislation, in those specific cases; the complained conduct will be justified provided that the 
compulsory legislation requires the perpetration of the anticompetitive conduct248. 
Furthermore, some anticompetitive practices may be authorized by competition authorities, 
given that such conducts would result in a public benefit that outweighs the anticompetitive detriment249. 
Additionally, in some competition law regimes, the government may exempt any class of enterprises from 
the application of the competition provisions in the interest of security of the State or public interest250. 
Finally, state monopolies are exempted from the application of the competition provisions in some 
countries, and hence, these are allowed251.  
(b) The Consent of the Plaintiff to the Unlawful Conduct of the Defendant 
 
Some jurisdictions recognize the possibility to justify the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant based 
on the fact that the victim has given its consent to the conduct in question. Nevertheless, the consent 
justification may be limited in some extent in jurisdictions where the liability of the defendant cannot be 
excluded in its totality unless the responsibility of the plaintiff is “significant”252. Furthermore, in some 
countries, the consent of the defendant would constitute an infringement of the competition rules in itself, 
hence, the fact that the claimant has given its consent to the anticompetitive conduct does not qualify as a 
justification for the defendant.  
(c) The Passing-on Defense 
 
An anticompetitive conduct may harm market participants in different layers of the distribution chain, as 
a consequence, such behavior does not only injures the purchasers in the subsequent downstream market, 
                                                          
248 Article L. 420-4 of the French Commercial Code provides that practices that result from the application of laws are not caught by 
the provisions regarding anticompetitive practices. The same consequence applies to practices whose perpetrators can prove that 
they have the effect of ensuring economic progress, including by creating or maintaining jobs, and that they reserve a share of the 
resulting profit to the users, without giving the opportunity to the undertakings involved to eliminate competition for a substantial 
part of the products in question. 
249 With regard to the grounds of justification at the EU level, an anticompetitive conduct may be justified if the latter contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit (Article 101(3) of the TFEU). Most Member States have introduced to their national law equivalent 
provisions to justify anticompetitive conducts that comply with the TFEU requirements (In Finland, Section 6 of the Competition 
Act; in Germany, Section 2 of the Act against Restraints of Competition; in Malta, Section 5(3) of the Competition Act; in Portugal 
Section 5 of the Competition Act; in Spain, Article 1.3 of the Competition Act). However, there are some non-EU countries that 
have similar provisions, see: Sections 88 and 90 of the Australian Competition and Consumer Act; the third schedule of the 
Singaporean Competition Act; Section 10 of the South African Competition Act; or Article 5(2) of the Swiss Federal Act on Cartels 
and Other Restraints of Competition. 
250 See Section 54 of the Indian Competition Act. 
251 In Mexico, state monopolies are allowed by Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution, provided that they serve the public interest.  
252 See: the Courage case (supra note 37), at para 31. In this case, the ECJ established a series of parameters that can be used in 
order to determine the responsibility of the co-contracting parties: (i) the economic and legal context of each case; (ii) the respective 
bargaining power and conduct of each of the co-contractors; (iii) whether a party is in such a substantially weak position that it 
cannot negotiate the contractual terms freely; and (iv) the cumulative effects on competition of any other similar contracts, if parts 
of a network.  
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given that the antitrust damage may be inflicted upon purchasers and non-purchasers at all levels of the 
supply chain.  
If a cartel or a dominant company sells its goods at supra-competitive prices, a direct purchaser, 
e.g. a wholesaler, suffers as a result of having paid a price that is in excess of the competitive price. 
However, the direct purchaser may be able to pass-on all or some of the loss to the next purchaser in the 
chain, e.g. a retailer or a consumer. These purchasers, who are only indirectly linked with the seller, e.g. a 
cartelist or a dominant firm engaged in anti-competitive behavior, in turn suffer a loss by paying a supra-
competitive price which has been passed-on to them. 
 The passing-on defense is a justification raised by the defendant in a private action for damages 
grounded on the infringement of the competition rules, where the latter alleges that the plaintiff has been 
able to pass the damage in whole or in part on to his customers by raising prices correspondingly, and as a 
result, the plaintiff has not suffered any damage himself253. The passing-on defense raises two questions 
concerning the private enforcement of competition law. The first is related to the availability of such a 
defense in competition law cases. And the second is concerned with the standing of indirect purchasers to 
sue for the harm suffered due to the defendant’s anticompetitive conduct. 
With regard to the discussed above, the existence of the passing-on defense as a justification for 
the defendant’s conduct should be closely connected to the standing of indirect purchasers. For instance, 
if on the one hand, a determined jurisdiction decides not to allow the passing-on defense to the defendant, 
and on the other hand, courts grant standing to indirect purchasers to sue for damages, this situation 
would expose the defendant to cumulated claims. Oppositely, if the passing-on defense and the indirect 
purchasers’ standing are not allowed, then, the direct purchaser plaintiff would enricher at the expense of 
the indirect purchaser who is actually the one that suffered the antitrust damage.  
 Some jurisdictions, have considered that the complexity of calculating the overcharged passed-
on down the supply chain, coupled with the availability of treble damages and the risk of duplicative 
recovery, would require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and 
complicated theories. Moreover, if a direct purchaser would be subject to a defense that it has passed-on 
the overcharge to its own customers, the claim for damages would keep running all the way down in the 
supply chain until the end consumers, who would only have suffered a small overcharge, maybe even too 
small to make their claims cost-effective. Consequently, in those cases, only direct purchasers would be 
allowed recover the entire amount of the overcharge254. However, some exceptions apply to this 
approach. The first occurs when the direct purchaser has sold the goods in question to an indirect 
purchaser pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract255. And the second, happens when the indirect 
purchaser actually owns or controls the direct purchaser256.  
                                                          
253 For techniques on how to measure the impact of the passing-on see the study made by the law firm Ashurst for the European 
Commission with regard to economic models for the calculation of damages: Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case 
of infringement of EC competition rules: Analysis of economic models for the calculation of damages, 2004, at pages 33 and 34. 
254 In the US, see Hannover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. (supra note 75); and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (supra note 
40). 
255 See Illinois Brick, at 732, n. 12. This exception was also acknowledged in Hannover Shoe, at 494 (supra note 40). 
256 See Illinois Brick, at 736, n. 16 (supra note 40). 
241 
 
Similarly, in one jurisdiction, a provincial court has denied the availability of the passing-on 
defense, provided that indirect purchasers do not have a cause of action under the competition 
provisions257. Finally, in some countries, even though, there are no specific provisions repealing the 
passing-on defense or do not have relevant case law on the subject, the passing-on defense is not allowed 
based on general civil rules258. 
Despite the above, most competition law regimes, at least in theory, recognize the possibility of 
the defendant to allege the passing-on defense. However, the majority of countries, either does not have 
specific provisions regulating the matter of the passing-on defense259, or does not have relevant case law 
regarding this issue260. Irrespective of the fact that most competition law regimes do not have specific 
rules allowing the passing-on defense, the possibility to invoke such defense may be grounded in the 
general principles of compensation of the damage caused (allowing indirect purchasers to recover the 
damage suffered), and the prohibition of the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff in actions for damages 
(allowing the passing-on defense). 
(d) Contributory Negligence 
 
Contributory negligence is a type of defense to a civil claim which is grounded on the negligence of the 
plaintiff. In order for the contributory negligence defense to apply the plaintiff has to contribute to the 
harm suffered through his own negligence or fault. Most jurisdictions provide for a reduction in the 
amount of damages whenever the claimant has contributed to the infringement on which the claim is 
                                                          
257 In Canada, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in two recent cases expressly established the inexistence of the passing-on 
defense and the ability of indirect purchasers to sue for damages (Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation; and Sun-Rype 
Products ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company (supra note 84).  
258 In Cyprus the courts may be reluctant to allow the passing-on defense. In Lithuania, even if it is proved beyond reasonable doubt 
that the purchaser has passed-on the overcharge, such a defense is not considered relevant or appropriate if undue benefits were 
obtained unjustly by the defendant. 
259 As an exception, Germany has adopted specific competition provisions regarding the passing-on defense: “If a good or a service 
was purchased at an inflated price, the existence of damage is not precluded because the good or the service was resold” (Section 
33(3) of the Act against Restraints of Competition).  
260 In Denmark, the court in: GT-Linien under konkurs v. De Danske Statsbaner DSB; Ekko A/S v. Brandt Group Norden A/S, 
acknowledged the availability of the passing-on defense. In France, the courts have decided on the passing-on issue in three 
occasions. On May 2006, the Nanterre Commercial Court dismissed the damages claim of the pharmaceutical company 
Arkopharma. The plaintiff claimed that it had suffered harm from the overcharge imposed by its suppliers Roche and Hoffman La 
Roche, both members of the “Vitamins Cartel”. In that case, the court determined that Arkopharma had the opportunity to pass-on 
the overcharge by raising its own resale prices, given that the increase was applied by all the industry (Arkopharma v Roache and 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Nanterre Commercial Court, 11 May 2006). On January 2007, the Paris Commercial Court also dismissed a 
claim for damages of the pharmaceutical Juva Santé and Juva Producition. The plaintiffs in the case alleged that damages where 
inflicted by the anticompetitive behavior of their suppliers: Hoffman La Roche and subsidiaries. The plaintiffs argued that they could 
not have passed the overcharge on to their customers since the increase would have resulted in a loss of their market shares (Paris 
Commercial Court, 26 January 2007, Juva Santé et Juva Production SED c/ Société Hoffman La Roche AG). Finally, on June 2010, 
the French Commercial Supreme Court acknowledged the passing-on defense in follow-on actions for damages brought by Doux 
Aliments. The plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered from the overcharge imposed by their supplier, the company Ajinomoto 
Eurolyne. The Court of Cassation rejected their claim and decided that they have passed the raw material increase on their own 
prices to customers and thus have not suffered from any damage pursuant to Article 1382 of the Civil Code France. In Germany, on 
June 28 of 2011, the German Supreme Court finally shed light on the indirect purchasers’ standing and the availability of the 
passing-on defense. The case was brought by Kreissparkasse Steinfurt, a savings bank that pursued the damage claims of an 
insolvent printing firm on the basis of an assignment of claims against Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, a papermaker fined by the 
European Commission for being part of a price fixing cartel in 2001 (Decision 2004/337/EC of 20 December 2001). In its decision, 
the Supreme Court established that indirect purchasers of the members of a cartel can bring direct damages claims against the 
members of the latter. Furthermore, the Supreme Court confirmed that the members of a cartel can defend themselves against a 
damage claim by arguing that the purchasers had actually been able to pass-on the overcharge to their customers (BGH 28.6.2011, 
KZR 75/10 – Papierfabrik August Koehler AG). In Italy, the courts have also decided on the passing-on defense. In the Juventus 
case, the Turin Court of Appeal considered the passing-on as a sort of contributory negligence and denied to award damages to the 
plaintiff who had intentionally passed the overcharge to the final consumer (Turin Court of Appeal, 6 July 2000, Indaba Incentive 
co. v. Società Juventus F. C. S.p.A.). In the UK, the Court of Appeal in 2010 acknowledged that British Airways could plead the 
passing-on defense against some of the members of the class. Even though British Airways did not invoke the passing-on defense, 
the court’s decision implies that such a defense is available in the UK.  
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based261. This kind of defense is contained in general principles of civil law; thus, it is not exclusive for 
competition law litigation.  
In practice, the contributory negligence defense will result in the reduction of the amount of 
damages in proportion to the contributory negligence. However, the degree of success of the contributory 
negligence defense varies among jurisdictions and ranges from the reduction of the amount of damages to 
the full absolution of the defendant. 
Remarkably, the contributory negligence defense will be allowed even in jurisdictions where the 
element of fault is not needed in order to establish the civil liability of the defendant for the infringement. 
As a result, the fault element will not be necessary to establish the defendant’s liability for the 
infringement; however, the plaintiff’s fault in contributing to the infringement will be taken into account 
as a way to reduce damages262.          
The reduction of the award of damages may also be subject to the duty of plaintiffs to mitigate 
the potential losses caused by the infringement of the competition rules. In such cases, the amount of 
damages required from the defendant will be reduced whenever the plaintiff fails to take the appropriate 
measures to restrict the damage. Likewise, in most countries, the amount awarded in damages to the 
claimant may be reduced if the latter has benefited from the challenged infringement of the competition 
rules. This reduction is grounded on the principle that the claimant may only be compensated for the harm 
actually suffered, thus precluding, the plaintiff from being unjustly enriched. 
V. LIMITATION PERIODS 
 
As a general civil rule, all jurisdictions have limitation periods which determine that after their expiration 
any damages claim becomes statute barred. Particularly in competition law litigation, limitation periods, 
on the one hand, serve the fundamental principle of legal certainty by ensuring that the legal position of 
the parties becomes irreversible at a certain point in time, and on the other hand, limitation periods may 
turn out to be significant restrictions for the private enforcement of competition law depending on its 
duration, the moment they begin to run and whether or not they can be suspended. 
(a) Initiation of the Limitation Periods 
 
Just like with other procedural issues, limitation periods regarding private actions for the infringement of 
the competition law provisions vary widely between jurisdictions. The first difference evidenced is the 
time from which the limitation periods begin to run. In some countries, the limitation periods are set 
irrespective of the knowledge of the plaintiff, in such cases; the statutory limitation begins to run from the 
date on which the infringement took place263. Oppositely, in other countries, the beginning of the 
                                                          
261 However, in the UK, since non-contractual competition law-based damages actions are brought for the breach of statutory duty, 
there is no fault requirement and consequently the award of damages will not be reduced due to the fault of the plaintiff. 
262 For instance, in France, the mere infringement of the competition provisions presupposes the existence of fault on behalf of the 
defendant. As to the plaintiff’s fault, this will not affect the defendant’s liability for the infringement of the competition rules, but it 
will reduce the amount of damages that the defendant is obliged to pay.   
263 Australia, Canada, Israel, Mexico, Scotland, Sweden, UK, Ukraine, US. 
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statutory limitation will depend on the subjective knowledge of the potential plaintiff, then, the limitation 
period will run from the date the damage was detected or ought to have been detected264. Moreover, in 
some countries, both statutory limitation approaches apply; on the one hand, there is a subjective 
limitation period which depends on the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff, and on the other hand, there 
is an objective or absolute limitation period, which is usually longer than the latter, and begins to run 
irrespectively of the plaintiff’s knowledge265. Finally, in competition regimes where stand-alone damages 
actions for the infringement of the competition provisions are not allowed, the limitation period will begin 
to run after the decision of the competition authority finding the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant 
becomes final266. In follow-on actions, the main rule is that the limitation period begins to run from the 
date on which the decision finding an infringement of the competition provision becomes final, either 
because the decision can no longer be appealed, or because the action accrued267. Notwithstanding, some 
competition regimes allow courts to grant permission to the victims of an anticompetitive conduct to file 
an action for damages before the decision declaring the infringement becomes final268.   
Moreover, in some jurisdictions the courts have made determinations with respect to when the 
limitation period actually begins to run in order to prevent the expiration of the victims’ right of action269. 
In such cases, the limitation periods are not suspended but its beginning will only happen under certain 
circumstances for the purpose of favoring the potential plaintiffs270.    
(b) Duration of the Limitation Periods 
 
The duration of the limitation periods to bring an action for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions also differs among jurisdictions. As a consequence, the statutory limitation to bring a private 
                                                          
264 Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain. 
265 Korea, Portugal, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey.  
266 See Article 26(2) of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act that establishes a three year limitation period from the date on which the 
cease and desist order or the payment order or the decision of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission becomes final and binding. In 
Singapore, pursuant to Section 86 of the Competition Act, a private action concerning the application of the competition provisions 
has to be brought within two years from the date that the Competition Commission of Singapore makes a decision or upon the 
determination of any appeal.  Similarly, in South Africa, Section 65(9)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act establishes that a person’s 
right to bring an action for damages comes into existence on the date that the Competition Tribunal made a determination in respect 
of a matter that affects that person; or in case of an appeal, on the date that the appeal is concluded. 
267 This approach was proposed by the European Commission in its White Paper on Damages, suggesting that a new limitation 
period of at least two years should start once the infringement decision becomes final (page 9). 
268 See Rule 31(3) of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules. The CAT granted the plaintiffs permission to bring its claim before 
the defendant’s right of appeal was exhausted, provided that the CAT considered that there was a serious risk that certain evidence 
in the possession of the defendant would not be available for disclosure if the plaintiffs were supposed to wait until the decision 
became final (Emerson Electric Co. and others v Morgan Crucible Company PLC, Case No. 1077/5/7/07, [2007] CAT 30).     
269 At the EU level, the European Commission in its White Paper on Damages has proposed that limitation periods should not start 
to run: in cases of continuous or repeated infringement, before the day in which the infringement ceases; or before the victim can 
reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the infringement and the injury (page 8).  
270 Under Italian law, the five year limitation period starts running from the date in which the right at issue can be exercised, 
however, the Supreme Court has determined that the limitation periods in private antitrust actions start running only when the 
plaintiff can reasonably perceive that certain conduct may be infringing the competition provisions (Corte di Cassazione, judgment 
n. 2305 of February 2 2007, Fondiaria-SAI Assicurazioni c. Nigriello). Similarly, in the Netherlands, the five year limitation period 
begins to run on the date on which the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury and the liable party. The Rotterdam Court of First 
Instance in the CEF/Bestuurders case determined that the limitation period may start to run upon the media coverage of a dawn raid 
by the Netherlands Competition Authority (Rotterdam Court of First Instance, 7 March 2007, CEF/Bestuurders, LJN BA 0926). In 
Spain, regarding the one year limitation period that begins to run from the date the victim has knowledge of the injury; the Supreme 
Court has established the “accomplishment theory”, which determines that the statutory limitation begins to run when the plaintiff’s 
action is capable of being successful (Judgment of the Supreme Court of 8 June 2007, case 625/2007). In application of this theory, 
the Supreme Court allowed the initiation of a follow-on action for damages more than one year after the victim had gained 
knowledge of the injury, and determined that the claim was only possible after unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct was ruled 
by the European Commission, and as a consequence, the limitation period had not expired (Judgment of the Supreme Court of 
October 2, 2008, case 870/2008). 
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action can last: one year271; two years272; three years273; four years274; five years275; six years276; seven 
years277; ten years278; twenty years279; or thirty years280, as the longest period. However, in some 
jurisdictions, the duration of the limitation period will vary depending on if it is a stand-alone or follow-
on action281. 
(c) Interruption of the Limitation Periods  
 
Some jurisdictions allow the possibility to suspend the running of the limitation periods under some 
circumstances. The ability to suspend the limitation periods to bring a private action for the infringement 
of the competition rules concerns the relationship between public and private enforcement of competition 
law.  
The adoption of a final decision by a competition authority may take a long time due to the 
difficulties that most competition cases represent for public enforcers. This time period may be further 
enlarged by appeals or any other judicial review of the competition authority’s decision. As a 
consequence, the limitation period to bring a private action for the infringement of the competition rules, 
when too short or not suspended, may expire while the public procedures are still ongoing282. 
 To avoid this from happening and to provide the antitrust victim a fair chance to remedy the 
harm inflicted by bringing an action before civil courts, some competition regimes allow the suspension 
of the limitation period whenever: a competition authority has commenced investigations on the same 
matter283; a plaintiff has filed claim before the court284; the perpetrator has committed a new infraction285; 
                                                          
271 Spain, Switzerland (Subjective limitation period), Turkey (Subjective limitation period)  
272 Canada, China, Peru, Singapore, Taiwan (Subjective limitation period), UK (follow-on actions before the CAT) 
273 Austria, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Korea (Subjective limitation period), Portugal (Subjective limitation period) 
274 US. 
275 Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Scotland, Ukraine.  
276 Australia, UK (stand-alone actions before the High Court) 
277 Israel. 
278 Korea (Objective limitation period), Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (Objective limitation period), Turkey (Objective limitation 
period) 
279 Portugal (Objective limitation period) 
280 Austria, Germany. 
281 In the England, the limitation period for a stand-alone action brought before the High Court is six years, whereas the limitation 
period for a follow-on action brought before CAT is two years after the relevant date, which is the later of: (i) the date of the final 
infringement decision, once the period for appealing the infringement decision has expired with no appeal having been made or, if 
there was an appeal, the appeal has been finally determined; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrued (Rule 31 of the 
CAT Rules 2003).   
282 “[a] national rule under which the limitation period begins to run from the day on which the agreement or concerted practice 
was adopted could make it practically impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused by that prohibited 
agreement or practice, particularly if that national rule also imposes a short limitation period which is not capable of being 
suspended” (Manfredi (supra note 37), at para. 78). 
283 In Germany, according to Section 33(5) of the Act against Restraints of Competition and Section 204(2) of the Civil Code, the 
limitation period of a claim for damages shall be suspended if proceedings are initiated by the cartel authority, the European 
Commission or the competition authority of another Member State. 
284 In Argentina, according to Article 55 of the Law for Defense of Competition, the limitation period to bring an action will be 
interrupted whenever a plaintiff files a claim before the court. 
285 In Argentina, the limitation period will be interrupted by a new infringement of the defendant (Article 55 of the Law for Defense 
of Competition). 
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an action has been initiated by the government286; an antitrust class action has been filed287; or the 
doctrines of fraudulent concealment288, duress289 or equitable estoppel apply290.  
VI. REMEDIES OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
 
1. Nullity of Anticompetitive Agreements 
 
One of the civil remedies that can be used in private antitrust litigation is the declaration of nullity of 
prohibited agreements. In this kind of action, the plaintiff requires the court to declare a determined 
contract null and void. Actions seeking nullity are usually grounded on general civil regulations; 
however, some legal regimes contain specific competition law provisions declaring the nullity of 
prohibited anticompetitive agreements. Regardless of whether the nullity is determined by a specific 
competition legal instrument or by general contract rules, the nullity of a determined agreement primarily 
affects the contractual relationship between the signing parties.  
1.1. Competent Courts 
 
Generally speaking, civil courts hold exclusive jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a determined contract 
irrespectively of whether the action is based on general contract regulation or on specific competition 
rules. However, in some legal systems, the competition authority is empowered to declare the nullity of 
an anticompetitive agreement, provided that in those regimes private actions for the infringement of 
competition law are not allowed291. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, only specific administrative courts in 
charge of competition law matters may declare the nullity of an agreement that is contrary to the 
competition provisions292. These last two procedures are not of a civil nature, thus, they do not correspond 
to this chapter. 
1.2. Nature, Standing, Effects and Prescription of Nullity Actions 
 
Even though the nullity of an anticompetitive agreement may be invoked by any contracting party, in 
practice, this kind of action is usually regarded as shield litigation. In contractual liability cases, when a 
co-contracting party claims the performance of the other party, or seeks compensation for the breach of 
                                                          
286 In the US, whenever any civil or criminal antitrust proceedings is instituted by the government, the running of the statute of 
limitations in respect to every private or State right of action shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year 
thereafter (15 USC Section 16(i)).  
287 Crown, Cork & Seal Co v. Parker, 462 US 345 (1983). 
288 In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F3d 517, 536-38 (6th Cir 2008); and In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F3d 145, 160 
(3d Cir 2002). 
289 Willmar Poultry Co v. Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 520 F2d 289 (8th Cir 1975); and PhilCo Corp v. RCA, 186 FSupp 155, 
161-62 (ED Pa 1960). 
290 American Pipe & Construction Co v. Utah, 414 US 538, 559 (1974). 
291 In Indonesia, the Commission for Supervision of Business Competition according to the provisions of the Law on the Prohibition 
of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition is empowered to declare the nullity of anticompetitive agreements as 
well as to award damages to injured parties. 
292 In South Africa, even though an affected party may bring an action for damages before a civil court, albeit only on a follow-on 
basis, only the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, both administrative courts, may declare void an agreement 
that is prohibited under the terms of the Act (Section 65(1) of the Competition Act). Furthermore, since South African law only 
allows follow-on actions, the provisions of the Act determine that in any action brought in a civil court concerning the application of 
the competition provisions the court must not consider it on its merits, unless the issue has been subject to an order made by the 
Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, in which case, the civil court must apply the determination of the latter to 
the issue (Section 65(2) of the Competition Act).   
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the contract, the defendant may invoke the nullity of the anticompetitive agreement as a defense in order 
to avoid its obligations pursuant to the contract.  
As to the standing for this kind of action, as stated above, these proceedings may be initiated by 
co-contracting parties, and additionally, even affected third parties may request the court the nullity of an 
anticompetitive agreement that has a negative impact on its business293. Regarding the nature and effects 
of a nullity declaration, the nature of the latter is absolute and it has erga omnes effects. Additionally, the 
nullity sanction for an anticompetitive agreement has retroactive effects; this means that the agreement 
will be null and void from the time of its conclusion. In order to avoid an excessive degree of legal 
uncertainty, actions for nullity are subject to prescription and in most countries the general prescription 
regime applicable to civil actions applies. And finally, the nullity is automatic as it comes as an ipso jure 
consequence of the application of the competition rules and does not need a prior administrative or 
judicial decision.  
1.3. Extent of the Nullity Declaration  
 
The motive of the nullity declaration will vary depending on the provisions on which such a declaration 
is grounded.  On the one hand, competition law regulations base the nullity declaration of a determined 
agreement on the anticompetitive effects of the contract in question. On the other hand, when an action 
for nullity is grounded on contractual law, the agreement will be declared null and void because it is in 
breach of a mandatory provision (such as the competition rules), or because the agreement has been 
concluded evading legal regulation294, or when the subject matter of the contract is unlawful295.  
In most competition law regimes, the nullity provisions appear to be limited to forbidden cartel 
agreements296. Notwithstanding, there are a few specific nullity provisions for competition law 
infringements related to the abuse of a dominant position297. This may be so, because abuse of dominance 
practices are not usually incarnated in legal documents, like forbidden cartel agreements, but are based on 
factual situations. Notwithstanding, the abuse of a dominant position may be grounded on a legal 
document which may produce legally enforceable rights and obligations298. Irrespective of the existence 
or not of specific rules declaring the nullity of infringements related to the abuse of dominance, in order 
to avoid inconsistencies between public and private enforcement of competition law, those legal 
                                                          
293 In the European Union, the ECJ in the Courage case, and later in the Manfredi case, determined that the nullity of an agreement 
may be invoked by co-contracting parties and also by third parties (supre note 37). 
294 See Section 200(2) of the Hungarian Civil Code 
295 See Article 1418 of the Italian Civil Code, which establishes that a contract that is in violation of mandatory provisions shall be 
void. Also establishes that a contract may be declared void by virtue of the unlawfulness of its cause (subject matter). 
296 Some competition law regimes have introduced regulations that resemble the provisions of Article 101.2 of the TFEU which 
declares automatically void all cartels and restrictive agreements. However, the TFEU, as most of the similar provisions, does not 
have a similar rule for agreements related to the abuse of a dominant position (Article 102 TFEU).   
297 In France, Article L420-3 of the Code de Commerce declares null any agreement prohibited by the competition provisions, 
among them, the abuse of a dominant position. In Romania, the Competition Act declares that any agreements, conventions or 
contractual clauses, either public or secret, that violate the provisions of Articles 5 (restrictive agreements) and 6 (abuse of 
dominance) of the Competition Act, are null and void. In Singapore, Section 34(3) of the Competition Act declares void all 
prohibited agreements. 
298 In Italy, the Corte d’Appello di Milano declared null and void the pricing clauses of gas supply agreements, provided that these 
imposed excessive prices running contrary to Article 3 of Law 287/90 which prohibits excessive prices by a dominant company 
(Corte d’Appello di Milano, September 16 2006, Avir c. ENI). In Sweden, the Svea Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the plaintiff in 
the Scandinavian Airlines System v. Staten genon Luftfartsverket. The plaintiff brought an action against the airport operator 
requesting that the clauses in the agreement that regulates airport fees be declared null and void given that such clauses were 
contrary to the abuse of dominant position competition provisions (Svea Court of Appeal, T 33-00, Staten genon Luftfartsverket v. 
Scandinavian Airlines System, April 27 2001).  
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documents should be also declared null and void. Contrarily, an abuse of dominance practice that has 
been declared unlawful and punished by a public authority will give rise to enforceable rights and 
obligations before a civil court. Thus, in countries with no specific nullity provisions for agreements 
connected to the abuse of a dominant position, general civil rules will apply299. For instance, some legal 
systems will declare the nullity of legal documents related to the abuse of a dominant position by 
determining that any agreement that is incompatible with a legal prohibition shall be null and void300. In 
other countries, any agreement that is contrary to the provisions of a mandatory rule, such as the 
competition regulations, will be declared null and void301. Finally, any agreement may be declared null if 
its subject matter is unlawful302.  
In addition to the stated above, in some competition law regimes, private plaintiffs may also 
request general courts to declare null and void merger agreements that provoke anticompetitive effects on 
their businesses, or agreements that have not been previously notified for clearance to the competition 
authority, or any other competent public body, when required303. Nevertheless, the authority to declare 
merger agreements null and void is not exclusive for civil courts. Some competition agencies, or other 
public authorities, such as ministries or sector regulators, may be empowered to annul and void merger 
agreements that produce negative effects on competition or those which have not been notified, when 
required, to the competent public authority for clearance.  
1.4. Right of Restitution 
 
The right of restitution resulting from a nullity declaration varies widely among jurisdictions. For 
instance, in some countries the restitutio in integrum principle will apply. This principle establishes the 
restitution of things to the status they were in, as there had never been a contract. The restitution includes 
all the goods and amounts of money that were the subject matter of the contested agreement304. In other 
countries, the restitution right that arises from a declaration of nullity will be based on unjust enrichment 
regulation. The restitution through unjust enrichment provisions is set to avoid that a party in the void 
agreement unjustly enriches at the expense of another305. In some countries, the right of restitution based 
on the principle of unjust enrichment is independent of liability for wrongdoing, and consequently, the 
restitution is allowed between co-contracting parties irrespective of their liability for the anticompetitive 
practice306. On the contrary, in other jurisdictions the principle of in pari delicto potior est conditio 
                                                          
299 In Lithuania, anticompetitive agreements in breach of Article 5 are null and void ad initio (Article 5(1) of the Lithuanian 
Competition Act). Even though it is not expressly indicated in Article 9 (abuse of a dominant position provision), the same sanction 
by virtue of the civil law rules on nullity of agreements (Article 1.80 of the Civil Code), will apply to contractual provisions 
considered abusive (KESERAUSKAS, Šarūnas, & MAKAUSKAITĖ, Agnė (2007), “Lithuania”. HOLMES, M. & DAVEY L. 
(eds). A Practical Guide to National Competition Rules across Europe. Second Edition. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, p. 532)    
300 In Germany, see Section 134 Civil Code. In Greece, see Article 174 of the Civil Code.  
301 In France, see Articles 6 and 1131 of the Code Civil. In Italy, see Article 1418 of the Civil Code. 
302 In Italy, see Article 1418 of the Civil Code. 
303 In the Netherlands, any interested party may bring an action for nullity before a District Court for the violation of Articles 6 
(Restrictive Agreements), 24 (Abuse of Dominance), and 34 (Mergers) of the Competition Act. 
304 Article 1.2 of the Spanish Competition Act (which resembles the provisions of Article 101.2 TFEU) is applied in conjunction 
with Article 1300 and following of the Civil Code, which establishes the restitutio in integrum principle under Spanish law. 
305 In Turkey, after a nullity declaration pursuant to Article 56 of the Competition Act, an affected party may request restitution by 
applying the unjust enrichment regulation contained in Articles 63 and 64 of the Code of Obligations.  
306 In Sweden, the Svea Court of Appeal declared that the plaintiff, a co-contracting party to a null anticompetitive agreement, had 
the right to be repaid for the excessive price it paid during the contract period. The court considered that the Competition Act was 
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defendentis prohibits restitution between parties that are engaged in unlawful practices. In such cases, 
contracting parties that are mutually or equally at fault and whose conduct is equally wrongful cannot 
claim restitution or satisfaction from the other(s)307. In other regimes, when a contract is null and void for 
being contrary to the competition provisions, contracting parties are obliged to repay any good, service or 
amount of money received by virtue of the contract, whenever this amounts to unjust enrichment. 
However, if the plaintiff is responsible for the imposition of the anticompetitive clause or contract on the 
other party, it will not have right to demand restitution. Additionally, other jurisdictions establish that 
when a party in a contract knew or should have known that the agreement was invalid and did not 
informed the other party, the former is obliged to pay the latter the damages caused as a consequence of 
having entered into an invalid contract308. 
1.5. Severance 
 
The nullity sanction of an anticompetitive agreement may apply to the whole contract or only to those 
parts or clauses that are affected by the prohibition. The nullity will apply to the whole contract when the 
unlawful parts cannot be severed from the agreement309, and oppositely, when the anticompetitive clauses 
are severable, the nullity will apply only to the latter310. In practice, in most countries, civil regulation on 
the severance of contracts will apply to determine if the nullity applies just to the unlawful parts or to the 
contract as a whole.  
1.6. Nullity of Related Contracts  
 
Another issue related to the nullity of restrictive agreements is the validity of independent but somehow 
connected contracts with the main anticompetitive agreement. Subsidiary or complementary contracts 
which are related to previously annulled contracts may be valid or declared null too, depending on 
whether or not the competition prohibitions also apply to them. On the one hand, independent but 
ancillary contracts that aim directly at securing the performance of the contractual obligations of the 
anticompetitive agreement constitute an inseparable whole with the basic agreement and consequently 
should also be declared null and void. On the other hand, independent but consequential contracts signed 
with third parties that aim at indirectly giving effect to the obligations grounded on the anticompetitive 
contract, such as employment contracts, contracts for the supply of materials, contracts for the lease of 
buildings, and others, should not be declared null and void since these agreements do not affect 
competition by themselves, and consequently, should not be caught under the competition prohibitions. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
applicable to the anticompetitive agreements the defendant used to abuse its dominant position by charging higher airport fees 
(Staten genon Luftfartsverket v. Scandinavian Airlines System, supra note 298). 
307 In Germany, see Section 817 Civil Code. In Spain, see Article 1306 of the Civil Code. 
308 See Article 1338 of the Italian Civil Code. 
309 According to the Austrian Supreme Court a contractual provision infringing competition law may entail total voidness of the 
contract in question given that the provision cannot be separated from the rest of the contract (OGH 22.02.2001, 6 Ob 322/00x). 
310 In Luxembourg, Soluver S.A requested the court to declare null a franchising agreement signed with the German company 
Wintergarden Feddersen, in order to recover the fee Soluver paid to Wintergarden by virtue of the franchising agreement. The 
Tribunal d’arrondissement of Luxembourg rejected Soulver’s petition and considered that the contract was not null, because the 
clauses in the contract that were allegedly in contravention with the provisions of Article 81 EC were severable from the contract. In 
consequence, the nullity of the anticompetitive clauses did not affect the rest of the contract (Tribunal d’arrondissement 
Luxembourg, 9 March 1990, Wintergarden Feddersen/Soluver).      
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Finally, in some countries, contracting parties may introduce separability clauses in a certain 
agreement. By introducing these clauses, the parties prevent that a nullity declaration invalidates the 
contract as a whole. Consequently, if a contract is null because it infringes the competition provisions, 
the nullity sanction will only affect the anticompetitive parts of the agreement, and the separability 
clauses will save the rest of the contract from being annulled. Notwithstanding, when the mere purpose 
of a separability clause is to preserve the otherwise annullable anticompetitive parts of a determined 
agreement, then the clause itself will be declared null and void provided that its primary intention is to 
avoid the nullity sanction of an anticompetitive agreement311.   
2. Injunctive Relief 
2.1. Permanent Injunctive Relief 
 
Injunctive relief is another civil remedy available for private plaintiffs for the infringement of competition 
law. Injunctions are court ordered measures forcing the defendant to cease any anticompetitive conduct 
and desist from such conduct in the future. Injunctions can be positive or negative, the former would 
require the defendant’s performance, while the latter will require the plaintiff to cease and desist the 
performance of a determined conduct. 
 As other civil remedies concerned with the application of competition law, injunctive relief may 
be embodied in the general provisions of civil or commercial law, or in some cases, it may be established 
in specific competition law provisions. Traditionally, however, the majority of jurisdictions refer this 
issue to the general civil or commercial rules312; nevertheless, there are some competition law regimes 
that have introduced specific antitrust rules establishing the availability of injunctive relief in private 
antitrust litigation313.  
 In practice, injunctive relief actions are better suited for cases related to the abuse of dominance, 
provided that in such disputes, the victim of the dominant undertaking usually seeks to enjoin the latter to 
cease its abusive behavior314. In abuse of dominance cases, injunctions can be positive or negative, for 
instance, a positive injunction would require the defendant the continuation of a relationship in case of a 
                                                          
311 The German Supreme Court declared that a separability clause that affects the scope of the provisions of Article 81 EC or the 
equivalent national rule shall be declared null and void (Supreme Court, 8 February, 1994, KZR 2/93, Pronuptia II (1994) 44 WuW 
547).  
312 In Belgium, injunctions can be based on unfair competition law (Article 54 of the 1971 Act on Commercial Practices). In France, 
Article L442-6(3)(b) of the Code de Commerce, grants the public prosecutor and the Minister of Economy locus standi to request an 
injunction. In Greece, injunction is grounded on the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 914, 281, 288 and 297 of the Civil Code). 
Similarly, in Italy the provisions of the Civil Code regulate the award of injunctive relief (Article 2599 of the Civil Code). 
313 In Austria, Section 1 of the Federal Act against Unfair Competition; in Japan, Section 24 of the Antimonopoly Act; in Germany, 
Section 33(1) of the Act against Restraints of Competition; in Ireland, Section 14(5)(a) of the Competition Act; in Sweden, Chapter 
3, Section 2 of the Competition Act;  in the USA, Section 16 of the Clayton Act. 
314 Case T-24/90 Automec Sri v Commission (II) [1992] ECR II-2223. In this case before the Court of First instance the complainant 
was refused an injunction by the Commission requiring BMW to supply it with cars. The Court held that the Commission could not 
order a party to enter into a contractual relationship and that the principle of freedom of contract was applicable. The Commission 
held that such purely positive measures were more suitable for cases related to Article 82 EC (abuse of dominance). 
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brefusal to supply315; alternatively, a negative injunction would require the defendant to restrain from 
conduct contrary to the competition law provisions316.  
 Injunctive relief actions differ from damages claims in some aspects: (i) injunctive relief actions 
do not include a monetary compensation; (ii) injunctive relief is available to antitrust plaintiffs even if the 
latter have not yet suffered any actual injury; (iii) injunctive relief serves different objectives than 
damages claims (deterrence of future infringements); (iv) the standard of proof is usually lower than the 
one required in damages claims (probability317, prima facie318). 
 Finally, even though injunctive relief is available in most jurisdictions, there are some 
differences found across jurisdiction in the application of this remedy in private antitrust litigation. For 
instance, in some common law countries, injunctive relief will only be awarded if damages are not an 
adequate remedy for the dispute319. Similarly, in some competition regimes, injunctive relief is not 
available to private parties seeking to oppose a merger320. Moreover, in some other countries injunction is 
reserved only for competitors321, associations322, or undertakings323. Also, in some competition law 
regimes, an action seeking injunctive relief can be filed by the competition authority324. Finally, with 
regard to collective actions, some jurisdictions allow some mechanisms to collectively seek injunction325. 
2.2. Preliminary Injunctive Relief 
 
Another equitable remedy that can be asserted by a plaintiff in competition law cases is preliminary 
injunctive relief. As its name suggests, this kind of remedy is awarded prior to the end of the litigation, 
this is contrary to the permanent injunctions which usually are granted at the end of the proceeding. The 
aim of preliminary civil injunctions is the protection of private interests by provisionally securing civil 
claims.  
 Normally, the award of preliminary relief has to do with the protection of the parties’ interests 
related to the civil action326, however, in some cases, the court may order special measures as preliminary 
                                                          
315 For instance, the Milan Court of Appeal found that the denial to supply to the wholesaler constituted an abuse of dominant 
position under Italian competition law, in consequence, the court decided to order the manufacturer to supply the wholesaler (Corte 
d'Appello di Milano, Order of July 23, 2005, Farmacie Petrone c. Pharmacia Italia e Pfizer Italia).  
316 In the UK, the High Court of Justice in the Attherace v British Horseracing Boar case, ordered the defendant to restraint from 
ordering, instructing, requesting or otherwise soliciting or encouraging their contractual partners or anyone else to cut off or 
otherwise interfere with the supply of pre-race data to the plaintiff (High Court of Justice, Attheraces Ltd v British Horseracing 
Board Ltd [2005] EWHC 1553).  
317 Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland. 
318 Austria, Italy, Malta. 
319 In the UK see case: American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396, establishing that injunction shall be only awarded if 
damages are not a suitable remedy.  
320 In Australia according to the provisions of the Trade Practices Act, private plaintiffs are allowed to seek declarations and 
divestitures in the case of mergers, but nor interim relief.  
321 In Austria, see Section 14(1) of the Federal Act against Unfair Competition. 
322 Idem 
323 In Sweden, see Chapter 3, Section 2 of the Competition Act. 
324 In Australia, an application for injunctive relief can be made by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission pursuant 
to Section 80 of the Competition and Consumers Act. 
325 Section 14 of the Austrian Act against Unfair Competition provides for collective actions seeking injunction, these may be 
brought by associations that promote the economic interest of entrepreneurs, provided that such associations represent interest which 
are affected by the offence or by the Federal Chamber of Labor, the Federal Economic Chamber, the Presidential Conference of the 
Austrian Chambers of Agriculture or by the Austrian Trade Union Federation. 
326 In Ireland, see case: Patrick Dunlea &Sons v Nissan (Ireland) Ltd, [1992] ECC 169; in the UK, see case; Cutsforth v Mansfield 
Inns [1986] All.ER 577 (QB); in the US, see case: SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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injunction, like: press announcements communicating the illegality of a determined practice327, or 
provisional interim damages if the court believes, at a preliminary stage, that an anti-competitive act has 
taken place328. 
3. Declaratory Relief 
 
Declaratory actions are also recognized by most legal systems as a remedy for the breach of competition 
law. This remedy is based on a judicial declaration about the legality or illegality of certain facts alleged 
by the plaintiff. In the private enforcement of competition law, the purpose of this action is to obtain a 
judicial declaration with a res judicata effect inter partes about the legality or illegality of a determined 
agreement or practice. As stated above, this kind of actions can declare either the legality329 or the 
illegality of a determined conduct330, additionally; this kind of actions may also directly declare the civil 
liability of defendant to pay damages to the affected parties331. Moreover, this kind of proceeding can be 
grounded on specific competition law provisions in some countries332. 
 In some jurisdictions, there are collective redress mechanisms through which the plaintiffs can 
collectively bring a declaratory action. This kind of procedure is usually brought by a public entity or a 
legitimate association, who will sue on behalf of the affected parties in order to obtain a court order 
declaring the civil liability of the defendant. Usually, once the civil liability of the defendant has been 
declared, the affected parties can bring damages claims to recover the damages inflicted upon them by the 
unlawful conduct of the defendant333.  
4. Non-monetary Relief  
 
Some competition law infringements can lead to substantial non-monetary relief. For instance, in 2000 
after Christie’s sought and obtained amnesty from the USA Department of Justice, many class actions 
were consolidated in the Southern District of New York. By the end of 2000 a settlement was reached 
between the parties for the amount of $412 million in cash and $100 million in discount certificates334. In 
the El Paso case, thirteen million California consumers and three thousand businesses benefited from a 
settlement that included more than $1.552 billion, of which $125 million were rate reductions on 
electricity, El Paso lowered its prices to the California Department of Water so that class members would 
benefit from reduced natural gas bills335. The Insurance case is a very peculiar one because of the 
                                                          
327 In the Netherlands, see case: Pres. Rechtbank Utrecht, 11.2.92, FNK/SCK. 
328 IN the UK, courts have awarded damages as an interim measure as long as this measure is considered to be a suitable final 
remedy, see case: Healthcare at Home Ltd v Genzyme Ltd, Case No. 1060/5/7/06, [2006] CAT 29. 
329 Tribunale di Milano, judgment of May 8, 2009, ENI et al. c. Pirelli Tyre et al. 
330 THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1980). 
331 Stockholm City Court, T 8122-00, Weba Kemi AB v. Aria ekonomisk forening,October 9, 2002, 
332 In Australia, any person may commence a proceeding for declaratory relief according to Section 163A of the Competition and 
Consumers Act. 
333 For instance, in Brazil, there is a collective mechanism through which the Public Prosecutor’s Office can file an action to declare 
the defendant’s civil liability, following this action; any affected party has to file a claim to qualify as a victim in order to recover 
damages (Article 82 of the Consumers Defense Code). In Greece, pursuant to Article 10 of the Consumer Protection Law, a 
consumer protection association can file an action requesting a court order declaring the liability of the defendant with the purpose 
of allowing victims to recover damages.  
334 In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327(2d Cir. 2002); 
and Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). 
335 Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV. Sweetie’s, v. El Paso Corporation, No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct.); Continental Forge 
Company v. Southern California Gas Co., No. BC237336 (L.A. Super. Ct.); Berg v. Southern California Gas Co., No. BC241951 
(L.A. Super. Ct.); City of Long Beach v. Southern California Gas Co., No. BC247114 (L.A. Super. Ct.); City of L.A. v. Southern 
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remedies and legal principles it established. The case was settled and ordered through an injunction the 
restructuration of the industry-wide mechanism for providing support and advisory services to 
Commercial General Liability insurance. The defendants also paid $36 million in cash, of which a part 
was destined to attorneys’ fees336, and the rest granted as a remedy for the victims in the form of cy pres 
funds337. These grants were used to fund the development of a Public Entity that provides risk 
management education and technical services to small businesses, public entities, and non-profits; and to 
fund the States for the development of a risk database for municipalities and local governments338. Other 
cases can lead to the restructuration of a determined industry. For instance, the VISA/MASTERCARD case 
is very important not only because it represents the largest settlement in antitrust history, but also because 
both firms agreed to implement a variety of injunctive relief characterized by the judge as of “substantial” 
value. The firms agreed to significantly reduce their charges for debit transactions, saving more than $1 
billion to merchants. Merchants were free to choose the firms’ products based on quality, speed, safety 
and price, and no longer were obliged to accept debit cards if they take credit cards339. 
5. Damages  
 
The main objective of an award of damages in competition law litigation is the compensation of the 
victims for the harm suffered due to the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant. Notwithstanding, in 
some jurisdictions, such objectives are not the only rationale to the award of damages, thus, there are 
some other justifications that may be used to grant damages, such as: the recovery of the benefits gained 
by the defendant through its unlawful conduct, or the punishment or deterrence of the wrongdoer by the 
imposition of punitive or exemplary damages.   
(a) Damages as Monetary Compensation 
 
Monetary compensation for the harm suffered by the victim of an anticompetitive conduct is available in 
most jurisdictions. Monetary compensation is different from restitution in that the latter has as the main 
purpose to put the victim in the situation he was prior to the violation of the competition rules, while 
compensation is the grant of an equivalent in kind or in money for the harm sustained by the antitrust 
victim. Restitution is the main remedy available for plaintiffs in many legal regimes340, however, to 
restore the plaintiff to the situation he would have been had the infringement not taken place may not be 
always possible or may be excessively difficult. Hence, whenever restitution is unavailable the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                                                          
California Gas Col, No. BC265905 (L.A. Super. Ct.); Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No. GIC 759425 (San Diego Super. 
Ct.); and Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego Super. Ct.). (El Paso). 
336 27.2% of the total amount paid. 
337 “Cy pres” from the French “cy pres comme possible”, meaning as near as possible. Cy pres funds typically result as a remedy 
from class action lawsuits when there are funds left over after the class members were compensated, or when it is either impossible 
or impractical to distribute the funds directly to the individuals who were injured. In those cases, the court may order that the funds 
be used for grants to benefit the class members indirectly or as near as possible in order to remedy or compensate them for the injury 
inflicted. In Canada for cases where cy pres was granted see, Currie v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., 2006 Carswel l Ont 
1213 (S.C.J.); Alfresh Beverages Canada Corp v. Hoechst AG et al., [2002] O.J. No. 79 (S.C.J.); and Sutherland v. Boots 
Pharmaceutical PLC, [2002] O.J. No. 1361 (S.C.J.). 
338 In Re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. CA 1989); reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991); affirmed sub 
nom Hartford Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
339 In Re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, a/k/a Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. and MasterCard 
International Inc., 396 F. 3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).     
340 Austria, Denmark, Germany, Portugal. 
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may request compensation341; moreover, in some jurisdictions compensation will only be allowed in cases 
where restitution is not possible342.  
(b) Damages as the Recovery of Illegal Gains 
 
In some countries, a damages claim may be structured as an action for the recovery of the illegal gains 
made by the defendant as a result of its anticompetitive conduct. In such cases, the injury sustained by the 
plaintiff will not be grounded on the actual loss suffered by the claimant, but on the illegal gains that the 
infringer has made as a result of the violation of the competition rules343.  
(c) Damages as Punishment 
 
With regard to exemplary or punitive damages, these are mainly awarded as a punishment to the 
defendant for the infringement of the competition rules. Additionally, this kind of damages serves as 
deterrence to prevent the infringement of the competition provisions in the future. As a consequence, the 
extent of exemplary or punitive damages surpasses the restitution and compensation objectives to 
accomplish punishment and deterrence.  
5.1. Economic Models for the Calculation of Damages 
 
The main objective of damages awards is compensation, thus, to achieve this objective courts will have to 
assess the amount of damages through calculations in order to reconstruct the state of the world without 
the alleged harm. Such assessment will normally require the intervention of qualified experts with 
specific knowledge on the market, the industry and the infringement of the competition rules. The 
cumbersome exercise of calculating the quantum of damages has been considered excessively difficult or 
even practically impossible when such calculation requires the exact amount of the harm suffered344. 
Additionally, in some cases, the claim of the victim may be too small compared to calculation 
requirements imposed, thus, turning the claim not cost-effective345.   
 Different kinds of damages may arise from a single competition law infringement. Broadly 
speaking, the most common antitrust damages may be resumed in: the overcharge damage, lost profits 
and damage resulting from a terminated or disadvantaged business. However, in practice, the bulk of 
damages claims related to the infringement of the competition rules surge from cartel agreements, in 
those cases, the victims will sue for the damages caused to them by the overcharged price paid due to the 
anticompetitive agreement. With regard to the other kinds of damages, these are usually very difficult to 
calculate and require individual assessment in order to measure the amount of the damage; therefore, the 
calculation of such damages is carried on a case by case basis by the courts deciding the dispute. For 
                                                          
341 In the Czech Republic the default form of damages is monetary compensation, however, when possible, the plaintiff may require 
restitution to the state before of the harmful event (Section 378 of the Commercial Code). 
342 Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Portugal. 
343 In Germany, according to Section 33(3) of the Act against Restraints of Competition, the assessment of the size of the damage 
may take into account the proportion of the profit obtained by the undertaking due to the infringement of the competition provisions. 
In Italy, pursuant to article 125 of the Italian Intellectual Property Code, there are three criteria to calculate damages: (a) the loss of 
profit of the claimant; (b) the disgorgement of profits of the infringer; and (c) applicable to cases involving both IP and antitrust 
issues is the amount of reasonable royalties. In the Netherlands, damages may be calculated in the basis of the profits made by the 
party that has breached the competition provisions (Section 6:104 of the Civil Code). 
344 See the Commission’s White Paper on Damages (supra note 3), at p. 7. 
345 Idem  
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those reasons, the calculation of damages discussed in this part of the study will focus on the calculation 
of damages concerning the monetary compensation that arise from cartel agreements.  
In most jurisdictions, the award of damages will include the compensation of both direct 
damages (damnum emergens), which is the victim’s actual loss for the overcharged price paid due to the 
anticompetitive conduct of the defendant; and loss of profit (lucrum cessans)346, which includes any loss 
of commercial opportunities347. The compensation under this approach will serve mainly the purpose of 
restoring the injured party to the position it would have occupied had the infringement not occurred 
through monetary compensation.  
 Different approaches have been adopted for the calculation of damages in competition law 
litigation. The most commonly used methods to calculate the situation of the victim in the absence of the 
infringement are described below: 
(a) The Before and After Method 
 
This method is the most simple and it is based in a simple comparison of prices during the period of the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct with the prices in the period before and/or after the infringement, 
assuming that these provide a reasonable approximation of the price levels in the absence of the 
anticompetitive conduct348. 
(b) The Yardstick Method 
 
The yardstick method uses a comparison of the market where the anticompetitive conduct is alleged to 
have taken place with a similar market unaffected by the infringement. The market used as reference will 
need to have similar competitive characteristics to the affected market in order to allow attributing the 
differences in the prices between the two markets to the effects of the anticompetitive conduct349. 
                                                          
346 The European Commission in its Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages (supra note 85), established the 
need to compensate the victims of antitrust violations for the actual loss and for the lost profits as well (para 149). In that line, the 
European Court of Justice in the Manfredi case determined the right of individuals to seek compensation not only for actual loss but 
also for loss of profit plus interests (Manfredi (supra note 37), at para 100). 
347 In Australia, the High Court determined that the loss of a commercial opportunity may have a present value, and consequently, be 
compensable (Sellars v. Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332, 355-6. See also: Hubbards Pty Ltd v Simpson Ltd (1982) 41 
ALR 509, 518) In Italy, the Corte d’Appello di Milano and Corte d’Apello di Roma, determined that the calculation of damages 
included the loss of chance or opportunity (lucro cessante) (Corte d’Appello di Milano, judgements of July 18, 1995 and December 
24, 1996, Telsystem c. SIP-Telecom Italia) and (Corte d’Apello di Roma, judgement of January 20, 2003, Albacom c. Telecom 
Italia). In Spain, the Court of first instance of Madrid in application of the principle contained in Article 1106 of the Civil Code, 
determined that a claimant can recover the direct loss suffered from the anticompetitive conduct as well as the loss of profit 
(Decision of the Court of first instance N. 4 of Madrid, of June 7, 2005, Antena 3 v. National Professional Football League).  
348 In Germany, the courts used the price after the termination of the cartel activities to determine the overcharge and the consequent 
loss of the plaintiffs (LG Dortmund 0 55/ 02 Kart Vitaminkartell III, Decision, April 1st 2004, and Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 
Berliner Transportbeton I, KRB 2/05, Decision, June 28th 2005). In the US, a court used the costs and advertising revenue trends of 
the plaintiff in a period before the infringement in order to calculate projected revenues and costs for the infringement period 
(Apollo Theater Foundation Inc. v. Western International, United States District Court of New York, 02 Civ 10037 (DLC), 
Decision, May 5th 2005). 
349 In Italy, a plaintiff in a follow-on action relied on the findings of the Italian Competition Authority, which had used the yardstick 
method in calculating the cartel overcharge by comparing the prices in the cartelized Italian market with the average European 
prices in other non-cartelized markets. The Guidice di Pace di Bitonto accepted the findings of the competition authority and 
awarded double damages to the plaintiff (Giudice di Pace di Bitonto, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, 
judgment of May 21, 2007). In the US, Conwood Co. v. US Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 793 n.8 (6th Cir. 2002); Eleven Line, Inc. v. 
N. Tex. State Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 213 F.3d 198,207 n.17 (5th Cir. 2000); and Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 
1974).  
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(c) The Cost-Based Method 
 
The cost-based method allows establishing the hypothetical market price by adding to the average 
production costs of the product in question a hypothetical profit margin considered to be appropriate 
under competitive conditions350. 
(d) The Price Prediction Method 
 
The price prediction method is based on econometric modeling which seeks to predict prices in a “but 
for” scenario on the basis of past determinants of prices in the market or between the market in question 
and yardstick markets. The accuracy of this method depends on the quality of the data available351. 
(e) The Theoretical Modeling Simulation Method 
 
The theoretical modeling simulation method involves the use of an oligopolistic model to determine the 
effects of the anticompetitive practice. This method may calculate damages in two ways: either by 
representing the market structure by statistical interrelations of relevant variables or by means of an 
independent economic model352. 
(f) The Multiple Regression Analysis Method 
 
The multiple regression analysis is a method that attempts to estimate the amount of damages suffered by 
the plaintiffs by determining the effect that two or more independent variables have on a single dependent 
variable353. 
In practice, since in most competition law regimes the nature of a damages award is compensatory, 
therefore, most courts will calculate the amount of damages by comparing the plaintiff’s actual position 
after the injury suffered due to the anticompetitive practice with the hypothetical position which would 
have existed had the infringement not occurred in order to determine the quantum of the damage354.  
In order to encourage private actions for damages concerning the infringement of the 
competition rules, some competition law regimes have incorporated specific provisions in order to 
facilitate the calculation and recovery of damages arising from competition law infringements. For 
instance, some competition law regimes have provisions that determine what a competition law victim 
may claim as damages for the harm suffered as a result of the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant355. 
                                                          
350 Cour d’Appel de Paris, S.A. Mors v. S.A. Labinal, judgment of 30 September 1998. In this case the expert appointed by the court 
identified the scenario in the absence of the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant in order to inter alia determine the loss of 
opportunity of the plaintiff by assessing the productions costs of the product in question.  
351 In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litg., 839 F.Supp. 1497, 1507 (D.Kan. 1995). 
352 In Spain, in a case involving exclusionary practices, the plaintiff’s expert used an oligopoly model that provided an econometric 
study in which Conduit’s lost market share in Spain was calculated by an econometric model that took the UK as a comparator 
market. Both markets were opened to competition at similar times, having been previously controlled by the incumbent telephony 
operator. In the UK, other operators rapidly gained market share, while in Spain the incumbent retained the largest share in the 
market, the experts argued that Conduit would have gained a greater market share in Spain in the absence of the exclusionary 
conduct by Telefónica (Juzgado de lo Mercantil Madrid (Madrid Commercial Court), Conduit Europe, S.A. v. Telefónica de España 
S.A.U, judgment of November 11th 2005). 
353 Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, the court 
determined that the multiple regression analysis is a reliable method for damages calculation. 
354 In German law Differenzhypothese. 
355 In Australia, according to Section 82(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act, any affected person by a conduct in contravention 
of the provisions of the Act may recover the amount of the loss or damage. In Canada, Section 36 of the Competition establishes 
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Furthermore, some competition law regimes have adopted specific provisions regarding the calculation of 
damages in order to facilitate to the courts the measurement of the amount of the injury suffered by the 
victims356. With regard to collective claims, some competition regimes have permitted the aggregation of 
damages in order to simplify the calculation of the damages suffered by collective claimants, the purpose 
of this aggregation is to enable independent victims who have suffered a small injury to recover the 
amount of damages from the violator of the competition provisions in a simple way357. Oppositely, in 
other jurisdictions, each member of the class in a collective proceeding for the recovery of damages has to 
prove the amount of the damage that has been inflicted upon him358.  
Additionally, in some competition law regimes, the courts have established legal presumptions in 
order to facilitate the calculation of damages in cartel related cases. In such jurisdictions, the courts have 
determined that whenever the prediction of the competitive price that the victim would have paid had the 
infringement of the competition rules not existed is too difficult to sustain, the courts will consider the 
prices charged just before the start of the cartel activity as the competitive market prices359.   
In the same line, some courts have recognized the difficulty on the plaintiffs to prove the amount 
of damages suffered as a consequence of the antitrust infringement, and as a result, have lowered the 
standards required to prove the quantum of the injury360. Furthermore, when a plaintiff has demonstrated 
the existence of a competition law infringement, the subsequent requirement of showing the extent of the 
damages may also be relaxed361.  
Furthermore, due to the fact that the calculation of the quantum of damages in competition law 
litigation represents such a heavy duty on the plaintiffs and on courts, some competition law regimes have 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that any person, who has suffered loss or damage as a result of a conduct contrary to the provisions of the Act, may sue for and 
recover an amount equal to the loss or damage. In Turkey, pursuant to Article 58 of the Competition Act, a person affected by the 
prevention, distortion or reduction of competition can claim as damage the difference between the cost paid and the cost that should 
have been paid if the competition had not been limited.  
356 For instance, in Germany, Section 33(3) Sentence 3 of the Act against Restraints of Competition establishes that courts may take 
into account, when calculating the amount of damages, the proportion of the profit which the undertaking has derived from the 
infringement. In Turkey, Section 58 of the Competition Act states that in determining the damage, all profits expected to be gained 
by the injured undertakings are calculated by taking into account the balance sheets of the previous years as well.  
357 In Axiom Plastics Inc. v. E.I. DuPont Canada Co. (supra note 227), the court established that the aggregate damages provisions 
of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act (1992, Sections 23 and 24) may be invoked in a competition law case in order to calculate 
damages. Similarly, in Irving Paper Ltd. V. Atofina Chamicals Inc. (supra note 227), the court held that the aggregate provisions are 
available when the claimants have proved the “potential liability” of the defendant.   
358 In Israel, see the Supreme Court decision: CA 345/03 Dan Reichart v. The Heirs of Moshe Shemesh [2007] ISRDC (not 
published). 
359 MIYAKAWA, Hiromitsu (2010), “Japan”. FOER, A., CUNEO, J. (ed). The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 536. 
360 In the US, according to the Supreme Court the relaxation of the burden of proving the amount of damages prevents the 
wrongdoer to profit from its wrongdoing at the expense of the victim (Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 US 251, 264, 66 S. 
Ct. 574 (1946)). In another case, a court determined that although the most common methods of quantifying antitrust damages are 
“before and after” and “yardstick” measures of loss profits, the plaintiff may use different measures tailored to the facts of the case 
if estimates and assumptions rest on adequate data (Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 213 F.3d 198,207 (5th Cir. 
2000)). In Italy the court may decide on the calculation of damages based on an equitable basis whenever practical problems of 
determination arise, for instance, the Corte d’Appello di Milano, measured the reputational damages upon an equitable basis (Corte 
d’Appello di Milano, judgment of July 11, 2003, Bluvacanze c. Viaggi del Ventaglio, Turisanda e Hotelplan Italia). 
361 In the Eleven Line case, the court established that once the fact of antitrust damage is proven, the burden of proving the amount 
of damages is more relaxed (Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass'n, Inc. (supra note 349). See also, Allied Accessories & 
Auto Parts Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 901 F.2d 1322, 1326 (6th Cir. 1990), where the court decided that it will be enough if the 
plaintiff shows the extent of damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, and consequently, the defendant will not be 
allowed to complain that the amount of damages cannot be measured exactly. 
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opted for the elaboration of certain guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in the calculation 
process362.     
5.2. Discretion of Courts when Awarding Damages for the Breach of Competition Law 
 
The discretion of the courts is primarily restricted by the compensatory nature of the damages award. 
Notwithstanding, in most jurisdictions, the procedural rules permit a court to determine damages by 
estimating a reasonable amount where either full proof cannot be presented at all, or only with difficulty, 
or where the costs or inconvenience of fully proving the damages would be disproportionately high 
considering the scope of the harm and the amount of compensation sought363. Furthermore, in 
jurisdictions where there are no specific methods for the calculation of the quantum of damages suffered 
due to a competition law infringement, the amount of damages is determined under the sole discretion of 
the courts in a case by case basis364. 
5.3. Limitations on the Amount Awarded as Damages 
 
Provided that in most countries the nature of an award of damages is merely compensatory, any amount 
granted by a court as damages for the infringement of the competition provisions must not exceed the 
quantum of the damages actually suffered by the victim taking into account both the actual damage and 
the loss of profit. In most countries, any award of damages contrary to these precepts would foster the 
unjust enrichment of the plaintiff. Consequently, when awarding damages, the courts are only limited by 
the compensatory nature of this kind of remedy, and as a result, the amount of damages granted to the 
victims is irrelevant as long as the victims are fully compensated for the harmful event. 
5.4. Availability of Punitive, Exemplary or Multiplied Damages  
 
The availability of punitive, exemplary or multiplied damages allows the victim of a competition law 
violation to recover more than just the actual damage suffered as a consequence of the harmful event. The 
possibility of the plaintiff to claim more than just the actual damage suffered as a consequence of the 
unlawful act of the defendant serves other objectives besides mere compensation for the injury, such as: 
the punishment of past infringements and the deterrence of future violations of the competition 
provisions.  
 Even though, the great majority of legal regimes award only the actual amount of damages 
provided that the main function of this kind of civil remedy is the compensation for the injury suffered by 
the victim, some competition law regimes allow the victims to recover punitive, exemplary or multiplied 
damages. 
                                                          
362 At the EU level, the Commission has recognized the need of a framework with pragmatic, non-binding guidance for the 
quantification of damages in antitrust cases (Page 7 of the Commission’s White Paper on Damages). In order to elaborate the non-
binding guidelines for the quantification of harm in antitrust damages actions, the European Commission ordered an external study 
on the quantification of antitrust damages prepared by economists and a multijurisdictional team of lawyers (“Quantifying antitrust 
damages”, Towards non-binding guidance for courts, Study prepared for the European Commission, Oxera and a multijurisdictional 
team of lawyers led by Dr. Assimakis Komninos).   
363 In Croatia, see Article 223 of the Civil Procedure Act. In the Czech Republic, see Section 136 of the Commercial Code. In 
Finland, see Section 17:6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. In Germany, see Section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In 
Hungary, see Section 2006(3) of the Civil Procedure Act. In Sweden, see Chapter 35 §5 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. In 
Turkey, see Article 43 of the Code of Obligations. 
364 For instance, in France, the judge handling the case has wide discretion in the determination of the amount of damages. 
258 
 
(a) Punitive Damages 
 
With regard to punitive damages, these are awarded to punish the antitrust violator or to deter him from 
future infringements. In practice, this kind of damages is rarely awarded by the courts. In order for the 
plaintiff to recover punitive damages, it has to show that the behavior of the defendant is particularly 
repulsive or that the defendant is a recidivist365.  
(b) Exemplary Damages 
 
As to exemplary damages, they resemble to punitive damages in that its imposition serves the objectives 
of punishment and deterrence of future infringements366. Similarly, the award of exemplary damages is 
only under exceptional circumstances, such as when there has been a deliberate and conscious violation 
of rights, or when the defendant’s conduct has been calculated to make a profit larger than the 
compensation payable to the plaintiff367. Furthermore, the defendant’s conduct must be extremely 
malicious or socially harmful to the extent that courts decide to make an example of the defendant for 
reasons of public policy368. Finally, the award of exemplary damages may be restricted to stand-alone 
actions given that in follow-on cases the fines imposed by the competition authorities have already 
fulfilled the punishment and deterrence objectives369. 
(c) Multiplied Damages 
 
Finally, some jurisdictions allow antitrust victims to recover multiplied damages from the defendant370. 
The objective of this kind of damages just like with punitive and exemplary damages goes beyond the 
simple compensation of the plaintiff and additionally seeks to punish the violator of the competition 
provisions and to deter future infringements371. In this regard, commentators have stated that private 
enforcement, and more specifically, multiplied damages claims, can fulfill the goals of deterrence and 
compensation372. The main difference between multiplied damages and punitive or exemplary damages is 
how the quantum of the damage is calculated; however, some scholars have indicated that multiplied 
damages can also serve a punishment objective373. In the former, the actual damages are multiplied by the 
                                                          
365 In Canada, even though Section 36 of the Competition Act does not allow plaintiffs to claim punitive damages, in practice, 
Section 36 claims are coupled with claims for damages for the common law torts of conspiracy or intentional interference with 
economic relations which may include punitive damages. In Cyprus, in the case Papakokkinou v. Kanther the court awarded 
punitive damages because it considered that the conduct of the defendant demonstrates arrogance, immoral motive or tendency to 
humility the other party (Papakokkinou & others vs Kanther (1982) Cyprus Law Reports p.65).  
366 Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] AC 1072, 1073. 
367 Rookes v. Banard [1964] AC 1129, 1226. 
368 In Ireland, Section 14(5)(b) of the Competition Act allows antitrust victims to recover exemplary damages, in practice, the 
amount granted as exemplary damages is usually a fraction of the general damages award, and not multiples like treble damages in 
the US. 
369 In the UK, the Devenish Nutrition v. Sanofi-Aventis & Others case decided on the availability of exemplary damages in follow-on 
actions. The High Court determined that the award of exemplary damages in follow-on cases is contrary to the Community principle 
of ne bis in idem, also the court determined that since the claimants were not the only affected –since there were a bunch of potential 
claimants- the award of exemplary damages should not apply to the case (Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) 
& Others [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch)) 
370 Taiwan, Article 32(1) of the Fair Trade Law. Turkey, Section 58 of the Competition Act. US, Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
371 In Italy, even though the award of multiplied damages is not available in its legislation, the Giudice di Pace di Bitonio in the 
Manfredi case, which was later referred to the ECJ, determined that when calculating the amount of damages, courts should consider 
the deterrent effect of the award. Consequently, the judge in that case awarded not only the actual damages suffered by the claimant 
but also intended to set off any profit gained by the defendant by awarding double damages to the plaintiff (Manfredi c. Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni, supra note 349).  
372 WHEELER, Malcom E. (1973), ‘Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?’. 61 California Law Review, p. 1319. 
373 WALLER, Spencer W. (2003), ‘The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust’. 78 Chicago Kent Law Review, 207, pp. 212-213. 
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court in the proceedings374. In the latter, the amount of punitive or exemplary damages is a fraction of the 
general damages award. With regard to the multiplication of the amount of damages, this can be done 
automatically after the court has reached a decision, or can be made at the request of the plaintiff, 
depending on which jurisdiction375 
6. Interest 
 
Pursuant to general rules in civil proceedings, the prevailing plaintiff should have the right to obtain 
interests in order to compensate the successful claimant for being deprived of compensation between the 
date on which the damage occurred and the date of the damage award. In relation to private antitrust 
litigation, it has been established that the successful plaintiff should receive full compensation for the 
harm suffered due to the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant, which includes: actual loss, loss of 
profit plus interests376.  
 The main issue regarding the award of interests in the private enforcement of competition law is 
to determine the period from which interests should start to run. With regard to the periods associated to 
the accrual of interests, in a broad sense, interests can be classified in: pre-judgment interests, which run 
from the date of the infringement or injury to the beginning of the action; and post-judgment interests, 
which run from the date of the judgment. 
6.1. Post-judgment interests 
 
In civil litigation a successful plaintiff can obtain post-judgment interests. The purpose of the award of 
post-judgment interests is to compensate the victim for the period between the entry of the judgment and 
the payment of the judgment by the defendant377. The award of post-judgment interest may be mandatory 
according to the provisions of some jurisdictions378. 
6.2. Pre-judgment interests 
 
As a general rule, in civil proceedings interests are awarded after the judgment. In practice, the possibility 
of the plaintiff to recover pre-judgment interests in competition law litigation can end up in a substantial 
increase in the amount of damages recovered by the successful plaintiff. Moreover, it has been stated that 
since the availability of pre-judgment interests can significantly increase the amount of damages 
recovered, such an award may enhance the effectiveness of private enforcement of competition law by 
compensating the victims while deterring future infractions without the establishment of punitive or treble 
                                                          
374 In Taiwan, Turkey and the US, the amount of damages is multiplied by three (treble damages). 
375 In the US, the trebling of damages is done automatically by the judge at the end of the proceedings. Conversely, in Taiwan and 
Turkey, the trebling of damages is done at the request of the plaintiff and is decided entirely under the discretion of the court. 
376 At the European Union level, it has been established that antitrust victims should be allowed to recover the actual loss, the loss of 
profit, and interests (Manfredi case, supra note 37). Additionally, the European Commission in page 7 of its White Paper on 
Damages (supra note 3) has welcomed the decision of the court regarding the rights of antitrust victims to recover the actual loss of 
the harm, the loss profit plus interests. Furthermore, the Ashurst Report (supra note 3) has identified the restrictions on level and 
duration of application of interest rates as a disincentive to private action given that such restrictions may reduce the potential award 
of damages (page 8).  
377 H.J. Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1991).  
378 In the US, see 28 USC Section 1961 (2000). 
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damages379. Nevertheless, some competition law regimes have restricted the award of pre-judgment 
interests to certain circumstances. For instance, a court may only grant pre-judgment interests when the 
bad faith on the part of the defendant has caused a material delay in the adjudication of the dispute380.  
Finally, in an effort to facilitate private actions for damages for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions, some competition law regimes have introduced specific provisions dealing 
with the award of interests381. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, pre-judgment interest may be awarded 
only in actions brought for the infringement of the competition law provisions382. 
VII. LITIGATION EXPENSES 
1. Litigation Costs 
 
Even though the most important thing that drives private plaintiffs to bring a private action for the 
infringement of the competition law provisions is the likelihood of winning the dispute, the litigation 
costs involved in this kind of procedures can be a strong disincentive to file such an action before civil 
courts, provided that these may be significantly higher than in most other civil disputes due to the peculiar 
characteristics of most competition law cases. 
 The litigation costs in competition law disputes generally cover two kinds of expenses. On the 
one hand, there are the court costs which are any costs generated by the court in the proceedings, such as: 
court fees; the costs for appointing an expert, or the expenses of witnesses. On the other hand, there are 
the party costs which may include: the attorneys’ fees, the costs of retrieving evidence, the costs for 
retaining an expert, and any other costs that the parties bear during the proceedings. 
 As stated before, the litigation costs linked to the private enforcement of competition law have 
been considered as a disincentive to private plaintiffs willing to sue for the violation of the competition 
provisions provided that the costs involved with the initiation of a private antitrust action are particularly 
higher compared to other civil actions383. This situation is evidenced with regard to both court costs and 
party costs. On the one hand, in most competition cases, the court fees are required to be paid upfront by 
the plaintiff, and these may involve a large amount given that its level may be calculated as a percentage 
of the value of the claim, consequently, since the amount of antitrust claims tends to be large in order to 
make the actions cost-effective, then, the court fees calculated with respect to the value of the claims will 
be as high as the latter. On the other hand, due to the complexity of most competition law cases, the party 
costs are usually high too because these may include exorbitant attorneys’ fees, plus all the expenses 
required to sustain the claim in the proceeding. 
                                                          
379 SMITH, V., MATON, A., CAMPBELL, S. (2010), “England and Wales”. In: Foer A. & Cuneo J. (eds) The International 
Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, p. 310. The authors state that since the amount of damages can significantly 
increase due to the award of pre-judgment interest, these can act as an effective equivalent to treble damages.  
380 In the US, see Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15(A)(1-3) (2009). See also cases: Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 
423, 435-36 (2d Cir. 2007); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 561 (7th Cir. 1986); and In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 504 
F. Supp. 2d 38, 64-66 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
381 In Germany, see Section 33(3) of the Act against Restraints of Competition.  
382 Under German law, in general civil actions for damages the plaintiff may be awarded statutory interest from the moment of 
default in payment. However, in damages actions for the infringement of the competition rules, the plaintiff may claim pre-judgment 
interest calculated from the moment in which the damage has occurred (Section 33(3) of the Act against Restraints of Competition).     
383 See the Commission’s White Paper on Damages (supra note 3), at page 9. 
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 In practice, the fact that most jurisdictions require the plaintiff the payment of courts fees 
upfront, which as stated before may be a considerable amount, plus the fact that most courts apply the 
loser pays principle, which requires the unsuccessful party to pay the litigation expenses of the prevailing 
party, can truly work as an obstacle to the private enforcement of competition law. This situation is due to 
the complexity and length of most competition law cases, additionally, the fact that the outcome of such 
disputes cannot be assessed by the claimant prior to initiation of the action contributes to the reluctance of 
private plaintiffs to sue for damages. 
(a) Court Costs 
 
In most jurisdictions court fees are payable upfront by the plaintiff as a general rule. Court fees may either 
be calculated as a fixed sum or as a percentage of the value of the claim. In some cases, due to the high 
value of the claim, the level of the court fees may be considerable, and as a consequence, act as a 
disincentive for potential plaintiffs. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, there is a chance to recover the 
court expenses if the plaintiff prevails over the defendant. In order to safeguard the right of individuals to 
get access to courts, to have a fair hearing by a tribunal, and to encourage private antitrust actions, some 
regimes have adopted certain measures regarding the payment of court fees. For instance, some 
jurisdictions have relieved the plaintiff from its obligation to pay upfront the court fees in collective 
actions brought by certain entities against undertakings that have injured the interests of consumers384. 
Moreover, in some countries, parties with limited or scarce resources will be exempted from paying court 
fees385. Finally, in some jurisdictions, even though the general rule is that the losing party has to bear the 
court costs, the judge has wide discretion to order another party to pay the judicial costs, in whole or in 
part, by issuing a reasoned decision386. 
(b) Party Costs 
 
As a general rule, each party must bear its own legal costs in the course of the proceedings. However, in 
most jurisdictions, the prevailing party may recover its litigation costs from the losing party either wholly 
or partly depending on the degree of success of its claim. The party costs may include: attorneys’ fees, 
expert fees, the costs for the production of evidence, and others, which may result in a significant amount 
for the parties. The fact that the outcome of the trial is hard to predict due to the characteristics of most 
competition law cases, plus the high level of the litigation expenses serve as a strong deterrent for private 
plaintiffs to bring an action before courts. Additionally, the application of the loser pays principle in civil 
cases exacerbates this situation provided that the claimant will face the dilemma of having to bear its own 
elevated litigation costs plus the defendant’s expenses. However, there are some mechanisms through 
which the parties can finance their litigation expenses387. 
                                                          
384 In Brazil, according to Article 87 of the Consumers Defense Code, the legitimated bodies to bring collective actions for the 
protection of the consumers’ interest are excused from paying court fees, unless malicious prosecution is proven.  
385 In Germany, Section 89a of the Act against Restraints of Competition establishes that the court fees may be reduced based on the 
value of the claim and the party’s economic situation. In Lithuania, the court may take into consideration the economic situation of 
the claimant and either reduce the amount of the court fees or defer its payment until the court reaches a decision. In Poland, parties 
with no possibilities to pay court fees are exempted from this obligation. In Spain, pursuant to Law 53/2002, some plaintiffs may be 
exempted from paying court fees: individuals, non-profit organizations, some legal entities and small companies.  
386 See Article 696 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
387 See Section VII, below. 
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2. Recoverability of Legal Expenses 
 
As discussed before, many jurisdictions apply the loser pays principle according to which the prevailing 
party may recover its litigation costs from the losing party. However, in practice there are some shades in 
the application of this principle. First, most courts take into account the level of success of the parties 
before making a determination with regard to the awarding of litigation expenses, thus, if neither party’s 
position is fully upheld, the litigation costs will be bear proportionally to the success of each party in the 
proceedings. Second, the courts have wide discretion to award the recovery of litigation expenses in some 
countries388. In such cases, the court will have authority to order the payment of the legal costs to either 
party irrespective of its success in the proceedings, this approach ensures that risk-adverse plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims do not refrain from filing an action under the fear of having to bear the litigation 
expenses of the defendant in case of losing the dispute389. Third, as a general rule the successful party 
may recuperate all its litigation expenses, however, in some jurisdictions not all litigation costs are 
recoverable390, and additionally, the amounts recovered may be subject to limitations391, which in practice 
means, that the successful plaintiff will rarely recover its full costs.  Finally, some competition regimes 
have adopted specific competition law provisions regarding the allocation of litigation costs which 
encourage the bringing of private actions for the infringement of the competition rules392.  
 
                                                          
388 In Finland, the courts have discretion to order the payment of litigation costs to the successful party if it deems that the losing 
party had a justified reason to litigate due to the ambiguities of the case. In Italy, the court may order that each party bears its own 
litigation costs whenever the case presents complex or unusual legal issues, or when there are conflicting court precedents regarding 
those issues, or when the courts believes there are justified reasons to order that each party bears its own litigation expenses. In 
Lithuania, the court may take into account the economic situation of the claimant and reduce the amount of court fees, or delay its 
payment until the court issues a decision. In Peru, the courts may exempt the losing party from its obligation to pay the legal 
expenses of the other party when the court believes that the unsuccessful plaintiff had reasonable grounds to file the action, or when 
the defenses raised by the unsuccessful defendant were based on reasonable grounds. In Spain, the losing party has to bear the 
litigation costs, unless the court determines that the case raised serious legal or factual doubts. In the UK the courts and the CAT 
have discretion to award the litigation cost to either party.    
389 This approach has been suggested in the Commission’s White Paper on Damages (supra note 3), which encourages Member 
States to make the recovery of litigation costs dependent on a court order that may depart from the loser pays principle in order to 
guarantee that the plaintiff, even if unsuccessful, would not have to pay the defendant’s litigation costs (Page 10).  
390 In Taiwan, only court fees are recoverable by the successful party, thus, each party has to bear its own party costs, such as 
attorney’s fees, unless the attorney of the losing party was appointed by the court, or in litigation before the Supreme Court.  
391 In most jurisdictions the amounts recovered do not cover the actual expenses of the parties. In Germany, the winning party may 
only recover attorney’s fees no higher than the statutory rate. In Korea, the courts determine the amount of the successful party 
litigation costs based on the Supreme Court Notice Nº 1829, The Rule on Remuneration of Attorney and Calculation of Litigation 
Costs. In Lithuania, attorneys’ fees are only recoverable to the extent permitted by law, which is determined by the Minister of 
Justice Recommendations on the Maximum Amounts of Attorney Fees that can be recovered in Civil Proceedings. In Turkey, the 
attorneys’ fees recoverable by the successful plaintiff are determined by the fixed rate established in the Minimum Tariff Schedule 
of the Act on Attorneyship. 
392In Canada, pursuant to Section 36 of the Competition Act, the court may award the plaintiff up to the full amount of its legal costs 
incurred in the investigation of its claim. In Germany, as a general rule, the litigation expenses are calculated on the basis of the 
value of the claim, however, pursuant to Section 89a of the Act against Restraints of Competition if a party sufficiently proves that 
its economic situation would be seriously jeopardized if it had to bear the cost of litigation calculated on the basis of the full value in 
dispute, the court may order the payment of the court fees based on a calculation made with respect to the economic situation of the 
requesting party. Additionally, the court may order that the benefiting party has to pay its attorney’s fees according to the adjusted 
part of the value on dispute. Moreover, if the benefiting party is order to pay the litigation expenses of the other party, it will only 
reimburse the opposing party for the paid court fees and the fees of its attorney only on a pro-rata basis. Finally, if litigation costs 
are imposed on the other party, the attorney of the benefiting party may recover his fees from the other party according to full value 
of the dispute. In the UK, the Competition Appeal Tribunal may, at its discretion, order the payment of litigation expenses to either 
party irrespective of its success; furthermore, the CAT may issue this order at any stage of the proceedings, even upfront. In the 
USA, pursuant to Section 15 of the Clayton Act, only the successful plaintiff has the right to recover its costs of suit plus reasonable 
attorney’s fees. In this respect, the Fifth Court denied a successful defendant the recovery of its legal expenses because by 
definition, only plaintiffs may recover legal costs under the provisions of the Clayton Act (J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting 
Co., 790 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (5th Cir. 1986)).    
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3. Funding Litigation 
 
Normally, due to the complexity of most antitrust cases, competition law litigation can be very expensive 
for the parties involved in the proceedings provided that they will have to bear such expenses as: court 
fees, attorneys’ fees, expert fees, costs for the production of evidence, translators, transportations, costs of 
witnesses, and others, to sustain its position before courts. In practice, these expenses will be higher for 
plaintiffs, given that they have to pay the court fees upfront and that the burden of proving the 
infringement of the competition rules and causality between the perpetrator’s conduct and the injury 
suffered rests on them. As consequence, unless the plaintiff has considerable economic resources which 
can fund its litigation expenses, this burden may be unbearable for most private plaintiff such as little 
enterprises or end consumers. 
 In order to avoid that private plaintiffs with meritorious claims refrain from filing a private 
action for the infringement of the competition provisions due to the lack of resources to fund its litigation 
costs, most jurisdictions allow some mechanisms through which potential plaintiffs can finance their 
claims, such as: (a) legal aid; (b) contingency fees; (c) conditional fee arrangements; (d) professional 
party funders; and (e) legal aid insurance or after the event insurance. 
(a) Legal Aid  
 
A number of countries provide legal aid for individuals with no resources to bring an action before courts. 
There are some issues related to the award of legal aid concerning the private enforcement of competition 
law: first, in some legal systems, this possibility may not be available for competition law cases393; 
second, the amount granted as legal aid in most cases is not high enough to cover the expensive litigation 
costs involved with the private enforcement of competition law394; third, in some jurisdictions, legal aid is 
only available for individuals and not for undertakings which in competition law cases may also be 
potential plaintiffs395.       
(b) Contingency Fees  
 
Contingency fees are a kind of fee arrangement for the funding of civil disputes through which the 
payment of the attorney’s legal services depends on, or is contingent to, the existence of some recovery or 
award in the case. The payment is then a percentage of the amount recovered. On the one hand, these 
kinds of fee arrangements are explicitly allowed in some jurisdictions396. While on the other hand, in 
                                                          
393 In Italy and Spain legal aid is not allowed in competition law cases. 
394 See the “Netherlands” chapter in the International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law (supra note 359) 
where the author states that the amounts granted as legal aid are fairly limited and may not be suited to antitrust damages claims 
(Page 377). See also the “Conclusions and Recommendations” chapter in A Practical Guide to National Competition Rules Across 
Europe (supra note 299) where the author asserts that the importance of legal aid in competition law litigation has declined in the 
UK due to the reductions made by the Government to the legal aid resources (Page 26). 
395 In the UK, legal aid is restricted only to individuals. In the Netherlands, pursuant to the Legal Aid Act, undertakings will only be 
granted legal aid under certain circumstances. In Switzerland, legal aid for individuals only is established as a constitutional 
principle. 
396 In the US, the majority of private antitrust actions are funded through contingency fees, which are one of the most representative 
characteristics of the private antitrust enforcement of the US. The availability of this kind of fee arrangement in the US is 
established by Rule 1.5 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Despite that the parties and its attorneys are free to 
determine the level of compensation for the legal services of the later; the US courts have discretion to ensure that the attorneys do 
not recover abusive amounts for its services. For instance, in the In re Visa Check/Master Money case, the judge determined that 
plaintiff attorney’s request was “excessive” and “absurd” (In re Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 522 
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some jurisdiction, contingency fees may be expressly prohibited397, or exceptionally be permitted under 
certain circumstances398.  
(c) Conditional Fee Arrangements  
 
Is an agreement between the client and its attorney by which the payment of the attorney’s fees is only 
due if the proceedings are successful. Conditional fee arrangements differ from contingency fees in that 
the fixed fees are not a percentage of the amount awarded to the client, but are an additional success fee 
for the efforts of the attorney in winning the case399.  
Finally, although in some jurisdictions contingency fees or conditional fee arrangements are not 
allowed because they are considered to lead to abuses and excesses400, in most of these countries, the 
possibility of using bonuses, which are an increase in the attorney’s fees that is calculated in function of 
the size of the award401; or uplifts, which are also an increase on the amount payable to the successful 
attorney, however, its calculation does not take into account the size of the award402, may have the same 
effects of contingency or conditional fees.   
(d) Professional Funders  
 
These are specialized companies in the purchase, the preparation and enforcement of damages claims 
arising from the infringement of competition law403. Professional funders provide for capital to fund the 
litigation expenses of the claimant in return of a proportion of the plaintiff’s eventual recovery on success, 
however, if the plaintiff is unsuccessful in its claim, the professional funders cannot recover the amount 
granted to fund the litigation404. Traditionally, this practice has been forbidden in some legal systems for 
its connection with the torts of maintenance405 and champerty406. At present, however, professional 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Dec. 19, 2003)). Other jurisdictions such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan, Korea, or New Zealand, also permit 
contingency fees.   
397 In France, true contingency fees are prohibited by Article 11 of the National Bar Rules. In India, attorneys are barred from acting 
on a contingency fees basis according to the professional ethics of the Bar Council of India. In Luxembourg and Portugal, attorneys 
are forbidden from fixing their fess by reference to a quota litis arrangement that makes the amount of fees exclusively dependent 
on the outcome of the proceeding. In the Netherlands, attorneys are not allowed to have a financial interest in the claim of their 
clients; consequently, contingency fees are prohibited. In Singapore, attorneys are not allowed to arrange the payment of its fees 
only in the event of success of the claim, moreover, attorneys are also forbidden from agreeing with their clients a remuneration 
proportionate to the amount which may be recovered by the client. 
398 In Germany, contingency fees are prohibited as a general rule (Section 49(b)(2) of the Federal Lawyer Regulations), however, 
according to the German Lawyers’ Fee Act, contingency fees may be allowed only in individual cases where the plaintiff would not 
file the action due the lack of economic resources. 
399 Conditional fee arrangements are available in the UK, where the attorney may agree to receive no payment at all or a reduced one 
if the client’s claim is not successful, and to receive normal or higher than normal payment, with a limitation of no higher than 
100%, if the claim is successful. Ireland and the Netherlands also allow conditional fee arrangements. 
400 In the US the availability of contingency fee arrangements plus the provisions of the Clayton Act (Section 15) recognizing the 
possibility of recovering attorneys’ fees has led to cases where the amount recovered as attorneys’ fees was immensely 
disproportionate to the amount recovered by the clients. For instance, in the United States Football League v. National Football 
League case the court awarded the plaintiff $1.00, trebled to $3.00 in damages, and $5,529,247.25 in attorney’s fees (704 F.Supp. 
474 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
401 In Greece, attorneys and clients may agree the amount of the former’s fees depending on the outcome of the case; such amount 
may not be higher than 20% of the amount claimed in the proceeding. 
402 In Luxembourg, attorneys may receive an increase in its fees; however, this cannot be subject to the outcome of the case. In the 
Netherlands, attorneys may receive a success fee only if the latter has been agreed irrespective of the outcome of the dispute. In 
Switzerland, attorneys can, considering the outcome of the proceeding, agree on an additional premium (pactum de palmario). 
403 For more information on litigation funding companies visit: http://www.claimsfunding.eu/,  or 
http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/  
404 In a case in the UK, the professional funders could not recover the amount granted to fund the claim from the unsuccessful 
plaintiff, and additionally, they had to pay the defendants’ attorneys’ fees (Arkin v Bouchard Lines Ltd. [2005]1 WLR 3055). 
405 Maintenance is the giving of assistance or encouragement to one of the parties to litigation by a person who has neither an 
interest in the litigation nor any other motive recognized by the law as justifying his interference.  
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funding in competition law cases is a practice that is increasing and no longer considered contrary to the 
law407. In some jurisdictions, private plaintiffs may benefit from public funds to finance its claim under 
the condition of repaying the amount granted by the fund plus a percentage of any settlement or award 
achieved408.   
(e) Legal Aid Insurance or After the Event Insurance  
 
This is a special type of insurance that covers the legal fees of a determined dispute. In these cases, the 
insurer indemnifies the client for any litigation expenses imposed on the latter, who in return has to pay a 
premium calculated by the insurer. This kind of insurance is available in most jurisdictions; however, it is 
rarely used in competition law disputes, or may not be available for such kind of disputes409. 
VIII. INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS 
1. Introduction 
 
In legal systems where both public and private enforcement of the competition provisions exist, these two 
possibilities interact at different levels with each other. Albeit, public and private enforcement serve 
primarily different enforcement objectives –deterrence and punishment the former, and compensation the 
latter- it is important to combine these two to achieve the main goals of competition law. Accordingly, it 
has been argued that in order to provide for an effective enforcement system of competition law both 
alternatives have to complement each other410.  
In practice, private actions should complement the public enforcement of competition law, and 
vice versa, in order to catch, punish and deter the majority of anticompetitive practices. Therefore, in 
stand-alone actions, private claims enforcing the competition provisions will cover the cases that the 
public authorities do not investigate for reasons of lack of resources or public priorities, and additionally, 
in follow-on actions, private claims will fulfill the compensation objectives of the competition provisions 
by initiating an action for damages arising from the decision of the competition authority finding the 
infringement of the competition provisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
406 Champerty occurs whenever a party agrees to maintain another to bring a claim on the basis that the third party funder shall 
receive a share of the amount recovered in the action, is a tort that applies to both litigation and arbitration proceedings. 
407 In Australia, the professional funding is no longer prohibited as maintenance and champerty (Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. 
v. Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386). Similarly, in Canada the Ontario Court in a class action case allowed a private funding 
agreement by which the funder Claims Funding International PLC., has agreed to indemnify the plaintiffs against costs in return for 
a 7% of any award or settlement (Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corporation, 2011 ONSC 1785). In Singapore, the Court of Appeal 
determined that where a third party funder has a genuine pre-existing commercial or substantial interest in enforcing the 
proceedings, the funding may not be champertous (Lim Lie Hoa and another v. Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 1 SLR(R) 775).  
408 In Canada, in the province of Ontario, plaintiffs in class action proceedings may apply to a public fund from the Class 
Proceedings Fund to cover the class litigation expenses. The benefiting plaintiff has the obligation to repay the amount granted by 
the fund plus a 10% of any award or settlement. For more information, visit: http://www.lawfoundation.on.ca 
409 For instance, in Germany legal aid insurance is not allowed for competition law disputes pursuant to the provisions of the 
General Policy Conditions of Defense Insurance. 
410 See the page 8 of the Commission’ Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages (supra note 85), stating that 
private actions before national courts are a complement to public enforcement.  
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2. Interaction between the Competition Authority Proceedings and Court Proceedings 
 
The public proceedings initiated by competition authorities interrelate with private civil actions brought 
by private parties fundamentally in two aspects. The first aspect concerns the decision of a competition 
authority finding the infringement of competition law and how this decision affects the civil proceeding 
initiated by a private plaintiff. The second aspect relates to the concurrency of both administrative and 
civil proceedings and whether the competition authority or the ordinary courts are under the obligation to 
stay their proceedings provided that the other has initiated its own procedure.     
2.1. The Requirement of a Prior Decision by the Competition Authority 
 
Most jurisdictions do not require the existence of a prior decision finding the infringement of the 
competition provisions issued by the competition authority in order to allow private plaintiffs to bring a 
civil action for the damages arising from the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant, in such cases, 
antitrust victims will be able to freely sue for damages irrespective of the existence of a competition 
authority’s decision. Despite the above, there are competition law regimes that establish the requirement 
of the existence of such a decision as a prerequisite for bringing a private action for damages before 
ordinary courts, consequently, in such jurisdictions antitrust victims will only be allowed to bring follow-
on actions411.  
 Moreover, in some competition law regimes that require a prior decision of a public authority in 
order to bring a civil action for damages, ordinary courts may be under the obligation to not consider any 
stand-alone action for damages on its merits412 or to refer the issue to the public authority if the claim 
complies with certain conditions413. Moreover, some competition law regimes may actually require that 
the private plaintiff accompanies its claim with the decision of the public authority finding the 
infringement414, or even to file with its claim a notice issued by the public authority certifying that the 
conduct on which the claim is based has been found to be contrary to the competition provisions and 
stating the date of the decision and the legal provision under which the public authority has based its 
decision415.   
2.2. Concurrency of Public and Private Proceedings 
 
The same competition law infringement can be the subject of administrative proceedings by a public 
authority which may declare the unlawfulness of the conduct, and at the same time, of civil proceedings 
before ordinary courts where the plaintiffs will claim to recover the damages suffered due to the 
anticompetitive conduct in question. Whenever, public and private proceedings concur because the same 
                                                          
411 India, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, South Africa. 
412 In South Africa, pursuant to Section 65(2) of the Competition Act, if party raises an issue concerning a conduct that is prohibited 
under the provisions of the Act in an action before a civil court, the latter must not consider that issue in its merits. 
413 In South Africa, pursuant to Section 65(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Competition Act, civil courts have discretion to refer a stand-alone 
damages claim to the Competition Tribunal if they deem that the issue has not been raised in a frivolous or vexatious manner and 
the resolution of the issue is required to determine the final outcome of the action.  
414 See Section 53N(2) of the Indian Competition Act, however, it has to be noticed that antitrust actions for damages in India are 
conducted by the Appellate Tribunal which is an administrative court in charge of the judicial review of the decisions of the 
Competition Commission of India. 
415 See Section 65(6)(b) of the South African Competition Act. 
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legal or factual issues are being contested in more than one procedure, one set of proceedings may be 
stayed to await the resolution of the other. 
 In practice, most ordinary courts are not under the obligation to stay its proceedings but they may 
do so at their own discretion or at the request of the parties. The parties will be interested in staying the 
civil proceedings especially if the decisions reached in administrative proceedings are binding on ordinary 
courts, given that the declaration of the infringement will compensate for any delay in the civil 
proceeding416. Additionally, a court may decide to stay its proceedings when an issue sub judice in 
another proceeding is important for the adjudication of the case handled by the court417. However, in 
some jurisdictions, ordinary courts may be statutorily obliged to stay its proceedings until a decision is 
reached by the competition authority once the later has initiated proceedings on the same matter418. 
Finally, in competition law regimes where the competition authority is just an investigating body and the 
courts are the decision making body, the court handling the case will not have to stay its proceeding 
because there are not concurrent proceedings provided that courts are the only bodies with authority to 
initiate and to decide on competition law matters419. 
 With regard to competition authorities, most of them do not have to stay their proceedings once 
an ordinary court has initiated proceedings on the same matter. Notwithstanding, some may do so in 
application of their discretion in selecting cases depending on their enforcement-priorities420 and whether 
or not they consider that private litigation is a better alternative than public enforcement421. 
3. Rules of Evidence Regarding the Interaction between Public and Private Proceedings 
 
3.1. Access to Documents Held by the Competition Authority and Courts 
 
In most competition law cases, potential plaintiffs usually face the burdensome task of proving the 
competition law infringement, among other things, in order to recover damages in civil proceedings. This 
imposition on potential plaintiffs is one of the major obstacles for private enforcement because of the 
latent asymmetry regarding the information held or known by the litigating parties, provided that most of 
the relevant evidence of the infringement will be in the possession of the defendant or third parties. In 
such cases, the competition authorities will be better suited to determine the infringement of the 
competition law provisions because they have intrusive powers to obtain all the relevant information from 
the undertakings under investigation and from third parties. In those cases, the information obtained by 
                                                          
416 NAZZINI, Renato (2004A), ‘Concurrent Proceedings in Competition Law: Procedure, Evidence and Remedies’. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, p. 9, para 1.23. 
417 Section 32:5 of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure. 
418 Pursuant to Article 88/B (6) of the Hungarian Competition Act, courts handling competition related cases shall stay their 
proceedings upon a notification of the Hungarian Competition Authority stating that it has initiated proceedings until the expiry of 
the time limit for filing an action in the court against the decision reached in the competition supervision proceedings or in cases 
where an action is filed against that decision, until the date on which the decision of the review court becomes final.   
419 This is the situation in Ireland where the Competition Authority is only an investigating body and does not have authority to issue 
a decision concerning the infringement of the competition law provisions. 
420 Pursuant to the Prioritization Principles published by the UK’s Office of Fair Trading, the OFT has discretion to initiate an 
investigation or not. One of the issues taken into account by the OFT is whether it is best placed to initiate proceedings with respect 
to private enforcement.   
421 In the Netherlands the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (The Netherlands Competition Authority, NMa) has rejected a 
complaint to start investigations in a few cases because a civil procedure had been already initiated on the same matter (Decision by 
the director-general of the NMa of 19 February 1999, Case nr. 1006/15; Decision by the director-general of the NMa, Case nr. 
3576/55, 15 September 2004; Decision by the NMa of 18 February 2008, Case nr. 5985). 
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the competition authorities in the course of their investigations may be valuable for potential plaintiffs 
thinking in bringing a private action against the investigated undertakings422.  
 Since competition authorities are public bodies, their documents and files should be subject to 
public consultation by natural and legal persons423. Thus, some jurisdictions have rules of administrative 
openness which govern the publicity of public documents and enable anyone to have access to public 
information which is in the possession of an administrative body424, however in practice; most private 
plaintiffs have difficulties in gaining access to documents held by competition authorities. The fact that 
the documents held by competition authorities may contain sensitive information about the defendant and 
about the public proceedings preclude competition authorities from sharing such kind of documents with 
third parties and courts425. 
 There are mainly two scenarios regarding the access to the competition authorities’ files: one 
where private plaintiffs in civil proceedings do not have access to those files; and the other, where such 
plaintiffs may gain access to the competition authorities’ files. Regardless these two scenarios, the 
information shared by competition authorities and public bodies is always restricted to non-confidential 
documents which do not contain sensitive information about the parties and the proceedings.  
In the first scenario, the access to the competition authority’s files will be restricted to the parties 
to the administrative proceedings in order to protect the interest of the parties involved426, and also the 
investigation itself427. Consequently, since private plaintiffs in civil proceedings are not considered as 
parties to the administrative proceedings, they will usually not gain access to the competition authorities’ 
files428. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, third parties may gain access to the competition authority’s 
file if the parties in the proceedings grant their permission429, or if they can successfully claim a legitimate 
interest in the outcome of the administrative proceedings430. Finally, competition authorities will be 
                                                          
422 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2009), ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’. World 
Competition. Volume 32, No. 1, p. 21. The author states that follow-on actions for damages may be facilitated by allowing the 
claimants to have access to the public enforcement file. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs will not have to prove the infringement, 
they may find useful information regarding the extent of the harm suffered and the causal link between the infraction and the harm. 
423 In Sweden, the general public can gain access to the activities of the central government and its public documents pursuant to the 
Offentlighetsprincipen constitutional principle, to the extent that these are not classified as confidential. 
424 In Estonia, the Public Information Act; in Finland, the Act on the Openness of Government Activities; in Germany, the Law on 
the Freedom of Information (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz); in Israel, the Freedom of Information Law; in Slovenia, the Access to 
Public Information Act.  
425 For instance, according to Chapter 30, Section 3 of the Swedish Publicity and Secrecy Act, the right to access public information 
is limited to non-confidential documents. 
426 Pursuant to Section 26(5) of the Portuguese Competition Act, the Competition Authority must safeguard the legitimate interest of 
the investigated undertaking by not revealing sensitive information about its businesses. 
427 For instance, in Finland the Supreme Administrative Court has determined that access to a document will be denied if its 
disclosure would threaten the outcome of the investigation and consequently affect the public interest (Decision of the Supreme 
Administrative Court 12.4.2006/883). 
428 In the Czech Republic, Section 21(a)(6) of the Competition Act establishes that those whose rights and duties are subject to the 
Office for the Protection of Competition dealings and decisions shall be the parties to the proceedings, leaving aside private 
plaintiffs in civil procedures. In Greece, Article 19 of the Hellenic Competition Commission Operation and Administration 
Regulation, at paragraph 5, establishes that persons or undertakings against whom an investigation by the Hellenic Competition 
Commission (HCC) has been initiated and also the complainant have access to the HCC’s non-confidential file. Additionally, 
paragraph 6 of the Regulation excludes third parties from gaining access to the file. Finally, paragraph 4 allows exceptional access 
to confidential files if the requesting party proves absolute necessity due to reasons of defense. In Hungary, pursuant to Article 55 of 
the Competition Act, only the parties to the proceedings and their representatives have access to the competition authority’s file, 
according to Article 52 of the Act, a party is a person against whom a proceeding was started or an applicant and the person who is 
the subject of the application. 
429 See Section 39(2) of the Austrian Cartel Act. 
430 In Spain, at least in theory, any person may request the competition authority to be accepted as an interested party in the 
administrative proceedings under Article 31 of Law 30/1992 of 26 November. 
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especially reluctant to share information gained from an application for leniency, provided that the 
disclosure of such information would place the applicant in a less favorable situation than the other 
infringers because of the information submitted to the competition authority, and additionally, it would 
also discourage other potential applicants from seeking lenient treatment431. 
 In the second scenario, private plaintiffs may gain access to the competition authority’s files by 
filing a request to the competition authority432 or by making a request to the court handling the action for 
damages433, in such cases, the court may have wide discretion in deciding to whether or not ask the 
competition authority to disclose the requested information, and to determine to what extent it will share 
such information with the requesting party. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions ordinary courts may even 
gain access to confidential documents434. In jurisdictions where the competition authority does not have 
authority to decide on the case but it is just a party to the proceedings, the other parties in the procedure 
may gain access to the non-confidential information gathered by the competition authority during its 
investigation435. Finally, in some competition law regimes, the competition authority’s files are covered 
by absolute secrecy during the investigation, however, once this has concluded third parties may gain 
access to the file436. 
3.2. Evidential Value of Decisions Issued by the Competition Authority and Courts 
 
The same competition law infringement may be subject, on the one hand, to administrative proceedings 
by a public body, such as a competition authority, which will establish the existence of an infringement of 
competition law, and on the other hand, to civil proceedings before ordinary courts where the victims of 
the infringement will sue the competition law offenders for damages. As stated before, since private 
plaintiffs do not have the same intrusive powers of competition authorities to gather all the relevant 
information to establish the infringement of the competition provisions, these may benefit from the 
evidence collected by competition authorities during the course of their investigations with the intention 
of proving the infringement. This possibility has been contemplated by some competition law regimes 
                                                          
431 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt in its Notice on the immunity from and reduction of fine in cartel cases –Leniency 
Programme- 2006, establishes that it will refuse applications by private third parties for file inspection or the supply of information, 
in so far as the leniency application and the evidence provided by the applicant are concerned (para 22). See also Article L 464-2 of 
the Commercial Code and Procedure Guidance of the French Competition Authority on the French Leniency Programme, 2 March 
2009. 
432 In Croatia an interested party may request access to the competition authority’s files pursuant to the Competition Act, however, 
access to information declared confidential is denied (Article 47 of the Competition Act). 
433 In Austria, ordinary courts may obtain access to public documents pursuant to Section 183(1)(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. At 
the EU level, the Commission cooperates with national courts based on the duty of loyal cooperation principle established in Article 
10 EC. Additionally, Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 establishes that national courts in the application of Article 81 and 82 EC 
may ask the Commission to share with them information in its possession. When the Commission shares information with national 
courts, it is precluded from disclosing any information protected by professional secrecy (Article 287 EC and 28(2) of Regulation 
1/2003). Furthermore, the Commission has the obligation to protect any information containing confidential information such as 
business secrets, thus, when a national court cannot guarantee the confidentiality of those documents the Commission may refuse to 
disclose them (Case C-2/88 Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365, paras 10 and 11). 
434 In Estonia, courts have authority to request information to the competition authority, including confidential files. Pursuant to 
Section 63(3) of the Estonian Competition Act, documents containing business secrets may be summited to courts only for the 
preparation of the hearing of a criminal, civil, administrative or misdemeanor matter, or for the hearing or making a court decision in 
such matter. 
435 In Ireland the competition authority it is just an investigatory body and does not have authority to issue a decision in the relevant 
case, thus, in proceedings where the competition authority is a party, it is under the obligation to disclose all relevant information to 
the other parties in the case. Additionally, due to the characteristics of the Irish legal system, the competition authority may even be 
asked to share information with the requesting party even if it is not a party to the proceedings under the non-party discovery 
principle. Moreover, the parties in a civil proceeding in Ireland may request information from other public bodies under the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.  
436 In Sweden, the competition authority’s files are subject to absolute secrecy during the investigation. 
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with the purpose of facilitating private enforcement and also to avoid the relitigation of legal and factual 
issues that have been already decided in the administrative proceedings by competition authorities.  
In this regard, it has been argued that the fact that a prior decision by a competition authority 
declaring the violation of the competition law rules is not binding on ordinary courts deciding in follow-
on actions for damages constitutes an obstacle to private enforcement437. In practice, the evidential value 
of the decisions issued by competition authorities diverges widely among jurisdictions, ranging from 
being considered just as evidence, to being a binding decision declaring the infringement of the 
competition law provisions. 
(a) Decisions by the Competition Authority as Evidence in Civil Proceedings  
 
With regard to the evidential value of the decisions of competition authorities, most jurisdictions attribute 
an important or even compelling evidential value to these. In some jurisdictions, these decisions may even 
constitute a rebuttable presumption of the facts contained in such decision438. Furthermore, in some 
jurisdictions the decisions of competition authorities finding the infringement of the competition 
provisions are considered as prima facie evidence of those findings in civil proceedings439. In some 
countries, the competition authority’s decisions are considered as admissible evidence provided that they 
comply with the criteria of the provisions concerning the types of evidence admissible440. Moreover, in 
some jurisdictions, the decision of a competition authority declaring the infringement of the competition 
provisions may lead to a reversal of the burden of proof441.  
Finally, in competition law regimes where competition authorities do not have authority to issue 
a decision on the matter because this is a prerogative of courts, there will not be a competition authority 
decision to use as evidence in follow-on actions for damages; however, follow-on plaintiffs may rely on 
the decisions issued by the relevant court declaring the infringement of the competition provisions442.  
(b) Decisions by the Competition Authority Binding on Civil Proceedings 
 
The binding effect of the competition authorities’ decisions may depend on the approach chosen by a 
determined competition law regime. Thus, in competition law regimes where both stand-alone and 
                                                          
437 The Commission in its Staff Working paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages has identified as an obstacle to private 
actions the fact that decisions of national competition authorities and courts’ decision of other Member States do not have binding 
effects on the courts in most Member States (para 36). Similarly, the Ashurst Report (supra note 3) has determined that it constitutes 
an obstacle to the extent that claimants will formally be required to prove certain elements of liability –the existence of an 
infringement- that would have been taken as proven by the decisions of competition authorities (page 8). 
438 Pursuant to Section 40 of the Cypriot Competition Act, a final decision by the Commission for the protection of Competition, 
European Commission or other competition authority asserting the infringement of the competition law provisions will constitute a 
rebuttable presumption of the infringement.  
439 In Australia, private plaintiffs may rely on the findings of fact in proceedings brought by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission as prima facie evidence of those facts according to Section 83 of the Competition and Consumer Act. 
Likewise, in Japan and Korea, the Supreme Courts have determined that the findings of the national competition authorities could be 
considered by ordinary courts as prima facie evidence.  
440 In Luxembourg, since the decisions of the competition authority are in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code of 
Procedure regarding the types of evidence admissible, these may be presented in civil proceedings as evidence.  
441 In Italy, the Supreme Court has determined that the decisions of Italian Competition Authority may lead to the reversal of the 
burden of proof in follow-on civil actions (Corte di Cassazione, judgment n. 3638 of February 13, 2009, Certel et al. c. ENTEL). 
442 In Canada, Section 36(2) of the Competition Act establishes that plaintiffs in civil actions may rely on the findings of criminal 
proceedings, as these constitute proof that the person against whom the action is brought engaged in conduct that was contrary to the 
Act, absent evidence to the contrary. In the US, according to 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), a final criminal judgment or civil order may 
constitute prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation in a subsequent civil procedure as to matters actually and necessarily 
decided against the defendant in the government’s case. Similarly in Ireland, a previous criminal decision of the Irish courts will 
have persuasive value in subsequent civil disputes for damages. 
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follow-on action are allowed, and consequently, the decision of a competition authority is not a 
requirement to bring a civil action for damages, most courts in those jurisdictions will not be bound by the 
decision of a competition authority declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions443. 
Conversely, in competition law regimes where only follow-on private actions are allowed, and therefore, 
a prior decision of the competition authority is a requirement to enable the private plaintiff to sue for 
damages, such decision will be binding on ordinary courts deciding on the award of damages444.  
Despite the above, in some competition law regimes where both stand-alone and follow-on 
actions for damages are allowed the decision of a competition authority may be binding on ordinary 
courts for the purpose of facilitating private actions and to enhance the consistent application of the 
competition law provisions445.  
In some countries, the hierarchy of the laws determines that a court decision prevails over an 
administrative decision; as a consequence, the determinations of competition authorities may not be 
contrary to those issued by courts. However, since this principle may interfere with the functions of 
competition authorities, in practice ordinary courts await the decision of the competition authority before 
making any determination in the case446. 
The scope of the bindingness of a competition authority’s decision will vary depending on the 
legal system. The most restrictive approach in such cases will be to declare binding only the decisions 
issued by national competition authorities447. However, there are competition law regimes that 
additionally recognize the binding effect of decisions issued by regional competition authorities448 and 
                                                          
443 For instance, see the Paris Court of Appeal case of 17 March 1998 establishing that the decisions of the Autorité de la 
Concurrece are not binding on national courts and vice versa (Paris Court of Appeal, 17 March 1998, Syndicat des pharmaciens de 
Faveyron). In Italy, the Supreme Court stated that the decisions issued by the competition authority are not binding on civil courts 
and that new facts and evidence which is contrary to the decision may be presented in follow-on on civil procedures (Corte di 
Cassazione, judgment n, 3640 of February 13, 2009, Associazione nazionale consulenti del lavoro c. INAZ Paghe). 
444 In South Africa, when civil courts are handling cases where the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court have 
issued a decision, the court is under the obligation to apply the determination of the Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court to the 
issue pursuant to Section 65(2)(a) of the Competition Act. In Singapore, an infringement decision by the Competition Commission 
of Singapore is a necessary pre-condition for bringing a civil action under Section 86 of the Competition Act, and the courts 
handling the damages award will be bound by such a decision. The situation is similar in India regarding the provisions of Section 
53N of the Competition Act. In Peru, civil courts are bound by the findings of INDECOPI. Similarly in Mexico, the infringement 
decision of COFECO (Mexican Federal Competition Commission) enables affected parties to claim damages before courts and it is 
binding on those courts. 
445 This approach is follow by some Member States of the European Union where the decision of a competition authority finding the 
infringement of the competition rules is not a pre-condition to file an action for damages. 
446 In Brazil, court decisions prevail over administrative decisions, such as those issued by the CADE. Nevertheless, with the 
purpose of ensuring the consistency of the application of the competition rules, ordinary courts will stay its proceedings until the 
competition authority has issued a decision. 
447 Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, UK. 
448 At the European Union’s level, Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 establishes that where the European Commission has reached a 
decision in a particular case which is also pending before a national court, the latter cannot take a decision running counter to that of 
the Commission (Case C-344/98 Masterfoods [2000] ECR I-11369, para 52).  If the national court doubts the legality of the 
European Commission’s decision, it has to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary ruling. This provision 
in practice establishes the binding effect of the European Commission decisions on national courts of the Member States. 
Additionally, some Member States have adopted provisions declaring binding the decisions of their national competition authorities, 
see for instance: Sections 18 and 20 of the UK Enterprise Act 2002, introduced as Sections 47A and 58A into the UK Competition 
Act 1998; Section 33(4) of the German Competition Act; and Article 88/B of the Hungarian Competition Act. However, in most of 
them –except for Germany where the decision of the competition authorities and courts of other Member States are binding on 
German courts- the decisions of the competition authorities of other Member States are not binding on national courts and will be 
freely assessed by national courts which may use them as supportive evidence.  
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competition authorities, or courts acting as such, of other states which are part of a supranational 
organization449. 
Finally, in some jurisdictions where the decisions of competition authorities are not binding as a 
matter of law, in practice, the national courts do not deviate from the competition authority’s decision450; 
or they may be required by higher courts to await the decision of the competition authority in the matter 
before deciding on the award of damages451; or the res judicata principle applies if there has been an 
appeal on the competition authority’s decision before the competent administrative courts, thus, turning 
such decision binding on civil courts on points of both fact and law452. 
(c) Non-binding Opinions by Competition Authorities 
 
When competition authorities do not take part in a determined civil proceeding, in some jurisdictions,  
they may volunteer or be asked to provide information on a point of law or some other aspect of the case 
to assist the court in deciding the matter before it. In such cases, the information can be submitted as a 
written opinion in the form of a brief (amicus brief), or as an oral opinion which will take the form of a 
testimony. Either way, the opinions and information provided by competition authorities through these 
mechanisms are not binding on civil courts, thus, these may be freely assessed as evidence at the court’s 
discretion. 
The involvement of competition authorities in civil proceedings varies depending on each legal 
system. For instance, in some competition law regimes civil courts are under the obligation to inform the 
competition authority of any civil proceeding concerning the application of the competition law rules453. 
As a result, the competition authorities may submit their written or oral opinion to the court in order to 
assist the latter in reaching a decision454. Conversely, in other jurisdictions, the obligation to inform the 
competition authority of a case concerned with the application of the competition provisions does not 
exist, and therefore, courts are free to decide about the involvement of competition authorities in civil 
                                                          
449 The 7th amendment of the German Competition Act introduced the provisions of Section 33(4) which establishes the binding 
effect of the decisions issued by the Bundeskartellamt, the European Commission, and the competition authorities of other Member 
States or courts acting as such.  
450 Switzerland. 
451 For Instance, the Turkish Supreme Court established that a decision of the competition authority is required before initiating an 
action under Article 57 of the Competition Act (Supreme Court decision of 1 November 1999 (supra note 76). 
452 In Greece, pursuant to Article 18(1) of L. 703/1977, the decisions of the Administrative Court of Appeals and of the Council of 
State (Supreme Administrative Court) issued regarding an appeal against a decision of the Hellenic Competition Commission 
constitute res judicata, and therefore, are binding on civil courts. 
453 At the European Union’s level, Article 15(2) of Regulation 1/2003 establishes the obligation of Member States to inform the 
Commission of any written judgment of national courts deciding on the application of Articles 81 or 82 EC. Some Member States 
have complied with the mandates of the Regulation by including such obligation in their national competition law provisions (In 
Estonia, Article 53(3) of the Competition Act; in Greece, Article 24(3) L. 703/1977; in Hungary, 91/H(2) of the Competition Act; in 
the Netherlands, Section 89(j) of the Competition Act). Furthermore, Article 15(3) of the Regulation allows national competition 
authorities and the Commission to submit, under its own initiative, written observations, and with the permission of the national 
courts, to summit oral observations on issues relating to the application of Article 81 and 82 EC. Notwithstanding, both provisions 
only refer to the application of the EU provisions. As a consequence, most Member States do not have similar provisions regarding 
the application of national law.  
454 At least in two Member States, the provisions of Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 apply to the enforcement of the national 
competition rules. In Germany (Section 90 of the Act against Restraints of Competition) the court has to inform the 
Bundeskartellamt of any case applying national or EU law. In Hungary, according to Sections 88/B(2) and 91/H(2) of the 
Competition Act, the court has to inform the competition authority or the Commission when applying national or EU law 
respectively.  
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proceedings455, or when allowed, competition authorities may submit their opinion at their own 
discretion. 
Despite the above, the involvement of competition authorities in civil proceedings can be 
triggered in different ways. For instance, in some jurisdictions, competition authorities will intervene in 
the civil procedure under its own discretion456. Moreover, in other jurisdictions, the courts deciding on the 
civil claim have authority to request the participation of the competition authorities, in such cases; the 
request may be made at the petition of the parties to the proceedings457, or at the court’s motion458. 
Additionally, in some jurisdictions the competition authority may intervene as a party or as amicus curiae 
with the leave of the court459. 
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, other institutions besides the competition authority may 
submit their observations related to the application of the competition law provisions460. Likewise, in 
some cases, international institutions and foreign governments have submitted their opinions to the courts 
of another country on issues that, they felt could affect their national interests and the application of their 
national law461. 
Finally, in some competition law regimes, the court deciding on the award of damages arising 
from the infringement of the competition law provisions may ask the opinion of the competition authority 
on the amount of damages462. 
4. Interaction between Leniency Programs and Private Actions for Damages 
 
Leniency programs are investigative tools established to detect cartel activity by encouraging 
undertakings and individuals to report their cartel activity and cooperate in the investigation instituted by 
the competition authority with the purpose of receiving in exchange full or partial immunity from any 
                                                          
455 In Estonia, ordinary courts may decide to include in the proceedings a body to protect the public interest in the case, such as the 
competition authority (Article 198(2) of the Civil Procedure Code). 
456 For instance in the US, the both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice may intervene in civil court 
proceedings. In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), the Department of 
Justice intervened in a private proceeding because it felt that the successful plaintiff’s verdict could diminish the authority of the 
FCC to organize the pricing and interconnection obligations of the telecom industry. Similarly, the FTC has filed an amicus brief 
recommending that the court rejects a proposed class action settlement in Chavez v. Netflix (No. CGC-04-434884 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), 
available at: www.ftc.gov/os/2006/01/netflixamicusbrief.pdf. In the UK, the OFT may submit written observations to the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal in England and Wales on issues related to the application of the competition rules, however, it needs 
the court’s permission to submit oral observations (OFT Guidelines, OFT 442 (Modernization), December 2004, para 10.4). 
457 In Ireland the parties in a court proceeding may request the court the participation of the competition authority in the case. 
458 In Spain, pursuant to Article 15bis of the Competition Act, courts may request the intervention of the competition authority. 
459 In Australia, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) may intervene as a party or amicus curiae in court 
proceedings with the permission of the court (Section 87CA of the Competition and Consumer Act). 
460 In the US, the American Antitrust Institute which is an independent organization with a mission to increase the role of 
competition, assure that competition works in the interest of consumers, and challenge abuses of concentrated economic power in 
the US and world economy, has filed an amicus curiae brief regarding issues concerned with the standing of indirect purchaser 
(Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants and Reversal, In re Dynamic Random Access 
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, Appeal No. 08-16478 (9th Cir.), filed Mar. 5, 2009 ('AAI DRAM Br.')). 
461 In the Empagran case, the US Supreme Court established a landmark in the extraterritorial application of competition law. In the 
case, the Court held that where anticompetitive behavior, such as price-fixing agreements affect both customers outside the US and 
customers within the US, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect, the plaintiffs that claim that 
they have suffered due to the foreign effect cannot invoke the jurisdictions of the US antitrust law or courts. This decision was 
finally in line with the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce and by the governments of the 
US, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the UK (F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 123 S.Ct. 2359 (2004)). 
462 In Mexico, ordinary courts may ask the opinion of the Mexican Federal Competition Commission as to the amount of the loss 
and the injury (Article 38 of the Federal Competition Act). 
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sanctions that would have been imposed upon them for the infringement of the anti-cartel provisions. 
However, in order to be granted leniency, the applicants have to meet the requirements of the program463. 
 Even though leniency programs are mainly concerned with the public enforcement of 
competition law, these interact in different extents with private antitrust enforcement. This interaction can 
be mainly evidenced regarding two aspects. In the first place, leniency programs interact with private 
enforcement with regard to the disclosure of sensitive information submitted by the applicant to the 
competition authority as part of its leniency application in follow-on civil proceedings. In the second 
place, these programs also interact with civil proceedings regarding the possibility of reducing the level of 
damages the applicant has to pay due to its collaboration with the competition authority.        
 As to the first issue, provided that leniency applications do not protect the leniency applicant 
from the civil law consequences of its participation in an infringement of the anti-cartel provisions464, the 
discoverability of leniency applications can facilitate the bringing and the further success of follow-on 
private actions, however, this possibility will in turn decrease the attractiveness of leniency programs, 
provided that potential leniency applicants may refrain from applying to leniency under the fear of facing 
numerous and expensive follow-on civil actions465. Thus, in practice, if the fact or the content of leniency 
applications is discovered to cartel victims, they will be able to prove more easily the antitrust 
infringement by the leniency applicants. On the one hand, this possibility will encourage cartel victims to 
bring claims for damages against leniency applicants and, on the other hand, it will discourage cartel 
participants from applying for leniency in the first place. Ultimately, this would significantly impede the 
discovery and punishment of cartels, and as a consequence, result in a lower degree of compensation of 
cartel victims466.  
 According to the relevant case law, the status of leniency documents in relation to disclosure 
requests made in the context of follow-on actions for damages is not completely clear. For instance, in 
some cases, the access to leniency documents by cartel victims in the context of civil damages actions has 
been denied by weighing and balancing the interest of the victims seeking compensation for the harm 
suffered against the necessity of effective cartel prosecution in which leniency programs play a leading 
role467. Alternatively, the access to leniency documents by cartel victims has been dealt with in a different 
manner by other courts. Thus, in some cases, the courts have granted access to certain leniency 
documents to cartel victims by considering that cartel members had no legitimate expectation that any 
leniency submissions would be protected from disclosure; that even though such disclosure would 
increase their exposure to liability, successful leniency applicants are offered significant amounts of 
reduction, or even immunity, of the sanction; and that it would be considerably difficult for cartel victims 
                                                          
463 For additional information on leniency programs, please see Chapter Two, Section IV. 
464 European Commission, Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006. 
465 The issue about protecting leniency application from being disclosed in follow-on civil proceedings has been dealt with in the 
Option 28 of the Commission’s Green Paper on Damages. 
466 CAUFFMAN, Caroline (2012), ‘Access to Leniency Related Documents after Pfleiderer’. Maastricht European Private Law 
Institute, Working Paper N0. 2012/3. 
467 In the Pfleiderer case, a preliminary question referred to the European Court of Justice on whether EU law prohibits disclosure of 
leniency applications to cartel victims, the ECJ ruled that the disclosure of leniency documents is not prohibited under EU law. 
However, the Court stated that national courts should weigh and balance the interest of the aggrieved parties against the need of 
effective cartel prosecution (Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt). Based on this ruling, the Amstgericht Bonn 
determined that the threat to the detection and prosecution of competition law infringements justifies the refusal to access to 
leniency documents (Amtsgericht Bonn, Case 51 Gs 53/09, 18 January 2012).  
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to obtain the requested information from other sources468. In light of the preceding, there have been some 
efforts to clarify the possibility to grant access to leniency documents to cartel victims in follow-on 
actions for damages, however, even though these recognize the fundamental role of private antitrust 
enforcement as a complement of public enforcement, they also declare the necessity to protect leniency 
materials against disclosure to the extent necessary to ensure the effectiveness of leniency programs469. 
 Leniency programs are fundamental mechanisms for the effective public enforcement of 
competition law provided that these programs contribute to the discovery, efficient prosecutions and 
sanctioning of the most serious infringement of competition law. The disclosure of leniency documents 
can put leniency applicants in a less favorable position in the context of follow-on actions for damages. In 
practice, this situation can affect the attractiveness of leniency programs and jeopardize the effectiveness 
of the public enforcement of competition law by the competition authorities. In this sense, to protect the 
effectiveness of leniency programs and anti-cartel enforcement, leniency documents should not be 
disclosed under any circumstances in civil actions for damages470. 
 The need to protect the leniency application from disclosure in follow-on civil proceedings has 
been recognized mainly with the purpose of avoiding that the leniency applicant be placed in a less 
favorable position than the other infringers due to the fact that it has applied for leniency471. Additionally, 
the fact that the information provided by the applicant as part of its leniency application may be subject to 
disclosure in follow-on civil proceedings may reduce the attractiveness and efficiency of leniency 
programs by discouraging potential leniency applicants from seeking leniency. As a consequence, most 
competition law regimes have introduced regulations establishing the protection from disclosure in 
follow-on civil proceedings of leniency applications. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the leniency 
application can be made orally to protect the information provided from being disclosed later on472. 
Moreover, other jurisdictions have expressly stated its reluctance to share information provided by a 
leniency applicant with ordinary courts in follow-on civil proceedings473, and also, with foreign 
competition authorities474  
                                                          
468 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and Others [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch). 
469 At the EU level, see: European Competition Network, Protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions. 
Resolution of the meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012.  
470 Article 6 of the Proposal Directive for damages actions, supra note 3. 
471 See page 10 of the Commission’s White Paper on Damages. 
472 In Australia, the ACCC will accept oral applications but it will keep written records of the application, however, the ACCC will 
ensure that those records do not prejudice the applicant. In Belgium, pursuant to the 2007 Leniency Notice the competition authority 
will accept, under the request of the applicant, that the application be submitted orally.  
473 For instance, in the US, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice determined in its Frequently Asked Questions 
Regarding the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters that the identity and information will be held 
under strict confidence by the Division, much like the treatment afforded to confidential informants (Question 32). In Germany, the 
Bundeskartellamt has stated that it will refuse applications by private third parties for file inspection or the supply of information 
regarding the leniency application and the evidence provided by the applicant (Paragraph 22 of the Notice of the Bundeskartellamt 
on the immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel case of 7 March 2006). Similarly, in the UK, the Office of Fair Trading will 
firmly resist requests for disclosure of leniency material, or the fact that leniency has been sought, where such request is made in 
connection with private civil proceedings (Paragraph 8.49 of the Leniency and no-action OFT’s guidance note on the handling of 
applications, December 2008). At the European Union level, the Commission has determined that it will only share with national 
courts information voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant with the latter’s consent (Commission Notice on the co-operation 
between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004 C 101/54, 
paragraph 26). 
474 In the US, the information and identity of the leniency applicant will not be disclosed by the Antitrust Division to foreign 
competition authorities even if there is a bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement, given that the Division is interested in 
maximizing the incentives for companies to come forward and self-report antitrust offenses (Question 33, FAQ, supra note 473). 
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As to the second issue, as a general rule, in most jurisdictions the benefits awarded to a leniency 
applicant for its cooperation in the leniency program are restricted to the administrative remedies applied 
by competition authorities and do not affect the civil liability of the benefiting applicant475. Thus, in most 
jurisdictions, the functioning of leniency programs is totally independent from further civil proceedings. 
However, in some competition law regimes, leniency programs and private actions for damages interact 
with each other. For instance, in some countries, the restitution of the affected parties by the 
anticompetitive conduct of the applicant is a requisite in order to be granted lenient treatment476. 
Moreover, in other jurisdictions, successful leniency applicants are rewarded for their cooperation in the 
public procedure by reducing the civil law consequences of their anticompetitive behavior in a certain 
way. For example, in certain jurisdictions where the amount recoverable as damages is multiplied by 
three, the successful leniency applicants will only have to pay single (rather than treble) damages if the 
latter has cooperated with civil plaintiffs in their lawsuit against the other cartel members. The court 
deciding on the award of damages will decide if the applicant has satisfactorily cooperated with the civil 
plaintiffs477. Furthermore, in other jurisdictions, the successful leniency applicant will be rewarded for its 
cooperation by requiring the injured party in a follow-on action to seek the recovery of the damages 
inflicted by the unlawful conduct from those other members of the cartel that have not been awarded 
immunity from fines, thus, the plaintiff will only be allowed to claim damages from the successful 
leniency applicant if the former was unable to recover the whole amount of its loss from the other 
members of the cartel478.     
IX. ARBITRATION OF COMPETITION LAW DISPUTES 
1. Introduction 
 
Arbitration is a well-established and widely used method of alternative dispute resolution. Over the years 
this procedure has become a common mechanism for resolving commercial disputes outside the 
jurisdiction of general courts. This growing preference for arbitration in commercial matters over 
ordinary court proceedings is due to some of the attractive characteristics that these procedures offer to 
the parties in a contract. In this regard, the arbitrability of a determined dispute originates from the private 
                                                          
475 At the EU level, the Commission has determined that the fact that an undertaking has been granted immunity or the reduction of 
fines cannot protect it from the civil law consequences of its participation in an infringement of the competition provisions 
(Leniency Notice at para 31, supra note 464). In France, the 2009 Leniency Notice mentions that full or partial immunity granted by 
the competition authority does not protect the applicant from any civil law consequences for the infringement of Article L. 42-1 of 
the Commercial Code and/or Article 101 of the TFEU. In Peru, pursuant to Article 26.4 of the Antitrust Law, the immunity granted 
from administrative sanctions does not release the applicant from the liability for damages. 
476 In the US, the DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Police, 1993, establishes as a condition to be granted leniency the restitution made by 
the corporation to the injured parties, where possible. Similarly in Australia, the 2003 ACCC’s Leniency Policy for Cartel Conduct 
used to establish a requirement to make restitution to injured parties, nevertheless, this requirement has been abolished by the 2005 
version of the Australian guidelines. 
477 In the US, Section 213(a) of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (ACPERA) establishes that 
the civil liability of defendants that have been granted immunity is limited to actual (rather than treble) damages only if they assist 
the plaintiff by providing a full accounting of relevant facts, furnishing of all relevant documents and by participating in interviews 
and depositions reasonably requested by the plaintiff (Section 213(b) ACPERA). The plaintiff’s right to recover litigation costs and 
prejudgment interests as provided by the Clayton Act remains unaffected by the provision of the ACPERA (Section 213(d) 
ACPERA). 
478 In Hungary, pursuant to Section 88/D of the Competition Act, the injured party has to seek recovery from the cartel members that 
have not been awarded leniency. The party may only recover damages from the applicant if he could not recover the whole amount 
from the other members of the cartel. Thus, the successful applicant may refuse to pay compensation for the injuries caused by its 
anticompetitive conduct, until the claim is collectable from any other wrongdoer liable for the same infringement.  
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autonomy of the contracting parties who decide to include an arbitration clause in the contract which 
determines that any dispute related to the rights and obligations established in the contract will be 
resolved by an arbitrator479, and as a consequence, remove the resolution of the contract from the general 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts. In such cases, a private judge or arbitrator chosen by the parties is given 
the task of settling the dispute by issuing a binding arbitration award. Furthermore, the agreement 
between the parties to submit any dispute to an arbitrator is an enforceable contract that binds the signing 
parties. Similarly, the arbitration award is an enforceable and final decision, and normally, it is subject to 
a limited judicial review.  
 In practice, there are different types of arbitration. For example, arbitration can be either national 
or international, in the first case, the arbitration proceedings, the subject matter of the contract and the 
merits of the dispute are governed by a national law, and in the second case, the arbitration involves a 
transaction that is either in a country other than the place of arbitration, that takes place in two or more 
countries, or where the parties under contract come from different countries. Additionally, arbitration can 
be institutional or ad hoc, institutional arbitration is administered and managed by an arbitral 
institution480, and ad hoc arbitration is regulated by the agreement of the parties, thus, in such cases the 
procedure is customized to meet the necessities of the parties and the facts of the dispute.  
 As stated above, currently there is a growing number of commercial disputes being resolved 
through arbitration, which includes disputes concerned with the application of the competition law 
provisions. The especial characteristics of these procedures have driven the contracting parties to include 
arbitration agreements as a regular clause in most commercial contracts, and especially in those that have 
an international dimension. For instance, compared to lengthy ordinary court procedures that may be 
subject to further appeals, arbitration can be an economical solution, especially in competition law 
disputes that because of their complexity can demand considerable expenses (experts, witnesses, etc.). In 
addition, in this type of proceedings the parties can choose the arbitrator and the legal rules to be applied 
in the procedure; thus, on the one hand, the faculty to name the arbitrator allows the parties to designate 
someone who has a determined expertise in the subject matter of the dispute, and on the other hand, the 
ability to choose the applicable law permits the parties to establish the legal provisions to be applied in 
case of a dispute. Moreover, arbitration provides the parties a quick and less formal procedure than 
ordinary proceedings before overburdened courts; this is especially welcomed in complex competition 
law cases that require a fast resolution. Finally, and maybe the most important attribute of arbitration, is 
the relatively easy enforcement of arbitration awards both in the jurisdiction of origin and abroad, this is 
due to the fact that arbitration is subject to several international conventions signed by a large number of 
countries around the world481.  
                                                          
479 The term “arbitrator” is used to make reference to the arbitral tribunal.  
480 There is a number of institutional arbitration organizations that parties can choose from: The International Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (www.iccwbo.org); The London Court of International Arbitration (www.lcia-
arbitration.com); The American Arbitration Association (www.adr.org); or The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 
(www.cprdr.org).   
481 The most important international convention on international arbitration is the United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York 10 June 1958 (New York Convention). By the year 2013, the convention 
has 148 contracting states.  
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 Nevertheless, on the other hand, there are some drawbacks of arbitration when compared to 
ordinary public proceedings. For instance, arbitration does not have the same authority and rigor as public 
enforcement of competition law. Moreover, unlike competition authorities, arbitrators do not have special 
powers of investigation to acquire relevant information about the dispute, accordingly, the parties in an 
arbitration proceeding can be asked to produce determined information but they cannot be compelled to 
do so by the arbitration tribunal. In addition, the discrete and confidential nature of the arbitration 
proceedings can be considered as a way for concealing determined practices that the parties do not want 
to make public. Due to the autonomy of arbitrators there is the risk that these might issue arbitral awards 
that conflict with decisions by other arbitration tribunals or even with decisions by a competition 
authority. Finally, the confidential nature of arbitral awards produces a lack of precedents, this means that 
given to the fact that arbitral awards usually are not published, the previous decisions by other arbitration 
tribunals in similar cases cannot be taken into consideration482. 
2. Interplay and Tension between Arbitration and Competition Law 
 
In essence, the intrinsic natures of arbitration and competition law are different. On the one hand, 
arbitration originates from the private will of the parties under contract to submit their disputes to an 
arbitral tribunal instead of ordinary courts. On the other hand, the provisions of competition law are 
mandatory and have a public policy character; consequently, their application has been primordially 
entrusted to public authorities. Accordingly, in practice, these different natures can produce certain 
tension in the interface between these two branches of law. 
 As stated above, the institution of the arbitration process is strictly related to the private 
autonomy of the parties under contract who decide to withdraw the resolution of their disputes from the 
jurisdiction of the state through the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract in question. Hence, 
this kind of extra-judicial procedure is entirely driven by the private will of the contracting parties. In this 
regard, the determination to submit the dispute to arbitration, the assignment of the arbitrator, and the 
designation of the legal provisions rest completely on the private will of the conflicting parties.  
 On the contrary, competition law has a public policy nature. The competition law provisions 
constitute a state mechanism through which the government restricts the private will of the parties in the 
marketplace with the purpose of preventing unlawful behavior for the welfare of the general public. As a 
consequence, the public policy character of competition law allows the state to restring the private 
autonomy of the parties for the sake of the public good. 
 The contradictory natures of arbitration and competition law, the former governed by the 
principle of the autonomy of will and the latter by the public order, can lead to the premature conclusion 
that these two branches of law are opposite483. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that arbitration and 
competition law are indeed complementary to each other and not contrary. For instance, arbitration is an 
                                                          
482 OECD, Arbitration and Competition, 2010, pp. 8-9. 
483 IDOT, Laurence (2010), ‘Arbitration and Competition’. Note prepared for the Competition Policy Committee of the OECD, p. 
53. 
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institution that can only be present in a free market economy with freedom of commerce and 
competition484. Furthermore, arbitration can play a fundamental role in the overall enforcement of 
competition law and enhance the deterrent effect of the competition law provisions, additionally, 
arbitration can assist public enforcers by prosecuting competition law infringements that the latter would 
not pursuit for prioritization reasons485.  
3. Arbitrability of Competition Law Disputes 
 
Traditionally, whenever a determined jurisdiction grants private law rights to natural and legal persons, 
the exercise of these can give rise to private law causes of action and defenses before the competent 
authorities of each jurisdiction, i.e. courts of civil jurisdiction. In addition to this judicial mechanism of 
civil dispute resolution, most jurisdictions allow the parties in conflict to seek resolution in alternative 
procedures that have an extra-judicial nature, such as arbitration. In this regard, to the extent that the legal 
provisions of a determined jurisdiction provide for the possibility to arbitrate civil law disputes, private 
parties under contract will be free to submit their civil disputes before the jurisdiction of arbitrators. 
Customarily, arbitrable disputes are those involving rights that the parties under contract are free to 
dispose.  
 Historically, competition law matters were not considered as arbitrable; this implied that 
arbitrators did not have the jurisdictional competence to adjudicate competition law issues. In such cases, 
arbitrators were precluded from applying the competition law provisions even if the parties under contract 
had specifically agreed to submit competition law disputes to arbitration. This determination of most 
jurisdictions to remove the adjudication of the competition law provisions from the jurisdictional 
competence of arbitrators is mainly grounded on the public policy character of competition law. In this 
regard, it has been argued that legislators did not intend for arbitrators to decide antitrust disputes because 
antitrust violations harm the general public. Moreover, the judicial system was considered to be better 
suited to handle the scope and complexity of competition law cases. And finally, since arbitrators were 
drawn from the business community, it was suggested that these could be biased towards business 
interests486.  
 The conventional argument against the arbitrability of antitrust disputes has been that the main 
objective of competition law is the attainment of a competitive market for the sake of the public interest 
and the collectivity of consumers (public policy nature of competition law); accordingly, provided that 
this is a public policy objective, it should be achieved through litigation in the public courts. On the 
                                                          
484 KOMNINOS, Assimakis P. (2012), ‘Arbitration and EU Competition Law’. In: Basedow, Francq & Idot (ed). International 
Antitrust Litigation, Conflict of Laws and Coordination. Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing. 
485 ROUSSOS, Antonis (2005), ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Arbitration Proceedings: Theory and practice’. Working paper, 
Workshop on Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy: Economic and Legal Implications of the Tendency to Criminalize 
Antitrust Enforcement in the EU Member States, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam, 17 February 
2005, available at: http://acle.uva.nl 
486 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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contrary, international commercial arbitration is concerned with the protection of the individual 
commercial interest of private parties487. 
 Notwithstanding the preceding, in the last few decades the international case law of the world’s 
leading jurisdictions has recognized the competence of arbitral tribunals to address competition law 
issues. The reasoning of international courts to allow the arbitrability of competition law disputes has 
been based on the so-called “second look” doctrine. According to this doctrine, an arbitration award 
applying competition law can always be reviewed by national or international courts when enforcing the 
arbitral decision, at this stage, the courts can also verify if the competition law provisions have been 
properly applied and fully respected by the arbitral tribunal488. Furthermore, states have overcome their 
historic skepticism towards arbitration, which was regarded as a derogation from the natural jurisdiction 
of state courts, and have turned to consider arbitration as an important factor of stability and development 
for international commercial relations489. Finally, the idea that arbitrators are at the service of the parties 
under conflict and can do nothing without their consent has been abandoned. Thus, it is now recognized 
that arbitrators have a duty to the legal system that allows arbitration as a method for the resolution of 
commercial disputes on a par with courts and that permits the arbitrability of antitrust disputes on the 
assumption that competition law will be respected and applied490.  
 As a consequence, over time, states and courts have moved from their previous position to 
consider competition law disputes as not arbitrable on the grounds of the public policy character of 
competition law. Accordingly, the public policy nature of mandatory rules in relation to the arbitrability 
of these has come to determine that mandatory rules, such as competition law, are considered as 
imperative provisions of law that have to be applied to an international relationship irrespective of the law 
chosen by the contracting parties to govern their contractual relations, provided that these are a matter of 
public policy491. This notion of the public policy of competition law has ultimately come to govern the 
arbitrability of antitrust disputes in both national and international arbitration procedures492. 
Currently, the public policy character of competition law is no longer sufficient grounds to 
restrict the arbitrability of antitrust claims in the majority of the most developed jurisdictions. In this 
context, the fact that legal provisions of public policy, such as competition law, are relevant for the 
adjudication of a certain dispute does not mean that the dispute cannot be submitted to arbitration493. In 
the course of time, the number of jurisdictions that have acknowledged the arbitrability of competition 
                                                          
487 BLANKE, Gordon & NAZZINI, Renato (2008A), ‘Arbitration and ADR of Global Competition Disputes: Taking Stock (Part I), 
Global Competition Law Review, Issue 1, p. 49. 
488 This approach has been recognized on both sides of the Atlantic: Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 
614 (1985); and Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV (C-126/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-3055. 
489 BERNARDINI, Piero (2004), ‘The Role of the International Arbitrator’, International Arbitration, Volume 20, Nº 2, pp. 116-
117. 
490 RADICATI di BROZOLO, Luca (2011A), ‘Arbitration and Competition Law: The Position of the Courts and of Arbitrators’, 
Arbitration International, Volume 27, No. 1, p. 23. 
491 HOCHSTRASSER, Daniel (2001), ‘Choice of Law and “Foreign” Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration’, 18(5) Journal 
of International Arbitration, pp. 67-68.  
492 BLANKE, Gordon (2005), ‘The Role of EC Competition Law in International Arbitration: A Plaidoyer’. European Business 
Law Review, p. 172. 
493 VAN LEYENHORST, Max & VAN DEN NIEUWEENDIJK, Isabelle (2007), ‘Characterization of Competition Law as public 
policy’. In: Zuberbühler & Oetiker (ed), Practical Aspects of Arbitrating EC Competition Law. Zürich: Schulthess, p. 39. 
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law disputes has increased494. Nevertheless, there are still certain cases where the arbitrability of 
competition law disputes has been denied by the courts on grounds of public policy495. However, there are 
also jurisdictions where the arbitrability of competition law matters has been expressly recognized by the 
legal provisions on arbitration496.  In the same line, in some jurisdictions, the arbitrable disputes 
established by the arbitration law include the disputes related to the recovery of damages caused by the 
infringement of the competition law provisions497. Moreover, some jurisdictions have even considered the 
introduction of mandatory arbitration mechanisms for damages claims for the infringement of 
competition law498. In other jurisdictions, the provisions that used to impose additional burdens for the 
arbitrability of competition law disputes have been revoked, for example, in some competition law 
regimes, arbitration clauses relating to antitrust disputes were declared null and void by the provisions of 
the competition act unless they reserved to the parties the right to bring an action before national courts 
for the resolution of the case in question499. Recently, an international organization has published a 
proposal with guidelines for the institution of damages claims for the infringement of competition law, in 
such proposal, it has been suggested that injured parties and the perpetrators of antitrust infringements 
should be encouraged to agree on compensating the harm caused by a competition law violation through 
consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-of-court settlements, arbitration and mediation500.  
4. Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply Competition Law  
 
There is another fundamental issue regarding the arbitration of antitrust disputes that arises from the 
previously seen acknowledgement of the arbitrability of competition law. In particular, this issue is 
related to the arbitrator’s duty to apply the competition rules. As seen in the previous section, arbitrators 
undoubtedly have a duty to apply the competition law provisions; moreover, they are expected to do so. 
Thus, the states’ recognition of the arbitrability of competition law matters implies the expectation that 
arbitrators will apply competition law501. In this context, there are several instances in which arbitrators 
may be required to enforce the competition law provisions in the course of the arbitration procedure. For 
instance, from the obligation of arbitrators to render an enforceable award that complies with the public 
policy rules, arises an implicit duty of arbitrators to apply competition law. Moreover, arbitrators may be 
obliged to apply competition law if this is within the scope of the arbitration clause. Similarly, arbitrators 
                                                          
494 For instance, in 1992, the Swiss Supreme Court held that arbitrators have jurisdiction to consider a plea that a contract is contrary 
to EU competition law and that their failure to do so can lead to the invalidation of the arbitral award (Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, 28 
April 1992; [1992] ASA Bull 368). In 1993, the Paris Court of Appeal established that arbitrators may apply EC competition law 
provisions (Société Aplix v Société Velcro, CA Paris, 14 October 1993 [1994] Rev. Arb. 165). In 1997, the Corte di Cassazione 
determined that controversies concerning the freedom of private enterprises, as recognized by the Italian Constitution, which include 
antitrust matters, are arbitrable (Corte di Cassazione, 21.8.1996, Nº 7733, Telecolor SpA v Technocolor SpA, 47 Giust. Civ. I-1373 
(1997). The arbitrability of antitrust disputes was also recognized in 2003 by courts in Sweden (Decision T 4366-02 of the Court of 
Appeal for Western Sweden of 29 December 2003, Dirland Télécom SA v Telecom AB), and 2005 in the UK (ET Plus SA v Jean-
Paul Welter & The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd [2005] EW HC 2115 (Comm.)). 
495 Alstom Power LTD v Eraring Energy (2004) ATPR 42-009. 
496 Section 1(3) of the Swedish Arbitration Act 1999.  
497 Article 3 of the Law on Commercial Arbitration of the Republic of Lithuania. 
498 In Peru the proposal for the amendment of the competition act included this possibility in the draft; however, this was not 
included when the act was finally passed. BULLARD, Alfredo & FALLA, Alejandro (2010), ‘Peru’. In: Foer, A. & Cuneo, J. (ed). 
The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 464 
499 This was the case in Germany until 1997 when the Act against Restraints of Competition was modified (Section 91 of the old 
version of the Act against Restraints of Competition). 
500 Proposal Directive for damages actions (supra note 3), para. 37.  
501 OECD (2010), p. 12. 
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may have a duty to apply the competition law provisions on the basis of the lex contractus. And finally, 
arbitrators may also be required to apply ex officio the provisions of competition law. 
 Nonetheless, in some jurisdictions the duty of arbitral tribunals to apply the competition law 
provisions originates from the implicit obligation of arbitrators to apply the legal provisions of the 
jurisdiction in question. In such cases, if the parties under conflict have not submitted relevant 
competition law issues to the arbitral tribunal, the arbitrator will usually bring these issues to the attention 
of the parties in the same fashion it would do in relation to any ordinary contractual issues not submitted 
by the parties502.  
 With regard to the implicit obligation of arbitrators to apply competition law, this is grounded on 
the obligation of arbitrators to render an enforceable award503. In order to comply with this fundamental 
obligation, arbitrators have to eliminate any possibility that their award will be annulled or set aside by a 
national or international court in the review process. Therefore, provided that any arbitral decision that is 
contrary to the public policy rules can be annulled or set aside, it is essential that arbitrators make sure 
that their awards are in conformity with the mandatory rules of public policy, such as competition law504. 
Accordingly, arbitrators face the risk of the unenforceability of their awards if they ignore relevant 
competition law issues in the making of the arbitral award505, hence, this entails that arbitrators will be 
expected to take into consideration the competition law provisions in force at the place of enforcement of 
the award. Furthermore, arbitrators have an intrinsic obligation to see that justice is done, in this regard; 
arbitrators cannot deliberately disregard the application of the competition law provisions in order to 
favor the parties in conflict, given that this would turn them into accomplices of a circumvention of the 
applicable competition law provisions. 
As abovementioned, there is a further duty of arbitrators to apply the competition law provisions 
if these are within the scope of the arbitration clause506. Overall, arbitrators have an obligation to address 
all matters that fall within the scope of the arbitration clause of the contract, in this sense, the application 
of the competition law provisions may be mandatory for arbitrators as a matter that falls within the 
arbitration clause507. In some jurisdictions, it has been found that irrespective of the exact wording of the 
individual arbitration clause in question, competition law matters may fall within the scope of any 
standard arbitration clause that calls for the submission of any dispute under the contract to arbitration, 
unless they are expressly excluded508. Normally, most arbitration clauses have a broad scope of 
application and will require the arbitration of disputes “arising out of” or “relating to” the contractual 
                                                          
502 This is the case in the US where due to the frequency of private actions concerned with the infringement of the antitrust 
provisions, arbitrators and private parties are more comfortable with the application of the antitrust rules in the arbitration process, 
in this sense, there is not a debate in the US on the duty of arbitrators to apply the antitrust rules (BLANKE, Gordon & NAZZINI, 
Renato (2008B), ‘Arbitration and ADR of Global Competition Disputes: Taking Stock (Part II), Global Competition Law Review, 
Issue 2, p.79). 
503 See, Art. 35 ICC Rules of Arbitration; Art. 32.2 LCIA Arbitration Rules; and Art. 31 ICDR Arbitration Rules.  
504 In the Eco Swiss case (supra note 488) the ECJ determined that the non-application of the EC Treaty and particularly its 
competition law provisions can amount to a violation of the public policy rules.  
505 BLANKE (2005), p. 175. 
506 The question of whether the existence of an arbitration clause can give rise to competition law matters has been discussed in the 
UK courts (Provimi Limited v Aventis Animal Nutrition and SA & Ors [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm)).  
507 STYLOPOULOS, Epameinondas (2009), ‘Powers and Duties of Arbitrators in the Application of Competition Law: An EC 
approach in the light of recent developments’, 30(3) European Competition Law Review, pp. 119-120. 
508 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] EWCA Civ 20; [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 891. 
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relations of the parties509. In practice, courts have interpreted these general arbitration clauses broadly and 
determined that any doubt as to the scope of the arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration510. On the other hand, some courts have refused to refer competition law disputes to arbitration 
when the claims did not fall within the contract containing the arbitration clause in question511. Moreover, 
in some jurisdictions, the courts have determined that an arbitration agreement will be considered null and 
void if this implies the submission of mandatory rules to arbitration512.  
 As a general practice, the contract in dispute contains a determined law clause by which the 
parties have designated the legal provisions applicable to their contractual relations (lex contractus). 
Thus, in cases where the competition law provisions form part of the applicable law chosen by the 
contracting parties, the arbitrators will be required to apply the competition law provisions in the 
resolution of the conflict arising from the contractual relation of the parties513.  
 Arbitrators have a duty to apply the competition law provisions in any event if the applicability 
is raised before them by the parties in conflict514. Hence, if the arbitrators refuse to consider relevant 
matters brought before them by the parties in the proceedings, such as the applicability of the competition 
law provisions, they face the risk that their decisions may be set aside for the failure to address all the 
issues raised in the procedure or for insufficient reasoning. Nevertheless, on the other hand, there is the 
issue of the potential obligation of arbitrators to apply the competition law provisions at their own 
motion, even if none of the parties has raised the applicability of competition law in the case. This 
possibility brings two further issues into debate, on the one hand, there is the obligation of the arbitrators 
to confine themselves to the matters submitted to the process by the parties and not abandon their passive 
role, and on the other hand, there is the risk that the parties under contract selected a specific law with the 
sole purpose of circumventing the application of mandatory rules, such as competition law. The decision 
of arbitrators to apply the competition law provisions ex officio, is basically contrary to the fundamental 
principle of party autonomy that governs the arbitral process. However, the fact that the parties under 
contract can unintentionally or deliberately exclude the application mandatory rules from the arbitration 
process can entail the possibility that the parties go unpunished for the infringement of competition 
law515. Accordingly, given that the competition law provisions are mandatory in nature; these cannot be 
rendered ineffectual or be opted into at will merely through choice of law clauses516. Nonetheless, in some 
jurisdictions the courts have determined that an arbitration award is not subject to annulment merely 
                                                          
509 See the Standard Arbitration Clause of the American Arbitration Association’s Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation 
Procedures, 2009, p. 7. 
510 AT&T Techs., Inc. v Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986); Louis Dreyfus Negoce, S.A. v Blystad Shipping 
& Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 2001).  
511 AlliedSignal, Inc. v B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 1999); Coors Brewing Co. v Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 
1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995).  
512In 2009, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, has determined that an arbitration agreement will be considered “null, 
void and inoperative” insofar as it purports to require the submission to arbitration of issues relating to mandatory EU law 
(Accentuate Ltd v ASIGRA Inc. [2009] EWHC 2655).  
513 In EU, arbitrators can be required to apply the EU competition law provisions on the basis of the lex contractus, if this coincides 
with the law of a Member State, provided that the EU provisions form part of the national law of the Member States and are directly 
applicable in their territories (Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei Gmb H v Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co 
KG (102/81) [1982] E.C.R. 1095).  
514 LUGARD, Paul (1998), ‘EC Competition Law and Arbitration: Opposing principles?’, European Competition Law Review, 
19(5), p. 297.  
515 LUGARD (1998), p. 300. 
516 DALHUISEN, Jan Hendrick (1995), ‘The Arbitrability of Competition Issues’, 11(2) Arbitration International, p. 161.  
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because the arbitrator has failed to raise sua sponte potential violation of competition law517.  In relation 
to the preceding, arbitrators should take into consideration the mandatory rules of competition law even if 
these have been excluded by the parties in the contract: in case that the parties have selected a specific 
law with the sole objective of circumventing the application of certain mandatory rules; in case where the 
performance of the contract is affected by the invoked mandatory rules, and there is a close link between 
performance and the rules; and in case that the enforcement of the arbitral decision would be at risk for 
the non-application of the pertinent mandatory rules518.  
5. Powers of the Arbitrators 
 
Arbitral tribunals have been vested with certain powers intended to assist them in the resolution of the 
disputes brought by the parties to the arbitration process. In some ways, these powers are comparable to 
those held by ordinary courts; however, some of these are not as extensive as those used in judicial 
proceedings. This occurs as a consequence of the choice of the parties to submit their controversies to the 
jurisdiction of arbitrators and remove them from the general jurisdiction of state courts. This decision 
involves an exchange between: extensive court procedures with effective review mechanisms, and 
expedite arbitration with simple and informal procedures519. Overall, arbitral tribunals may be empowered 
to: grant interim measures at the request of the parties; require the production of relevant evidence related 
to the facts of the dispute; make use of experts’ reports submitted by the parties and appoint their own 
experts who provide their expertise for the resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, provided that the 
procedure and the powers of the arbitral tribunals are shaped by the private will of the contracting parties 
in the arbitration clauses, in practice, the parties will ultimately determine the powers of the arbitrators 
and the extent of these.  
5.1. Interim measures 
 
Most arbitral tribunals can grant interim measures at the request of the parties before the arbitral award is 
issued. Given that the arbitration procedure is governed by the private will of the parties in conflict, the 
arbitrator’s power to grant interim measures can be waived by the prior agreement of the parties520.  
Interim measures are provisional measures ordered by the arbitral tribunal on the exercise of the authority 
that the contracting parties have conferred on the latter to resolve a determined dispute. Interim measures 
can be granted at any time prior to the issuance of the arbitration award, moreover, the arbitral tribunal 
can award any interim measure it deems appropriate. Overall, interim measures can include orders to: 
maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; take action that would prevent, or 
refrain from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral 
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process itself; provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied; or 
preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute521.  
In order for arbitral tribunals to grant interim measures, the requesting parties may have to 
demonstrate that a kind of harm that is not reparable by an award of damages is likely to occur if the 
measures are not granted, and that such harm outweighs the harm to be caused to the party against whom 
the measure is directed; and that there is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on 
the merits of the claim522. Furthermore, arbitral tribunals may oblige the party requesting the grant of an 
interim measure to provide appropriate security in connection with the requested measure523. Normally, 
interim measures can be modified, suspended or terminated under exceptional circumstances upon the 
request of the parties or at the tribunal’s initiative. Moreover, the interim measures by arbitrators are 
binding for the contracting parties and enforceable before the competent courts. Finally, the power of the 
arbitration tribunal to grant an interim measure in the arbitral procedure does not prejudice the right of the 
contracting parties to apply to any competent court for interim measures. 
5.2. Powers to request information  
 
In addition, arbitrators have certain powers to obtain relevant information from the parties in the course of 
the arbitration process. However, in practice, irrespective of the jurisdiction in question and the arbitration 
tribunal, the contracting parties will ultimately determine the disclosure mechanisms of the proceedings in 
the arbitration agreement. The investigative powers granted to arbitral tribunals are less extensive than the 
powers vested on ordinary courts. This limitation on the arbitrator’s powers to request the relevant 
information is considered as part of the “trade off” between arbitration and litigation524. In this regard, in 
jurisdictions where the contracting parties have a wide and extensive discovery process in judicial 
procedures, the parties’ obligation to disclose in the arbitral proceedings is somehow limited. For 
instance, in some cases, the courts have refused to annul arbitral awards on the grounds of incomplete 
discovery responses by the parties in the arbitration process525. Moreover, the rules of arbitration 
institutions also provide for limited discovery procedures where the arbitrator has the duty to decide the 
extent of disclosure526. The ultimate objective of limiting discovery in arbitration proceedings is to 
expedite the procedure and reduce costs527.  
 On the other hand, in jurisdictions where the discovery process is not available the arbitrators are 
empowered to request from the conflicting parties the production of documents, exhibits or any other 
relevant evidence528. Additionally, the arbitration tribunal may have authority to order any party to make 
                                                          
521 Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985: With amendments as adopted in 2006, 
2008.  
522 Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010), 2011. 
523 Article 25 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, 1998. 
524 McCALLUM, Elizabeth B, & McCAREINS, R. Mark (2004), ‘Arbitration Procedures: The Rules of the Road in Arbitrating 
Antitrust Disputes’, Antitrust, Volume 19, Issue 1, p. 17.  
525 Prestige Ford v Ford Dealer Computer Services, Inc., 324 F.3d 391 (5th Cir.2003). 
526 American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large, 
Complex Commercial Disputes), 2010, Rule L-4; and JAMS, Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, 2010, Rule 17.  
527 MARGOLIS, Daniel H. & VORRASI, Kenneth M. (2011), ‘Arbitration in US Antitrust Enforcement’. In: Blanke, G. & Landolt, 
P. (eds), EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners. Volume 2. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2011, p. 1756. 
528 Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
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any property, site or thing under its control available for inspection by the arbitral tribunal, any other 
party, its expert or any expert to the arbitral tribunal529. Moreover, arbitrators may be allowed to summon 
any party to provide additional evidence that may be relevant for the resolution of the dispute530. Finally, 
the failure of a party to comply with a request by the arbitral tribunal to produce relevant evidence within 
the established period of time may drive the tribunal to make the award on the evidence before it. In some 
cases, the arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the tribunal may request from a competent court 
assistance in taking evidence, in such cases, the court will execute the request within its competence and 
according to the pertinent rules on taking evidence531.  
5.3. Use of experts in arbitration 
 
Additionally, arbitral tribunals may have the power to use the experts’ reports submitted by the parties to 
the tribunal. In such cases, the arbitral tribunal may conduct an exchange of experts’ reports between the 
parties and be empowered to resolve disputes and compel disclosures532. Moreover, the arbitrators may 
have the faculty to decide to hear expert witnesses appointed by the parties533. Additionally, arbitrators 
may have the ability to appoint their own expert(s) who shall be and remain impartial and independent of 
the parties to assist them in the resolution of the controversy. Normally, the appointment of experts by the 
arbitral tribunal is made in consultation with the parties to the proceedings. Overall, there are certain 
obligations and rights that the parties have with regard to the participation of experts in the arbitration 
process.  On the one hand, the parties in the arbitration process may be required by the arbitrators to give 
the experts any relevant information or to provide access to any relevant documents, goods, samples, 
property or site for inspection by the experts534. Any dispute between the parties and the experts 
concerned with the relevance of the required information or production will be referred to the arbitration 
tribunal for decision535. On the other hand, the parties in the arbitration procedure may have the 
opportunity to examine the report submitted by the experts and question their findings, additionally, the 
parties may request the arbitral tribunal the appearance of the experts in a hearing and have the 
opportunity to interrogate the experts, moreover, the parties can present their own expert witnesses in 
order to testify on the points at issue536.  
6. Arbitration and Competition Authorities 
 
As with other types of competition law enforcement, the application of the competition law provisions in 
arbitration procedures can interact with concurrent proceedings and other types of antitrust enforcement. 
Particularly, arbitral tribunals can interact with competition authorities when enforcing the competition 
law provisions. In practice, however, the relation between arbitral tribunals and competition authorities 
                                                          
529 Article 22 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules. 
530 Article 25(5) of the ICC Arbitration and ADR Rules. 
531 Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
532 Rule L-3(e) of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures; and Rule 17(d) of the JAMS Comprehensive 
Arbitration Rules & Procedures. 
533 Article 25(3) of the ICC Arbitration and ADR Rules. 
534 Article 21(1)(b) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules. 
535 Article 29(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
536 Article 29(4) and (5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 26(2) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration. 
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may raise certain questions, these are related to: the cooperation of competition authorities in arbitral 
proceedings where competition law matters have been raised537; the possibility of arbitrators to stay 
proceedings in case the competition authority has initiated an investigation on the same matter; the effects 
on the arbitral procedures of the decisions by competition authorities declaring the infringement of the 
competition law provisions; and the use of arbitration by the competition authority in merger remedies. 
6.1. Cooperation of the competition authority in arbitration 
 
With regard to the cooperation by the competition authority in arbitral procedures where competition law 
matters have been raised, this involvement of administrative authorities in court proceedings is more 
customary in jurisdictions where the application of competition law is mainly done by administrative 
entities, such as the competition authority. In this regard, in jurisdictions where the antitrust provisions 
are frequently applied by courts, the intervention of competition authorities in court proceedings, and in 
our case, arbitral procedures, is virtually inexistent538. Notwithstanding, in jurisdictions where the 
competition authorities can cooperate/intervene in other procedures dealing with the application of the 
competition law provisions, such as litigation or arbitration, this possibility can occur in two instances. 
On the one hand, competition authorities can be requested by arbitral tribunals to submit their opinion on 
a determined matter to assist the arbitrators in the resolution of the dispute. And on the other hand, 
arbitral tribunals may require the information acquired by the competition authorities in the course of an 
investigation for the infringement of competition law that may be relevant for the determination of the 
competition law matters that have been raised in the arbitration proceedings. 
 As stated before, the competition authority can cooperate with the arbitral tribunal by submitting 
an amicus curiae brief, in such cases, the competition authority will submit its opinion on certain 
competition law issues in order to ensure a proper interpretation and application of the competition law 
provisions, this practice is intended to avoid inconsistencies that could lead to the unenforceability or the 
setting aside of the arbitral award. Depending on the jurisdiction and the proceedings, the competition 
authority will issue the amicus curiae brief at its own motion or when it has been invited to do so. In 
arbitral procedures, the main issues related to the competition authority’s possibility to submit an amicus 
curiae brief are concerned with the admissibility of the latter in the proceedings and the evidential value 
of such submission. As a general rule, unlike some courts539, arbitral tribunals do not have an obligation 
to accept such submissions by competition authorities. Hence, provided that the arbitral procedure is 
ultimately determined by the private autonomy of the contracting parties, the arbitrators will be required 
to give effect to any agreement of the parties as to whether the submission of the competition authority’s 
opinion should be admitted or not. However, in the case that the parties have not established such 
                                                          
537 ICC Case No. 7146 (2001) XXVI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 119. 
538 The involvement of competition authorities in court proceedings is a typical European issue, conversely, in the US the 
competition agencies can occasionally file an amicus curiae brief in pending cases before courts, however, the cooperation or 
supervision by the competition agencies, in the EU sense, has never been an issue for US courts applying competition law 
(KOMNINOS, Assimakis P. (2011), ‘Assistance by the European Commission and Member States Authorities in Arbitration’. In: 
Blanke, G. & Landolt, P. (eds), EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners. Volume 1. Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, p. 728). 
539 In the EU according to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States 
can submit written observations to the national courts on issues relating to the application of the EU competition law provisions. 
However, according to the EU case law, arbitrator tribunals are not considered as courts for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003 
(Nordsee case, supra note 513).  
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possibility in the arbitration agreement, the submission by the competition authority may be accepted by 
the arbitrators at their own discretion540. 
 As to the possibility to require the submission of relevant information gathered by the 
competition authority, this can take place in two different scenarios during arbitration. In the first case, by 
virtue of the powers vested on arbitral tribunals to require the parties under conflict to disclose any 
relevant information for the resolution of the dispute541, the arbitral tribunal could ask a party that is 
currently under investigation by the competition authority to submit any information that the former has 
provided to the latter, in such cases, appropriate arrangements must be made to protect confidentiality and 
business secrets. Normally, the information required by the arbitral tribunals could include: all documents 
produced at the request of the competition authority and the documents seized or copied by the 
competition authority in the course of a dawn raid542. On the second scenario, the arbitral tribunal may 
request the competition authority for information obtained in the course of an investigation, however, as 
seen previously543, competition authorities are usually reluctant to disclose any information about the 
parties in administrative proceedings with courts and third parties, and especially if the information 
contains confidential documents, business secrets or information provided by the parties in leniency 
applications given that this possibility could diminish the attractiveness of leniency programs544. 
Oppositely, the possibility of the competition authority to request the arbitral tribunal to disclose any 
relevant information acquired from the parties in the arbitral procedure could deprive the confidential 
nature of the arbitration procedure. In those cases, the arbitral tribunal should not disclose any 
information to the competition authority without the express prior consent of the arbitrating parties545. 
6.2. Stays 
 
One of the special characteristics of competition law enforcement is the possibility to apply the 
competition law provisions in more than one procedure at the time. In this sense, concurrent proceedings 
may occur, for example, when the competition authority has initiated administrative proceedings against a 
determined practice that may be anticompetitive, and at the same time, the same practice is the subject 
matter of an ongoing arbitration. In such cases, the arbitral tribunal is presented with the possibility of 
staying its proceedings and wait for the decision of the competition authority in the case in question. The 
fact that competition authorities are specialized institutions with a high level of expertise in competition 
law matters and special investigative powers serves as an incentive for arbitrators to stay their 
proceedings and benefit from the authority’s findings. Moreover, due to the complex nature of some 
competition law disputes, the conflicting parties and the arbitrators will be relieved from having to prove 
or analyze complex issues, like market definition, cost structures or profitability, given that they will be 
able to rely on the competition authority’s decision if they wait for the resolution of the administrative 
                                                          
540 NISSER, C. & BLANKE, G. (2006), ‘Reflections on the Role of the European Commission as Amicus Curiae in International 
Arbitration Proceedings’, European Competition Law Review, Issue 4, p. 177. 
541 See section 5 ‘Powers of the Arbitrators’, above.  
542 NAZZINI, Renato (2004B), ‘International Arbitration and Public Enforcement of Competition Law’, European Competition Law 
Review, 25(3), pp. 159-160. 
543 See Section VIII, above.  
544 MAMANE, David & MENZ, James U. (2011), ’Practical Challenges in Arbitrating Antitrust Claims’, Competition Law 
International, 7, pp. 18-19. 
545 STYLOPOULOS (2009), p. 122. 
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procedures. In general, arbitrators do not have a duty to stay proceedings in case that the competition 
authority has initiated an investigation on the same matter546. Thus, the decision to stay proceedings rests 
on the private will of the contracting parties and on the discretion granted to the arbitral tribunal. 
Similarly, competition authorities are not obliged to stay proceedings if an arbitral tribunal has instituted 
proceedings on the same matter, however, there have been cases where competition authorities have 
decided not to initiate an investigation where there was a pending arbitration procedure547. 
 The decision to stay arbitration procedures is closely related to two fundamental principles of 
international arbitration: the obligation of arbitrators to render an enforceable award and the principle of 
party autonomy548. As explained before, the duty of arbitrators to render an enforceable award is closely 
related to the public policy nature of competition law, this means, that during the review process courts 
will exercise a thorough scrutiny of arbitration awards in order to see if the arbitrators have applied the 
antitrust rules correctly and if these have been fully respected. Therefore, according to the risk that 
arbitrators face of having their decisions being set aside or unenforced if these are contrary to the 
competition law provisions and to a subsequent decision by the competition authority on the same matter, 
the arbitral tribunals should consider to stay their proceedings and wait for the decision of the competition 
authority if there is a high risk of conflict between the award and the administrative decision. As to the 
principle of party autonomy, it is for the parties to decide if the proceedings should be stayed or not. In 
this sense, the arbitrators are compelled by the agreement of the parties on the matter; however, given that 
the parties cannot cover any possible scenario in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators may exercise 
their discretion in procedural matters to stay the proceedings if the parties have not agreed on that specific 
matter.  
 In practice, nonetheless, the decision to stay arbitral proceedings will be appropriate in cases 
where the nature of the dispute, the evidence before the tribunal, or the legal issues involved are such that 
it is likely that a decision by the competition authority on the same matter will conflict with the arbitral 
award and that such a conflict could cause a real risk of the arbitral decision being set aside or 
unenforced549.  
 Additionally, arbitration may interact with other concurrent procedures such as private litigation 
before ordinary courts. This may occur when a party is sued in court for the resolution of a determined 
contract, but the latter contains a clause that requires arbitration. In such cases, the defendant may file a 
motion to stay litigation pending arbitration. In most jurisdictions, arbitration is favored over litigation, 
thus, if the court is presented with an appropriately supported motion to stay, then the court may decide to 
issue an order staying the litigation550.  
 
                                                          
546 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court recognized the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to apply Article 81 and 82 EC even if the 
Commission had initiated an investigation on the same matter (G SA v V SpA and Arbitration Tribunal [1996] E.C.C. 1). 
547 ICC Case No. 7181 (1996).  
548 NAZZINI (2004B), pp. 157-159. 
549 NAZZINI, Renato (2004A), pp. 12-13. 
550 In the US, according to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, courts are obliged to stay proceedings if presented 
with a supported motion to stay.  
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6.3. Effects of the competition authority’s decision in arbitration 
 
As stated before, the intervention of the competition authority in arbitration is more frequent in 
jurisdictions where the competition law provisions are mainly applied in administrative proceedings and 
not in jurisdictions where ordinary courts are used to handle antitrust disputes. Accordingly, if an arbitral 
tribunal is faced with the same or similar competition law issues that have been previously addressed by 
the competition authority; the decision of the latter may have different effects on the arbitration procedure 
depending on the jurisdiction in question.  
 For instance, in some competition law regimes, a final decision by the competition authority 
declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions constitutes prima facie evidence against the 
defendant in a subsequent action for damages551. Consequently, in such competition law regimes, an 
arbitration award that is contrary to the findings of the competition authority declaring that the defendant 
has violated the competition law provisions would be difficult to be subsequently enforced before the 
competent courts552.  
 In other jurisdictions, according to the relevant case law and the pertinent provisions553, the 
decisions of the competition authority declaring the infringement of the competition law provisions are 
binding on courts, but not on arbitral tribunals554. Nonetheless, in cases where the arbitrators apply the 
same provisions to the same facts, the decision of the competition authority can be regarded as admissible 
evidence in the arbitration procedure555. Moreover, even though arbitral tribunals are not directly bound 
by the decision of the competition authority, the fact that courts cannot take decisions running counter to 
those issued by the competition authority, in practice means that the courts cannot enforce an arbitration 
award that is contrary to a decision on the same matter by the competition authority. In this sense, 
arbitrators, even though, not directly bound by the competition authority’s decision, in compliance with 
their obligation to render an enforceable award will consider the decision in question, provided that the 
failure to do so could result in the setting aside or unenforceability of the award556.  
6.4. Competition authority’s use of arbitration in merger remedies 
 
In line with the recognition of the arbitrability of competition law disputes, some competition authorities 
have recently began to use arbitration clauses as a mechanism to enforce third-party rights deriving from 
merger remedies. In this sense, the arbitration clauses are included in the commitments given by the 
contracting parties in order to obtain from the competition authority clearance of their proposed 
transactions. In such cases, arbitration has been considered to be an appropriate means to guarantee the 
                                                          
551 In the US, see § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.  
552 BLANKE, Gordon & NAZZINI, Renato (2008C), ‘Arbitration and ADR of Global Competition Disputes: Taking Stock (Part 
III), Global Competition Law Review, Issue 3, p.135). 
553 In the EU, according to the Masterfoods case (supra note 448) courts cannot take decisions running counter to those issued by the 
Commission. In the same line, the provisions of Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 states that: “When national courts rule on 
agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission 
decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission…”.  
554 According to the EU case law, arbitral tribunal tribunals are not considered as courts of the Member States (Nordsee case, supra 
note 513).  
555 NAZZINI (2004A), p. 161.  
556 BLANKE & NAZZINI (2008C), p. 135.  
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parties´ compliance with the commitments offered to the competition authority557. Nevertheless, even 
though arbitration has been more used in merger control cases, there have been a few instances where the 
arbitration clauses have been used in other enforcement actions, for example: in some jurisdictions, 
arbitration clauses have been included in cases related to the unlawful restraint of competition558; 
additionally, in other jurisdictions, arbitration clauses have been included in commitments offered to 
obtain an individual exemption for anticompetitive agreements559.   
 In practice, the use of arbitration by the competition authorities over past years has been 
infrequent and inconsistent; accordingly, there is little guidance on the manner and use of arbitration by 
competition authorities560. In addition, the fact that the competition authorities do not always grant the 
same powers and duties to arbitral tribunals has resulted in different scopes that are ultimately determined 
by the characteristics of each case561. However, some key components of the use of arbitration by the 
competition authorities can be identified. 
 For instance, with regard to the disclosure of relevant information in the course of the arbitration 
procedure there are different approaches depending on the case and the competition authority. In 
jurisdictions that provide for broad discovery process in judicial procedures, usually, the contracting 
parties are free to determine the scope of discovery which is normally limited in arbitration procedures 
when compared to judicial litigation. In such jurisdictions, the competition authorities have not addressed 
the issue of the scope of discovery in remedy related arbitration proceedings562. On other competition law 
regimes, the competition authorities usually determine in the arbitration clause the right of arbitrators to 
request all relevant information from the parties in the proceedings and the subsequent obligation of the 
parties to provide the arbitral tribunal with any information that may be requested563. 
 A further issue is related to the determination of the participation of the competition authority in 
the arbitration procedure. Thus, depending on the case in question, the competition authority may be 
involved in the arbitration process in different extents. For instance, in some cases, the arbitration clauses 
determine the right of arbitral tribunals to seek the interpretation of the competition authority of the 
commitment decision that allows the arbitrability of the dispute564, moreover, in other cases, the 
arbitrators are obliged by the arbitration clause to request the interpretation of the competition authority of 
the commitment decision, in such cases, the competition authority’s interpretation shall be binding on the 
arbitration tribunal565. In addition, in some cases the parties in the arbitration procedure may be required 
by the competition authorities to notify them if an arbitration proceeding has been commenced and to 
                                                          
557 NISSER & BLANKE (2006), p. 175. 
558 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1995-2 Trade Cases (CCH) para. 71, 118 (D.D.C. 1995).  
559 Decision 78/253, Campari, December 23, 1977, [1978] O.J. L70/69; Decision 89/467, UIP, July 12, 1989, [1989] L226/25; 
Decision 93/403, EBU/Eurovision, June 11, 1999, [1993] O.J. L179/23; Decision 99/329, P&I Clubs, April 12, 1999, [1999] O.J. 
L125/12; and Decision 99/781, British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, September 15, 1999, [1999] O.J. L312/1. 
560 MARGOLIS & VORRASI (2011), p. 1755. 
561 STYLOPOULOS (2009), pp. 123-124. 
562 In the US, the competition agencies (DOJ and FTC) have not addressed the scope of discovery in their enforcement 
orders/decrees issued to date (MARGOLIS & VORRASI (2011), pp. 1756-1757). 
563 COMP/M.3570-Piaggio/Aprilia [2005] OJ C7/5; and COMP/M.3280-Air France/KLM [2004] OJ C60/5. 
564 Idem 
565 COMP/M.3083-GE/Instrumentarium [2004] OJ L109/1. 
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serve the authorities with a final copy of the arbitration award566. Finally, in some cases, the competition 
authorities may reserve for themselves several rights to intervene in the arbitration process, these may 
include: the right to approve the assignation of arbitrators; the right to participate in the procedure; or the 
right to provide assistance and submit evidence in the arbitration proceeding567. 
 Furthermore, the competition authorities may determine other aspects of the arbitration process, 
such as: the number of arbitrators comprising the arbitral tribunal568; the specific arbitration rules that 
shall govern the procedure569; the obligation of the conflicting parties to resort to other ADR procedures 
before arbitrating570; the determination of the applicable law and venue of arbitration571; or the time 
periods for the arbitration proceedings572.  
7. Review of Arbitration Awards 
 
As a general rule, arbitral awards are subject to a quite limited review by courts, this limited review of 
arbitral awards is due to the parties’ election to submit their disputes to arbitration instead of the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts; as a consequence, they give up their right to seek redress from the courts 
for all but the most exceptional errors at arbitration573. In this line, as to the review of the award on the 
merits, with a few exceptions, it is considered as inappropriate to revisit the merits of the award or to 
disturb the arbitral tribunal’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Nonetheless, the fact that the arbitral 
award is related to the application of the competition law provisions can be regarded as a sufficient 
ground of review depending on the consideration that the law of the country where the court sits has over 
the public policy nature of competition law574. Finally, in practice, arbitral awards can be reviewed by the 
competent courts in two instances. On the one hand, arbitral awards can be reviewed by courts by way of 
an action for setting aside the arbitral decision. And on the other hand, arbitral awards can be reviewed 
when the successful party seeks the enforcement of the award before the relevant court.  
 As seen before, the arbitrability of competition law disputes is almost an entirely settled matter, 
however, the question of the approach that should be taken in cases where competition law is raised as a 
ground for setting aside the award or to resist its enforcement remains. This uncertainty on the review of 
arbitration decisions concerned with the application of the competition law provisions is due to the 
inherent tension that exists between these two branches of law that arises as a consequence of their 
different natures. On the side of arbitration, there is a widely accepted premise that arbitral awards are in 
first instance final, and as such should be regarded as court decisions not subject to review by a higher 
                                                          
566 United States v. Data Card Corp., 1987-1 Trade Cases (CCH) para 67,437 (D.D.C. 29 January 1987); United States v. The Dow 
Chemical Co., 1987-2 Trade Cases (CCH) para 67,684 (N.D. 111. 12 August 1987); and United States v. Imetal SA, 2000-1 Trade 
Cases (CCH) para 72,922 (D.D.C. 25 May 2000). 
567 Imetal case (supra note 566).  
568 In re El Paso Energy Corp., No. C-3915, 2000 FTC LEXIS 7 (FTC, 6 Jan. 2000).  
569 Dow Chemical (supra note 566); United States v. Morton Plant Health System, 1994-2 Trade Cases (CCH) para 70,759 (M.D. 
Fla. 28 June 1994); Imetal (supra note 566); United States v. Cargill, Inc., 2002-2 Trade Cases (CCH) para 72,967 (D.D.C. 30 June 
2000); and El Paso (supra note 558). 
570 In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2008 FTC LEXIS 47 (FTC, 28 Apr. 2008).  
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573 Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Dean v. Sullivan, 118 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th 
Cir. 1997).  
574 BLANKE & NAZZINI (2008C), p. 142. 
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court, except on limited grounds, such as the violation of the public policy of the country in which the 
reviewing court sits575. With regard to competition law, its mandatory nature and public policy character 
entail in practice that this has to be vigorously enforced. In this regard, due to the special characteristics 
of these two areas of law it is uncertain whether the mandatory and public policy character of competition 
law demands a type of review of the arbitral award that surpasses the normally accepted limited review in 
order to safeguard the objectives of the arbitral decisions576. 
 As abovementioned, the recognition of the arbitrability of competition law disputes has been 
determined in great part by the establishment of the “second look” doctrine by the courts of the leading 
jurisdictions. The purpose of the notion of the “second look” is to address the concern that the 
competition law provisions may not be adequately applied in the arbitration proceedings by permitting the 
competent court to review the arbitral award from the point of view of public policy in order to ensure the 
respect of those rules of competition law that are considered to form part of public policy577. In this sense, 
the arbitrability of competition law has been justified on the premise that courts have the opportunity at 
the review process to determine if the competition law provision have been applied adequately and fully 
respected by the arbitral tribunals578.  
 In practice, there are different approaches with regard to the extent and intensity of the judicial 
review of arbitral awards related to the application of the competition law provisions that vary from one 
jurisdiction to the next, these normally depend on the interpretation of the public policy nature of 
competition law that the law of the country where the reviewing court sits has made. Thus, there are two 
doctrinal and jurisprudential positions which have been adopted, the maximalist and the minimalist 
approach.  
 Under the maximalist position, the reviewing courts are required to carry out an in depth review 
of the arbitral awards when these are challenged, or when their enforcement is required by the parties. 
This approach requires an entire review of the case and all the relevant evidence. The main purpose of 
this approach is to avoid the risk that arbitration will be used to circumvent competition law. As to the 
minimalist approach, there are no special considerations for arbitral awards raising competition law 
issues, the intention is to completely resolve the dispute via arbitration and not involve courts. The 
explanation for the minimalist approach is that if a full review of the arbitral award is carried out by 
courts, this arguably defeats the purpose of going into arbitration in the first place and diminishes the trust 
afforded to arbitrators and the institution of arbitration. In this sense, reviewing courts should only refuse 
the recognition and the enforcement of arbitral awards where there is a fundamental breach of public 
policy579.   
 The rationale for the maximalist approach is the need to effectively enforce competition law in 
light of its mandatory and public policy nature. In this regard, proponents of the maximalist approach 
                                                          
575 According to Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused 
when “The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country”.  
576 RADICATI di BROZOLO (2011), pp. 3-4. 
577 POUDRET, Jean Francois & BESSON, Sebastien (2007), ‘Comparative Law of International Arbitration’. 2nd Edition. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, para. 352. 
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suggest than only a very strict standard of review of arbitral awards raising competition law issues can 
avoid the infringement of competition law and an interference with the enforcement of competition 
policy580.  
 On the other hand, the foundation for the minimalist approach rests on the premise that even 
though competition law forms part of the public policy, it will be in extreme cases where an arbitral 
award will have to be annulled or refused recognition or enforcement. For instance, when arbitral awards 
have as their sole purpose the creation of hard core horizontal restrictions of competition that are 
“repugnantly anti-competitive”, or when the arbitrators have ignored competition law although it was 
raised by the parties. In all other cases, there will not be a violation of the public policy, particularly if 
arbitrators have addressed the competition law issues, although their decision was erroneous. Thus, 
reviewing arbitral awards for errors would amount to a révision au fond, which is contrary to the 
principles of arbitration itself581.  
 Irrespective of the existence of these two contrary positions, over the years there has been a 
reconciliation between the apparently opposite policy objectives of minimal review of arbitral awards and 
effective enforcement of competition law582. This has led both courts and scholars to position themselves 
in favor of the minimalist approach.  
  Notwithstanding the preceding, there are certain cases where the reviewing courts did not 
recognize the arbitral awards and have refused to enforce them on grounds of violation of the public 
policy. As seen before, the arbitrability of competition law disputes parted from the recognition that the 
courts in the reviewing process can reexamine the arbitral award and verify if the competition law 
provisions have been adequately applied and fully respected by the arbitral tribunal, the so-called “second 
look” doctrine583. The strict application of this doctrine has allowed some courts to deny the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards on grounds of public policy violations, in such cases, the courts 
determined that arbitral awards that are contrary to the competition law provisions cannot be enforced584, 
and that an infringement of the competition law provisions does not have to be flagrant to constitute a 
violation of public policy585.  
 Despite these few cases where reviewing courts have applied the maximalist approach, most 
courts have adopted a minimalist approach when reviewing competition law arbitral awards. Under this 
position, courts review the arbitral award for the purpose of establishing that the competition law matters 
have been addressed and decided, this review is mainly focused on the compatibility of the operative part 
                                                          
580 RADICATI di BROZOLO (2011), p. 4. 
581 KOMNINOS (2012), p. 214.  
582 RADICATI di BROZOLO (2011), p. 4. 
583 “Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts  of the United States will have the opportunity at the 
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws has been addressed” (Mitsubishi case, 
supra note 488).  
584 Press Rechtbank The Hague, 27 May 2004, Marketing Displays International Inc v VR Van Raalte Reclame BV, KG/RK 2002-
979 and 2002-1617 (2006) 2 SIAR 201. 
585 Tribunal de première instance Bruxelles (Civ Bruxelles), 8 March 2007, SNF SAS v Cytec Industrie BV (2007) 127 GP No 112-
114, 53. However, the court of appeal determined that the court of first instance cannot reexamine the merits of the case and 
substitute the arbitrators’ opinion with its own or examine legal errors possibly made by the tribunal (Cour d’appel de Bruxelles 22 
June 2009, SNF SAS v Cytec Industrie BV (2009)). 
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of the award with the competition law provisions586. In practice, the request to set aside the arbitral award 
is usually filed by one of the parties arguing that the disputed contract was contrary to the competition 
law provisions in order to avoid complying with the determinations of the award. The decisions of the 
reviewing courts to recognize and enforce the contested arbitral awards on grounds of violation of the 
public policy include: the establishment that the violation of public policy in an arbitral award has to be 
flagrant, effective and concrete in order to lead to the setting aside of the award587; the refusal to 
reexamine the merits of the dispute588; the deference to the arbitral tribunal applying the competition law 
provisions589; and the consideration of violations of public policy only in obvious cases590. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
586 BLANKE & NAZZINI (2008C), p. 144. 
587 CA Paris, Thalès v Euromissile (2005) Rev Arb 750. 
588 CA Paris, SNF SAS v Cytec Industries BV (2007) XXXII YCA 282. This case was confirmed on appeal by the French Supreme 
Court (Cass Civ, 4 June 2008, SNF SAS v Cytec Industries BV (2008) 135 JDI Clunet 1107).  
589 Court of Appeal of Thessaloniki, judgment 1207/2007 (Greece); Court of Appeal of Florence, 21 March 2006, Soc Nuovo 
Pignone v Schlumberger SA; and Court of Appeal of Milan, 5 July 2006, Terra Armata Srl v Tensacciai SpA (2007) 25 Bull ASA 
618 (this award was also challenged in Switzerland where the reviewing court recognized its enforceability (Tensacciai v Terra 
Armata (2006) Rev Arb 763, 8 March 2006 (Tribunal Fédéral)). 
590 Court of Appeal of Svea, Case T 6730-03, 4 May 2005, Republic of Latvia v Latvijas Gaze (Sweden).  
296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This part of the study is concerned with the voluntary compliance of the competition law provisions by 
undertakings and individuals, and with the analysis of the antitrust compliance programs that have been 
put into place across jurisdictions for this matter. Antitrust compliance programs have the greatest 
potential to prevent and uncover hard-core cartels, provided that other anticompetitive practices, such as 
abuse of dominance or monopolization, usually require more complex legal and economic analysis,  
consequently, most of these are designed to control anticompetitive activity that is related to this type of 
conduct1. In this regard, this part of the study will be mainly focused on compliance programs and their 
ability to prevent, detect, remedy, and report hard-core cartels. The first part will present the case for the 
need of voluntary compliance and the establishment of antitrust compliance programs to increase the 
overall enforcement of competition law. The second part will address the self-enforcement and antitrust 
compliance topics. The third part will deal with the current need of robust antitrust compliance programs 
to enhance the overall enforcement of competition law. The fourth part will study the factors or drivers 
that encourage individuals and undertakings to comply or non-comply with the antitrust provisions. The 
fifth part will provide guidance on the essential features that a compliance program should have in order 
to guarantee its credibility and effectiveness. The sixth part will make a comparative analysis of the 
guidelines and best practices available across jurisdictions. The seventh part will review the most relevant 
literature with regard to the relationship between compliance programs and the enforcement of 
competition law. And finally, the last part will make a comparative study of how competition law 
enforcers deal with the implementation of compliance programs when imposing antitrust sanctions for the 
infringement of competition law and the interaction of compliance programs and settlement mechanisms 
and leniency programs.   
                                                          
1 OECD, Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, 2011, p. 13. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Besides the objectives of competition law enforcement, a fundamental function of competition law, as 
happens with any other public law, is to guarantee the compliance of its legal provisions in order to 
accomplish the desired goals of the law. In this regard, the ultimate purpose of competition law policy is 
not to sanction antitrust offenders with the imposition of fines or imprisonment, but to ensure effective 
compliance of the competition law provisions2. 
In the case of competition law, traditionally, the governments have assured its compliance 
mainly via the public enforcement of the competition rules by public authorities, such as competition 
agencies, sector regulators, judicial courts, and others. While enforcing the provisions of competition law, 
public enforcers have been empowered with the ability to sanction undertakings and individuals –
depending on the jurisdiction- for the breach of the competition law provisions. As seen in the Public 
Enforcement chapter, there is a variety of sanctions that competition law enforcers can apply for the 
infringement of the antitrust rules, which range from the imposition of financial penalties on the 
concerned undertakings, to the imprisonment of the individuals involved in anticompetitive practices3.  
Significant efforts have been made across jurisdictions with the purpose of strengthening 
competition law enforcement and compliance in the last decades. In particular, these measures are 
intended to prevent or detect the infringement of the antitrust provisions and to sanction the offenders for 
their illegal behavior. In most jurisdictions with strong competition law systems, there has been a 
proliferation of leniency programs, coupled with a substantial increase of the financial penalties, and the 
implementation of sanctions against individuals involved in anticompetitive practices, such as financial 
penalties, director disqualification or even imprisonment; all these measures are intended to achieve 
higher levels of compliance and deterrence. However, and despite these efforts, the current enforcement 
policy is not sufficient given that there are still many competition law infringements being discovered 
across jurisdictions4. Thus, these approaches have partly failed in encouraging full compliance with the 
competition law provisions.  
With regard to leniency programs and its ability to deter market participants from engaging in 
anticompetitive practices, it has been argued that leniency programs have not led to optimal deterrence 
levels, that leniency may actually strengthen certain cartels, and that these programs may not be 
uncovering the most harmful cartels but might be only discovering the cartels that are easy to find5, as a 
consequence, leniency programs should be coupled with additional enforcement policies in order to 
assure higher levels of compliance of the competition law provisions.  
                                                          
2 RILEY, Anne & BLOOM, Margaret (2011), ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes – Can companies and antitrust agencies do 
more?’ Competition Law Journal, Volume 10, Issue 1.  
3 See Section VI of Chapter Two.  
4 CONNOR, John & HELMERS, Gustav (2007), ‘Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005’, at 38 (Working 
Paper, January 2007). 
5 SOKOL, Daniel (2011), ‘Detection and Compliance in Cartel Policy’. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Volume 2; LELIEFELD, Daniel & 
MOTCHENKOVA, Evgenia (2010), ‘Adverse Effects of Corporate Leniency Programs In View Of Industry Asymmetry’, 2 J. 
APPLIED ECON. SCI. 114; HARRINGTON, Joseph E. & CHANG, Myong-Hun (2009), ‘Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels 
with an Application to Evaluating Antitrust Policy’, 7 J. EURO. ECON. ASSOC. 1; and LANDE, Robert H. & CONNOR, John M. 
(2011), ‘Optimal Cartel Deterrence: An Empirical Comparison of Sanctions to Overcharges’. AAI Working Paper, No. 11-08. 
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Moreover, the fact that the current level of financial penalties has proved to be insufficient to 
reach the desired levels of deterrence and compliance, has inspired academics to suggest the further 
increase of the levels of fines imposed for the infringement of competition law6. Nevertheless, there are 
certain limits above which financial penalties cannot be raised. For instance, corporate fines for the 
infringement of competition law cannot be raised above the ability to pay of undertakings, provided that 
this would lead them to bankruptcy. This possibility to force undertakings to exit the market is contrary to 
the primordial objectives of competition law and policy provided that the market place would turn less 
competitive, consumers would have to pay higher prices, receive poorer services and benefit from less 
innovation7. In addition, impossibly high financial penalties would inevitably carry other undesired side 
effects, like: (i) the over-enforcement of the antitrust provisions, this means that undertakings may fear to 
enter into lawful agreements that would have reported benefits for consumers under the fear of being 
severely fined; and (ii) other social and economic costs, such as the reduction of the dividends of 
shareholders, or the cut of expenses by undertakings, which will ultimately harm end consumers8. 
Moreover, fines imposed on corporations do not have a deterrent effect on individuals who are ultimately 
the responsible for the business decisions of the infringing undertakings. Thus, some competition regimes 
allow the possibility to impose financial penalties on both undertakings and individuals; however, the 
deterrent effects of fines imposed on individuals are lost when undertakings assume these penalties on 
behalf of their employees9.  
If according to the abovementioned, corporate fines would need to be impossibly high in order to 
reach the desired levels of deterrence and compliance and the fines on individuals are not effective 
sanctions due to the possibility of undertakings assuming the fines imposed on their employees, then 
imprisonment seems to be an adequate sanction for the infringement of competition law that sends a 
strong message to market participants to comply with the provisions of the law and provides for high 
levels of deterrence. Thus, unlike financial penalties, imprisonment presents a significant deterrent effect 
and compliance duty for individuals who are ultimately the responsible for the infringement of 
competition law10. However, due to the fact that except for a few jurisdictions the imposition of 
imprisonment as a sanction for the infringement of competition law is relatively scarce or even inexistent 
in most competition law systems that allow this possibility, accordingly, this type of sanction does not 
provide sufficient incentives for individuals to comply with the mandates of the law.  
As stated before, the amount of financial penalties for the infringement of competition law has 
increased significantly in the last decades, as well as the length of jail sentences imposed in jurisdictions 
where this type of sanction is available, and the implementation of leniency programs has also 
proliferated across jurisdictions. Nevertheless, this increase in the severity of the sanctions imposed and 
                                                          
6 CONNOR & HELMERS (2007); CONNOR, John & LANDE, Robert (2007), ‘Cartel Overcharges: Implications for U.S. and EU 
Fining Policies’, 51 Antitrust Bulletin 983; WILS, Wouter P.J. (2005A), ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’, 
World Competition, Volume 28, No. 2. 
7 WERDEN, Gregory (2009), ‘Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime’, 5 European Competition Journal 1, 
30-31.  
8 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2006A), ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’. World Competition. Volume 29, No. 2, p. 20. 
9 According to the OECD, financial penalties on individuals alone are not effective because of the ability of undertakings to 
reimburse their employees (OECD, Cartel Sanctions against Individuals, 2004). 
10 GINSBURG, Douglas & WRIGHT, Joshua (2010), ‘Antitrust Sanctions’, Competition Policy International, Volume 6, 3, 4.  
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in the enforcement policies used to deter future violations of competition law has not resulted in an 
exponential decline of anticompetitive behavior11.     
 Accordingly, even though governments and competition law enforcers have made tremendous 
efforts to deter potential antitrust offenders and to enhance the compliance levels of the competition law 
provisions; these have not been entirely successful in accomplishing these desired objectives. Hence, 
given that the sanctions available and other enforcement policies are not sufficient to reach the desired 
levels of deterrence and compliance, undertakings, competition authorities, practitioners and academics 
need to question what other strategies might enhance deterrence and compliance12. In this regard, the 
voluntary compliance of market participants of the competition law provisions can play a fundamental 
role in enhancing the levels of deterrence and compliance, provided that without the latter, there is no rule 
of law, no matter how well the institutions and regulations are designed13.  
II. SELF-ENFORCEMENT & ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE 
 
As seen in previous chapters, the legal provisions of competition law can be enforced in different 
procedures and by different persons or authorities, this application of the law is ultimately intended to 
assure the compliance of the antitrust provisions and the accomplishment of the objectives of the law. 
This type of enforcement is based on the formal and supervisory public control of the State for the 
compliance of laws that have a public nature. However, the compliance of the law is not only achieved 
due to the legal authority of the State to demand the obedience of the law. In this sense, and on their 
behalf, the recipients of the law can also achieve compliance by voluntarily obeying and respecting the 
mandates of the law. This self-enforcement of the law by market participants does not require the 
intervention of competition authorities and courts in order to assure compliance of the legal mandates. 
Hence, it is thanks to the voluntary willingness of market participants to abide by the law that the 
compliance of the competition law provisions is assured. It goes without saying, however, that voluntary 
antitrust compliance is complementary to the State’s application of the competition law provisions, given 
that self-enforcement on its own cannot achieve the objectives of competition law enforcement.  
 Generally speaking, the people’s voluntary compliance of law can be driven by different factors, 
such as: (i) the legal obligation of the members of a determinate State to obey the law; (ii) the perception 
of internal factors like what people regard as just and moral, and of external factors such as the gains and 
losses resulting from different behaviors; and (iii) the sense of social responsibility of enterprises. 
(i) Legal obligation to comply with the law 
 
Every business and individual has the obligation to act according to the established laws of a determined 
territory. In Plato’s Crito, according to Socrates, all citizens belonging to a State have an obligation to 
                                                          
11 GINSBURG & WRIGHT (2010), p. 13.  
12 OECD (2011), p. 25. 
13 LEVI, Margaret, TYLER, Tom & SACKS, Audrey (2009), ‘The Reasons for Compliance with the Law’. The United States 
Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, Working paper. 
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obey the laws of the State. This obligation to obey the law derives from the notion of the Social Contract, 
by virtue of which, the citizens of a society give up their rights to the State and in return receive peace 
and security14. In this regard, the State is empowered to create laws that govern the relations of the 
citizens, which these are obliged to comply for the sake of society.  
For the purpose of this study, this duty to comply with public laws is also concerned with the 
obligation of companies and individuals to obey the State’s provisions on competition law. The aim of the 
government in enacting public laws that protect free competition in the market is intended to provide the 
benefits of free markets to the general population of the State. A fundamental feature of this relationship 
between the State and its inhabitants and their obligation to comply with the law is the coercive nature of 
public laws15. This means that the government and its institutions are allowed to demand compliance 
from the recipients of a determined law, such as the competition law provisions. In practice, this 
possibility of competition law enforcers to demand compliance and the people’s sense of obligation to 
comply with the law constitute strong incentives for individuals and undertakings to abide by the law.  
(ii) Perception of internal and external factors to comply with the law 
 
In addition to the compliance of the law due to the sense of obligation of citizens to obey the mandates of 
the law, which is derived from the Social Contract, people also obey the law through the perception of 
internal and external factors.  
The perception of internal factors, or normative perspective, explains compliance with the law 
from the angle of what people regard as just and moral. In normative commitment people feel personally 
committed to obey the law irrespective of whether they risk punishment for breaking the law. Normative 
commitment implicates personal morality or legitimacy. Personal morality entails complying with the law 
because citizens feel that the law is just. Alternatively, legitimacy means obeying the law because citizens 
feel that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behavior. Accordingly, the normative 
perspective explores people’s internalized norms of justice and obligation.  
On the other hand, according to the perception of external factors, or instrumental perspective, 
the citizens accommodate their behavior to respond to changes in the tangible, immediate incentives and 
penalties associated with following the law. Under this explanation of why people obey the law, citizens 
comply with the mandates of the law because of the fear of being punished for conducts contrary to the 
law. In this case, compliance is assured by shaping the public behavior through the increase of the 
severity and certainty of punishment for breaking the law16.  
(iii) Corporate social responsibility 
 
Particularly, in the case of competition law, undertakings voluntarily comply with the antitrust provisions 
in the framework of corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a concept 
                                                          
14 HOBBES, Thomas (1996), ‘Leviathan’, Richard Tuck (ed). 1st Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; LOCKE, John 
(1986), ‘The Second Treatise on Civil Government’. New York: Prometheus Books; ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques (1997), ‘The Social 
Contract and other later political writings’, Victor Gourevitch (ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
15 HART, H.L.A. (1994), ‘The Concept of Law’. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 20. 
16 TYLER Tom R. (1990), ‘Why People Obey the Law’. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
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whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
integration with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis17. 
In this regard, and in relation to competition law, under the precepts of CSR the undertakings 
carry out their commercial activities in a manner consistent with all applicable competition laws and 
regulations, taking into account the competition law provisions of all the jurisdictions in which their 
activities may have anti-competitive effects.  
In addition, by virtue of CSR the undertakings also abstain from entering or carrying out anti-
competitive agreements among competitors, including agreement to fix prices; make rigged bids; 
establish output restrictions or quotas; or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, 
territories or lines of commerce. 
Furthermore, a socially responsible behavior on behalf of undertakings with regard to the 
competition law provisions also requires undertakings to cooperate with the investigations carried out by 
competition authorities. This means that the undertakings have to provide responses as promptly and 
completely as practicable when requested by the competition agencies. The assistance of the undertakings 
in the investigation can also include the use of available instruments, like waivers of confidentiality to 
promote effective and efficient cooperation among investigating authorities.  
Finally, socially responsible undertakings habitually promote employees awareness of the 
importance of compliance with all applicable competition laws and regulations. For this purpose, it is 
fundamental to train and educate senior management of the undertakings in relation to competition law 
matters18.  
In this regard, given that the provisions of competition law contribute to the efficient operation 
of markets, the overall welfare and economic growth; undertakings with a sense of social responsibility 
are expected to comply fully with the fundamental mandates of competition law. Accordingly, in order to 
fulfill all the above mentioned objectives, socially responsible undertakings build genuine antitrust 
compliance programs to ensure compliance with the important antitrust provisions. Antitrust compliance 
programs are part of CSR and are intended to provide the undertakings and their employees with 
awareness about the developments concerning the scope, remedies and sanctions of competition law. In 
addition, compliance programs create channels of cooperation between the competition authority and the 
undertakings with the purpose of obtaining valuable information in the curse of an investigation. 
Ultimately, the creation of genuine compliance programs is envisioned to promote and assure the 
compliance of the antitrust provisions and to prevent violations of the law, and as a consequence, to 
accomplish the benefits and goals of competition law.  
 
                                                          
17 European Commission, Green Paper, Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, 2001.  
18 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition, p. 57. 
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III. ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
 
Antitrust compliance programs are programs whereby undertakings commit themselves to obey the 
provisions of competition law and the values or objectives on which these are based. These programs 
usually include a set of actions aimed to assist undertakings in building a genuine culture of compliance 
with the antitrust rules; prevent potential violations of the law; detect infringements that have been 
committed; and eventually, remedy them. In practice, compliance programs are not exclusive for the field 
of competition law, given that in most undertakings that have some kind of corporate compliance 
program this programs will usually deal with other issues, such as anti-bribery and corruption, securities 
and tax law, consumer health and safety, or environmental protection, among others. The main objective 
of an antitrust compliance program in any undertaking is to reduce the likelihood that antitrust violations 
will occur in the future19.  
 Antitrust compliance programs constitute the policies, procedures, guidelines and mechanisms 
established by a determined undertaking in order to be allowed to comply with the mandates of 
competition law. These programs are usually tailor made for each undertaking by regarding different 
factors, such as the size of the undertakings, the sector where it develops its main economic activity, the 
market place, and the potential risks of infringing competition law, among others. Summarizing, 
compliance programs involve the management commitment to do the right thing and effective 
management measures and steps to make that happen20.  
Effective antitrust compliance programs shall fulfill a variety of objectives both for undertakings 
and competition law enforcers. For instance, with regard to undertakings, antitrust compliance programs 
basically allow undertakings to prevent, detect, remedy and report infringements of the competition law 
provisions, in addition, compliance programs may allow undertakings to take advantage of leniency 
programs, similarly, companies that have taken adequate steps to achieve compliance, but have 
nonetheless committed a violation, may receive a reduction in financial penalties imposed for such 
infringement, moreover, early detection of anticompetitive practices can enable undertakings to take early 
corrective measure, allowing them to reduce the burden of costs related to fines, penalties and litigation, 
finally, a credible an effective antitrust compliance program can enhance the public perception on 
undertakings as a consumer friendly company committed to business ethics and social responsibility21. As 
to the competition law enforcers, compliance programs will allow undertakings to assist competition 
authorities to detect anticompetitive practices and to punish those responsible for the infringement of 
competition law, in this way, competition authorities and courts will save resources that otherwise would 
have been destined to the detection of the reported anticompetitive practices22.  
Furthermore, from the perspective of the undertakings, the adoption of antitrust compliance 
programs is a protective measure that is intended to provide them with the necessary guidance that they 
                                                          
19 HANNAY, William M. (2003), ‘Designing an Effective Antitrust Compliance Program’. New York: Thomson /West, p. 5.  
20 MURPHY, Joseph (2011), ‘Promoting Compliance with Competition Law: Do compliance and ethics programs have a role to 
play?’. Paper prepared for the OECD Roundtable on Promoting Compliance with Competition Law.  
21 Competition Commission of Pakistan, Voluntary Competition Compliance Code: Statement of Principles and Policy, 2010.  
22 See the Korean report in: OECD (2011), p. 122. 
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need to comply with their legal obligations and to minimize the risk of infringing the law23. On the one 
hand, antitrust compliance programs report benefits to undertakings by creating an effective culture of 
competition law compliance, enhancing the company’s reputation, raising job satisfaction and pride of the 
staff, and avoiding the potentially high cost of non-compliance. On the other hand, non-compliance 
presents undertakings considerable costs, such as high corporate fines, sanctions on individuals, invalidity 
of agreements that may infringe the competition law provisions, lawsuits from those damaged by the 
infringement, and bad press for the infringing undertakings24. 
However, the mere establishment of antitrust compliance programs by undertakings is not 
sufficient to assure the required levels of compliance, in this regard, depending on the competition law 
regimes, compliance programs will have to comply with certain requirements in order to be considered as 
effective programs. Moreover, there is not a one-size-fits-all model that undertakings can adopt with 
regard to the design of effective antitrust compliance programs. Accordingly, undertakings should then 
find an effective means of assessing and addressing their competition law risk. Additionally, provided 
that, at least at first instance, the establishment of antitrust compliance programs is voluntary; 
consequently undertakings are free to adopt a compliance program depending on their competition law 
risk exposure.  
Despite the preceding, irrespective of the competition law regime in question or the size or sector 
of the concerned undertaking and its risk exposure to commit and infringement of the competition law 
provisions, most antitrust compliance programs share certain basic features. For instance, at the core of 
any effective antitrust compliance program there should be a sound culture of competition law 
compliance, this means a public commitment on the part of the undertaking to fully comply with the 
mandates of competition law25. Such commitment has to involve all the lairs of the organizational 
structure of the undertaking; thus, it would have to include from senior managers to sales representatives. 
In addition, most antitrust compliance programs include compliance manuals that provide a statement of 
policy and ethical conduct expected and endorsed by the undertaking, employees whose activities may 
raise competition law issues are supposed to be familiar with these manuals. These manuals may contain 
lists of common practices that employees may need to avoid, such as discussing pricing strategies with 
competitors, or which products the undertaking is going to sell and where. Moreover, the employees will 
be required to attend mandatory training seminars as part of the compliance program, in addition, these 
may be required to sign that they have completed this training26 or may be regularly evaluated27. 
Furthermore, risk assessment is a fundamental tool of most antitrust compliance programs; this is 
intended to determine the key competition law compliance risks faced by the undertaking and assessing 
                                                          
23 Autorité de la Concurrence, Antitrust Compliance and Compliance Programmes: Corporate Tools for Competing Safely in the 
Marketplace, 2012.  
24 For more on the benefits and drawbacks of compliance and non-compliance of competition law, see: European Commission, 
Compliance Matters: What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules, 2012; and OFT (2010B), How Your Business 
Can Achieve Compliance: Guidance, October 2010.  
25 Autorité de la Concurrence (2012), p. 8-9; Fiscalía Nacional Económica (Chile), Programas de Cumplimiento de la Normativa de 
Libre Competencia, Junio 2012; OFT (2010B), p. 14.  
26 ABA Section of Antitrust Law (2005), ‘Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for Corporate Counselors’. Chicago: 
ABA Publishing, p. 64-69. 
27 Competition Bureau Canada, Bulletin – Corporate Compliance Programs, 2010. 
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the level of risk identified28. Most antitrust compliance programs also include monitoring, auditing and 
reporting systems that allow undertakings to observe if the program is successful in preventing 
infringements of the law, to audit if a violation of the competition provisions has occurred, and to report 
conduct that may be contrary to the antitrust rules. Finally, another feature of most compliance programs 
is the adoption of disciplinary procedures and incentives. The disciplinary procedure will explicitly 
provide for disciplinary actions against employees who infringe the competition law provisions, like 
suspension, demotion, dismissal, or legal actions. On the other hand, the availability of incentives, such as 
promotions and bonuses for employees that behave in accordance with the antitrust compliance program 
is a feature that some undertakings include in their corporate compliance programs.  
IV. DRIVERS OF COMPLIANCE & NON-COMPLIANCE 
 
The drivers of compliance and non-compliance constitute a variety of factors that influence undertakings 
and individuals to obey or disobey the provisions of competition law. In this regard, the drivers of 
compliance will encourage undertakings and individuals to comply with the provisions of competition 
law, on the contrary, the drivers of non-compliance will encourage undertakings and individuals to 
infringe the antitrust provisions.  
1. Drivers that encourage compliance 
 
a) Fear of monetary sanctions imposed on corporations and individuals 
 
The fear of undertakings and individuals of being sanctioned with financial penalties constitutes a strong 
driver of competition law compliance. This driver is further exacerbated by the current high levels of 
financial penalties of most developed competition law regimes. The deterrent effect of financial penalties 
creates a credible threat of penalties which weighs sufficiently in the balance of expected costs and 
benefits to deter potential offenders from committing competition law infringements29. However, in order 
for potential antitrust offenders to be driven into complying with the competition law provisions, the 
amount of the financial penalty must exceed the expected gain from the violation. Consequently, this 
requires the imposition of high financial penalties that serve as a sufficient deterrence against potential 
competition law infringements30. Moreover, given that corporate financial penalties do not always 
guarantee adequate incentives for responsible individuals within the undertaking to comply with the 
competition law provisions31, some competition law systems allow the possibility of fining individuals for 
their participation in the violation of the antitrust rules32. This possibility to sanction individuals, if 
implemented correctly, may enhance the incentives of individuals, who are ultimately the responsible for 
the business decisions of companies, to comply with the mandates of competition law. Nevertheless, there 
are certain issues that may diminish the deterrent effect of financial penalties for individuals, for instance, 
                                                          
28 ABA Section of Antitrust Law (2010), ‘Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for Corporate Counselors’. Second 
Edition. Chicago: ABA Publishing. 
29 WILS (2006), p. 12. 
30 BECKER, Gary S. (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’. 76 Journal of Political Economy, p. 169; and 
LANDES, William M. (1983), ‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’. 50 The University of Chicago Law Review, p. 652.  
31 WILS, Wouter, P. J. (2008A), ‘Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement’. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 181. 
32 See Section VII of Chapter Two. 
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the difficulty of determining the optimal levels of fines that effectively deter individuals from 
participating in anticompetitive activities can take away the deterrent effects of this type of sanction, 
additionally, the possibility of individuals being reimbursed by their undertakings can also reduce 
significantly the deterrent effects of fines on individuals33. Finally, corporate sanctions and individual 
sanctions complement each other as incentives for undertakings and individuals to comply with the legal 
mandates of the law, thus, legal sanctions applied to undertakings can effectively deter those who act on 
their behalf, similarly, threats of criminal and civil sanctions directed against individuals inhibit the 
intention to commit corporate crime34.  
b) Fear of imprisonment 
 
Criminal sanctions against individuals are the most effective deterrence mechanisms available for 
competition authorities in their fight against hard-core cartels35. For businessman, ‘prison is the inferno’, 
consequently, the threat of being sentenced to spend time in jail still constitutes the most meaningful 
deterrent for the infringement of competition law36. In jurisdictions where this type of sanction has been 
properly implemented, this represents the difference between considering cartels on a cost/benefit basis as 
a reasonable risk-taking exercise and serious deterrence that prevents anticompetitive activities related 
with hard-core cartels37. There is evidence that international cartels do not extend their anticompetitive 
conducts into jurisdictions that have effective mechanisms to detect cartel activity and provide for severe 
sanctions –imprisonment- for the violation of the antitrust provisions38. Moreover, the fear of being 
sentenced to jail increases the incentives of individuals to comply with the antitrust provisions and to 
resist to corporate pressure from overly ambitious profit targets or performance goals or overly strong 
incentives set for them by the company that might have driven them to violate the antitrust provisions. In 
this regard, the fear of being sentenced to prison maybe the strongest driver of competition law 
compliance for individuals if compared to other types of sanctions available for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions39. In addition to the evident inconvenient of having to spend time in jail, 
imprisonment also presents a strong reputational factor that enhances its deterrent effects, given that 
criminal convictions represent a condemnation by society of certain conduct in a way that the imposition 
of a civil penalty cannot40. 
c) Fear of damage to individual or corporate reputation 
 
Another factor that can motivate undertakings and individuals to comply with the competition law 
provisions is the fear of reputational damage. Moreover, for most undertakings and individuals 
                                                          
33 OECD (2003), p.17.  
34 PATERNOSTER, Raymond and SIMPSON, Sally (2006), ‘Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice 
Model of Corporate Crime’. Law & Society Review, Volume 30, No. 3,p. 579.   
35 BAKER, Donald I. (2001), ‘The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging’, 69 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 693, p. 713.   
36 LIMAN, A.L. (1977), ‘The Paper Label Sentences: Critique’. 86 Yale Law Journal 619, 1977, pp. 630-31. 
37 OECD, Cartel Sanctions against Individuals, 2003, p. 16.  
38 HAMMOND, Scott D. (2004), ‘Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program’, paper presented at the ICN Workshop on 
Leniency Programs (Sidney, 22-23 November 2004). The author states that the US Department of Justice has uncovered cartels that 
operated in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world, but did not expand their cartel activity to the US due to the fear of the 
executives of the infringing undertakings of having to spend time in jail in the US.  
39 OFT, The Deterrent Effect of Competition Enforcement by the OFT: A report prepared for the OFT by Deloitte, November 2007.  
40 OECD (2003), p. 18; OFT (2010A), Drivers of Compliance and Non-compliance with Competition Law: An OFT Report, May 
2010, p. 30. 
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reputational damage is a greater driver for antitrust compliance when compared to the imposition of 
financial penalties41. For undertakings, being sanctioned for infringing the law can produce certain 
undesired consequences that are usually related to the concept of reputational damage42. The reputational 
damage that arises from being convicted for having violated the law mainly affects the trustworthiness of 
undertakings. The damage to the reputation of a company can result in the loss of revenue, customers, 
consumers, partners, employees, and the destruction of shareholder value. Moreover, reputational damage 
does not only occur as a consequence of being actually convicted for having infringed the law, but the 
mere accusation can also tarnish the public image of undertakings. With regard to individuals, the stigma 
and reputational damage associated with being sanctioned for the infringement of the law, also increases 
their incentives to obey the provisions of the law. Furthermore, in the case of individuals, the reputational 
damage for breaking the law is further enhanced in the case of a criminal conviction, given that the 
imposition of criminal sanctions carries, and is design to carry, a stigma effect43. Finally, the possibility 
for individuals of having a criminal record raises further reputational issues, like the affectation of a 
future career life.  
d) Morality 
 
The decision-making process to comply or not with the provisions of competition law, or any other law, 
definitively contains a moral dimension. Accordingly, businessmen have a moral responsibility to obey 
the law whether or not they are likely to be caught44. The choice to commit a corporate crime, such as the 
infringement of the competition law provisions, has both rational and moral aspects. The rational aspect 
involves the assessment by the decision-maker of the costs and benefits of the unlawful behavior. On the 
other hand, the moral aspect involves the moral considerations of the decision-maker. In this regard, the 
moral considerations of decision-makers can be an especially powerful source of corporate social control; 
accordingly, strengthening the business ethics of managers may constitute an effective crime-control 
strategy given that moral inhibitions seem to be an effective tool against corporate crime45.  
e) Effective compliance training programs 
 
Another key driver of competition law compliance is the adoption of effective compliance training 
programs for employees that face an actual risk of infringing the competition law provisions. The main 
purpose of training employees in antitrust compliance is to create awareness of the risks of infringing the 
competition law provisions. In this regard, a well-informed employee is less likely to infringe the 
mandates of competition law, at least willfully, than an employee who is not familiar with the antitrust 
rules. Hence, raising awareness helps minimize the risk of violations occurring46. Nonetheless, it has been 
argued that employees inclined to engage in anticompetitive practices can learn from compliance training 
                                                          
41 OFT (2010A), p. 30.  
42 The threat of reputational damage works as an incentive for undertakings and individuals to obey the legal provisions irrespective 
of the branch of law.  
43 WILS (2005).  
44 WILS (2008), p. 185. 
45 PATERNOSTER & SIMPSON (1996), pp. 579-580. 
46 OECD (2011), p. 333. 
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programs how to engage more effectively in anticompetitive practices or how to avoid being detected and 
punished for the infringement of the competition law provisions47. 
f) Disciplinary measures and positive incentives 
 
Both disciplinary measures and positive incentives are essential parts of effective antitrust compliance 
programs; these demonstrate the seriousness with which the undertaking views conduct that is contrary to 
the competition law provisions. In addition, these measures serve as important drivers of competition law 
compliance. State-of-the-art antitrust compliance programs should have clear rules and procedures for the 
eventual violation of the competition law provisions48. In this sense, compliance programs shall determine 
what consequences the non-compliance of the antitrust rules will trigger. Depending on the specific 
compliance program, these disciplinary measures may include: suspension, demotion, dismissal, or even 
legal actions. In practice, just like the actual threat of being sanctioned by public authorities for the 
infringement of competition law, disciplinary measures within the undertaking should encourage 
employees to comply with the provisions of competition law. Regarding positive incentives, these should 
constitute an essential part of any antitrust compliance program due to their ability to foster competition 
law compliance49. Positive incentives for employees usually involve linking employee evaluations, 
bonuses and promotions to the compliance of the competition law provisions.  
g) Impact of competition investigations and litigation cause on compliance 
 
Undertakings’ fear of costly competition investigations and follow-on litigation is a strong driver of 
competition law compliance. The possibility of being investigated by the competition authority for the 
alleged infringement of competition encourages undertakings to comply with the antitrust rules. Hence, 
the costs involved in competition investigations, such as the expenses faced by undertakings during the 
investigation and the reputational damage to the public image of investigated undertakings, deter 
undertakings from engaging in anticompetitive behavior that may lead to a posterior investigation. In 
addition, the threat of private litigation may also encourage competition law compliance. For instance, in 
competition law regimes where every injured party in the market can bring a private action for the 
infringement of competition law, the likelihood of observed transgressions being prosecuted grows. 
Moreover, private antitrust litigation increases the likelihood of prosecution of competition law 
violations, given that private parties can fully internalize the benefits of their antitrust enforcement. 
Finally, if the remedies available for private parties are sufficient enough to encourage potential claimants 
to bring private claims, these can also enhance competition law compliance50. 
 
                                                          
47 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2013), ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement’. Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement, Volume 1, No. 1. Against Wils’s position, see: GERADIN, Damien (2013), ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes & 
Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils’. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 1, Issue 2. 
48 OFT (2010B), p. 28.  
49 MURPHY, Joseph and KOLASKY, William (2012), ‘The Role of Anti-Cartel Compliance Programs In Preventing Cartel 
Behavior’. Antitrust, Volume 26, No. 2, p. 62. 
50 See William Kovacic describing the characteristics of U.S. private antitrust litigation and how this promotes better compliance of 
the antitrust rules: KOVACIC, William E. (2003), ‘Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition Laws’. British 
Institution of International & Comparative Law. Third Annual Conference on International and Comparative Competition Law: The 
Transatlantic Antitrust Dialogue. London, May 15, 2003.  
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h) A genuine and credible culture of compliance 
 
Moreover, a fundamental driver of competition law compliance is the availability of a genuine and 
credible corporate culture of law compliance. Corporate culture is the set of enduring and underlying 
assumptions and norms that determine how things are done in an organization. Hence, a genuine 
corporate culture is based on shared beliefs, values and understandings that shape the behavior across the 
organization51. In this regard, undertakings and individuals that operate in environments where the value 
of competition is widely understood and appreciated, and in which the competition law provisions are 
respected, are more likely to comply with the mandates of the law52.  
g) Influence of compliance programs on the sanctions 
 
As will be seen bellow, the existence of compliance programs may affect the amount of the sanction to be 
imposed for the infringement of the competition law provisions53. Thus, the competition authority may 
reduce the level of the penalty if it considers that despite of having violated the antitrust provisions the 
undertaking has adopted a true compliance program, or alternatively, the authority may increase the 
sanction if it considers that the compliance program is just a façade. In cases where the sanctions can be 
increased for the existence of a compliance program the individuals and undertakings may further 
incentive to comply with the antitrust provisions as they can be sanctioned more heavily because of the 
compliance program.  
2. Drivers that encourage non-compliance 
 
a) A corporate culture of non-compliance 
 
As previously seen, a certain corporate culture of competition law compliance will ultimately determine 
how an undertaking behaves in the marketplace. In this sense, if the undertakings and the individuals 
within them are driven by a strong corporate culture that encourages them to comply with the provisions 
of the law, then these will most likely avoid engaging in unlawful conducts. On the other hand, if within 
the company, industry, or even country, there is not a genuine culture of competition law compliance, or 
even worse, there is a latent corporate culture of non-compliance; then the risk of competition law 
infringements occurring is even greater54. Moreover, as it will be seen below, the commitment of 
undertakings and their employees to comply with the provisions of competition law has to cover all the 
layers of the structural organization of the company, in practice this means, that this commitment to obey 
the law has to begin at the senior management level and go all the way down to lower levels of the 
structure where there are employees that face the risk of committing violations of the law.  
 
                                                          
51  KILLINGSWORTH, Scott. ‘Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through Organizational Values and Culture’, 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Volume 25, No. 4, 2012, pp. 964-965. 
52 OECD (2011), p. 24.  
53 Section VII and VIII below.  
54 Idem.   
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b) Lack of or ambiguity in senior management’s commitment to compliance 
 
A solid and true commitment by senior management to comply with the antitrust provisions is a 
fundamental driver of competition law compliance. By demonstrating its commitment to competition law 
compliance, senior management is sending a strong message to other employees that behavior contrary to 
the provisions of competition law is not acceptable55. The commitment of senior management needs to be 
evident in all aspects related to the antitrust compliance policy of the undertaking.  In this regard, senior 
management has to encourage a corporate culture of competition law obedience by playing an active and 
visible role in promoting the antitrust compliance program. Accordingly, senior management has to show 
its support to the program by ensuring sufficient resources to compliance, and demonstrating that 
violations of the company policy on competition law compliance will be dealt with effectively. 
On the contrary, the fact that senior management does not care for competition law compliance or 
sees competition law as something to be evaded will inevitably lead to the non-compliance of the antitrust 
provisions within the company56. Given to the nature of most anticompetitive practices, competition law 
infringements usually involve the participation of employees that have been given substantial authority by 
their company57. In practice this means that most competition law infringements, especially hard-core 
cartels, are committed at the senior level within the organizational structure of undertakings58. This 
situation clearly represents an important problem for competition law compliance programs, provided that 
the support of those who are usually involved in anticompetitive practices –senior management- is 
considered as fundamental for the effectiveness of a compliance program59. Accordingly, the involvement 
of senior management in the infringement of the competition law provisions constitutes a strong driver of 
non-compliance of competition law for employees at a lower level in the organizational structure of the 
company. In addition, it provides for a series of difficulties for the success of antitrust compliance 
programs and could make these control mechanisms unsuitable for combating hard-core cartels. For 
instance, in order to avoid detection, top management may underfund antitrust compliance programs, or 
create a façade of compliance without effective means to prevent and detect anticompetitive behavior. 
Moreover, the involvement of senior management in anticompetitive practices makes it less probably that 
employees at lower levels in the organizational structure of the company come forward and report their 
employers60.  
Another serious factor of non-compliance of competition law is the ambiguity in the senior 
management’s commitment to antitrust compliance61. The ambiguity in senior management’s 
commitment to competition law compliance occurs when top management executives send mixed signals 
to their employees with regard to their actual position on competition law compliance. For instance, on 
the one hand, top management executives may express support for competition law compliance, and on 
                                                          
55 Competition Bureau Canada (2010), p. 7. 
56 OFT (2010A), p. 36.  
57 WILS (2013), p. 8. 
58 KLAWITER, D.C. and DRISCOLL, J.M. (2009), ‘Antitrust Compliance in the Age of Multi-jurisdictional Leniency: New ideas 
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the other hand, they may also set ambitious profit targets and pressure their employees to meet them, even 
if this means that employees have to overlook the compliance policy of the company. Consequently, 
employees usually feel motivated to infringe the provisions of the law by the expectations that the 
company has set for them and by the pressure of profits targets, performance goals, or strong incentives of 
the company62.  
c) Market conditions that facilitate the infringement of competition law 
 
Another possible factor that could lead to the non-compliance of competition law is related to the market 
conditions that facilitate the commission of antitrust infringements. Accordingly, undertakings that 
operate in markets or industries that because of their characteristics facilitate the commission of 
competition law infringements are more prone to engage in anticompetitive behavior63. For instance, 
markets where there is a small number of players, price transparency, a homogenous product, continuous 
exchanges of information among competitors, or public signals about planned price or output level, tend 
to facilitate the formation of cartels. In this regard, in order to avoid the infringement of the competition 
law provisions, the undertakings that find themselves in these kinds of markets have to identify in time 
these characteristics and devote their antitrust compliance programs to reduce the risk of infringement. 
Accordingly, risk identification constitutes a fundamental part of effective antitrust compliance programs 
that allows undertakings to prevent the violation of the competition law provisions.  
d) Ignorance of the legal consequences of non-compliance 
 
Even though, the ignorance of the antitrust rules does not justify anticompetitive behavior, when 
employees are not sure about the legal consequences of certain practices, this lack of clear knowledge of 
the competition law provisions may constitute a factor for non-compliance. With regard to the 
infringement of the cartel prohibition this premise does not seem to be applicable. As seen before, the 
infringement of the cartel prohibition usually involves the top management of the concerned 
undertakings. In practice, most businesspeople know that price-fixing or market sharing are illegal 
activities and that depending on the competition law regimes in question, these can be severely 
sanctioned. What this means is that the individuals who usually engage in cartel activities are fully aware 
of the unlawfulness of their behavior. Proof of this is the fact that individuals involved in cartel activities 
take exceptional measures intended to conceal the existence of the cartel64. If this is the case, then 
antitrust compliance programs would be useless for combating cartels65. However, if competition law 
infringements could be committed by employees at a lower level of the organizational structure of the 
company, then the possibility of untrained and uniformed staff infringing the provisions of competition 
law could result. In such cases, antitrust compliance training programs would reduce the risks of non-
compliance by making sure that employees are well informed about the legal consequences of their 
actions. Similarly to the ignorance of the legal consequences of anticompetitive conducts, the perception 
of employees that the likely gains for not complying outweigh the likely costs constitutes a further factor 
                                                          
62 WILS (2013), pp. 9-10.  
63 OECD (2011), p. 24. 
64 STEPHAN (2009), pp. 7-8.  
65 Idem. 
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of non-compliance. Thus, the potential violator, in deciding whether to commit a violation, will consider 
the cost to him (the punishment cost), and if the cost is lower than the prospected benefits, then the 
potential violator will commit an infringement of the law66. 
e) The rogue employee as a driver of non-compliance 
 
In otherwise compliant undertakings, rogue employees are another driver of non-compliance of 
competition law67. The rogue employee defense in corporate crime cases argues that a certain employee 
within the structure of the company has committed a violation of the law despite the fact that the 
company has a rigorous corporate compliance program and an effective compliance culture. According to 
this defense, there was nothing that the undertaking could have reasonably done to detect or stop the 
infringement. In the case of competition law compliance, this would mean that irrespective of the fact that 
a determined undertaking has established a state-of-the-art antitrust compliance program there still exists 
the possibility of rogue employees committing antitrust violations while acting on behalf of the 
undertaking. Against the rogue employee defense it has been argued that this cannot be applicable to most 
hard-core cartel cases where the top management of the undertaking is usually involved68. Moreover, an 
infringement of the competition law provisions is difficult to be committed by a single perpetrator, 
especially if this is not at the senior management level. Accordingly, single perpetrators would not be able 
to commit a violation of the competition law provisions if these are not helped by someone else, or if the 
compliance programs and internal control mechanisms that are intended to prevent these illegal activities 
are not suitable for these purposes69.   
An additional driver of non-compliance of competition law is the arrogant attitude of antitrust 
offenders. When employees in an undertaking believe they are above the law or that they are so smart that 
they will not get caught or convicted, they are more likely to violate the law70.    
f) Influence of the compliance programs on the sanctions 
 
As competition authorities can reduce the level of penalty for the existence of compliance programs71, 
individuals and undertakings could be induced to violate the antitrust provisions if they believe that for 
the mere fact of having a compliance program any sanction imposed will be reduced. In this sense, it is 
fundamental that competition authorities effectively determine the truthfulness of compliance programs 
before reducing any penalty to be imposed.  
V. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, anticompetitive practices, especially cartels, are still being 
discovered around the world in spite of the efforts of competition authorities and courts to eradicate these 
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unlawful conducts. As a consequence, new approaches to fight anticompetitive practices, such as the 
adoption of antitrust compliance programs, have emerged lately. In this regard, a strong antitrust 
compliance program can constitute a fundamental tool for the prevention and detection of cartel activities 
within undertakings if such programs are designed and implemented accordingly. In practice, 
unfortunately only a few undertakings take seriously the labor of adopting a credible and effective 
antitrust compliance program given that most competition law authorities do not incentivize undertakings 
to adopt compliance programs and do not give any credit to those that already have72. As a consequence, 
this position of competition authorities has reduced the incentives of most undertakings to create effective 
antitrust compliance programs. Despite the preceding, if competition authorities would unquestionably 
grant credit to undertakings just for having established antitrust compliance programs without having 
considered if these are real and creditworthy, then the possibility of undertakings creating sham antitrust 
compliance programs with the sole purpose of receiving certain indulgence from the competition 
authority arises73.  
In this regard, there are certain fundamental features that have been identified which may 
enhance the credibility and effectiveness of competition law compliance programs, these are the 
following74. 
i) Risk Assessment  
 
An elemental part of any corporate compliance program is to provide for mechanisms that allow 
undertakings to timely identify and assess the key competition law compliance risks that they face while 
conducting their business activities. Thus, once the company is aware of these areas of risk within its 
organization, it should then assess the level of those risks. This labor has to be conducted periodically and 
should include the assessment of risky practices and risky personnel. The main objective of risks 
assessment is to allow the undertaking to focus all the resources it has available to control these areas of 
risk so that competition law infringements do not occur. 
ii) Integrated Approach 
 
Most competition law compliance programs form part of a wider corporate policy of law compliance. 
Thus, antitrust compliance programs should be fully integrated into the compliance and ethics 
infrastructure of the company so that it is not isolated. Nonetheless, if antitrust compliance programs have 
to share scarce resources with other compliance areas that may have priority over antitrust, then there is 
the risk that competition law compliance gets left behind.  
 
 
                                                          
72 See the speech of Joaquín Almunia –Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition- where he states 
that the European Commission should not reward companies that have antitrust compliance programs if these have failed to prevent 
anticompetitive behavior. ‘Compliance and Competition Policy’ Speech before Businesseurope and the US Chamber of Commerce 
(Brussels, 25 October 2010), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-586_en.htm   
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iii) Standards 
 
Effective competition law compliance programs have to clearly determine standards, procedures and 
policies designed to prevent and detect unlawful cartel activities. These standards include codes of 
conduct, procedures and organizational policies that incorporate values, such as the commitment to free-
market competition.  
iv) Controls 
 
In order to successfully establish an effective competition law compliance program, interested 
undertakings have to implement control mechanisms designed to create effective barriers that prevent 
cartel activities, or at least make the commission of this type of anticompetitive conducts more difficult, 
for example, to require prior approval to attend trade association functions.  
v) Empowered Compliance Officer 
 
Along with the active participation of top management executives and the board of directors, a further 
welcomed feature of effective competition law compliance programs is the availability of an empowered 
compliance officer. In this regard, the management bodies of the undertaking should designate a 
compliance officer responsible for the correct implementation and application of the compliance and 
ethics program. The effectives and credibility of antitrust compliance programs can be enhanced if these 
compliance officers are independent in their functions, are sufficiently empowered, and participate in 
senior management decision-making; in this sense, it is better if the designated compliance officer 
belongs to the senior management and has direct access to the supervisory bodies of the undertaking. 
vi) Resources and Infrastructure 
 
Taking into consideration, the size and resources of the undertakings, these should provide sufficient 
funds and infrastructures to the person or group of persons responsible for the implementation of the 
compliance policy. These funds and infrastructures should be sufficient enough so that compliance 
official and other employees are in a position to act effectively, moreover, the assignment of sufficient 
resources empowers compliance officials and allows them to act in a more independent and professional 
way. As compliance programs have to be tailored to the needs and situation of the concerned 
undertakings, small companies cannot spend as much as big corporations in the establishment of antitrust 
compliance programs. In such cases, small businesses that cannot adopt elaborated compliance programs 
due to their limited resources, could promote a corporate culture of competition law compliance through 
less expensive actions, such as training their employees about the mandates of the law and the legal 
consequences for infringing the law.  
vii) Board Oversight 
 
A good practice to ensure an effective competition law compliance program is to delegate the 
appointment of the compliance officer to the management bodies and the board of directors of the 
undertaking. Moreover, the management bodies of the undertaking shall oversee the correct 
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implementation of the compliance program, and require the compliance officer to report directly to the 
board of directors. On the other hand, the compliance officer shall also have the ability to directly access 
the company’s supervisory bodies (board of directors, others), when required by a question or issue 
relating to the undertaking’s antitrust compliance program or policy.  
viii) Senior Management Support 
 
The establishment of an effective antitrust compliance program and the promotion of a culture of 
compliance must start at the top of the company. In this sense, the support of senior management is 
essential for the design and further development of the competition law compliance program. A clear and 
genuine commitment from the top management executives encourages the entire staff and motivates the 
company to commit effectively to the compliance policy of the undertaking. 
ix) Personnel Practices 
 
The level of commitment to competition law compliance can be influenced by the personal characteristic 
of the undertaking’s employees and their tendency to infringe the mandates of the law. Accordingly, 
effective competition law compliance programs should implement diligent personnel practices that 
include effective measures to prevent delegation of authority to those who may engage in cartel activities 
based on prior anticompetitive conduct or conduct inconsistent with the undertaking’s compliance and 
ethics program. 
x) Training and Communication 
 
Another fundamental feature of effective competition law compliance programs is that concerned with the 
training of employees that are exposed to the risk of infringing the provisions of competition law. There 
are different approaches in relation to the compliance training programs, however, most of them involve: 
the distribution of informational documents, mandatory training sessions, and regular evaluation of the 
knowledge of the competition law compliance program. The main purpose of establishing compliance 
training programs is to inform employees about the scope of competition law and the importance of 
complying with these provisions. Compliance training program shall include all the layers of the 
organization where employees may be exposed to the risk of violating competition law.  
xi) Third Parties 
 
Another fundamental point that an effective antitrust compliance program needs to cover is concerned 
with the establishment of systems that address cartel risks from third parties, such as trade associations 
and those acting on behalf of the undertaking. In addition, these systems should also provide for effective 
mechanisms to monitor these third parties. Finally, undertakings should require third parties that act on 
their behalf to implement effective competition law compliance and ethics programs. 
xii) Audit and Monitor 
 
Furthermore, the availability of effective mechanisms of monitoring and auditing allow undertakings to 
prevent and detect anticompetitive behavior and flaws of the antitrust compliance programs. Accordingly, 
315 
 
in practice these types of mechanisms are essential for the adoption of an effective antitrust compliance 
program. Moreover, these mechanisms can enable undertakings to identify other potential areas of risk, 
and in this way, allow them to devote part of their resources and attention to create new competition law 
compliance policies in those areas.  
xiii) Measure Effectiveness 
 
The success of a determined competition law compliance program depends on the undertaking’s capacity 
to monitor and evaluate its correct and effective implementation. In this regard, undertakings should 
adopt mechanisms that enable them to regularly measure the effectiveness and performance of the 
competition law compliance program with the purpose of allowing them to review and if necessary 
modify their antitrust compliance policies.  
xiv) Reporting System 
 
In order to accomplish their main objectives, to prevent and detect anticompetitive behavior within the 
undertaking, competition law compliance programs have to establish an efficient reporting procedure 
through which individuals can provide reliable information about a proven or possible infringement of 
competition law. For employees to be encouraged to report these actual or potential violations, it is 
necessary that these reporting systems provide certain confidentiality and protection against possible 
retaliatory measures. Moreover, undertakings should also consider the implementation of systems through 
which the employees can obtain advice about any competition law concern they might have.  
xv) Protection from Retaliation 
 
As seen before, in order for competition law compliance programs and their reporting systems to succeed, 
it is important that these reporting procedures include mechanisms that provide the reporting employee 
with effective protection from any retaliatory actions. If there is an actual threat of retaliation, employees 
that have gained information about an actual or potential infringement of the competition law provisions, 
most likely, would not report it under the fear of retaliation. In this regard, reporting systems should be 
coupled with especial mechanisms that allow confidentiality and anonymity.   
xvi) Discipline 
 
As above mentioned, the implementation of consistent disciplinary procedures for the violation of the 
antitrust compliance policy demonstrates the seriousness of the undertaking’s commitment to comply 
with the provisions of competition law. Accordingly, the establishment of appropriate and consistent 
disciplinary measures against the infringement of the antitrust compliance policy is fundamental to ensure 
the credibility and effectiveness of the latter. These disciplinary procedures shall include all levels of the 
organizational structure of the undertaking, thus, senior management should also be subject to 
disciplinary sanctions in case of violation of the antitrust compliance program. 
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xvii) Incentives 
 
Moreover, in order to make antitrust compliance programs more effective, the abovementioned 
disciplinary procedures should be coupled with appropriate incentives that promote the employees’ 
commitment with the competition law compliance program. In this regard, linking employee evaluations, 
rewards, promotions and bonuses with the compliance of competition law, serves as an incentive for 
employees to obey the mandates of the antitrust rules.  
xviii) Response to Violations 
 
An effective competition law compliance program should be able to efficiently respond to any actual or 
potential violation of the competition law provisions by conducting a timely investigation and if 
necessary to impose any appropriate disciplinary sanctions upon the individuals that have violated the 
compliance policy of the undertaking. Moreover, the antitrust compliance program should provide 
opportune responses to any consultation made by an employee in relation to competition law issues. This 
opportune response of the compliance program enhances its effectiveness and its ability to prevent 
recurring violations.  
xix) Diligence and Industry Practice 
 
A further important feature for the adoption of an effective competition law compliance program is its 
ability to continuously assess compliance policies and procedures that maintain its compliance policy 
diligent and at least as good as industry practice. This includes the assessment of new policies and 
procedures based on changes in the industry, changes in the law, changes in the competition authority’s 
enforcement policies, lessons learned, results of new competition law investigations, or complaints, 
among others.   
xx) Documentation 
 
Finally, the documentation of compliance policies is critical for the success of the antitrust compliance 
program. Documented evidence of antitrust compliance may assist an undertaking in advancing a due 
diligence defense, where available. The mere existence of a competition law compliance program is not a 
defense to allegations of having violated the antitrust provisions. Hence, a credible and effective 
compliance program may enable an undertaking to prove that it took reasonable steps to avoid 
contravening the law. In this regard, the documentation of all compliance efforts (training sessions, 
disciplinary actions, incentives provided, and others) is advisable.  
VI. GUIDANCE & BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS 
 
As expected, governments are interested in promoting the obedience of public laws, such as the 
competition law provisions. The voluntary compliance of the law offers important benefits for the 
enforcement authorities, for instance, by being relieved from having to compel the public to obey the law 
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by threatening or using force due to the voluntary compliance of the recipients of the law, the 
enforcement authorities save the resources that would have been needed to impose compliance75. In this 
regard, a number of competition authorities around the world have issued detailed guidelines and best 
practices for the establishment of credible and effective competition law compliance programs as a way to 
encourage undertakings and individuals to obey the antitrust rules. Most of these guidelines do not 
prescribe a generic regime with respect to these programs, on the contrary, they acknowledge that each 
undertaking is different, and as a consequence, the issues that their antitrust compliance programs have to 
address and their eventual design will be determined by certain factors, such as the size and complexity of 
the organizational structure of the company, and its risk exposure. Accordingly, some competition law 
regimes also provide guidelines on how to implement antitrust compliance programs for small 
undertakings and undertakings with scarce resources76. 
Moreover, given that, at least in first instance77, in most competition law regimes the adoption of 
an antitrust compliance program is not mandatory, these guidelines normally are not binding on 
undertakings at the time of designing these programs. Nonetheless, in some jurisdictions the undertakings 
have to comply with the requirements established in these guidelines in order to receive a certificate that 
acknowledges the credibility and effectiveness of their antitrust compliance programs78. Similarly, in 
other competition law regimes, undertakings that want to demonstrate its commitment to compliance and 
want to avail the benefits of the latter have to register the programs with the competition authority79. 
Finally, in some competition law regimes, even though undertakings are not required to submit their 
compliance programs for prior approval, these are required to submit annual reports on the 
implementation of their antitrust compliance programs to the competition authority80.  
 In practice, besides a few differences, most guidelines available for the effective implementation 
of competition law compliance programs have included, in different extents, most of the elements 
mentioned in the previous section. For instance, most guidelines available depart from the premise that 
any compliance program shall demonstrate the true and unequivocal commitment of the undertaking to 
comply with the provisions of competition law81. Moreover, in most cases it is required that this 
commitment has to start at the top of the organization and spread throughout the layers of the company, 
                                                          
75 TYLER (1990), p. 4.  
76 For instance, the ACCC’s website includes four compliance program templates to assist companies that do not have the resources 
to develop a tailored antitrust compliance programs. Similarly, the Competition Commission of Singapore in its compliance 
guidelines encourages SMEs to adopt compliance programs adapted to their size and economic resources.  
77 In some cases undertakings that have been involved in anticompetitive practices are required to implement antitrust compliance 
programs. 
78 In Brazil, Ordinance No. 14 of 19 March 2004 issued by the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE) establishes the guidelines of 
prevention programs on economic order offences. According to the Ordinance, the companies that have complied with the 
requirements of the Ordinance in the adoption of their compliance programs can request the SDE a certificate valid for two years 
that recognizes that the company has a credible and effective compliance program. On the other hand, undertakings can also adopt 
their compliance programs independently of the provisions of the Ordinance, in such cases they cannot request a certificate from the 
SDE. The advantage of implementing a program in accordance with the Ordinance was that according to Article 9 (revoked by 
Ordinance 48 of 2009), undertakings that had a certificate could ask for a reduction in the penalties imposed for the infringement of 
competition law. However, given that since the adoption of the new antitrust act in May 2012 (Law No. 12.529/20011) the SDE has 
been concentrated into CADE, it is not clear how the existing regulation on compliance programs will be applied. In Korea, the 
Korean Fair Trade Mediation Agency is the entity responsible for testing and qualifying compliance programs for the KFTC, in this 
sense, the companies are required to apply for the qualification of their compliance programs to this agency.  
79 Competition Commission of Pakistan (2010), p. 18.   
80 Israel Antitrust Authority, Model Internal Compliance Program, 1998. 
81 The OFT guidelines (OFT (2010B)), determine that at the core of any compliance program there has to be a true commitment to 
comply with the antitrust rules.  
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i.e. it should include the board of directors, the senior management and any other employees in lower 
levels of the organizational structure that face an actual risk of infringing the competition law 
provisions82. It is suggested that the commitment of high-level personnel can be demonstrated by a 
message of the senior management to the rest of employees declaring the importance of competition law 
compliance and/or by making reference to the compliance program in the business’s mission statement83. 
Also, most guidelines require the appointment of an individual with authority to coordinate and monitor 
the implementation of the antitrust compliance program84. Usually, this individual is part of the top 
management of the company and is required to report directly to the governing authority of the 
organization (e.g. the board of directors, where available)85.  
In addition, according to the majority of these guidelines, an effective antitrust compliance 
program shall contain effective mechanisms to identify the areas of risk that the company faces with 
regard to the possibility of infringing competition law, thus, this identification should mainly determine: 
the overall risk of the company and the individual exposure of the employees86. In this sense, it is 
recommended that the undertaking should conduct an initial audit on the past of the company and its 
commitment to competition law in order to identify risky areas within the company87. Once these 
potential risks have been identified, then the compliance programs should provide for specific measures 
to assess the likelihood of violating the law, this could be accomplished by defining certain factors, like 
the position of the company in the market, the characteristics of the industry and the market, the 
frequency and level on the company’s interaction with competitors; and then determine how these factors 
can lead to an eventual infringement of competition law88.  
Moreover with the purpose of adopting an effective antitrust compliance program, most 
guidelines require undertakings to establish clear standards and procedures within their programs89. These 
standards and procedures shall be tailor made to address the specific characteristics of each undertaking90, 
and shall be contained along with other fundamental issues of the program in a compliance manual that 
the undertaking has to develop and which employees have to become familiar with91. Another 
fundamental requirement for the success of these compliance programs is that undertakings have to assign 
sufficient resources to provide the individuals responsible for their implementation with the necessary 
means to accomplish the objectives of these programs92. 
 With regard to the employees, undertakings are required to implement antitrust compliance 
training programs for the individuals who are most exposed to commit antitrust violations. These training 
programs are intended to provide individuals with the necessary knowledge about the competition law 
provisions and the legal consequences for the infringement of these. In order to ensure the correct training 
                                                          
82 Competition Bureau Canada (2010).  
83 Competition Commission of Singapore, Better Business with Competition Compliance Programme: How competition compliance 
can help your business, 2011. 
84 In Brazil, see Ordinance No. 14, issued by the Secretariat of Economic Law on 19 March 2004 (Ordinance No. 14).  
85 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,2012. 
86 Japan Fair Trade Commission, Survey on Compliance Efforts with the Antimonopoly Act (Summary), November 28, 2012. 
87 Competition Commission of Pakistan, Voluntary Competition Compliance Code: Statement of Principles and Policy, 2010. 
88 OFT (2010B).  
89 Competition Bureau Canada (2010). 
90 Israel Antitrust Authority (1998). 
91 Turkish Competition Authority, Competition Compliance Program, 2011. 
92 ACCC, Corporate Trade Practices and Compliance Programmes, 2005. 
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of employees, these training programs shall be mandatory and undertakings shall constantly evaluate the 
familiarization of employees with these93.    
Moreover, the undertakings, within the design of their antitrust compliance programs may 
establish further burdens on employees. For instance, employees who are exposed to an actual risk of 
infringing the competition law provisions may be required to state and confirm that they acknowledge the 
contents of the corporate compliance program94, or to provide a written statement to conduct their 
business activities in accordance with the company’s competition compliance policy95. Also, employees 
can be required on a periodic basis to confirm in written that they are not part to or aware of any violation 
of the competition law provisions96. Similarly, employees who are in constant contact with competitors 
may be subject to special supervisions97. Finally, compliance programs shall have procedures to control 
that individuals who have been engaged in illegal activities or conduct that is contrary to the compliance 
policy, do not be included in areas where there are potential compliance risks98.  
An essential element usually established in most of the guidelines is the implementation of 
effective channels though which employees can report the actual or potential infringement of the 
competition law provisions. It is highly recommended by most of these guides that undertakings provide 
reporting procedures that guarantee the anonymity of the employee and the confidentiality of the 
information99. The purpose of this is to ensure employees that they will not suffer any retaliatory 
measures as a consequence of the report. Moreover, in some jurisdictions these guidelines recommend the 
use of incentives to encourage employees to report anticompetitive behavior, such as the implementation 
of in-house leniency programs100. In addition, it is also recommended that undertakings establish 
consultation mechanisms so that employees can submit any doubt they may have with relation to the 
competition law provisions and the company’s compliance policy101. Furthermore, some of these 
guidelines recommend undertakings the adoption of internal review mechanisms for the previous 
evaluation of the legal consequences of certain business agreements, usually those signed with 
competitors102.  In relation to these two procedures, it is critical for their proper implementation that the 
undertakings enable mechanisms that ensure a timely and appropriate response to reports and 
consultations103.  
Additionally, the establishment of effective antitrust compliance programs requires the 
implementation of mechanisms to ensure that the program is followed. In this sense, the guidelines 
recommend undertakings to adopt monitoring and auditing procedures to detect any violation of the 
undertaking’s antitrust compliance policy104. Moreover, antitrust compliance programs should also 
                                                          
93 Office for the Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic, Information Bulletin 2/2004. 
94 European Commission (2012). 
95 Competition Commission of India, Competition Compliance Programme for Enterprises: A Suggested Framework for 
Compliance of the Competition Act, 2002 by Enterprises , 2011. 
96 Competition Commission of Pakistan (2010). 
97 Ordinance No. 14. 
98 United States Sentencing Commission (2012). 
99 Fiscalía Nacional Económica (2012). 
100 Japan Fair Trade Commission (2012). 
101 Competition Commission of Singapore (2011).  
102 Competition Commission of India (2011). 
103 Fiscalía Nacional Económica (2012). 
104 United States Sentencing Commission (2012). 
320 
 
establish mechanisms that enable the undertakings to evaluate the effectiveness and diligence of their 
programs105. This requires an ongoing evaluation of the antitrust compliance policy in relation to the 
development and change of competition law and business practices106. 
Finally, as seen before the availability of proper incentives and disciplinary measures reflect the 
seriousness and commitment of undertakings with regard to competition law compliance. In this sense, 
most of the guidelines available recommend undertakings to implement appropriate incentives and 
disciplinary measures within their compliance programs with the objective of, on the one hand, encourage 
the true commitment of employees with the antitrust compliance policy, and on the other hand, to 
sanction those who have acted against the compliance program107.  
VII. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS & COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
Depending on the jurisdiction in question, the adoption of antitrust compliance programs may have 
different effects on the enforcement of the competition law provisions. In particular, these effects on the 
enforcement of competition law triggered by the infringement committed by the adopting undertakings 
are related to the imposition of financial penalties, the acceptance of commitments or settlements and the 
application of leniency programs.  
 Currently, there is an intense debate on the value that competition law enforcers should grant to 
the fact that an undertakings has implemented, or not, an antitrust compliance program. As stated before, 
the scope of this debate covers the interaction of competition law compliance programs in the case of an 
infringement of the competition law provisions with the imposition of antitrust financial penalties, the 
acceptance of commitments or settlements and the application of leniency programs. 
 In relation to the imposition of financial penalties for the infringement of competition law, there 
are mainly two positions with regard to the value that competition law enforcers should grant to the 
implementation of corporate antitrust compliance programs. On the one hand, there are those who argue 
that competition law enforcers should take into account the fact that undertakings have implemented 
antitrust compliance programs when determining the imposition of financial penalties. On the other hand, 
there are those who consider that the adoption of antitrust compliance programs should not be considered 
by competition law enforcers in setting financial penalties. 
 With regard to the position that considers that competition law enforcers should take into 
account the implementation of antitrust compliance programs in relation to the imposition of a financial 
penalty, most of the literature is grounded on the premise that only genuine antitrust compliance programs 
that have established a true compliance culture within the structure of the company should be considered 
as a factor in the determination of financial penalties. In this sense, companies that implement symbolic 
or cosmetic compliance programs shall not receive any credit, given that this recognition by competition 
                                                          
105 Office for the Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic (2004).  
106 Competition Commission of Singapore (2011). 
107 Turkish Competition Authority (2011).  
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law enforcers can encourage the adoption of sham compliance programs that have as sole purpose the 
reduction of any potential penalty for the infringement of the competition law provisions108.  
 Moreover, there is a further debate among those who argue in favor of the recognition by 
competition law enforcers of genuine and robust antitrust compliance programs. This is related to the 
value that the enforcers should grant to the implementation of these programs, hence, on one side, there 
are those who suggest that undertakings should be relieved from any financial penalty, and on the other 
side, there are those who think that a reduction in the amount of the penalty should be sufficient to 
encourage companies to adopt genuine antitrust compliance programs. In this sense, on the one hand, the 
immunity from financial penalties departs from the idea that undertakings that have been reasonably 
diligent in complying with the competition law provisions should not be fined for the infractions 
committed by their employees while acting on their behalf109. And on the other hand, those who advocate 
in favor of a reduction in the fine over total immunity argue that even though an undertaking has 
infringed the antitrust rules despite its best efforts, the latter will still have to pay a reduced fine, this 
ensures that companies do not adopt sham programs with the intention of being relieved from having to 
pay a fine. Moreover, it has been stated that it is unfair and does not make sense to treat a company that 
has made extensive and genuine efforts to prevent competition law infringements from occurring in the 
same fashion as a company that has not make such efforts or whose top management deliberately and 
systematically planned its anticompetitive practices110.  
 Furthermore, in addition to those who recommend that the implementation of corporate antitrust 
compliance programs should be considered by competition law enforcers as a mitigating factor in setting 
financial penalties, there are some who suggest that as a way to encourage undertakings to adopt antitrust 
compliance programs, competition law enforcers should consider the fact that an undertaking has not 
implemented a corporate compliance program as an aggravating factor when setting the amount of the 
financial penalty111. 
 As stated at the beginning of this section, there is a contrary position to the one reviewed above, 
which is in favor of considering the adoption of antitrust compliance programs as a mitigating or 
aggravating factor in setting financial penalties for the infringement of competition law. This argument, 
suggests that the fact that undertakings have invested time and resources in implementing a determined 
corporate compliance program, irrespective of its credibility and effectiveness, should in no way be 
considered by competition law enforcers when fining undertakings that have violated the antitrust rules.   
 The foundation of this proposition is that if competition law enforcers promise an indulgent 
treatment (reduction or immunity of fines) to those undertakings with compliance programs, there is a 
high risk that undertakings will implement sham corporate antitrust compliance programs with the hope 
of benefiting from a reduction in the fines imposed for the violation of competition law, or even 
                                                          
108 GERADIN (2013), p. 3; MURPHY & KOLASKY (2012), p. 61. 
109 GINSBURG & WRIGHT (2010), p. 18; HOFSTETTER, Karl & LUDESCHER, Melanie (2010), ‘Fines against Parent 
Companies in EU Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for “Best Practice Compliance”. World Competition, Volume 33, No. 1, p. 8. 
110 FORRESTER, Ian S. (2009), ‘Due process in EC competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed procedures’. 871 
European Law Review; GERADIN (2013).  
111 RILEY & BLOOM (2011). 
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immunity. Moreover, the literature against the reduction of fines due to the implementation of genuine 
and robust compliance programs argues that it is not possible for competition law enforcers, as outside 
observers, to accurately determine at a reasonable cost which antitrust compliance programs are genuine 
and effective and which are just symbolic programs112.  
 Finally, against the reduction of fines for the prior adoption of compliance programs is has been 
stated that competition law enforcers already offer sufficient incentives to undertakings to come forward 
and cooperate with the authority for the detection and elimination of anticompetitive practices, such as 
reduction in the amount of the fines for cooperating in the discovery of cartels, for the cooperation during 
the proceedings before the competition authority, or for the limited participation of the undertaking in the 
cartel. In this sense, these incentives should be sufficient for undertakings to cooperate with competition 
authorities. Moreover, if the imposition of a financial penalty is being discussed is because the 
undertaking has been involved in anticompetitive practices, accordingly, competition authorities should 
not grant any credit to undertakings for compliance programs that have failed113.  
 As to the relationship between antitrust compliance programs and the acceptance of 
commitments and the application of leniency programs, this is concerned with the potential requirement 
by competition law enforcers to demand that undertakings willing to benefit from the preferential 
treatment that these mechanisms provide, implement genuine antitrust compliance programs in addition to 
the further requirements that these procedures normally establish. In practice, the requirement by 
competition law enforcers for the implementation of robust compliance and ethics programs before 
commitment or settlement agreements are signed, or to be admitted to a leniency program, is intended to 
provide effective incentives for undertakings to adopt a compliance program with the ultimate intention 
of preventing new cartels from forming114. Accordingly, it has been suggested that competition law 
enforcers could require the adoption of compliance programs as part of commitment agreements115, or 
leniency applications116.  
VIII. DIFFERENT APPROACHES BY COMPETITION LAW ENFORCERS 
 
In practice, there are various approaches by the competition law enforcers, competition authorities and 
courts, with regard to the antitrust compliance policy across jurisdictions. These approaches are 
concerned with the different positions adopted by the competition law enforcers when dealing with the 
implementation, or lack of implementation, of competition law compliance programs in case of an 
infringement of the antitrust provisions. Particularly, these different approaches are related to the 
suggestions reviewed in the previous section: the value granted to the implementation of compliance 
programs when setting antitrust sanctions, and the interaction of compliance programs with the 
acceptance of commitments and the application for leniency.  
                                                          
112 HARRINGTON, Joseph (2010), ‘Comment on Antitrust Sanctions’. Competition Policy International, Volume 6, No. 2, pp. 48-
49; WILS (2013), pp. 19-20. 
113 See the speech of Joaquín Almunia, footnote 64 above.  
114 OECD (2011), p. 15. 
115 RILEY & BLOOM (2011). 
116 For instance, the World Bank in its leniency program for corruption requires that the admitted applicants shall adopt effective 
compliance and ethics programs (World Bank, Voluntary Disclosure Program: Guidelines for participants, 2011). 
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1. Compliance programs as a mitigating factor 
 
In some competition law regimes, competition authorities and courts consider the prior adoption of 
antitrust compliance programs by infringing undertakings when setting the amount of the corresponding 
financial penalty. In most jurisdictions where this possibility is available, competition law enforcers take 
the implementation of corporate compliance programs as a mitigating circumstance to favor undertakings 
that have instituted this kind of programs over others that have not. As seen before, the fundamental 
requirement that competition law enforcers have established in order to consider compliance programs as 
a mitigating factor is the adoption of a genuine and effective competition law compliance program that 
has created an actual antitrust compliance culture within the undertaking, this requires the obedience of 
the antitrust rules by all member of the organization, i.e. board of directors, senior management, and other 
employees. Thus, in determining the credibility and effectiveness of antitrust compliance programs, 
competition law enforcers considerer certain factors, such as: the availability and effective distribution of 
compliance manuals among the employees; the effectiveness of the measures taken by the undertaking; 
the regular training of employees; and the acknowledgement of the compliance program by senior 
management; among others. Accordingly, in practice, the main objective of offering undertakings that 
have successfully implemented compliance programs a reduction in the amount of the financial penalties 
is to encourage market participants to adopt antitrust compliance programs with the ultimate purpose of 
increasing the obedience of the competition law provisions.  
 The possibility to reduce the amount of the fines in the case that the infringing undertaking has 
implemented a compliance program is recognized in a few jurisdictions. This recognition has been 
established in the guidelines for the design of compliance programs117, or the guidelines for the 
imposition of financial penalties118. Nevertheless, in practice, there are only a few actual cases where 
competition authorities and courts have considered the reduction of financial penalties119.  
 According to the research performed in the elaboration of this study, there is not one jurisdiction 
that provides for an automatic reduction in the amount of the financial penalties due to the existence of a 
prior antitrust compliance program on the part of the infringing undertaking. In this sense, most 
jurisdictions that allow this possibility require a prior analysis of the circumstances of the infringement 
and the compliance program in question. This analysis varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it is 
mainly concerned with establishing if the compliance program is genuine and not just a façade. In this 
regard, competition law enforcers will assess the truthfulness of the program by determining if this 
includes the requirements provided in the guidelines elaborated for this purpose120.   
                                                          
117 In India, among the benefits of implementing a compliance program, the guidelines suggest the possibility to reduce fines 
(Competition Commission of India (2011), p. 4). In Singapore an effective compliance program can be considered as a mitigating 
factor for the impositions of fines (Competition Commission of Singapore (2011), p. 6).  
118 In Pakistan, according to the Guidelines on Imposition of Financial Penalties, the prior adoption of a compliance program is 
considered as a mitigating factor (Section 8.1 of the Guidelines). In the UK, the amount of financial penalties can be reduced where 
the infringing party can prove that adequate steps had been taken ensure compliance with the competition law provisions (OFT, 
Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of the Penalty, at para. 2.16).  
119 For instance, in Australia see cases: ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 450; ACCC v George Weston Foods 
Ltd [2000] FCA 690; ACCC v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Limited (No. 3) [2007] FCA 1617.  
120 In Australia, about the determination of the credibility of compliance programs see case: ACCC v George Weston Foods Ltd 
[1999] FCA 858. 
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 In some competition law regimes, with the purpose of providing a certain degree of certainty to 
undertakings; the competition authorities have designed mechanisms though which undertakings can 
submit their compliance programs for evaluation and certification. In such cases, the undertakings have to 
present a draft of their compliance programs to the competition authority, and the latter will determine if 
the programs comply with the requirements established to be considered credible and effective. 
Ultimately, the competition authority will issue a certificate or qualification declaring that the program is 
creditworthy. Thus, in these regimes the availability of a certificate121 or qualification122 will allow the 
concerned undertakings to request a reduction in the amount of the financial penalty in case of 
infringement of the competition law provisions.  
 Furthermore, the reduction of the financial penalties due to the existence of a compliance 
program can be restricted in some jurisdiction with regard to the type of anticompetitive infringement 
committed by the undertaking in question. Accordingly, in such cases the possibility to require the 
reduction of the fine will only apply to infringements that are not related to hard-core cartels. The basis 
for this restriction is that undertakings involved in hard-core activities have the possibility to make an 
application for leniency and obtain full immunity, or settlement and obtain a reduction of the financial 
penalty123.   
 Finally, in competition law regimes where there are criminal sanctions for the infringement of 
the antitrust provisions, the implementation of an antitrust compliance program can relief individuals 
from criminal liability. For instance, in jurisdictions where senior management executives are held 
criminally responsible for the infringement of competition law committed by their undertakings, the fact 
that at the time of the infringement there was a genuine antitrust compliance program can be used by 
senior management as a defense against criminal prosecution124.  
2. Compliance programs as an aggravating factor  
 
As a general rule, most competition law enforcers are neutral with regard to the recognition of antitrust 
compliance programs. Thus, they do not consider their existence or inexistence as a mitigating or 
aggravating factor for the imposition of antitrust sanctions for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions. The main purpose of the adoption of antitrust compliance programs is to allow the adopting 
undertakings to prevent antitrust violations from taking place, in this sense, these programs are not 
intended to provide infringing undertakings reductions on the sanctions imposed, or to allow competition 
                                                          
121 In Brazil according to the Ordinance No. 14, before its modification in 2009, the availability of a certificate issued by SDE was 
considered for a reduction in the amount of the fine (Article 9 of SDE Ordinance No. 14/2004 (revoked by Ordinance No. 48 of 
March 4 2009)).  
122 In South Korea, the amount of the financial penalties imposed can be reduced in cases where the undertaking has submitted its 
compliance program for qualification to the KOFAIR (Korean Fair Trade Mediation Agency) and has obtained a qualification 
superior to A (qualifications range from AAA to D).  
123 In France, the Autorité will consider the implementation of a genuine compliance program as a mitigating circumstance in cases 
not related to cartel activity (horizontal or vertical agreements, abuse of dominance). In cartel cases, the undertaking can apply to the 
leniency program or settlement in order to receive a reduction or immunity from fine (Autorité de la Concurrence (2012), p. 8).  
124 In Israel, the provisions of the Antitrust Law impose direct criminal liability on individuals who participated in the violation of 
the antitrust provisions. Moreover, section 48 of the Antitrust Law determines that if the infringement was committed by the 
company, anyone who was an active director or senior management executive at the time of the offence will be prosecuted. 
Nevertheless, senior executives can defend themselves from indirect liability by proving that they were not aware of the antitrust 
infringement and that they adopted all reasonable measures to guarantee compliance with antitrust provisions, such as the adoption 
of an effective antitrust compliance program. 
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law enforcer the possibility of increase the sanctions in the case of flawed compliance programs. 
Nevertheless, there are jurisdictions where the implementation of compliance programs can act as an 
aggravating factor in the setting of financial penalties under certain circumstances.  
 Even though most competition law regimes, as a way to encourage the implementation of 
antitrust compliance programs, have declared that the fact that a genuine compliance program has failed 
to prevent a determined infringement shall not be considered by competition law enforcers as an 
aggravating circumstance when setting financial penalties125, there are, however, a few cases where 
competition law enforcers can consider flawed or sham antitrust compliance programs as aggravating 
factors. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the competition law enforcers can consider the existence of 
compliance programs as an aggravating factor when setting financial penalties where such programs have 
been used to facilitate the infringement of the competition law provisions, to mislead the competition 
authority as to the existence or nature of the infringement, or have been used in an attempt to conceal the 
infringement126. Moreover, there have been cases where the competition authority has increased the 
amount of the financial penalties due to the existence of sham compliance programs127.  
 The existence of a compliance program and its use as an aggravating factor is more usual in 
relation to the sanctions imposed on the individuals involved in anticompetitive behavior. For instance, in 
some competition law systems, the fact that a senior executive has participated in conduct contrary to the 
competition law provisions will lead the competition authority to believe that the senior management’s 
commitment to compliance was not genuine and that the program was neither credible nor effective. 
Moreover, the fact that the senior executive has knowingly violated the law can be considered as an 
aggravating factor for the individuals involved in the offense128.  
 Finally, in jurisdictions where the individuals involved in anticompetitive behavior can be 
criminally prosecuted, the prior existence of an antitrust compliance program may facilitate criminal 
conviction, given that the fact that a compliance program was in place can lead the courts to consider this 
as evidence of criminal intention. Moreover, the adoption of a compliance program can also serve as an 
aggravating factor in criminal procedures against senior executives, provided that its availability can 
indicate that the individuals violated the competition law provisions willfully and deliberately129. 
Moreover, in some competition law regimes, even though, the guidelines on compliance programs 
available establish that compliance programs that have failed to prevent the infringement of competition 
law will not be considered as an aggravating circumstance, even if the senior executives participated in 
                                                          
125 “[t]he existence of a compliance programme will not be considered an aggravating circumstance if an infringement is found by 
the enforcement authorities…” (European Commission (2012), p. 21). 
126 Competition Bureau Canada (2010), p. 17; OFT (2010B), p. 32.  
127 In the EU, the Commission has considered the existence and violation of a compliance program as an aggravating factor in the 
imposition of the financial penalties. In this case, the infringing undertakings previously received a reduction in the fine in exchange 
of a commitment agreement that included the implementation of the compliance program in question. The Commission found that 
the fact that the undertaking had not complied with the commitment and the provisions of the compliance program, was sufficient to 
increase the financial penalty by 75%, and that the existence of the compliance program may facilitate the evidence that the 
company entered into a prohibited behavior intently. (Commission Decision of 14 October 1998 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty Case IV/F-3/33.708 - British Sugar plc, Case IV/F-3/33.709 - Tate & Lyle plc, Case IV/F-3/33.710 - 
Napier Brown & Company Ltd, Case IV/F-3/33.711 - James Budgett Sugars Ltd).  
128 Competition Bureau Canada (2010), p. 17. 
129 BANKS, Theodore & JALABERT-DOURY, Nathalie (2012), ‘Competition Law Compliance Programs and Government 
Support or Indifference. Best practices for compliance programs: Results of an international survey’. Concurrences, No. 2-2012. 
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the infringement despite their commitment to the compliance policy, there is the possibility that the 
competition authority may institute criminal proceedings against these individuals if the required 
conditions to do so are met130.  
3. Compliance programs and settlement agreements and leniency programs 
 
Depending on the competition law regime in question, commitment/settlement agreements and leniency 
programs may interact with the implementation of antitrust compliance programs and the overall 
enforcement of competition law. In practice, commitment/settlement agreements and leniency programs 
relate to antitrust compliance programs in that the application of the former may require the 
implementation of the latter. As a general rule, the prior implementation of an antitrust compliance 
program is not a requisite to sign a settlement agreement or to apply for leniency. However, in some cases 
infringing undertakings may be required by competition law enforcers to adopt compliance programs if 
they want to benefit from the preferential treatment that settlement and leniency provide.  
In most jurisdictions, there is no condition requiring that an undertaking must already have 
adopted an antitrust compliance program before entering into settlement discussions with the competition 
authority in relation to any potential competition infringement under consideration, nonetheless, in some 
cases the willingness of infringing undertakings to adopt compliance programs can be considered as an 
attenuating circumstance when imposing a fine131. However, in some cases, the infringing undertaking 
can propose the adoption of a compliance programs as part of a settlement agreement with the 
competition authority in exchange of a reduction in the amount of the financial penalty132. Moreover, in 
other cases, the adoption of an antitrust compliance program can be ordered by the competition law 
enforcer in order to accept the commitments proposed by the undertaking133. In addition, in some cases, 
the competition authority can recommend the infringing undertaking the implementation of an antitrust 
compliance program as a measure to avoid new antitrust offences134.  
                                                          
130 Autorité de la Concurrence (2012), p. 8. 
131 In France, according to the procedure of non costestation des griefs of Article L. 464-2 III of the Code de Commerce, companies 
that receive a statement of objections and not discuss or challenge these objections can reduce the fine imposed up to 10%. 
Additionally, if the undertakings commit to adopt a genuine antitrust compliance program an additional reduction of up to 10% may 
be granted by the enforcer. 
132 In the EU, the Commission accepted commitments from British Sugar on 7 August 1986; these included the implementation of a 
comprehensive competition compliance program. In 1988, the Commission adopted an infringement decision recognizing the 
exemplary efforts of British Sugar to comply with the mandates of competition law. In this sense, the implementation of the 
compliance program worked as a mitigating factor and the financial penalty imposed was reduced (Commission Decision of 18 July 
1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Case No IV/30.178 Napier Brown - British Sugar)). However, 
later on the Commission discovered that British Sugar participated in collusive agreements with some of its competitors between 
1986 and 1990. As a consequence, the Commission considered that the existence of a compliance program should be regarded as an 
aggravating circumstance and increased the financial penalty by 75 % (Commission Decision of 14 October 1998, footnote 118 
above. In France the Autorité may choose to close proceedings on the basis of the commitments proposed by the infringing 
undertaking (Article L 464-2 of the code de Commerce), in practice, there have been some cases where such commitments have 
included the adoption of antitrust compliance programs (Autorité de concurrence - Décision n° 10-D-29 of the 27 September 2010).  
133 In Australia, according to section 87B of the Competition and Consumer Act, the ACCC can accept court-enforceable 
undertakings from companies committing themselves to implement compliance programs. However, courts are empowered to order 
undertakings to establish education and training program for employees or other persons involved in the infringement of 
competition law (section 86C of the CCA). In Brazil, CADE requested an undertaking the adoption of a compliance program during 
the negotiations for settlement, this included measures like: the appointment of a compliance officer; periodic reports; training;  
hotline to report; and mechanisms to identified violations and the individuals that are more likely to commit them (Administrative 
Proceeding No. 08012.005328/2009-31). 
134 In Brazil, after imposing financial penalties on the competition law offenders, CADE recommended these the adoption of 
corporate compliance programs in order to avoid further infractions of the Law (Administrative Proceeding No. 
08012.009088/1999-48).   
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In most cases, the competition authority is responsible for monitoring that the undertakings are 
complying with the commitments agreed during the settlement negotiations, this control would include 
the supervision of the implementation of the compliance programs. In most jurisdictions, the violation of 
the commitments can result in the imposition of financial penalties and even the initiation of new 
proceedings135.  
With regard to the requirement to implement a competition compliance program as part of an 
application for leniency, during the research for this study not one jurisdiction that provided for this 
requirement has been found. However, the requisite to adopt a compliance program in order to receive 
lenient treatment exists in other fields of law and is being discussed as an alternative for competition 
law136. In some competition law systems there are cooperation programs, which are additional to leniency 
programs that provide for a lower level of enforcement action, or no action at all, against an individual or 
undertaking in exchange for information and full continuing and complete cooperation. These programs 
are related to infringements of the competition law provisions that are not related to hard-core cartels and 
may require the implementation of a compliance program137.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
135 In France, in the case the undertaking violates the commitments proposed, the Autorité can impose a fine for the violation of the 
commitment (Autorité de la Concurrence (2012), p. 8; and Article L. 464-3 of the Code de Commerce).   
136 World Bank (2011).  
137 See the Cooperation Policy of the Commerce Commission of New Zealand, available at: http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-
commission/commission-policies/cooperation-policy/ 
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I. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is a well-known fact that over a hundred jurisdictions have implemented some kind of competition law 
provisions in their national legislations. The current trend of trade liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation taking place at a fast global pace has inspired this worldwide proliferation of competition 
law regimes. The implementation of competition law provisions has occurred in different contexts and 
circumstances across the globe, in this sense; there is a great variety of countries with different traditions 
and levels of economic development that have adopted competition law provisions, which in addition, 
may be aimed at the accomplishment of different objectives. Accordingly, the spectrum of countries that 
have put in place competition law regimes includes both jurisdictions with a long tradition on market 
oriented economies and competition law policy, and countries that have recently moved from central 
planned economies and have recently adopted competition law provisions in their legislations. Moreover, 
there is a great deal of divergence on the levels of economic development of these countries provided that 
there are countries that have large and well developed economies, and on the other hand, there are some 
countries with small and underdeveloped economies. As mentioned above, the objectives sought by these 
countries through the implementation of competition law regimes differs from one country to the next, 
hence, countries with large and developed economies may usually seek to avoid anticompetitive conducts 
within their large markets, instead, competition law in developing countries may be intended to eliminate 
entry barriers to attract foreign capitals and competitors with the ultimate purpose of economic growth.   
 From the abovementioned, it is evident that competition law has increasingly gained worldwide 
acceptance and that there is a great diversity among competition law systems due to the different 
backgrounds of the countries that have enacted antitrust provisions in their legislations. Nevertheless, 
despite this wide expansion of competition law and the different contexts and circumstances of most 
countries, this global proliferation of competition law has not brought along a proportional increase in the 
enforcement of competition law. Consequently, in practice, a considerable amount of countries that have 
established competition law regimes have not just yet accomplished decent levels of competition law 
enforcement.  
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 On the one hand, the lack of effective competition law enforcement can be related to the 
economic, legal, cultural and religious traditions of some countries and regions. For instance, in the 
Middle East, none of the existing competition law regimes in the Arab World is remarkably or 
particularly advanced in terms of having a competition law understanding or culture, or in terms of 
competition law enforcement138. 
 On the other hand, this lack of competition law enforcement, however, is not particularly related 
to the levels of economic development or the history of competition law and policy of most countries, 
given that there are jurisdictions with well developed economies and a long tradition of competition law 
and policy that have not matched the enforcement levels of other similar countries that have stronger 
competition law regimes. Alternatively, there are countries with a shorter history of market based 
economies and competition law and policy that have been more successful in implementing a solid 
competition law system with considerable rates of enforcement.   
 For instance, until before the 2008 financial crisis Ireland had a high level of economic 
development thanks to its significant increase during the 90’s. In addition, Ireland has a long tradition of 
competition law and policy with a history of over sixty years, some of the first European merger 
regulations, and four competition acts. Furthermore, the Irish competition law system has appealing 
characteristics that theoretically should ensure fair levels of enforcement, these include: strong sanctions 
for antitrust offenders, such as the imprisonment of individuals involved in hard-core cartels; or the 
possibility for private parties to bring civil claims for the recovery of damages. In spite of the level of 
economic development, the long competition law and policy tradition and the appealing characteristic of 
its competition law system, Ireland has not reached a considerable level of competition law enforcement, 
especially in regard to criminal prosecutions139.    
 Conversely, other countries with different circumstances and backgrounds have been more 
successful in the implementation of strong competition law regimes and have attained decent rates of 
competition law enforcement. Such is the case of the Republic of Korea, once a colonial country, which 
began developing its economy after WWII and implemented its first competition act at the beginnings of 
the 80’s. In just over thirty years, the Korean competition law system is now considered Asia’s best 
antitrust enforcer and a reference for the international competition enforcement community. Until 2011, 
the Korean Fair Trade Commission had issued remedies to over 43,000 cases and has imposed financial 
penalties amounted to KRW 3 trillion140. In this regard, Korean antitrust enforcement can be considered 
as a success story if one takes into account the Korean history of decade-long growth-oriented industrial 
policy141.  
 Thus, it could be argued that the success in the enforcement the antitrust provisions and the 
implementation of a sound competition law regime is not merely related to the backgrounds of the 
                                                          
138 DABBAH, Maher M. (2007), ‘Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East’. Cambridge, New York, et al: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 4. 
139 LYONS, P., MASSEY, P., & McDOWELL, M. (2012), ‘Boston v. Berlin: A half century of Irish antitrust’. In: Mehta, P. (ed). 
Evolution of Competition Laws and their Enforcement. London and New York: Routledge, p. 111-130.  
140 Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of Korea, 2012 Annual Report.  
141 YANG, Meong-Cho (2009), ‘Competition Law and Policy of the Republic of Korea’. The Antitrust Bulletin. Volume 54, No.3, p. 
621-650.  
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countries, the substantial commands of the antitrust legislations, or the institutional arrangements of most 
competition law regimes. There are other important issues related to the success of competition law 
systems. Most countries that have recently implemented competition law systems in their national 
legislations face a variety of difficulties in the execution of their antitrust provisions. These difficulties 
are normally related to the lack of resources for the implementation of fully functioning competition law 
institutions. In addition, most new competition law regimes do not have enough specialists with academic 
training or practical experience in competition law matters to successfully enforce the antitrust provisions. 
This absence of sufficient specialists is related to the lack of academic infrastructures that provide 
formation to students in the competition law area. Moreover, new competition law regimes may also 
encounter the obstacle of deficient judicial systems that have little or no experience in the adjudication of 
competition law matters. A further difficulty faced by some competition law regimes is the interference of 
political forces in the enforcement of the competition law provisions; this is more frequent in countries 
with state-owned enterprises and policies favoring domestic producers over foreign enterprises. Finally, 
new competition law regimes face great difficulties in the recollection of relevant information from 
investigated undertakings for proving the infringement of the antitrust provisions, additionally; 
competition law institutions encounter difficulties in relation to the standards of proof required by 
ordinary courts in order to demonstrate the anticompetitive conduct of the defendants142. 
 Despite the preceding, even though there are studies that rate the effectiveness of competition 
regimes, the appropriate levels of enforcement and the overall efficiency of competition regimes are 
difficult to measure effectively143. Currently, there is not an effective measurement mechanism to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of competition law and its institutions144. Traditionally, the rates 
of enforcement have been related with the good performance of antitrust agencies, hence, the initiation of 
new cases by the competition authorities have been used as the main criteria to grade competition law 
enforcement145. However, to rely entirely on this standard to measure good performance would be 
incorrect provided that the amount of enforcement activity may respond to different aspects. For instance, 
the competition authorities face different challenges in different jurisdictions, hence, in some 
jurisdictions, the high rates of public enforcement may be caused by the lack of private enforcement, and 
similarly, the scarce enforcement of competition law may be caused by high levels of voluntary 
compliance. Accordingly, the good performance of competition authorities should be analyzed by 
considering substantive results, such as antitrust agencies improving economic performance and social 
welfare by stimulating improvements in quality, reductions in cost, and increases in innovation. 
Moreover, good agency performance should be measured by evaluating the effectiveness of the 
enforcement process of competition authorities, i.e. transparency, accountability and internal controls146.  
                                                          
142 KOVACIC, William E. (1998), ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies’. 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. XXIII, No 1, p. 403-454. 
143 For instance, every year, Global Competition Review evaluates the performance of the world’s leading competition authorities in 
its ‘Rating Enforcement’ publication.  
144 SOKOL, Daniel D. (2010), ‘Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from 
Restaurant Guides’. 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, p. 578. 
145 KOVACIC, William E. (2009), ‘Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?’. George Mason Law 
Review, Volume 12, Number 4, p. 908. 
146 Idem at p. 907. 
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 In addition to the abovementioned difficulties that competition law regimes have to overcome in 
order to obtain decent levels of enforcement, there is the fundamental issue of creating a solid competition 
law culture among the institutions responsible for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions, the 
stakeholders and the general public. In this regard, a sound competition culture refers to the awareness of 
the business community, public authorities, non-governmental agencies, the media, the judiciary, and the 
general public, of the substantive commands of competition law, and their overall responsibility to ensure 
that such commands are observed in the interest of competition and overall economic development147.     
As to the overall application of competition law, the competition law institutions have to be 
competent when enforcing the competition law provisions in order to acquire the credibility of market 
participants and the general public. For this purpose, competition law institutions have to be concerned in 
recruiting, training and retaining qualified professionals in the fields of law and economics that provide 
the antitrust agencies with the necessary human resources needed to build strong public institutions in 
which the recipients of the law and the general public can rely. Furthermore, competition law institutions 
have to spend wisely their limited resources in the prosecution of emblematic cases that have an 
importance to the general population in order to demonstrate the benefits of competition law for society. 
Additionally, as stated before, the general public has to be convinced of the benefits of competition law, 
provided that the majority of the population does not have a clear idea or an idea at all, about competition 
law and its benefits.  
 Furthermore, competition law is not static, which means that it is constantly evolving as trade 
practices change over time. In this regard, in order to build strong competition law systems with 
considerable levels of enforcement, competition law institutions, legislators and academics have to be 
updated on the most recent developments of competition law and policy. For this purpose, institutions, 
legislators and academics have to be constantly studying and analyzing the work of foreign competition 
law institutions and international organizations that work on the development of competition law best 
practices guidelines (International Competition Network (ICN), the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)). Hence, the constant reformulation of competition law and policy is fundamental for 
attaining decent levels of enforcement. For example, in a broad sense, competition law in the UK can be 
traced many centuries back in the UK legislation. Since those times, competition law and policy have 
been constantly evolving in the UK. After WWII the first modern competition law provisions emerged in 
the UK, however, those provisions were badly conceived, and as a consequence, under-enforced. It was 
only in the beginnings of the 21st Century with the adoption of the Competition Act, 1998, and the 
Enterprise Act, 2002, that the UK has finally introduced a coherent competition law regime. Nonetheless, 
this process of evolution of the UK competition law system has not reached a final impasse, given that 
still today UK competition law is looking for ways to improve. For instance, private antitrust enforcement 
is the least effective part of competition law in the UK, in this regard, the UK government has proposed 
certain measures intended to foster private claims for the infringement of the competition law provisions, 
                                                          
147 ICN, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group (Sub-Group 2). Lessons to Be Learnt From the Experiences of Young 
Competition Agencies. Cape town, South Africa, 2006, p. 38.  
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these include, the broaden of the competence of the CAT to handle private claims; the introduction of opt-
out collective actions; and the promotion of ADRs as a way to resolve competition law disputes148. 
Accordingly, the enactment of clear and flexible competition law provisions is fundamental for the 
foundation of strong competition law regimes, nevertheless, the mere adoption of antitrust provisions 
does not guarantee on its own the accomplishment of the competition law objectives, given that 
jurisdictions have to overcome the abovementioned difficulties, and at the same time, be able to adapt 
their antitrust rules to the constant change of trading.  
 A further issue that has been considered to have affected the levels of competition law 
enforcement in some jurisdictions, is that related to the transposition of foreign antitrust provisions into 
the national legislations of some countries, especially those of developing economies. In great part, the 
proliferation of competition law regimes across the world that has taken place in the last few decades has 
been promoted by different instances that have ultimately resulted in the indiscriminate transplantation of 
foreign competition law commands into the legislations of the adopting countries.   
In most cases, the institution of competition law regimes has been promoted by international 
organizations in developing countries in exchange of credits or funds, in this regard, it has been argued 
that the antitrust provisions of developed nations have been forced down the throat of developing 
countries with the aid of international organizations149. Moreover, the willingness of developing countries 
to participate in bilateral and multilateral agreements has driven these nations to incorporate antitrust 
provisions in their national legislations. For example, Chile was required to reform its competition law 
regime in order to sign a free trade agreement with the U.S. back in 2004. Moreover, in the ASEAN 
region, the members of ASEAN have committed themselves to all have competition laws by 2015. 
Similarly, in the EU aspiring countries to EU membership are required to implement competition law 
provisions that resemble those of the EU. Finally, in some countries the institution of competition law 
regimes has been forced by the occupation forces of winning countries after bellicose conflicts, such is 
the case of Japan that has modeled its Antimonopoly Act and its antitrust institution (Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission) on the U.S. model, provided that this process was promoted by and under the supervision of 
the U.S. Occupation Forces in 1947 after WWII150. 
In practice, this indiscriminate process to transpose foreign competition law models from 
jurisdictions that have been successful in implementing strong competition law regimes with considerable 
rates of enforcement, mainly those of the EU and the U.S., has resulted in the establishment of under-
enforced competition law regimes in most of the receiving countries. This recent trend to inspire new 
antitrust provisions in those of successful competition law regimes has prevented these countries from 
converting their competition law provisions into effective enforcement tools in practice, provided that 
most of these countries have experienced considerable difficulties in creating strong competition law 
institutions and executing effective enforcement programs. This ambitious endeavor of legislators and 
foreign forces to implement complex antitrust provisions in countries that have competition law 
                                                          
148 See, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Private Actions in Competition Law: a consultation on options for reform. 
April 2012.  
149 DABBAH, 2010, p. 4.  
150 TAKIGAWA, Toshiaki (2009), ‘Competition Law and Policy of Japan’. The Antitrust Bulletin. Vol. 54, No 3, p. 435-515.  
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institutions with scares economic and human resources, strong opposition from political and economic 
forces, and judicial systems with little to no experience in competition law matters, has ultimately resulted 
in badly conceived competition law regimes. In addition, this implementation of competition law regimes 
that are designed to fail from their inception presents some drawbacks on its own. For instance, on the 
one hand, this implementation of useless sets of laws is a waste of the limited resources of most 
developing countries where such provisions have been established. Moreover, on the other hand, the 
implementation of unclear and ineffective competition law commands affects the interests of market 
participants and the general public in economies with already precarious conditions.   
Therefore, it can be safely argued that there is not a single recipe that legislators should consider 
when adopting or reforming their competition law systems, provided that the characteristics of each 
country are unique and these should be contemplated in enacting the antitrust provisions. This one size fits 
all exercise has brought along the creation of competition law regimes where the antitrust rules are under-
enforced. The fact that some jurisdictions have been successful in implementing strong competition law 
systems does not mean that the adoption of similar provisions in other countries will entail the creation of 
effective competition law systems elsewhere. The implementation of a successful competition law system 
requires the tailoring of the competition law provisions to the needs of each particular economy, 
therefore, the EU and U.S. models may be used as a reference, however, these cannot be successfully 
duplicated in countries with different initial conditions151.  
 Notwithstanding the preceding, the reader must not be mistaken. The formulation of new 
competition law systems or the reform of existing ones should always be assisted by the study and 
analysis of several foreign competition law regimes. This practice will allow legislators to be well advised 
on the recent developments of competition law and how these could be transposed into their legislation. 
Moreover, this study and analysis of foreign competition law regimes should be coupled with the analysis 
of the recommendations on competition law and policy of international organizations, such as the ICN, 
OECD, or UNCTAD. Particularly, this need to study and analyze foreign competition law regimes and 
the recommendations of international organizations has inspired the present comparative study, which is 
intended to enlighten competition law officials, policymakers, practitioners and academics on the 
approaches chosen by some jurisdictions on the main features of their competition law regimes and the 
subsequent enforcement of the antitrust provisions.  
 Overall, even though the enforcement of competition law has increased in the last few decades, 
mainly because of the proliferation of competition law regimes across the world, the reformulation of old 
competition law regimes and the interest of international organizations in the field of competition law, the 
increase in the enforcement of competition law has not been exponential to this process of competition 
law globalization. On the one hand, in most jurisdictions where new competition law regimes have been 
instituted, these regimes have faced considerable obstacles that have impeded the successful application 
of competition law, in such cases, the mere passing of the competition law statutes has not been enough to 
build around it a solid competition law regime. On the other hand, in some jurisdictions that already had 
                                                          
151 WALLER, Spencer, MUENTE, Rafael (1989), ‘Competition Law for Developing Countries: A Proposal for and Antitrust 
Regime in Peru’. 21 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, p. 159-184.  
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competition law provisions, the improvement in the competition law commands has not brought along 
corresponding improvements in the outcomes of the application of competition law. Nevertheless, this 
asymmetry between implementation of competition law provisions and the subsequent lack of 
enforcement is not so surprising if one takes into account the complexity of competition law and the 
ambitious objectives of the law, especially in relation to the precarious conditions of some of the 
countries that have enacted antitrust provisions. This complexity of competition law has made its 
application difficult in countries with scarce resources and little experience in market processes. The 
obstacles faced by competition law agencies related to the lack of human and economic resources, 
pressure of political and economic forces, deficient judicial systems, and the inability to gather relevant 
information to prove the competition law infringement, among others, has ultimately made almost 
impossible for new and inexperienced competition law agencies to efficiently apply the antitrust 
commands. In addition, jurisdictions that have certain experience with markets processes and competition 
law policy, still find somehow difficult to obtain considerable rates of competition law enforcement, 
given that the process of establishing strong competition law regimes does not happen overnight and , as 
stated before, the mere adoption of competition law provisions, irrespective of the level of economic 
development of the country in question, does not guarantee on its own the implementation of a successful 
competition law regime. Moreover, in some countries the application of the competition law commands 
has been uneven, given that these jurisdictions have been more successful in the application of certain 
competition law provisions. For instance, it is well-know that the private enforcement of competition law 
is considerably low compared to the public enforcement in most jurisdictions. Similarly, the criminal 
prosecution of individuals involved in anticompetitive practices, in countries that allow this possibility, is 
considered in some jurisdictions the weak link of the competition law chain. It could be stated that this 
has occurred due to the inability of the competition law authorities to convince the judicial system and the 
general public of the unlawfulness of the anticompetitive practices of the defendants. In great part of the 
countries that have competition law commands, the courts have not felt compelled to award considerable 
amounts of damages to antitrust victims for the anticompetitive conduct of the defendants, to second the 
decisions of the competition authority imposing sanctions or penalties, or to sentence an individual to 
imprisonment for the infringement of the competition law provisions. Furthermore, the diversity of 
competition law regimes across the world and the multiplicity of enforcers have, in practice, increased the 
level of punishment of anticompetitive practices, however, such increase has occurred in an 
unpredictable, erratic and random fashion, given that depending on the competition regime in question 
and on the antitrust infringement, the punishment and remedies imposed for certain violations exceed the 
enforcement efforts and sanctions available for other anticompetitive practices152.   
 Ultimately, the diversity of competition law systems, institutions and proceedings should not be 
resolved by a utopian process of harmonization of competition law and policy. Provided that this latent 
diversity can be surpassed by the commonalities found on the application of the antitrust provisions and 
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the goals and objectives of competition law. Thus, in order to provide for some harmony in the laws that 
govern global transactions, these commonalities shall be maximized.  
 In sum, even though the current state of competition law enforcement is not the most desirable in 
the majority of jurisdictions, there has been a considerable increase in the last few decades. A couple of 
decades ago, competition law and policy were considered proper for developed countries with complex 
economies and large markets, nevertheless, today, the professed benefits of competition law have spread 
to all countries despite their level of economic development. Notwithstanding, the mere passing of 
competition law acts is not sufficient for the development of strong competition law regimes and the 
accomplishment of the competition law objectives. There are several obstacles that most competition law 
regimes have to overcome before they are able to obtain decent levels of enforcement. The work of 
competition law institutions, international organizations and academics is fundamental to assist in the 
development of strong competition law regimes. In that sense, this is the aim of the present comparative 
study, to provide competition law officials, practitioners and academics with a clear and comprehensive 
perspective of the approaches chosen in a fair sample of competition law regimes that includes countries 
with different levels of economic development, traditions and competition law history, in order to allow 
them to analyze the consequences and potentialities of these legislative approaches and to suggest the 
possibilities available for the formulation or reformulation of the fundamental commands of competition 
law.  
II. CONCLUSIONS TO THE PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT CHAPTER 
 
Due to the fact that the competition law provisions are not self-executing and to the secretive nature of 
most competition law infringements, the substantial provisions of competition law have to be enforced by 
someone that has the expertise and the powers to uncover and sanction the infringement of the 
competition law provisions. In this regard, most competition law regimes have opted for the public 
approach, which is, the enforcement of the competition law provisions by a public entity vested with wide 
powers of investigation and the ability to impose sanctions and remedies upon those who have breached 
the competition law commands.  
In practice, in most jurisdictions the public enforcement of competition law has been more 
prosperous than other types of enforcement, provided that only in one country, the U.S., the number of 
antitrust cases handled in private proceedings is superior to the number of cases adjudicated in public 
procedures. The public nature of this branch of law and the wide faculties provided to the public enforcers 
of competition law has made the public application more effective in the majority of jurisdictions. As a 
result, the wide powers of investigation granted to the public enforcers to uncover anticompetitive 
practices and the ability to unilaterally impose their decisions on the addressees of the competition law 
provisions has allowed tipping the scales in favor of the public enforcement of competition law.   
  Notwithstanding the preceding, some competition law systems, especially young ones and those 
established in developing countries, have encountered serious difficulties for the effective enforcement of 
competition law. This are mainly concerned with the implementation of inadequate competition law 
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provisions, conflicting policies, week competition law institutions that lack financial and human 
resources, ineffective sanctioning systems and review mechanisms.  
1. Inadequate Competition Law Commands 
 
The enactment of clear and sound competition laws is fundamental for the successful implementation of 
strong competition law regimes in every jurisdiction. Overall, the substantive commands of competition 
law shall include clear and sufficient prohibitions against the most common and harmful anticompetitive 
practices in order to establish the scope of the antitrust provisions and to prevent these anticompetitive 
practices from happening. Moreover, the establishment of the prohibitions against the anticompetitive 
practices has to be coupled with an effective sanctioning system that allows competition law enforcers to 
impose suitable sanctions and remedies on those who have infringed the competition law provisions. 
Additionally, the substantive commands of competition law shall also include the enforcement procedures 
and the investigative powers granted to uncover the prohibited anticompetitive practices in order to 
provide competition law enforcers with efficient mechanisms to detect and sanction any conduct that is 
prohibited by the substantive commands of competition law. 
 In addition to the abovementioned substantive commands of competition law there are other 
provisions included in some competition laws that may ease the enforcement of competition law. For 
instance, the inclusion of the objectives sought by the competition law provisions allows clarifying the 
intention of the legislators at the time of the enactment of the competition law. However, in some cases, 
the inclusion of conflicting objectives may affect the effective enforcement of competition law in 
practice. Moreover, the addition of definitions in the competition law provisions is especially welcomed 
in new competition law regimes that lack sufficient case law on competition law matters, in such cases; 
the existence of clear definitions facilitates the enforcement of the competition law commands. Similarly, 
the incorporation of thresholds and legal presumptions may ease the enforcement of competition law; 
nonetheless, these should be periodically revised in order to maintain them updated.  
 As to the anticompetitive practices controlled by the competition law provisions, most 
competition law regimes are designed to police three typical anticompetitive conducts: restrictive 
agreements, abuse of a dominant position and mergers that create or strengthen a dominant position. In 
practice, the implementation of such complex provisions, especially in competition law regimes with 
scares resources and little experience on market processes has led to the enactment of hollow legal 
commands, which are erratically enforced or not enforced at all. The ambitious endeavor of legislators in 
new competition law regimes to include the full range of prohibitions found in successful competition law 
systems has resulted in excessively broad and complex competition law provisions. The fact that the 
enforcement of these ambitious legal commands has been delegated to inexperienced competition law 
agencies with scares human and economic resources that face strong opposition of political and economic 
forces and are subject to the review of deficient judicial systems has wrecked the unrealistic expectations 
of the drafters of these competition law commands. Additionally, the fact that in some jurisdictions the 
competition law provisions also deal with other matters, like, intellectual property, price control, 
deceptive advertising or fraudulent market practices has brought additional obstacles for the effective 
337 
 
enforcement of competition law. In this regard, it would be wise for legislators drafting competition law 
provisions for new antitrust regimes to limit the scope of these provisions and the responsibilities of the 
inexperienced enforcers, provided that, once competition authorities have implemented successful 
enforcement processes and advocacy programs, there is always room for improvement through legislative 
reforms, however, public opinion is a fundamental component of any movement for legislative reform. In 
addition, in competition law regimes that have not yet reached considerable rates of enforcement, the 
legislative enhancement of the competition law provisions is also a possibility to improve the current state 
of competition law enforcement. Thus, in new competition law regimes, the competition law provisions 
can be limited to the prohibition of the most harmful anticompetitive practices, those that do not have 
redeeming social value, mainly hard-core cartels and other equally harmful practices like the abuse of 
dominance and resale price maintenance. Moreover, new competition law institutions should focus their 
efforts and limited resources in competition advocacy and the prosecution of the most harmful 
anticompetitive practices and emblematic cases that have a significant value for the general public.  
Jurisdictions contemplating the implementation of competition law commands; these would be 
well advised to limit the scope of the substantive commands of competition law and the responsibilities of 
the competition law institutions in order to facilitate the codification of competition law and the 
subsequent enforcement of these provisions. In this sense, broad and general antitrust provisions that are 
supposed to be clarified by judicial interpretation like those found in the U.S. model may be inadequate 
for most civil law countries that relay in the precepts of the provisions, thus, in such cases, clear and 
sufficiently defined provisions are better suited for being applied by new competition law agencies and 
inexperienced judicial systems.  
Summarizing, jurisdictions designing competition laws should focus on implementing adequate 
provisions that address the particular realities of their jurisdictions and should avoid relying so heavily on 
the provisions of experienced competition law regimes. In this way the competition law provisions will 
address the most harmful anticompetitive conducts that affect their national markets. Moreover, these 
fundamental provisions should include supporting provisions that effectively allow the enforcers to detect 
and eliminate these anticompetitive practices. Ultimately, in jurisdictions where inadequate competition 
law provisions that do not allow competition law authorities to effectively eliminate antitrust 
infringements and to sanction the offenders have been implemented, these can be amended through 
legislative reform.  
2. Weak Competition Law Institutions 
 
In relation to the institutional arrangements of competition law regimes, there is a great deal of diversity 
mainly with regard to the number of competition law institutions and the enforcement functions delegated 
to these institutions. As seen in the Public Enforcement Chapter, different approaches have been chosen 
in the design of the competition law institutions. In practice, however, the effectiveness of these different 
institutional arrangements also varies depending on the jurisdiction, which means, that there is not a 
particular institutional arrangement that has proven to be effective irrespective of the conditions of the 
competition law regime in which it is implemented.  
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 With respect to the number of competition law institutions responsible for the enforcement of the 
antitrust provisions, there are jurisdictions where competition law is enforced by a single institution, and 
alternatively, there are regimes where the enforcement of competition law is delegated to multiple 
institutions. In practice, even though there are successful competition law systems with both single and 
multiple agencies models that have established strong enforcement processes, there appears to be an 
inclination towards the implementation of single institution models. For instance, in the U.S., there are 
two antitrust agencies responsible for the enforcement of competition law at the federal level, the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The multiple agency model of 
the U.S. is one of the top rated competition law regimes in the world; however, there are serious 
drawbacks present in this type of institutional arrangement, such as rivalry and inconsistency between 
multiple agencies and the duplicative costs of having more than one agency with overlapping functions153. 
In this regard, in 2007, the Antitrust Modernization Commission addressed the viability of changing this 
dual model and concluded that due to practical and political difficulties of reallocating authority and the 
fact that the coexistence of the two institutions has not produced significant negative consequences it was 
not recommendable to change the current institutional model154. There are, however, other competition 
law regimes with multiple institutions that have moved to the single agency model, such is the case of 
Brazil that has recently concentrated the three previously existing competition law institutions in a single 
one155. Similarly, in the UK, the Competition Commission and the competition functions of the OFT will 
merge into a single competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority, in the first half of 
2014156. Moreover, other competition law regimes are evaluating the possibility to reform their multiple 
institutional models and adopt a single agency model, for example, the UK, which has one of the 
strongest competition law systems in the world is planning to redesign its competition law system and to 
dissolve both the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission and create a single institution, 
the Competition and Markets Authority, responsible for the enforcement of competition law157. These 
examples show the current trend to move from multiple competition law institutions to a single institution 
in regimes with more than one agency, and the reluctance of new competition law regimes that are 
designing competition law institutions from scratch to implement multiple institution models158.   
 As seen before, there is a current trend among new competition law regimes to implement single 
institution models. In such regimes, the enforcement functions are delegated to a single competition law 
agency with strong powers of investigation and with authority to impose sanctions and penalties, which 
are reviewed by a separate appellate body. This institutional approach is the one suggested by UNCTAD 
                                                          
153 CRANE, Daniel A. (2011), ‘Enforcing Competition Law with Multiple Agencies and Private Enforcers’. Hokkaido Journal of 
New Global Law and Policy, vol 10, p. 45-70, at p. 58-64. 
154 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, 2007, p. 129-32.  
155 Under the provisions of the former competition act (Law 8.884/94), the Brazilian competition law regimes had three different 
institutions responsible for the enforcement of competition law: CADE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica), the 
Economic Law Office (Secretaria de Direito Econômico), and the Economic Policy Bureau (Secretaria de Acompanhamento 
Econômico). The current Antitrust Law (Law 12.529/2011) has concentrated all three agencies within CADE. 
156 Competition Commission, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform (Response by the 
Competition Commission), 2011; and OFT, A competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform (The OFT’s 
response to the Government’s consultation), 2011. 
157 In 2010, the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Skills has begun an inquiry to redesign the UK’s competition law regime.  
158 FOX, Eleanor M. (2010), ‘Antitrust and Institutions: Design and Change’. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. Volume 41, 
No. 3, p. 473-488. 
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in its Model Law on Competition159 and has been followed by several jurisdictions. The most 
representative and probably the most successful jurisdiction that has implemented this type of institutional 
arrangement is the EU. At the EU level the Competition Directorate of the European Commission is the 
institution responsible for the enforcement of the EU competition law provisions; this single institution 
has broad powers of investigation and consolidates the executive and adjudicatory enforcement functions, 
in addition, its decisions are reviewed, in first instance, by the General Court160 and, in last instance, by 
the Court of Justice of the EU. Despite this tendency to delegate the competition law enforcement to a 
single institution, some competition law regimes, especially those with scares resources, little experience 
with market processes, and deficient judicial systems, have not been able to duplicate the results of the 
EU or other successful competition law regimes. 
 In relation to the design of the competition law institutions and the assignment of the 
enforcement functions, there are jurisdictions that conglomerate the enforcement functions within a single 
agency, and conversely, there are other jurisdictions where there is a separation of these functions among 
different institutions. In practice, both of these institutional models have been successfully implemented 
in some competition law regimes. Nevertheless, the conglomeration and the separation of the enforcement 
functions present certain benefits and drawbacks that legislators should consider when designing or 
reforming their competition law institutions. In a broad sense, in relation to the structure of the 
competition law institutions and the allocation of the enforcement functions, most competition law 
institutions fall within one of the following three institutional models161. First, the bifurcated judicial 
model, in which the competition law institution has been attributed the investigative functions, but has to 
bring enforcement actions before courts of general jurisdiction given that the former does not have 
adjudicative powers162. Second, the bifurcated agency model, in which the competition law institution has 
authority to investigate possible antitrust infringements, but must bring enforcement actions before 
adjudicative authorities specialized in competition law matters163. And third, the integrated agency model, 
in which the competition law institution has been awarded both investigative and adjudicative 
functions164.   
 As stated before, the implementation of each one of these models involves certain trade-offs. For 
instance, the institution of the bifurcated judicial model, on the one hand, provides for high levels 
accountability, detachment, transparency and protection of due process, however, this model scores 
poorly in relation to the expertise of general courts in competition law matters, timeliness and process 
costs. As to the, bifurcated agency model, this allows a high level of independence, expertise and 
detachment in the composition of the specialized tribunal, moreover, it provides decent levels of 
administrative efficiency and protection of due process, however, the creation of specialized competition 
                                                          
159 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Model Law on Competition: Substantive Possible Elements for a 
Competition law, Commentaries and Alternative approaches in Existing Legislation. New York and Geneva, 2010, p. 66.   
160 Formally known as Court of First Instance.  
161 TREBILCOCK, M. & IACOBUCCI, E.M. (2010), ‘Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values, Structure and Mandate’. 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, vol. 41, p. 459-464.  
162 In the U.S., the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has authority to investigate the infringement of the antitrust 
provisions but has to bring civil or criminal proceedings before federal courts in order to obtain criminal sanctions or civil relief.  
163 In Canada, in non-criminal cases, the Commissioner of Competition has investigative functions; however, the adjudicative 
functions have been delegated to the Competition Tribunal.  
164 In the EU, the Competition Directorate of the European Commission has both investigative and adjudicative functions.  
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law tribunals represents a substantial expense for most jurisdictions. Finally, with regard to the 
implementation of the integrated agency model, the latter provides for high levels of expertise in 
competition law matters and administrative efficiency, on the other hand, the main drawback of this 
model is the risk of prosecutorial bias due to the combination of the investigative and the adjudicative 
functions in one institution.  
 Irrespective of the institutional design of the competition law institutions, there are certain issues 
that are strictly related to the optimal functioning of antitrust agencies, these are related to the insufficient 
capital and human resources of most competition law agencies. With regard to the capital resources, 
virtually all competition law agencies have limited budgets that impede the desired performance of some 
of these institutions. Thus, in order to overcome this obstacle, antitrust institutions have to spend their 
limited resources wisely in the prosecution of cases that immediate attention and try to obtain additional 
funds while retaining their independence and transparency. In relation to the human resources, 
competition law agencies, especially young ones, normally encounter difficulties in finding and retaining 
trained professionals in the competition law area. This problem is usually related to the lack of sufficient 
qualified professionals and the lack of financial resources to hire and retain skilled professionals. This 
limited human resource capacity, challenges the ability of competition authorities to timely address 
competition concerns and the effective enforcement of the law. In this regard, some competition 
authorities have established successful training programs on their own and in collaboration with foreign 
competition authorities and international organizations.    
 
3. Ineffective Sanctioning Systems 
 
A further issue that is strictly related with the effective enforcement of competition law and the 
attainment of the desired effects of competition is the availability of an appropriate sanctioning system 
that provides public enforcers with effective mechanisms to prevent and sanction any anticompetitive 
practice that is contrary to the competition law provisions. Competition law has a regulatory and 
compulsory nature, which require market participants a certain business behavior for the accomplishment 
of the competition law objectives. In this sense, an appropriate sanctioning system is fundamental for the 
effective implementation of competition law, given that punishment is a critical component for the 
enforcement of any compulsory legislation, such as competition law. Thus, market participants will only 
comply with the provisions of the law if they are threatened by being punished for non-compliance. 
Accordingly, deterrence plays a fundamental role in the enforcement of competition law, due to the fact 
that the threat of being sanctioned for the breach competition law is crucial, given that it is virtually 
impossible for competition authorities to control the activities of every single market participant165. 
 A remedial system like competition law seeks to deter people from violating the provisions of 
the law. In order to accomplish this objective, the sanctions provided in such systems have to make the 
engagement in unlawful practices costly for the recipients of the law. In this regard, an appropriate 
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sanctioning system will have to impose a cost on the violator, whether this is pecuniary or not, equal to 
the cost the violation imposed on the society166.  
 Competition law regimes across the world have relied on a diverse set of sanctions to deter 
undertakings from engaging in anticompetitive practices, however, the establishment of the appropriate 
sanctioning system depends on the specific characteristics of each competition law regime. There is a 
variety of sanctions that can be imposed for the infringement of competition law, which include: the 
imposition of financial penalties, administrative sanctions, and the imprisonment of the individuals 
responsible for the competition law infringement.  
 The imposition of financial penalties is the most common type of sanction used for the 
infringement of competition law. The versatility of this type of sanction and the relatively low costs of its 
imposition and administration, compared to other types of sanctions, have been determinant in the 
adoption of this type of sanction in most competition law regimes. However, there is a great deal of 
diversity with regard to the main characteristics of this type of sanction that are mainly concerned with 
the nature of the sanction and the persons subject to this sanction.  
The nature of financial penalties varies depending on the competition law regime in question and 
the administrative system of these. Thus, there are jurisdictions where financial penalties have an 
administrative nature and others where fines have a civil or criminal nature. In practice, the nature of fines 
has some implications in the enforcement of competition law and the imposition of the fines. For 
instance, in competition law regimes that provide for the imposition of financial penalties of an 
administrative nature, the latter are imposed in administrative procedures by administrative authorities, 
normally the competition authority. This possibility for the competition authority to impose 
administrative fines ease the imposition of these, and as a consequence, reduces the costs of 
administration given that the authority does not have to file an action before the competent authority to 
request the imposition of the fine. On the one hand, this faculty of administrative authorities may benefit 
competition law enforcement by allowing the enforcers to sanction antitrust offenders expeditiously and 
without excessive administrative costs. On the other hand, this faculty allows the possibility of imposing 
abusive and inadequate sanctions if there are no effective mechanisms to review the decisions imposing 
these fines. In the case of financial penalties of civil or criminal nature, the imposition of these is 
competence of civil or criminal courts, respectively. The imposition of financial penalties by courts 
prevents the imposition of abusive penalties by biased competition authorities and protects due process, 
however, the fact that competition authorities have to bring an action before general courts provides for 
additional obstacles in the enforcement of competition law. This is especially burdensome for young 
competition authorities that lack experience in litigation.   
With regard to the persons subject to being sanctioned with the imposition of financial penalties 
for the infringement of competition law, there are two approaches chosen in most competition law 
regimes. On the one hand, some jurisdictions restrict the imposition of financial penalties to undertakings 
only. On the other hand, other competition law regimes allow the imposition of financial penalties on 
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undertakings and individuals acting on behalf of infringing undertakings. In jurisdictions where 
individuals can be fined the competition law liability of an undertaking derives from the establishment of 
a violation of the competition law provisions by its management or employees. Hence, the purpose of 
allowing individuals to be fined is to punish those who decide on the undertaking’s business strategy. The 
fact that financial penalties imposed on undertakings only can be ultimately passed on to consumers rests 
the deterrent effects of this type of sanction in practice. However, the deterrence level of financial 
penalties imposed on individuals can also be reduced if these sanctions are assumed by the undertakings 
on behalf of their employees. In this regard, there are jurisdictions that have established specific 
provisions that prohibit undertakings to assume the fines imposed on their employees, thus, protecting the 
deterrent effect of financial penalties and punishing individuals for their participation in anticompetitive 
practices. Accordingly, the imposition of financial penalties on individuals will reduce the willingness of 
business people to commit violations, given that the public punishment of antitrust offenders has deterrent 
effects, due to the fact that it creates a credible threat of punishment to others, and in addition, it has 
moral effects, by sending message to the spontaneously law-abiding, reinforcing their moral commitment 
to the rules167.   
In practice there are certain issues regarding the imposition of financial penalties and their 
effectiveness to deter market participants from engaging in anticompetitive behavior. For instance, 
determining the appropriate level of financial penalties has proven to be a demanding exercise. The fact 
that most competition law provisions do not establish a fixed amount of fines and that the circumstances 
of each case are different require from public enforcers a heavy analysis of complex evidence, which can 
be sometimes an overwhelming exercise, especially for young competition authorities. This situation is 
exacerbated in jurisdictions where the competition authority does not have effective mechanisms to gather 
relevant information about the challenged practice in order to determine an appropriate level of the fine 
that effectively sanctions and deters market participants. 
 A further issue related to the imposition of financial penalties is the inability of some 
competition authorities, especially young competition authorities with scarce resources, to effectively 
enforce their decisions imposing fines for the infringement of the competition law provisions. In order for 
the sanctioning system to provide its desired deterrent effects, the sanctions imposed have to be 
effectively enforced to present market participants with a credible threat of being punished. Nevertheless, 
there are jurisdictions where the competition authorities face serious difficulties in ordering the 
sanctioned party to comply with the sanctions imposed due to the fact that these authorities lack the legal 
powers to enforce compliance on their own. In such cases, competition authorities have to request the 
intervention of the competent courts to order the infringing undertakings to pay the fines imposed. 
Moreover, in some of these jurisdictions the problem is further exacerbated by deficient judicial systems 
that provide for lengthy procedures and little experience in market processes, which ultimately affect the 
effective enforcement of competition law. Furthermore, even competition authorities that have 
enforcement powers may face certain difficulties when trying to order the compliance of their fining 
decisions. For instance, young competition authorities with few resources and little experience in 
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litigation will encounter difficulties in enforcing their decisions even if they have the legal powers to do 
so. Additionally, in jurisdictions where the legal status of competition authorities and their competences 
are not clearly established, the legitimacy to impose sanctions and their competence to do so will be 
frequently challenged, thus, adding further obstacles for the effective enforcement of competition law.  
Moreover, competition authorities in developing countries may encounter strong political and economic 
opposition when trying to enforce fines imposed on large transnational undertakings, large national 
undertakings or state owned enterprises. Finally, needless is to say that young competition authorities in 
developing countries; that face strong opposition; rely on a deficient judicial system; and lack authority to 
impose sanctions on their own; will face almost insurmountable obstacles in trying to impose a fine and 
effectively enforce it.   
In addition, it has been argued that the current level of financial penalties is too low to deter 
market participants from engaging in anticompetitive conducts, consequently, in order for financial 
penalties to effectively deter market participants from violating the antitrust provisions, these would have 
to be impossibly high and would exceed the statutory ceilings of most legislations and the ability of 
undertakings to pay without being forced in to bankruptcy168. Imposing a fine that exceeds the ability to 
pay of an undertaking and forces the latter to bankruptcy and to exit the market would be against the 
primary objective of competition law to protect the competitive process. Accordingly, competition law 
regimes should not rely exclusively in financial penalties, especially those imposed on undertakings only, 
to accomplish the desired deterrent effects to avoid violations of competition law. These financial 
penalties may have to be coupled with additional sanctions that present individuals with a credible 
threaten to being punished for non-compliance with the commands of competition law. In this regard, the 
use of financial penalties on individuals, and especially the possibility to imprison managers and 
employees are usually suggested to enhance the level of deterrence of competition law169. 
In this regard, some competition law regimes have established in their sanctioning systems the 
possibility to impose the imprisonment of individuals involved in anticompetitive practices. There are 
jurisdictions that provide for this possibility since the inception of their competition law regimes; such is 
the case of the U.S. that allows the imprisonment of the individuals who violate the antitrust provisions 
since the adoption of the Sherman Act back in 1890. In addition, there has been a trend in the last few 
decades to criminalize certain anticompetitive practices with the hope that the deterrent effect of this type 
of sanction will prevent the most harmful anticompetitive violations, i.e. hard-core cartels170. 
Nevertheless, other competition law regimes that used to provide for the possibility to impose 
                                                          
168 WILS, Wouter P.J. (2001), ‘Does the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require Not Only Fines on Undertakings 
But Also Individual Penalties, In Particular Imprisonment?’. Paper presented at the 6th Competition Law and Policy Workshop at 
the European University Institute (Florence, 1-2 June 2001), at p. 11-18. 
169 WILS (2001), p. 22. 
170 For instance, in the UK, the Enterprise Act 2002 has added a criminal cartel offence, limited to hard-core cartels, punishable with 
imprisonment and/or fines for individuals only, as well as a sanction of director disqualification for individuals. Other jurisdictions 
such as: Canada, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, and Malta have introduced criminal sanctions for the 
breach of the substantial provisions of competition law.   
344 
 
imprisonment have decided to decriminalize their provisions due to the fact that these where almost never 
enforced and were effective on paper only171.  
The criminalization of the competition law provisions –imprisonment in particular- is intended to 
enhance the deterrence levels of the antitrust provisions, and as a consequence, to increase the compliance 
of the law. Even though, the amount of the financial penalties imposed in the last decades has increased 
considerably, to rely solely on the imposition of financial penalties has proven to be insufficient to 
comply with the desired levels of deterrence172. As a consequence, there are those who argue that the 
threat to individuals of being imprisoned for participating in anticompetitive practices will bring about the 
desired levels of deterrence and compliance with the law. On the other hand, there are those who believe 
that imprisonment should be regarded as a last instance sanction given that this type of sanction 
represents a cost to society and that the professed high levels of deterrence attributed to imprisonment are 
not that high provided that this kind of sanction is imposed so rarely in competition law cases173. 
On the one hand, imprisonment can be more efficient than other types of sanctions due to its 
level of deterrence. In addition, given that the amount of the financial penalties imposed currently cannot 
be raised to a level that exceeds the ability of undertakings to pay, and that there is the possibility that 
these fines could ultimately be passed on to consumers, deterrence by other means would be required. 
Hence, it seems that effective deterrence will be best accomplished if both the undertaking and the 
individuals acting on its behalf are punished. With regard to the imposition of financial penalties on 
individuals, these would not reach the desired level of deterrence, especially if there is the possibility that 
undertakings assume the fines imposed on behalf of their employees. On the other hand, imprisonment 
may not be an appropriate sanction in some jurisdictions for a number of reasons. For instance, the 
adoption of criminal penalties –especially imprisonment- for the infringement of competition law may not 
be in line with the social and legal norms of a particular country. In this regard, the general public will 
have to be convinced that antitrust offenders deserve imprisonment as punishment, moreover, in most 
jurisdictions; the introduction of criminal penalties for antitrust breaches will require difficult legislative 
amendments. Therefore, jurisdictions that are implementing competition law provisions from the scratch 
would be well advised to avoid the introduction of criminal provisions in its first attempt to develop their 
competition law regimes. Moreover, jurisdictions that have already competition law provisions that 
provide for administrative or civil penalties should not switch to criminal sanctions without the 
acceptance of the relevant constituencies174. Additionally, the costs of imprisonment are higher if 
compared to other sanctions such as financial penalties, and the costs of the offender being imprisoned 
constitute a deadweight loss to society. Likewise, the higher procedural requirements of criminal 
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procedures represent a further obstacle for the effective enforcement of competition law, given that these 
difficult the prosecution of competition law violations in practice. 
In most competition law regimes the sanctioning system is usually coupled with certain remedies 
aimed at maintaining or restoring the competitive process. Unlike sanctions, remedies do not have a 
punitive nature and serve additional purposes, like, the termination of an anticompetitive conduct, or the 
restoration of the competitive process. As seen in the Public Enforcement Chapter, there is a variety of 
remedies available depending on the competition law regime in question. These can broadly be grouped 
in: behavioral remedies, which require a person either to do something or to stop doing something; and 
structural remedies, which require undertakings to divest assets they hold in order to restore the 
competitive structure of a determined market. Consequently, an effective set of remedies would include 
both structural and behavioral remedies.  
 In particular, the main issue related to the imposition of remedies and the effective enforcement 
of competition law is concerned with the correct determination of the appropriate remedy for the 
anticompetitive conduct in question. Overall, when determining the appropriate remedy, competition 
authorities should consider the imposition of remedies only if a real threat to competition has been 
identified. The competition law issue that a determined remedy is intended to address should be clearly 
identified in order to impose the optimal remedy for each case. Moreover, remedies should be the least 
restrictive means to effectively eliminate the relevant competition concerns. Also, the remedies imposed 
by competition authorities should only address competition law issues, given that remedies are not tools 
for industrial planning and usually are not suited to accomplish wider purposes.  
In addition to the preceding principles considered when determining the appropriateness of a 
certain remedy, there are some antitrust remedies that are better suited to address specific anticompetitive 
practices. For instance, structural remedies, such as divestiture, are usually preferred for mergers cases 
over behavioral remedies. In merger cases, the imposition of remedies is intended to restore or maintain 
the competitive process while at the same time to allow the realization of relevant merger efficiencies and 
other additional benefits. Even though, this type of remedy is considered as the most drastic, it also 
provides for some benefits, for instance, divestiture does not require ongoing monitoring like other 
remedies do; it also allows the rapid elimination of market power; it allows the concerned parties to take 
part in the design of the remedy; and finally, it involves less intervention of courts and other institutions 
in its implementation.  
On the other hand, in cases involving restrictive agreements or the abuse of a dominant position, 
behavioral remedies are usually more suitable for addressing the anticompetitive effects of these types of 
practices. This type of remedies may require the concerned undertakings to stop engaging in certain 
activities that are contrary to competition, or alternatively, they may impose an affirmative obligation to 
do something in order to restore the competitive process. In the first case, the remedies are intended to 
terminate the infringement of competition law, and in the second, to restore the competitive process. This 
kind of remedies is advantageous in that they can be formulated to address the particular competition law 
concerns raised by each case. Additionally, in some jurisdictions the imposition of these remedies can be 
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agreed by the competition authority and the concerned undertakings, this possibility eases the 
implementation of these remedies and enhances its ability to restore the competitive process. On the other 
hand, even though behavioral remedies can be modeled to address a specific competition law concern, 
this type of remedies may require an ongoing supervision, which can suppose significant costs both for 
the competition authority and the concerned undertakings.  
Consequently, the implementation of an effective sanctioning system requires the availability of 
both structural and behavioral remedies in order to accomplish all the enforcement objectives of 
competition law. However, there are some matters that jurisdictions have to consider in order to allow the 
competition law enforcers to effectively impose optimal remedies that address the specific competition 
concerns of most anticompetitive practices. For instance, competition law regimes should provide for a 
clear statutory basis that allows public enforcers to impose any type of remedy available for the 
infringement of competition law. Moreover, there are certain obstacles that can affect the effective 
imposition of these antitrust remedies. For example, young competition authorities may find the 
formulation of remedies as an overwhelming exercise in cases where complex analyses are required. In 
this way, the lack of resources and experience of new competition law authorities can affect the effective 
imposition of the antitrust remedies. In addition, some remedies used in large and developed markets may 
not be appropriate for the market conditions of some developing countries, e.g. divestiture may not be 
suitable in small markets with few market participants, due to the difficulty of finding an appropriate 
acquirer. Similarly, in jurisdictions where the competition authority cannot impose remedies on its own, a 
deficient judicial system may impose further burdens for the enforcement of competition law, such as 
lengthy procedures and adverse decisions. A further obstacle encountered in the imposition of antitrust 
remedies is related to the unwillingness of the concerned undertakings to comply with the mandates of the 
remedies imposed by the competition authority. In new competition law regimes with no competition law 
culture, the addressees of remedies may be reluctant to comply with the provisions of these, in such cases, 
on the one hand, the competition authority should have effective means to enforce its decisions imposing 
remedies, and on the other hand, the competition authority must implement advocacy programs in order 
to promote the benefits of competition law and the obligation of market participants to comply with the 
commands of the law.  
4. Deficient Judicial Review Mechanisms 
 
Finally, another fundamental issue that is related to the effective enforcement of competition law by 
public authorities is the availability of an adequate mechanism to review the decisions of the public 
enforcers. Thus, the independent and effective judicial review of the decisions issued by competition 
authorities is fundamental for the establishment of a well-functioning competition law regime, given that 
flawed decisions can affect the interests of the concerned undertakings, third parties and the general 
public. In particular, the function of the judicial review of competition law cases is to ensure that the 
decisions issued by public authorities are fair and lawful. Additionally, the availability of an optimal 
review mechanism enhances the quality of the decisions issued by the competition authorities and the 
trust in the system.  
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 As with other features of competition law, the judicial review of the decisions by public 
authorities varies from one country to another. In this regard, depending on the jurisdiction an appeal 
against a competition law decision can be made to general administrative courts, administrative courts 
specialized in competition law matters, judicial courts of general jurisdiction, or even to the Supreme 
Court. Moreover, as seen in the Public Enforcement Chapter, the judicial review of competition law cases 
also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in relation to the standard of review, the suspensory effects 
and the decisions issued by the appellate bodies.  
 Despite the abovementioned differences, competition law regimes, especially new ones, have 
encountered a series of challenges in the implementation of effective judicial review mechanisms. For 
instance, in jurisdictions that have deficient judicial systems, the judicial review of competition law cases 
may be affected by the deficiencies of the system if competition decisions are reviewed by courts of 
general jurisdiction. Moreover, competition cases are often very complex and require profound legal 
knowledge and a sound economic understanding of market processes. Accordingly, in most young 
competition law systems, there is a shortage of sufficiently trained judges with enough experience in the 
competition law field. Given that a judiciary that is familiarized with the substantive commands of 
competition law and its economic aspects is fundamental for the development of a sound competition law 
system, most competition law regimes that face this lack of sufficiently trained judges have to address this 
issue in order to provide for an effective review mechanism. In this sense, some countries have developed 
training programs for the judiciary that provide the latter with the essential knowledge in competition law 
concepts, goals and its economic aspects. In addition, other competition law regimes have dealt with this 
issue by establishing specialized entities responsible for the review of competition law cases, e.g. the 
creation of a specific chamber in the court responsible for the judicial review of competition cases, or the 
creation of specialized tribunals in competition law matters. A further difficulty encountered by public 
enforcers with regard to the judicial review of competition cases is related to the length of the appeal 
procedures. In most jurisdictions, the judicial review of competition decisions involves lengthy 
procedures that impose further obstacles to the effective enforcement of competition law. Thus, in some 
competition law regimes there have been established expedites procedures that reduce the formalities and 
length of appeal cases. Finally, the fact that the decisions by the competition authority or courts 
responsible for the enforcement of competition law can be quashed in the appeal process presents a 
further obstacle for the effective enforcement of competition law. This possibility may occur in two 
instances; on the one hand, untrained judiciary that do not have a clear understanding of competition law 
may strike down correct decisions by the competition authority, on the other hand, flawed decisions by 
the competition authority may be quashed in the appeal process.   
III. CONCLUSIONS TO THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT CHAPTER 
 
In a number of competition law regimes, the enforcement of the competition law provision is not limited 
to the public application of the law by administrative or judicial authorities, additionally, the antitrust 
rules in these jurisdictions can be enforced by private parties that have been harmed by the 
anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and seek the award of civil remedies before the competent 
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courts. On the one hand, there are those who argue in favor of the private enforcement of competition law 
and consider that the overall enforcement of competition law can benefit from the civil actions brought by 
private parties, given that these serve as an important complement to public enforcement. An enforcement 
system that allows the possibility of private parties to tackle down violations of the antitrust provisions 
provides additional enforcers who are closer to the relevant problems175. Moreover, private enforcement 
can save the taxpayer a significant amount by shifting the costs and risks of public antitrust litigation176; 
in addition, the private enforcement of public laws, such as competition law, allows breaking the 
government’s monopoly in the enforcement of public laws. Finally, private parties that have suffered 
harm as a consequence of the infringement of competition law may be better suited and better informed 
than public officials to prove the infringement of the competition law provisions177. On the other hand, 
there are those who argue that public enforcement of competition is superior to private enforcement in 
that public officials benefit from more effective investigative and sanctioning powers. Moreover, as 
private enforcement is driven by the private profit motive, it systematically diverges from the general 
interest, which is normally the main purpose of public laws. Finally, private enforcement is more 
expensive than public enforcement given that private actors may lack the desire, resources, or expertise to 
enforce public laws178. 
Nevertheless, despite the postulated benefits and drawbacks of private antitrust enforcement, 
many competition law regimes have established provisions that allow private parties to enforce 
competition law. However, in spite of this possibility to privately enforce competition law, the current 
state of private antitrust enforcement is one of almost total underdevelopment in most competition law 
regimes that allow this possibility. There is only one competition law regime, the U.S., where private 
enforcement outnumbers public enforcement. In the U.S. there is a 10 to 1 rate between private actions 
and public procedures for the infringement of the competition law provisions. The fact that the U.S. 
competition law system provides this possibility for private parties to enforce the competition law 
provisions since its inception, back in 1890, has allowed this competition law regime to acquire far more 
experience with private antitrust enforcement than any other jurisdiction. In addition, some of the features 
of U.S. civil litigation have made the private enforcement of competition law so prevalent in this regime, 
these include a combination of: treble damages remedies, class action procedures, one-way cost rules, 
contingency fees, and civil jury trials. Nonetheless, most jurisdictions reject many of the U.S. features of 
civil litigation and consider that the adoption of the U.S. model in their jurisdictions may lead to private 
antitrust litigation abuses and excesses179. In this sense, most competition law regimes seek to accomplish 
an optimal level of private enforcement, in order to ensure that private antitrust enforcement encourages 
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compliance with the law, but at the same time avoiding litigation that is wasteful and could discourage 
socially beneficial conduct180.  
This state of underdevelopment of private antitrust enforcement is due, in part, to the fact that in 
most jurisdictions this branch of law has been traditionally enforced by public authorities, thus, in 
practice, this institutionalized enforcement of competition law has excluded private parties from the 
actual application of competition law, and as a consequence, it has provoked a scarce and erratic private 
antitrust enforcement181. Moreover, the lack of private antitrust enforcement may be further aggravated by 
the serious difficulties that private enforcers have faced when bringing civil actions for the infringement 
of competition law in most jurisdictions where this possibility is available. In practice, private enforcers 
have encountered different obstacles that vary from one jurisdiction to the next, however, these are 
mainly related to the jurisdiction and applicable law, the legal standing, the access to evidence, the 
standard of proof, the calculation of the amount of damages, the costs of private litigation, and the 
interaction between public and private enforcement. In order to overcome these obstacles faced by private 
enforcers and to increase the current state of private enforcement, some jurisdictions, especially those of 
well-established competition law regimes, have promoted different initiatives to encourage the private 
enforcement of competition law. For instance, in 2008, the European Commission issued its White Paper 
that suggests specific policy options and measures intended to assist the victims of EU antitrust 
infringements to get access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated for the 
harm they suffered182. Similarly, in the UK, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has 
made a consultation in which it proposes some measures intended at enhancing the effectiveness of the 
private antitrust enforcement in the UK183.  
1. Unclear Legal Basis for the Private Enforcement of Competition Law 
 
As previously seen in the Private Enforcement Chapter, there is a great deal of diversity with regard to 
the statutory basis for privately enforcing the provisions of competition law. In general, two approaches 
have been chosen by most competition law regimes, on the one hand, some regimes have introduced 
specific provisions in their antitrust rules that allow private parties to enforce these provisions before the 
relevant courts; on the other hand, other competition law regimes have not established specific provisions 
in their competition laws, but rely on the general provisions of civil or commercial law. In practice, the 
availability or not, of specific provisions that allow the private application of the competition law 
provisions may affect in some extents the optimal enforcement of competition law by private parties. The 
introduction of specific provisions in the competition law allowing private parties to enforce this branch 
of law may ease the private enforcement in civil procedures; moreover, this approach has been suggested 
by UNCTAD in its Model Law on Competition (2010), which encourages competition law regimes to 
introduce a specific provision that gives injured parties the right to bring a claim in order to recover the 
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damages suffered184. Despite the preceding, the mere establishment of a provision that grants private 
parties the right to file a claim for the infringement of competition law does not in itself guarantees the 
attainment of optimal levels of private enforcement, given that, in different extents, most competition law 
regimes rely on the general provisions of civil/commercial law for procedural issues and the conditions of 
liability, thus, if the interaction between the specific provisions and the general provisions is not clear, 
this will create obstacles for the effective private enforcement of competition law. Consequently, even 
though the inexistence of specific competition law provisions allowing private enforcement does not 
create obstacles for the effective enforcement, the availability of these specific provisions may serve as an 
incentive for private parties to file civil claims for the infringement of competition law, moreover, if the 
right of private parties to file claims is coupled with other specific provisions, such as the presumption or 
removal of the fault requirement, this would effectively ease the private enforcement of the competition 
law provisions.  
2. Inexperienced Competent Courts to handle Competition Law Cases 
 
One of the major difficulties found by private parties when filing civil claims for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions is that related to the lack of experience of the relevant courts of general 
jurisdiction in competition law matters185. As stated before, untrained judiciary in competition law matters 
supposes an important obstacle for the enforcement, both public and private, of competition law. Due to 
the complexity of most competition law cases, the competent courts responsible for handling private 
claims must be familiarized with the substantial provisions of competition law and have a sufficient 
understanding of its economic implications in order to effectively address the competition law concerns 
of every case. Thus, exercises such as the calculation and allocation of damages can be an overwhelming 
endeavor for courts of general jurisdiction with little to no experience in competition law matters and 
market processes. In order to overcome this obstacle to private actions for the infringement of 
competition law, different jurisdictions have addressed this issue in different ways. For instance, in some 
jurisdictions, the handling of private claims for the infringement of the competition law provisions has 
been delegated to specific chambers of existing courts. Alternatively, other jurisdictions have addressed 
this issue by creating specialized competition law courts that are exclusively responsible for hearing 
private claims; moreover, other regimes have opted for allowing the existing competition courts, usually 
responsible for the judicial review of the competition authority’s decisions, to handle private claims. 
Finally, in competition law systems where these possibilities are not viable, an alternative could be the 
establishment of training programs for the competent courts imparted by the competition authorities. 
3. Limited Legal Standing 
 
Furthermore, in some competition law systems, private enforcers may additionally face obstacles with 
regard to the legal standing required to file a civil claim for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions. For instance, in some jurisdictions, the legal standing to bring private claims for the breach of 
competition law is limited to direct purchasers only. In these jurisdictions, only the parties that have been 
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directly affected by the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant will be allowed to sue the latter before 
the relevant courts in order to obtain compensation for the harm suffered. In such cases, in direct 
purchasers that have not been directly injured by the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant are not 
allowed to bring civil claims to recover damages. In this regard, the limitation of standing to direct 
purchasers only prevents corrective justice because it precludes ultimate consumers from seeking 
compensation for the harm they have suffered; in addition, it also affects the deterrence levels given that 
these regimes rely exclusively on direct purchasers, even though these may be reluctant to sue their 
suppliers186. On the other hand, the limitation of standing to direct purchasers only is intended to avoid 
that the defendant is ordered to pay multiple damages as both the indirect and direct purchasers can file a 
claim for damages. In addition, in other competition law regimes there are other restrictions on the legal 
standing for bringing a claim for the infringement of the competition law provisions, for example, in 
some jurisdiction the standing to bring a civil claim for the breach of competition law is restricted to 
undertakings only, in such cases natural persons cannot recover damages, in other jurisdictions, a 
contractual relationship between the potential plaintiff and the defendant is required to give the former 
legal standing to bring a claim. In practice, these limitation to the legal standing to bring damages 
constitute important obstacles for private parties injured by the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant, 
hence, the removal of these limitations on standing could facilitate and encourage private claims and the 
overall enforcement of competition law.  
4. Unavailability of Effective Collective Redress Mechanisms  
 
Most competition law regimes provide for some kind of collective redress mechanism for private parties 
that have been injured by the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant. The purpose of establishing 
collective redress mechanisms is to provide consumers and purchasers with small claims with effective 
means to collectively sue for the harm suffered as a consequence of the infringement of the competition 
law provisions, given that it is unlikely for practical reasons, that consumer and indirect purchasers with 
small claims will bring individual actions to recover the small amount of damages suffered as a 
consequence of the anticompetitive behavior of the defendant. However, in a variety of competition law 
regimes, collective action in competition law cases are restricted for injunctive relief actions and cease 
and desist orders, moreover, in some jurisdictions, these collective claims are used in matters of unfair 
competition more that competition law187. In this sense, the availability of effective collective redress 
mechanisms allow the small claims of indirect purchasers and final consumers to be cost-effective, in 
addition, it enhances the levels of deterrence and obedience of the law, and accomplishes the 
compensatory function of competition law. Accordingly, effective collective redress mechanisms have to 
available for private parties in order encourage the latter to file a claim for damages and to enhance the 
levels of development of private antitrust enforcement.  
5. Impossibility to Access Relevant Information and High Standards of Proof 
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In most competition law regimes the burden of proving the infringement of competition law and the harm 
suffered as a consequence rest on the plaintiff, in this sense, an important obstacle to private antitrust 
enforcement in most competition law systems is that private plaintiffs often lack the procedural tools 
necessary to gather all the relevant information to prove the infringement of the competition law 
provisions and the subsequent harm suffered as a consequence. Due to the secretive nature of most 
anticompetitive practices, the collection of necessary information that proves the violation of competition 
law and the harm suffered as a consequence of the latter may turn out to be an overwhelming exercise for 
most private plaintiffs most of the times, and especially for those with limited resources. However, there 
are jurisdictions that have established broad discovery rules that allow private parties to gather all 
necessary information to successfully file a civil claim for the infringement of the competition law 
provisions. For example, in the U.S. private plaintiffs can demand that the defendants to produce any 
documents that are relevant to the plaintiff’s claims. This is one of the most important features of the U.S. 
civil litigation system that has allow private antitrust enforcement to be so widespread in this jurisdiction 
when compared to others. Nonetheless, detractors to the U.S. model argue that the broadness of this type 
of discovery procedure may produce the unwanted excesses of the U.S. litigation, and as a consequence, 
allow the proliferation of fishing expeditions and unmeritorious claims. Notwithstanding the preceding, in 
jurisdictions that lack effective procedural rules that allow private plaintiffs to obtain the necessary 
evidence to sustain their claims, some kind of discover is required for the success of the private 
enforcement of competition law. In the current situation of some competition law regimes, the parties 
suspected to have breach competition law are not under the obligation to produce relevant information 
and can only be required to do so by the relevant court when the private plaintiff has sufficiently 
identified the individual document sought, which in most cases cannot be done because the plaintiff may 
not be even aware of the existence of such document. Accordingly, it has been proposed to provide 
private plaintiffs in competition law cases with some limited discovery rights, which would allow private 
plaintiffs to get access to documents and other relevant evidence from the defendant if they can assert 
facts –with a reasonable degree of particularity- evidencing the existence of the conspiracy188.   
 In addition to the struggle of private plaintiffs to get access to the necessary information required 
to successfully bring a private claim for the infringement of competition law; these also face further 
impediments related with the high standards of proof required in most competition law regimes. The fact 
that most jurisdictions require private plaintiffs to proof various elements of liability, such as the causal 
link between the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and the alleged harm suffered by the plaintiff, 
or the fault requirement and the existence of an infringement of the competition law provisions, represent 
in most cases insurmountable obstacles to successfully bring a private claim for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions. Some competition law regimes have addressed these issues by lowering the 
standard of proof or by reversing the burden of proof in order to facilitate and encourage private actions. 
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6. Excessive Cost of Private Litigation 
 
A further impediment for the success of private antitrust enforcement is related to the excessive costs 
involved in this type of procedures. Moreover, the fact that these litigation expenses can be considerably 
higher in comparison to other civil disputes due to complexity of most competition law cases and to the 
amounts involved in these disputes, disincentives private plaintiffs, especially those with limited 
resources and/or small claims, from filing civil claims for the infringement of competition law. Normally, 
competition law litigation involves two types of expenses, on the one hand, there are the court cost, which 
are the expenses generated by the court in the course of the procedure, these include, court fees, the 
appointment of experts, or the expenses of witnesses, on the other hand, the parties to the proceeding have 
to bear with their own litigation costs, which include, the attorney’s fees, cost for retrieving evidence, or 
costs for retaining an expert, among others. As stated before, due to the complexity of competition law 
litigation, the abovementioned expenses are usually significantly high, moreover, the fact that most 
competition law regimes require the plaintiff to pay the court fees upfront, which normally tend to be high 
given that the amounts of the claim have to be high in order to make the action cost-effective, and that 
most jurisdictions apply the loser pays principle, which requires the unsuccessful party to pay the 
litigation expenses of the prevailing party, constitute a huge financial impediment for most private 
plaintiffs, except of course for plaintiffs with deep pockets.   
 This threat for private plaintiffs of having to pay its litigation expenses plus the defendant’s in 
case the latter prevails, disincentives private plaintiffs for bringing an action for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions and impedes private parties an effective access to courts for civil claims. 
Accordingly, in order to incentive private plaintiffs to file civil claims for the infringement of the 
competition law provisions and to provide them effective access to courts, it has been proposed the 
establishment of a rule that unsuccessful plaintiffs will only have to pay the litigation expenses if they 
acted in a manifestly unreasonable manner by bringing the case. Additionally, courts may be given a 
discretionary power to order at the beginning of the proceedings that the plaintiff not be exposes to any 
costs recovery even if the latter is unsuccessful in its claims189. Moreover, the obstacle imposed by the 
financial costs of private antitrust litigation can be diminished by reducing or waving the obligation of 
private plaintiffs to pay court or other state fees. Similarly, the use of contingency or conditional fees 
could also ease private antitrust enforcement190.  
7. Rough Interaction between Private and Public Proceedings 
 
It has been argued that private enforcement of competition law is a complement to public enforcement 
given that private antitrust litigation can deal with cases which the public authorities will not deal with 
due to resource constraints and other prioritization needs191. In this regard, the interaction between these 
two types of proceedings is fundamental for the accomplishment of the competition law goals and 
objectives, as well as the attainment of the enforcement objectives of competition law.  
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In jurisdictions where the competition law provisions can be applied both in public and private 
proceedings, these interact with each other in different levels. For instance, public and private 
proceedings interact with each other with regard to the requirement of a previous decision by the 
competition authority declaring the infringement of competition law in order to be allowed to bring a 
private claim against the antitrust offender. Similarly, public and private enforcement interact in relation 
the possibility of staying one of these proceedings while waiting for the resolution of the other. Moreover, 
public and private proceedings also interact with each other in relation to the evidential value of the 
findings of one proceeding over the other. In addition, public and private enforcement interact with regard 
to the access of evidence collected in these proceedings. 
As seen in the Private Enforcement Chapter, in some competition law regimes, the existence of a 
prior decision by the competition law authority declaring that the competition law provisions have been 
infringed by the anticompetitive behavior of the defendant is a prerequisite for private parties that have 
been injured by the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant in order to bring a civil claim for the 
recovery of damages. In practice, this requirement can be considered as an important obstacle for the 
success of private antitrust litigation. 
The fact that the same anticompetitive conduct may provoke the initiation of public proceedings 
by the relevant public authorities and private claims by the private parties affected by such behavior may 
lead to the establishment of concurrent proceedings. In such cases, given that the same legal or factual 
issues are simultaneously contested in more than one procedure, one of these can be stay until the other is 
resolved.    
One of the major obstacles identified for the success of private antitrust enforcement is the lack 
effective means for private plaintiffs in order to collect the necessary information to prove their claims. In 
this regard, given that competition authorities have strong investigative powers that allow them to 
uncover most anticompetitive practices, normally, the files of the competition authority contain valuable 
information proving the infringement of the competition law provisions that may be valuable for private 
plaintiffs in subsequent civil claims for the same infringement. However, the fact that most competition 
authorities are reluctant to share the information gathered in the course of an investigation constitutes an 
obstacle for private plaintiffs. Moreover, the information provided by the antitrust offenders to the 
competition authority via leniency applications is not shared by competition authorities. This 
impossibility of private plaintiffs to get access to information gathered by the competition authority 
constitutes a further obstacle to private antitrust enforcement, nevertheless, this unwillingness of 
competition authorities to share information, especially the one gathered via leniency applications, with 
private plaintiffs is intended to protect the attractiveness of leniency programs and not to put the persons 
that have granted this information in a disadvantaged position. 
With regard to the evidential value of the prior decisions of the competition authority, the fact 
that in some competition law regimes civil courts handling competition law cases brought by private 
plaintiffs are not bound by the decisions of the competition authority declaring the infringement of the 
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competition law provisions has been considered as an obstacles for the private antitrust enforcement192. In 
this regard, there are different approaches as to the evidential value of the decisions by the competition 
authority across jurisdictions, which range from considering the competition authority’s decision as 
evidence to declaring the findings of the competition authority as binding in follow-on actions by private 
plaintiffs. 
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